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POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AT THE AGE OF POST- REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

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Uniwersytet Warszawski

Ośrodek Analiz Politologicznych

ul. Nowy Świat 69

00-927 Warszawa

biuro@oapuw.pl, epolitikon@oapuw.pl

www.oapuw.pl, www.epolitikon.pl

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Centre for Political Analysis

Nowy Świat 69 Street

00-927 Warsaw

biuro@oapuw.pl, epolitikon@oapuw.pl

www.oapuw.pl, www.epolitikon.pl

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Wstęp

Szanowni Państwo,

przekazujemy kolejny numer „e-Politikonu”, w którym podejmowane są tematy związane z szeroko rozumianą problematyką komunikowania politycznego i medialnego.

I tak niezwykle interesujące podejście do patrzenia na strategie komunikacyjne zaproponowała Ewa Nowak-Teter, która w artykule pt. *Fear and fun as communication strategies in TV news. The interrelations of emotional frames and topics* konceptualizuje „strach” i „zabawę” jako „emocje medialne” zintegrowane w ramach dominującej strategii komunikacyjnej, rozumianej jako „kontinuum rozrywki”. Kontinuum to jest organizowane przez zabawę po jednej, a strach po drugiej stronie. Autorka weryfikuje założenie, że dominująca perspektywa komunikacyjna stosowana przez media informacyjne jest wyznaczana głównie przez ramy związane z rozrywką oraz ze wzbudzaniem obaw.

Dwa artykuły poświęcone są włoskiej scenie politycznej i charakterystycznemu dla niej populistycznemu stylowi komunikowania politycznego. Giovanni Barbieri, Roberto Mincigrucci i Sofia Verza w artykule pt. *Who is the Most Populist? A Study of the Italian Political Leaders' Interviews During the 2018 Electoral Campaign* przedstawiają studium porównawcze populistycznie komunikujących się z wyborcami włoskich polityków. Natomiast Łukasz Jan Berezowski analizuje cechy komunikowania politycznego we współczesnych Włoszech, w kontekście tzw. demokracji postprzedstawicielskiej oraz cyfrowej rewolucji w komunikowaniu politycznym.

W kolejnych artykułach Jacek Wasilewski analizuje obecne w polskiej rzeczywistości narracje medialne dotyczące uchodźców, a Dariusz Krawczyk odnosi się do

problemu zagrożenia dezinformacją w cyberprzestrzeni i wskazuje, że stanowi ona szansę na wzrost społecznego zasięgu środków masowego przekazu.

Dodatkowo w dziale Varia znajdują Państwo artykuł Joanny Gocłowskiej-Bolek poświęcony wyzwaniu, jakim dla Ameryki Łacińskiej jest kryzys migracyjny w Wenezueli (*Venezuelan migration crisis as a growing international challenge for Latin America*) oraz tekst Roberta Nahapetyana pt. *The causes of the velvet revolution*, w którym autor omawia źródła aksamitnej rewolucji, która miała miejsce w Armenii wiosną 2018 roku.

Numer zamyka esej Łukasza Scheffsa na temat polskiej rzeczywistości społeczno-politycznej w kontekście wyborów prezydenckich 2020.

Olgierd Annusewicz

Introduction

Dear Readers

We present you the next issue of e-Politikon which tackles the questions of political and media communication in its broadest sense.

A particularly interesting approach to perceiving communication strategies was proposed by Ewa Nowak-Teter, who in her article *Fear and Fun as Communication Strategies in TV News. The Interrelations of Emotional Frames and Topics* conceptualizes 'fear' and 'fun' as 'media emotions' integrated within the dominant communication strategy, understood as an 'entertainment continuum'. This continuum is organized by fun on the one hand and fear on the other. The author verifies the assumption that the dominant communication perspective used by the information media is determined mainly by the framework related to providing entertainment and to arousing fear.

The next two articles are focused on the Italian political scene and its specific populist style of political communication. Giovanni Barbieri, Roberto Mincigrucci, and Sofia Verza present in their article *Who is the Most Populist? A Study of the Italian Political Leaders' Interviews during the 2018 Electoral Campaign* a comparative study of the populist communication of Italian politicians with their voters. Łukasz Jan Berezowski, on the other hand, analyses the qualities of political communication in contemporary Italy in the context of the so-called post-presentational democracy and the digital revolution in political communication.

In the following articles, Jacek Wasilewski analyses the media narratives on refugees in the Polish context, whereas Dariusz Krawczyk addresses the problem of the threat of disinformation in cyberspace and indicates that it is an opportunity to increase the social reach of the mass media.

Additionally, in the Varia section you will find an article by Joanna Gocłowska-Bolek concerning the challenge that poses the migration crisis in Venezuela for Latin America (*Venezuelan Migration Crisis as a Growing International Challenge for Latin America*) and Robert Nahapetyan's text *The Causes of the Velvet Revolution*, in which the author discusses the sources of the velvet revolution that took place in Armenia in spring 2018.

The issue closes with an essay by Łukasz Scheffs on the Polish sociopolitical reality in the context of the 2020 presidential election.

Olgierd Annusewicz

Ewa Nowak-Teter

Fear and Fun as Communication Strategies in TV News. The Interrelations of Emotional Frames and Topics

Key words:

emotional framing, entertainment, fear frame, fun frame, TV news

Introduction

“Nothing to fear but fear itself”, says the title of the cross-national survey report conducted in 2016 in six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Spain and Sweden) by Demos, British cross party think-tank. Besides the low level of trust both in EU and in national level political institutions, the report revealed that the greater proportion of citizens in each country is expecting things to get worse rather than better¹. The general picture of the public sphere’s climate in Europe was described as the ‘fear of the unknown,’ ‘fear of the other’ and ‘fear of the future’. On the other hand, ‘fun culture’ is recognized as the dominant cultural

¹ *Mapping and responding to the rising culture and politics of fear in the European Union. Nothing to fear but fear itself?*, Demos, 2017, <https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Demos-Nothing-To-Fear-But-Fear-Itself.pdf>, 17.04.2017; compare: *Public Opinion in the European Union. Standard Eurobarometer 86. 2016. First Results. Autumn 2016*, <http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2137>, 26.03.2019.

approach when describing the popular culture of contemporary societies², and where the televisual forms of this culture belong to the most popular³.

The infotainment function of TV news is widely acknowledged in media studies and confirmed by researchers⁴. The entertainment psychology used to be focused on the emotional enjoyment of the audience when explaining the motivations of media consumption⁵. However, deeper analysis shows a more complex picture of the problem.

A uses and gratification approach led scholars to distinguish between a two-dimensional explanation of media usage gratifications. It was found that enjoyment is composed of fun-related gratifications (positive affect: fun, amusement) or thrill-

² L. Chen, *The Most profitable industries in 2015*, "Forbes" 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/09/23/the-most-profitable-industries-in-2015/#189fa3b97712>, 03.08.2017; A. McKee, *Fun! What Entertainment Tells Us About a Good Life*, London 2016, pp. 106-107; D. K. Thussu, *News as Entertainment. The Rise of Global Infotainment*, Los Angeles 2007, pp. 3-6.

³ At the time of the research presented in the study, television was considered the main supplier of news for the majority of European citizens. Television took also the second place (66%), after radio (70%), among the sources of information Europeans trust the most, although it is going to be outperformed by the Internet (considering the Internet as the main source of information for younger generations); *Public Opinion in the European Union...*, 26.03.2017; *Fake News and Disinformation Online*, Flash Eurobarometer, February 2018, http://data.europa.eu/euodp/pl/data/dataset/S2183_464_ENG, 20.04.2018; *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017*, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, <https://www.google.com/search?q=television+as+source+of+information+in+eu-rope+2017+pdf&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b>, 04.05.2018.

⁴ A. Alencar, S. Kruikemeier, *Audiovisual infotainment in European news: A comparative content Analysis of Dutch, Spanish and Irish Television news programs*, [in:] "Journalism", 2016, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884916671332>; D. K. Thussu, *News as Entertainment...*, pp. 27-35; D. Zillmann, *The Coming of Media Entertainment*, [in:] D. Zillmann, P. Vorderer (eds.) *Media Entertainment. The Psychology of its Appeal*, Mahwah 2000, pp. 1-20.

⁵ L. J. Shrum, *What's so Special About Entertainment Media and Why Do We Need a Psychology for It?: An Introduction to the Psychology of Entertainment Media*, [in:] L. J. Shrum (ed.), *The Psychology of Entertainment Media. Blurring the Lines Between Entertainment and Persuasion*, Mahwah, New Jersey, London 2004, pp. 1-12; P. Vorderer, F. F. Steen, E. Chan, *Motivation*, [in:] J. Bryant, P. Vorderer (eds.), *Psychology of Entertainment*, New York 2006, pp. 3-18.

related gratification (negative effect but resulting in meaningfulness and appreciation; e. g. *I was moved by this movie*⁶). While the fun-related gratification appears understandable, the explanation why people watch frightening entertainment seems to be a major challenge. Plausible accounts consider audiences' need for excitement, looking for physiological stimulation, sensation-seeking or self-enhancing of positive and negative emotions⁷. Psychological explanations of the audiences' motives give us a picture of the reception conditions, but it remains unclear whether and how exactly "fear" and "fun" are transformed into news being the most popular source of information, especially how they are used in frames organizing TV news. What is more, although fear and fun are often the subject of scientific consideration within media studies, they are most often investigated separately⁸. The aim of this study is to fill this gap, especially by offering a conceptualization of fear and fun as mediated emotions integrated into the dominant communication perspective, understood as an entertaining continuum (with fun on one side and fear on the other). To achieve this research goal the investigation aims to verify the assumption that the dominant communication perspective used by news media (when organizing news stories) is formed with fear and fun frames being the most popular communication strategies. In order to verify this assumption the analysis

⁶ M. B. Oliver, J. K. Woolley, *Tragic and poignant entertainment. The gratification of meaningfulness as emotional response*, [in:] K. Döveling, C. Von Scheve, E. Konijn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media*, New York-London 2011, p. 144.

⁷ J. Cantor, *Fear reactions and the mass media*, [in:] K. Döveling, C. von Scheve, E. A. Konijn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media*, New York-London 2011, pp. 148-163; D. Schumann, *Media factors That Contribute to a Restriction of Exposure to Diversity*, [in:] L. J. Schrum (ed.), *The Psychology of Entertainment Media. Blurring the Lines Between Entertainment and Persuasion*, Mahwah, New Jersey, London 2004, pp. 233-254; D. Zillmann, *Theory of Affective Dynamics: Emotions and Moods*, [in:] J. Bryant, D. Roskos-Ewoldsen, J. Cantor (eds.), *Communication and Emotion. Essays in Honor of Dolf Zillmann*, Mahwah 2003, pp. 534-567.

⁸ D. L. Altheide, C. J. Schneider, *Qualitative media analysis*. Thousand Oaks 2013, p. 128; D. K. Leung, F. L. Lee, *How Journalists Value Positive News. The influence of professional beliefs, market considerations, and political attitudes*, "Journalism Studies", vol. 16 (2), 2015, pp. 289-304.

seeks to determine the general topical and frame structure of the news media content, as well as the distribution of the fear and the fun frames among different topics.

“News alerts” on TV

In recent decades television has faced not only the challenges associated with strong market competition, but also those emerging from social media and its rapidly growing popularity. One of the most effective ways to deal with these challenges is merging mass media logic with social media logic by creating “Social TV”: *Attaching ‘social’ as an adjective to television means increasingly braiding the conversational and creative strengths of networked platforms with the mass entertainment and audience engagement abilities of broadcast networks*⁹. Engaging new audiences (teens and young adults who increasingly spend their time on social platforms) might be the most demanding and ambitious strategy for television as a traditional channel of communication. The features of the young media audience include a minimal or decreasing interest in TV news (as being boring) and a low level of credibility of mainstream journalism (gathering the news in alternative ways), to name a few, while preferring à la carte model of news consumption (to know a little bit about a lot of subjects)¹⁰. Younger age groups consume significantly less news than their older counterparts being the subject of incidental and highly selective news exposure and engaging in news only if there is some exceptional reason. The “news alert” and “first checking and in case of need googling” became the new news consumption model¹¹. The “news alert” denotes the call to be exposed

⁹ J. Van Dijck, T. Poell, *Making Public Television Social? Public Service Broadcasting and the Challenges of Social Media*, “Television & New Media”, vol. 16 (2), 2015, p. 2.

¹⁰ R. Marchi, *With Facebook, Blogs, and Fake News, Teens Reject Journalistic ‘Objectivity’*, “Journal of Communication Inquiry”, vol. 36 (3), 2012, pp. 246-262.

¹¹ D. Antunovic, P. Parsons, T. R. Cook, *‘Checking’ and googling: Stages of news consumption among young adults*, “Journalism”, vol 19 (5), 2016, pp. 632-648; S. Craft, S. Ashley,

to news that is unusual, strange or weird (being scary, funny or both), so it assumes an irregular and incidental exposure to the newscasts shared by social media users or published by professional journalists. The strategy of news consumption described as “first checking and in case of need googling” means that young people are monitoring different networks or media sites simultaneously in order to be informed and get the basic knowledge about a lot of subjects (checking) and to dig deeper only in case when news of special interest appear (googling). When comparing with traditional media, seeking news on the Internet (with its great diversity and almost endless supply of content) means facing much higher selectivity¹², which makes only emotionally laden news alerts available for the viewers’ attention.

News alerts could be associated with breaking and hard news and not applicable to soft news. Nevertheless, the traditional typology of hard news (of great importance, significance and immediacy, which the public needs to know) and soft news (primarily interesting rather than important, often human interest stories¹³) is questioned at present, especially by scholars who claim that the distinction between these two types of news has become blurred and who suggest allowing so-called “general news”, defined as a recent announcement regarding new data that should be reported but not necessarily immediately¹⁴. This news is often relatively ‘light’ news, concerning quality of life topics and only of interest to certain groups in society. However, in the current study it is supposed that news alerts are not

A. Maksł, *Elements of News Literacy: A Focus Group Study of How Teenagers Define News and Why They Consume It*, “Electronic News”, vol. 10(3), 2016, pp. 143-160.

¹² S. Kruikemeier, A. Shehata, *News Media Use and Political Engagement Among Adolescents: An Analysis of Virtuous Circles Using Panel Data*, “Political Communication”, vol. 34 (2), 2017, pp. 221-242; E. Mitchelstein, P. J. Boczkowski, *Online news consumption research: An assessment of the past work and an agenda for the future*, “New Media & Society”, vol. 12 (7), 2010, pp. 1085-1102.

¹³ B. Zelizer, S. Allan, *Keywords in News and Journalism Studies*, New York 2010, p. 142.

¹⁴ S. N. Lehman-Wilzig, M. Seletzky, *Hard news, soft news, ‘general’ news: The necessity and utility of and intermediate classification*, “Journalism”, vol. 11 (1), 2010, pp. 37-56.

necessarily connected with hard, breaking news, but can be also related to general news and soft news that is able to evoke exceptional interest among wide groups of media users. We also presume that “news alert” determines the desirable form of current news in the meaning of the fear frame and/or fun frame, playing the role of communicative tools which are able to evoke exceptional interest.

Emotional framing and types of frames

Framing studies are among the most popular topics in media research¹⁵. The concept of framing is focused on the determination of salience of selected aspects of the issue that makes certain meanings more preferred than others. The selected aspects of the issue promote particular problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations or recommended treatments¹⁶. In the 1990s Pan and Kosicki¹⁷ defined frames as cognitive instruments applied in order to code, interpret and find the meaning of the information. These instruments can be used by the media or by political elites, knowingly or not, to create public opinion¹⁸. Frames can be used as elements of strategic communication, where the subject or entity exercises rational operations and decides how communication can be used strategically to support organizational goals¹⁹.

¹⁵ P. Borah, *Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory: A systematic Examination of a Decade's Literature*, "Journal of Communication", vol. 61, 2011, pp. 246-263; R. M. Entman, *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm*, "Journal of Communication", vol. 43 (4), 1993, pp. 51-58; Z. Pan, G. M. Kosicki, *Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse*, "Political Communication", vol. 10, 1993, pp. 55-75; D. H. Weaver, *Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming*, "Journal of Communication", vol. 57 (1), 2007, pp. 142-147.

¹⁶ R. M. Entman, *Framing: Toward...*, p. 52.

¹⁷ Z. Pan, G. M. Kosicki, *Framing Analysis...*, p. 57.

¹⁸ R. M. Entman, *Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11*, "Political Communication", vol. 20 (4), 2003, pp. 415-432; R. M. Entman, *Media Framing Biases and Political Power: Explaining Slant in News of Campaign*, "Journalism", vol. 11 (4), 2010, pp. 389-408.

¹⁹ D. Holtzhausen, *Strategic Communication*, [in:] W. Donsbach (ed.), *The Concise Encyclopedia of Communication*, Chichester 2015, pp. 597-599.

The cognitive dimension of framing makes no exclusion but is rather a point of departure for emotional effects. In line with emotional framing studies²⁰, when using a particular frame one is able to evoke emotional or cognitive responses depending on how the story is presented and attributed. It is also confirmed that news framing effects depend, to a great extent, on the emotional responses of the audience to the frame in question²¹. At the same time, experimental and analytical studies revealed the facilitative role of emotions when informing and persuading citizens about public issues²². Framing scholars identified the role of emotions as complementary mechanisms in framing: *People [...] strive for consistency between cognitions and emotions [...]. Cognitive and emotional reactions will reinforce each other*²³.

A news framing approach assumes the existence of different types of frames and interpretations of news²⁴. However, there are some categories of frames, for

²⁰ D. L. Altheide, *Creating Fear. News and the Construction of Crisis*, New York 2002 (e-book); H. J. Kim, G. T. Cameron, *Emotions Matter in Crisis: The Role of Anger and Sadness in the Publics' Response to Crisis News Framing and Corporate Crisis Response*, "Communication Research" vol. 38 (6), 2011, pp. 826-855; R. Kühne, C. Schemer, *The Emotional Effects of News Frames on Information Processing and Opinion Formation*, "Communication Research", vol. 42 (3), 2015, pp. 387-407; C. J. Yan, P. Dillard, F. Shen, *Emotion, Motivation, and the Persuasive Effects of Message Framing*, "Journal of Communication", vol. 62 (4), 2012, pp. 682-700.

²¹ S. Lecherer, L. Bos. R. Vliegthart, *The Mediating Role of Emotions: News Framing Effects on Opinions About Immigration*, "Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly", DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699015596338>, pp. 1-27.

²² O. Bas, M. E. Grabe, *Emotion-Provoking Personalization of News: Informing Citizens and Closing the Knowledge Gap?*, "Communication Research", vol. 42 (2), 2015, pp. 159-185; K. Wahl-Jorgensen, *The strategic ritual of emotionality: A case study of Pulitzer Prize-winning articles*, "Journalism", vol. 14 (10), 2013, pp. 129-145.

²³ H. M. Kepplinger, S. Geiss, S. Siebert, *Framing Scandals: Cognitive and Emotional Media Effects*, "Journal of Communication", vol. 62 (12), 2012, p. 661.

²⁴ R. M. Entman, *Framing: Toward...*, p. 51-58; C. H. De Vreese, *News framing. Theory and typology*, "Information Design Journal + Document Design", vol. 13 (1), 2005, pp. 51-62; A. Godefroidt, A. Berbers, L. d'Haenens, *What's in a frame? A comparative content analysis of American, British, French and Russian news articles*, "The International Communication Gazette", vol. 78 (8), 2016, pp. 777-801; H. A. Semetko, P. M. Valkenburg, *Framing*

instance, the scandal frame and the fear frame, that are the most popular in media studies, as they are also the most visible in media content. Altheide and Schneider claim that the fear frame is the most popular one used by news media. They also contend that the feeling of fear is a key element of creating “the risk society”, organized around communication oriented to policing, control, and prevention of risks²⁵. The concept of a fear frame is grounded in the discourse of fear, gaining popularity in news communication in recent decades (for example “fear” in the headlines of “Los Angeles Times” and ABC television news reports tripled in the 1990s). Fear in news is most often associated with topics devoted to children, community, schools, and the police. It is often connected with violence and crime, but is much more pervasive and expansive. It takes the form of a problem frame, used in a narrative approach when presenting the news (fear as a resource), and can be reactive or proactive, depending on the situation when someone is presented as victim or when one does something to avoid becoming a victim²⁶. Fear is also an element of newsworthiness, pervading the criterion of negativity, as well as belonging to sub-criteria such as conflict, crime, damage and tragedy²⁷. The explanations given to the tendency of watching unpleasant news are mainly the need for excitement, where the element of excitation makes the issue more important than others²⁸. As a consequence: “Fear has become a standard feature of news formats steeped in a problem frame oriented to entertainment”²⁹.

European Politics: A content Analysis of Press and Television News, [in:] “Journal of Communication”, vol. 50 (2), 2000, pp. 93-109.

²⁵ D. L. Altheide, C. J. Schneider, *Qualitative media analysis...*, p. 128; D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News. A Discourse of Control*, “The Sociological Quarterly”, vol. 40 (3), 1999, pp. 475-503.

²⁶ D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News...*, pp. 475-503.

²⁷ T. De Nies et. al., *Bringing Newsworthiness into the 21st Century, Web of Linked Entities. Workshop proceedings*, 2012, <http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-3087467>, 01.05.2018.

²⁸ J. R. Young, *The Role of Fear in Agenda Setting by Television News*, “American Behavioral Scientist”, vol. 46 (12), 2003, pp. 1673-1695.

²⁹ D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News...*, p. 25.

Although entertainment and infotainment content is widely discussed in the literature devoted to news reporting³⁰, the academic discussion concerning entertainment or fun applied as frames in news media messages is very limited, if not absent. What can be noticed is the fun frame that is applied in the context of web marketing and video gaming activity³¹. When considering fun features of the news, however, at least certain entertaining elements can be observed. Fun in news is often presented in the topics of humor, sex and celebrities³². There are particular tactics when presenting humor in news which include surprise, slapstick, ridicule, defiance³³. There are also certain forms, such as BuzzFeed, focusing on narrative elements and storytelling, which became popular elements of news (e. g. memes, and animal videos)³⁴. The technical dimensions of entertaining news include editing techniques that provoke emotional reactions of viewers (e. g. post-productions techniques and audio-manipulations)³⁵. Drawing from existing observations

³⁰ L. Bogart, *Television News as Entertainment*, [in:] P. H. Tannenbaum (eds.), *The Entertainment Functions of Television*, New York 1980, pp. 209-249; D. K. Thussu, Daya K., *News in the Era of Global Infotainment*, [in:] S. Allan (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to News and Journalism*, London-New York 2010, 362-373; P. Vorderer, *Entertainment Theory*, [in:] J. Bryant, D. Roskos-Ewoldsen, J. Cantor (eds.), *Communication and Emotion. Essays in Honor of Dolf Zillmann*, Mahwah 2003, pp. 131-153; D. Zillmann, *The Coming of Media Entertainment...*, pp. 1-20.

³¹ M. Fuentes, H. Brembeck, *Best for baby? Framing weaning practice and motherhood in web mediated marketing*, "Consumption Markets & Culture", vol. 20 (2), 2017, pp. 153-175; N. Yee, *The Labor of Fun. How Video Games Blur the Boundaries of Work and Play*, "Games and Culture", vol. 1 (1), 2006, pp. 68-71.

³² R. Uribe, B. Gunter, *Are 'Sensational' News Stories More Likely to Trigger Viewers Emotions than Non-Sensational News Stories? A Content Analysis of British TV News*, "European Journal of Communication", vol. 22 (2), 2007, pp. 2017-228.

³³ P. Moy, C. N. Johnson, M. L. Barthel, *Entertaining and emotional elements in political coverage*, [in:], C. Reineman (ed.), *Political Communication*, Berlin-Boston 2014, pp. 409-426.

³⁴ E. Tandoc, J. Jenkins. *The BuzzFeedication of journalism? How traditional news organizations area talking about a new entrant to the journalistic field will surprise you*, "Journalism", vol. 18 (4), 2015, pp. 482-500; C. Peters, *Emotion aside or emotional side? Crafting and 'experience of involvement' in the news*, "Journalism", vol. 12 (3), 2011, pp. 297-316.

³⁵ A. Alencar, S. Kruikemeier, *Audiovisual infotainment in European news...*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884916671332>.

devoted to the features of using fun in news, the current study offers the notion of “fun frame” as communication perspective designed in order to “have fun” and relax (for the targeted audience).

However, to give a comprehensive picture of the frame structure of the the analyzed televisual content, other popular types of frames in media studies are taken into account in addition to the fear and fun frames. The research design of the study generally draws from one of the most empirically grounded typologies, that of Semetko and Valkenburg (conflict, human interest, economic consequences, morality, responsibility³⁶), however it also takes into account those types of frames that can be relevant for examining the emotional dimension of framing, that is scandal, sympathy, fear and fun frames and also horse race frame (if the period of analysis includes the presidential election time)³⁷.

Entertaining and threatening

The impressions of fear and threat presented in various forms are recognized to be an inherent part of news values and negative bias, a trend in the news media confirmed in many countries³⁸. The mediated danger and the negativity of news, especially stories devoted to politics, became the subject of distinctive conceptual consideration, development and typology³⁹. Various explanations were given for the increase of “bad news journalism” or “critical journalism”, including an evolutionary

³⁶ H. A. Semetko, P. M. Valkenburg, *Framing European Politics...*, pp. 93-109.

³⁷ D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News...*, pp. 475-503; H. M. Kepplinger, S. Geiss, S. Siebert *Framing Scandals...*, 659-681; J. Strömbäck, A. Shehata, *Structural Biases in British and Swedish Election News Coverage*, “Journalism Studies”, vol. 8 (5), 2007, pp. 798-812.

³⁸ D. D'Alessio, *Media Bias in Presidential Election Coverage...*, p. 93; S. Soroka, S. McAdams, *News, Politics, and Negativity*, “Political Communication”, vol. 32, 2015, pp. 1-22

³⁹ G. Lengauer, F. Esser, R. Berganza, *Negativity in political news: A review of concepts, operationalization and key findings*, “Journalism”, vol. 13 (2), 2011, pp. 179-202; S. Soroka, L. Young, M. Balmas, *Bad News or Mad News? Sentiment Scoring of Negativity, Fear and Anger in news Content*, “The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 659 (1), 2015, pp. 108-121.

one (people are genetically designed to pay more attention to dangerous bad news) and one concerning the function of social control played by journalists⁴⁰. Other explanations of negative bias, supposedly the most well-grounded, include commercial and economic pressures on news organizations that turn to the negative coverage as a way of increasing audience size⁴¹.

Commercial and economic pressures apply as well to the fun content of the news. One of the main reasons for entertainment growth in the news media landscape is the general trend situating entertainment and media industry among the top economy segments in Europe⁴². The usage of news as entertainment is induced by visual pleasure, attractiveness, and the feeling of being a witness of an event⁴³. Ironically, the same applies to fear which is regarded as pervading popular culture and the news media⁴⁴. Consequently, entertainment defined as [...] *any activity designed to delight and, to a smaller degree, enlighten* [...] ⁴⁵, is considered the most important form of culture in post-modern Western democracies⁴⁶. Striving for entertainment is not only visible through the development of infotainment, the almost dominant *genre* in the news media, but also through reception studies, where sport and entertainment are among the most popular media content. One of the most valuable sources of information about audience preferences is the public web

⁴⁰ G. Lengauer, F. Esser, R. Berganza, *Negativity in political news...*, pp. 179-202.

⁴¹ G. Cavender, M. Fishman, *Television Reality Crime Programs: Context and History*, [in:] M. Fishman, G. Cavender (eds.), *Entertaining Crime. Television Reality Programs*, New York 1998, pp. 1-18; H. J. Kim, G. T. Cameron, *Emotions Matter in Crisis...*, pp. 826-855; J. R. Young, *The Role of Fear in Agenda Setting by Television News...*, pp. 1673-1695.

⁴² Reshaping Europe's media landscape. Pinpointing the drivers of Media M&A, 2016, <http://www.pwc.co.uk/industries/entertainment-media/insights/reshaping-europes-media-landscape.html>, 03.08.2018; L. Chen, *The Most profitable industries in 2015*, "Forbes", 2016, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/09/23/the-most-profitable-industries-in-2015/#189fa3b97712>, 03.08.2017.

⁴³ K. B. Jensen, *The Social Semiotics of Mass Communication*. London 1995, p.p 80-89.

⁴⁴ D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News...*, pp. 475-503.

⁴⁵ P. Vorderer, *Entertainment Theory...*, p. 131.

⁴⁶ A. McKee, *Fun! What Entertainment...*, pp. 1-3, 107-108.

facility – Google Trends. Even preliminary and exploratory research can show that sports and celebrities are the most popular topics of Google searching⁴⁷. At the same time, one the most pervasive form of television reception is the one described as “dramatic entertainment”⁴⁸ induced by the need for constant sensation that is especially visible in 24-hour news channels⁴⁹.

The concept of the market driven news is a key idea studied within mediatization approach. It assumes that media logic, including commercialization, tends to play an essential role in the news media’s institutional activity, especially by striving to maximize audience and generate profits⁵⁰. The inherent ingredient of the media-commercial logic is the “fear” frame⁵¹ that is offered as one of the most popular approaches to present engaging (political) topics and compelling interpretations. The dominance of a “threat” message is accompanied by “fun” content, which can take the form of soft or “light” news, presenting distanced, humorous or ridiculous items oriented towards relief and stress reduction from the emotions already evoked by “fear” news.

Thus, when conceptualizing the dominant communication perspective used by news media, the mediated emotions of fear and fun are offered as two sides of an entertainment continuum (with fear on one side and fun on the other). The continuum is formed by adequate frames, that is communication strategies used by news media to organize news stories, with fear and fun embedded in the frames.

⁴⁷ Google Trends Datastore, <http://googletrends.github.io/data/>, 08.08.2019.

⁴⁸ H. M. Newcomb, *The creation of television drama*, [in:] N. W. Jankowski, K. B. Jensen (eds.), *A handbook of qualitative methodologies for mass communication research*, London-New York 2002, pp. 93-107.

⁴⁹ S. Cushion, J. Lewis, *Introduction*, [in:] S. Cushion, J. Lewis (eds.), *The Rise of 24-hour News Television. Global Perspectives*, New York 2010, pp. 1-4.

⁵⁰ S. Cushion, R. Lewis, H. Roger, *Adopting or resisting 24-hour news logic on evening bulletins? The mediatization of UK television news 1991-2012*, “Journalism”, vol. 16 (7), 2015, pp. 866-883.

⁵¹ D. L. Altheide, C. J. Schneider, *Qualitative media analysis...*, pp. 92-93.

As a result of an operationalization process, the fear frame is identified as a communication strategy that includes certain features of a media message that are able to evoke fear, but also when the general impression appearing after watching them was threatening in its nature and connected with the conviction that the threat is real and possible. On the other hand, the fun frame is operationalized as a communication strategy in which the general tenor of the message is identified as a being relaxing and presented in order to 'have fun'.

In the investigated context of news media space, the focus of attention is on the entertaining and threatening approach, which is offered as a hypothesized dominant form of mediated presentation of reality (represented by a hierarchy of topics). In order to investigate the fear and fun frames, the following hypothesis is offered:

H 1: The dominant communication perspective used by news media (when organizing news stories) is formed with the fear and fun frames being the most popular communication strategies.

In order to verify the hypothesis, descriptive statistics tools are applied, where the following research questions organize the first stage of the analytical process:

RQ 1: What is the general topical structure of the news media content?

RQ 2: What is the general frame structure of the news media content?

In the second stage of the investigation, the detailed analysis is limited to the fearful and funny messages, and aims to determine the distribution of fear and fun frames among different topics:

RQ 3: What is the distribution of the fear and the fun frames among different topics?

In the third stage, the research is focussed solely on first rate news framed as fearful or funny in order to present the topical and interpretative structure of the most influential messages:

RQ 4: What is the distribution of the fear and fun frames among different topics, when the analysis is limited to the set of ‘the top-three’ news media topics?

The hypothesis and research questions allow us to design an examination process and sequentially concentrate on the analysis of the detailed features of media communication displayed by the empirical material covering the content of the TV news media in Poland.

TV news under transformation. The example of Poland

Enjoyable and threatening entertainment is the subject of numerous Western-European and American studies⁵², however the topic was hardly elaborated using Central or Eastern European contexts. Media systems in this region have their peculiarities that not necessarily make them imitate Western Europe and the US but often take their own way, and this can make hybrid media system in Poland an interesting example of the current process of news transformation. This case can be considered as at least a twofold phenomenon, firstly as including transforming TV news into form of “social-media TV”, and secondly as describing peculiarities and changes in the chosen national media environment. The hybridity of the media system in Poland is embodied by the duality of and competition between public and private sectors as well as the decreasing popularity of traditional form of TV among the younger audience groups, reacting generally only to the “news alerts”. This makes it necessary to apply some forms of “social media TV” to respond to the challenges posed by the young media audience. What is more, in 2015 the liberal message dominant until then in both public and private news media started to be replaced by national-populist media content in public communication that evoked a strong opposition reaction in private media. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that

⁵² A. Alencar, S. Kruikemeier, *Audiovisual infotainment in European news...*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884916671332>; P. Moy, C. N. Johnson, M. L. Barthel, *Entertaining and emotional elements...*, pp. 409-426; M. B. Oliver, J. K. Woolley, *Tragic and poignant entertainment...*, pp. 134-147.

the liberal approach is not a structural feature of the media system in Poland. In fact, the system evades unambiguous classifications, especially when one wants to be in line with the typology of Hallin and Mancini (2004)⁵³. The hybridity of the media system in Poland (and the media-politics relationship) is reflected in the mentioned duality of public and private-owned media channels. Political parallelism binding in the public sector (where the governing parties are politically favoured thanks to the national legal solutions) is accompanied by the liberal model executed in the private sector (domination of foreign ownership of the media channels⁵⁴). The current stage of transformation of the Polish media system brings it closer to polarized pluralism, with a high level of political parallelism and the dependence of public news media on the ruling party.

The duality and hybridity of the media landscape is especially applicable to the TV market, where the dominant positions are usually taken by public channels, that is those belonging to TVP (Telewizja Polska), and two privately-owned channels, TVN and Polsat, alternately holding the leading position on the TV news media market. In 2015 TV news was identified as the main source of information by 71 percent of respondents in Poland⁵⁵. At the same time, among the evening TV news programs, “Wiadomości” of public television, TVP1, reached the highest audience ratings (24.67 percent SHR) in the TV news media market with the second position taken by “Fakty” (23.21 percent SHR) broadcast by TVN, the privately-owned channel.

⁵³ D. C. Hallin, P. Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics*, Cambridge 2004, pp. 10-12.

⁵⁴ B. Dobek-Ostrowska, Bogusława, *Polski system medialny na rozdrożu. Media w polityce. Polityka w mediach*. Wrocław 2011, p. 171; B. Dobek-Ostrowska, *Italianization (or Mediterraneanization) of the Polish Media System? Reality and Perspective*, [in:] D. C. Hallin, P. Mancini (eds.), *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*, Cambridge 2012, pp. 26-50.

⁵⁵ *Sondaż: Telewizja nadal głównym źródłem informacji dla Polaków*, Polska Agencja Prasowa, 2015, <http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,516914,sondaz-telewizja-nadal-glownym-zrodlem-informacji-dla-polakow.html>, 27.03.2017.

Methods

The study's methodological framework employs thematic and framing analyses integrated to investigate the empirical material. Thematic analysis was used as the research tool for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data⁵⁶. Framing analysis was employed to identify frames in communication⁵⁷. The project's methodological design assumes the application of generic frames that are more suitable to quantitative types of studies⁵⁸. Integration of themes and frames serves to identify a hierarchy of topics that are presented through the selected communication strategies making use of fear and fun.

To verify the main hypothesis and answer the research questions, a three-level analytical model was applied. To give the general picture of the topical and frame structure of the material under investigation, the first level of analysis presented the statistical distribution of the thematic and framing differentiation. In the second stage, the main focus of the study was on analyzing the fear and fun frames hypothesized as the dominant communication perspectives. To be precise, the goal of this stage of analysis was to find the points of intersection of the fear or fun strategies within the distinctive topical fields that are most vulnerable for this kind of interpretation (some points of media communication where the fear or fun frames and the selected topics meet). In the third stage, the analytical attention is limited to the topical and frame structure of first-rate news.

News story, being the standard unit of analysis in the news media studies, is offered as the basic entity under investigation. Each news story was manually coded

⁵⁶ V. Braun, V. Clarke., *Using thematic analysis in psychology*, "Qualitative Research in Psychology", vol. 3 (2), 2006, pp. 6-23; G. K. Guest, K. M. MacQueen, E. E. Namey, *Applied Thematic Analysis*, Thousand Oaks 2011, pp. 49-66.

⁵⁷ D. Chong, J. N. Druckman, *Identifying frames in political news*, [in:] E. P. Bucy, R. L. Holbert (eds.), *The Sourcebook for Political Communication Research. Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques*, New York 2011, pp. 238-267.

⁵⁸ C. H. De Vreese, *News framing...*, pp. 51-62.

by two independent coders using two levels of coding protocol. On the first, “topic level”, the Comparative Agendas Project Master Codebook (CAP 2014)⁵⁹ served as the list of codes. On the second, “frames level”, the frames list was derived from the extant literature on the subjects of framing and emotional framing. The sampling strategy was designed in order to ensure a balanced distribution across each week of the selected period of media content (2015), therefore a random sample of composite week technique was employed to select the data being the subject of analysis⁶⁰. The randomization process resulted in a sample of 42 evening newscasts and 366 news items (N=366) aired in 2015 on two prime time TV news broadcasts on a Polish public station (“Wiadomości” TVP1) and a private station (“Fakty” TVN). The sampling strategy was applied to the news bulletins broadcast by the public station and duplicated in the case of the private one (forty two newscasts, twenty one each on public and private stations, including in total 366 news units, on average 8.71 news items per news program). Using TV content with different ideological viewpoints and ownerships allowed us to get a balanced view of the media coverage and to make valid observations of public discussion devoted to the selected cases. However, as the goal of the analysis was not a comparative one, public TV coverage was not decoupled from the private TV broadcasts and both parts were considered as general population that served for sampling the data set being investigated. Coding procedure was carried out by two trained coders (advanced students of journalism and communication) provided by the list of the mentioned CAP codebook and the list of frames accompanied with the detailed description of the listed categories. The first coder categorized the whole sample and the second

⁵⁹ *The Comparative Agendas Project Master Codebook – List of Topics* (CAP 2014), <http://sbevan.com/cap-master-codebook.html>, 23.08.2017.

⁶⁰ R. D. Wimmer, J. R. Dominick, *Mass Media: An Introduction*, Wadsworth 2011, pp. 162-163.

coder classified ten percent of randomly selected news stories, achieving Krippendorff's alpha $\alpha=.78$ for the topics and $\alpha=.80$ for the frames value of intercoder reliability⁶¹.

Results

In the first stage of the investigation thematic analysis of news media content was applied and descriptive statistical tools were used to give a picture of the topical and general framing differentiation of the sample (RQ1, RQ2).

Table 1. General topical structure of the news media content.

TOPICS	Frequency of topics <i>f</i>	Percentage share %
Criminal issues and court administration	48	13.11
Government operations	37	10.11
Transport, energy and industrial policy	36	9.84
Health	32	8.74
Political competition	32	8.74
Economy and financial issues	22	6.01
International affairs and defense issues	22	6.01
Terrorism	21	5.74
Social welfare and employment	15	4.10
Environment and natural disasters	15	4.10
Civil rights and immigration	14	3.83
War related issues	11	3.01
Sports	10	2.73
Death notices	7	1.91
Curiosities	6	1.64
Other	9	2.46

Note: N=366

Source: own elaboration.

⁶¹ K. Krippendorff, *Content Analysis. An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Thousand Oaks 2004, p.221-223.

In Tables 1 and 2 the hierarchy of themes and frames reflecting the communicative structure of the investigated TV news messages is presented, showing the frequency of topics expressed in the absolute numbers and percentage shares. In Table 2 the frequency of frames types encountered in the analyzed media message is presented.

Table 2. General frame structure of the news media content.

Frames	Number of news that apply the type of frame <i>F</i>	Percentage share %
Fear	90	24.59
Conflict	63	17.21
Human interest	61	16.67
Economic	39	10.66
Fun	31	8.47
Responsibility	28	7.65
Sympathy	27	7.38
Morality	6	1.64
Horse race	5	1.37
Scandal	3	0.82
Other	13	3.55

Note: N=366.

Source: own elaboration.

When answering the first research question (RQ1) about the thematic category criminal issues and court administration should be pointed out as the most prominent news topic (48; 13.11 percent) followed by government operations (37; 10.11 percent) and transport, energy and industrial policy (36; 9.84 percent). Therefore, issues of internal governmental and policymaking can be considered as dominating the media agenda. Criminal issues are commonly encountered as “catchy news”, but court administration and governmental or policy issues as hard news do not so often meet the hard news criteria and the category of “general news” would be more relevant. However, the reason is the change in government that resulted

in numerous controversial and unforeseen political and policy decision (including courts, industry and transport) evoking a great deal of media and public attention. The issues related to court administration, including the struggle between executive (the president and the government) and judiciary powers (Constitutional Court), could be perceived as “news alerts” creating public concerns about respect for democratic principles. The occurrence of “news alerts” seems to be even more plausible when we take into account the results in Table 3, where the issue criminal issues and court administration takes second position in terms of frequency of fear frame application.

This topical structure is not a typical one for the agenda of political communication order in Poland, as previous research results indicated⁶². Taking into account the election campaign time included in the analyzed sample, the topical structure in Table 1. can be perceived as reflecting the transformation of the thematic order of political communication in Poland. The significant contribution of social, national and economic safety topics became more visible in the media agenda under study. A substantial level of attention was paid to foreign affairs, which is not typical for the average structure of Polish media. Culture, education and sports are generally reported as soft news, being the background rather than the foreground of news bulletins, as was the case in the analyzed content.

Framing analysis has been introduced to answer the research question devoted to the frame structure of the analyzed news media content (RQ 2). The results presented in Table 2. rank the prominence of various types of frames included in the research design. These outcomes show the hierarchy of interpretative schemata that definitely favors emotionality, as the group of “emotional” frames has definitely stronger representation (conflict; human interest; sympathy; morality;

⁶² E. Nowak, *Ustanawianie agendy politycznej przez media. Efekt newsa w Polsce*, Lublin 2014, pp. 239-251; B. Łódzki, *Ustanawianie agendy mediów podczas kampanii wyborczych w 2005 roku*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 124-128.

scandal) than the group of the (policy) rational frames (economic) or political calculation, (responsibility; horse race). The outcomes of general framing analysis partly support the main hypothesis that assumes fear and fun frames as dominant communication strategies organizing news media messages. However, the noticeable prevalence of the fear frame (24.59 percent) and the large share of the fun frame (8.47 percent) deserves further investigation of our main supposition.

Table 3. Distribution of fear and fun frames among different topics.

TOPICS	FRAMES			
	News devoted to the topic that applies fear frame <i>F</i>	Percentage share %	News devoted to the topic that applies fun frame <i>f</i>	Percentage share %
Terrorism	20	22.22	0	0.00
Criminal issues and court administration	16	17.78	2	6.45
Transport, energy and industrial policy	14	15.56	3	9.68
War related issues	9	10.00	0	0.00
Health	6	6.67	2	6.45
Economy and financial issues	6	6.67	1	3.23
Government operations	5	5.56	2	6.45
Environment and natural disasters	3	3.33	2	6.45
Culture and education	2	2.22	5	16.13
Civil rights and immigration	2	2.22	0	0.00
International affairs and defense issues	2	2.22	1	3.23
Political competition	0	0.00	6	19.35
Sports	0	0.00	5	16.13
Curiosities	0	0.00	2	6.45
Other	5	5.56	0	0.00

Note: N=366 (total); N=90 (news with fear frame); N=31 (news with fun frame).

Source: own elaboration.

When the distribution of the fun frame is added to the hierarchy of the fear frame (among different topics; RQ 3) we get results showing that both perspectives form a two-dimensional picture of emotional framing, where fear and fun are situated at the (almost) final points of the scale, with a few exceptions for fun frame affiliated topics. The category of political competition dominates among fun topics; this

means that politainment can be determined as belonging to the most popular genres of news entertainment (six news, 19.35 percent). In other words, the results suggest that when the fun frame is applied, it occurs most often within the topic of politics. The thematic category of political competition was coded with the meaning of political actors and party rivalry. This led us to assume that politics, as such, frequently enough, is treated as a non-essential and not so serious public activity deprived of real power in a sense. Interestingly enough, the second most popular thematic category in which the fun frame is used is related to sports (five news; 16.13 percent), obviously also including competition in sports and emotional engagement in the feeling of being “a fan of our team”, which allows us to assume some kind of emotional consistency between the media interpretation of political and sport competition. With respect to the thematic category culture and education, the fun frame should be associated with a different emotional background, i.e. with offering typical soft, relaxing and entertaining news. There are also other topics where the fun frame was applied: transport, energy and industrial policy, criminal issues and court administration, health, environment and natural disasters. These topics belong to categories that are likely to be presented using the fear scheme. However, in the analyzed cases the fun frame was used, which makes these two types of frames potentially interrelated in certain cases (presenting various elements of an event using different perspectives).

In the third stage of investigative process (Table 4) the topical structure and distribution of frames in “first-rate” TV news content was introduced in order to isolate the most publicly visible and communicatively influential news messages. In this case, the sample under analysis was limited to the first three stories broadcast in each evening news bulletin in which the fear or fun frame was applied. The results are less scattered and it is quite clear that the most accessible and visible media content is dominated by the terrorism topic, interpreted by using fear frame (RQ4). When taking into account the set of “first-rate” news with the fear frame

(N=35), it turns out that 41.18 percent of the news was devoted to the terrorism topic. War-related issues made considerable contribution (14.71 percent) to the fear-related picture of the reported reality. It is important to note that the terrorism and war-related events being reported did not take place in Poland, and that Poland was classified in 2015 as a country with “no impact of terrorism” (Global Terrorism Index 2016). The war-related issues referred at least partly to the Ukrainian crisis (military intervention in Donbas and the Crimea), which makes using the fear frame more well-grounded and the concerns more actual. The topics of transport, energy and industrial policy and the government operations represent domestic concerns, where the threats were affiliated more to the systemic legal and structural changes introduced by newly elected government. Therefore, focusing on the terrorism theme accompanied by a threatening perspective within “first-rate” media can be considered as the news media’s strategy that aims to create a ‘news alert’ for foreign issues.

Table 4. Distribution of fear and fun frames among different topics (“the top three” news).

TOPICS	FRAMES			
	News devoted to the topic that applies fear frame <i>f</i>	Percentage share %	News devoted to the topic that applies fun frame <i>f</i>	Percentage share %
Terrorism	14	41.18	0	00.00
Transport, energy and industrial policy	5	14.71	0	00.00
War related issues	5	14.71	0	00.00
Government operations	4	11.76	0	00.00
Economy and financial issues	2	05.88	0	00.00
International affairs and defense issues	2	05.88	0	00.00
Criminal issues and court administration	1	02.94	0	00.00
Culture and education	1	02.94	0	00.00
Political competition	0	00.00	1	100

Note: N=35, the set of news broadcasted as three top stories that used fear or fun frames.

Source: own elaboration.

Considering the application of the fear frame in a wider context (that is within the whole set of all “first-rate” issues under analysis) the picture of mediated danger is

not so apparent, however it should be noted that over a quarter of TV news content (Table 2, 24.59 percent) was presented using the fear frame, which makes this communication strategy one of the most essential modes for presenting the picture of the real-world events. Within the “first-rate” TV news media content, only one news item was presented with the fun frame. Consequently, the fun-related perspective turned out to be of minimal importance within the most prominent news. Nevertheless, in case of prime news it is not so surprising, as this is usually devoted to the hard and serious messages.

Discussion and conclusion

The goal of the study was to verify the hypothesis that the news media use the fear and fun frames as the most popular communication strategies that, taken together, form the dominant communication perspective organizing news stories. In the first stage of the investigation, determining the most frequent thematic category, the issue criminal issues and court administration was separated and the essential salience of social, national and economic safety topics was discovered. When it comes to the general framing analysis, the hierarchy of interpretative schemata seemed to definitely favor emotionality over rationality. The outcomes of the first stage of the research partly support the main hypothesis that assumes the fear and fun frames as the dominant communication strategies. At the same time, the noticeable prevalence of the fear frame over the fun frame has to be noticed.

The second stage of the analysis was restricted to the two types of frames and was joined with thematic analysis in order to obtain the detailed topical structure of fearful and funny messages. It was not a surprise that within these topics the themes associated with traditional or currently rising threats to human life and safety definitely dominated, however, we expected the topic of refugees (coded as civil rights and immigration; 2.2 percent) to be much more prominent, being one of the contemporary Europe’s most urgent problems. What we discovered, instead,

was not the problem of refugees openly stated as the topic of the news but concealed within the theme of terrorism. In the case of the fun frame the categories of political competition and sports dominated and can be attributed to some kind of emotional consistency between media interpretation of political and sport competitions by offering engagement in being a supporter of “our team”.

The third stage of the examination applied the same procedure as the second stage but was limited to the content selected in line with the criterium of “the top-three” items of news bulletins. In this level of the investigation the fear-fun dimension in media reporting revealed an even clearer picture of the fear and fun related messages. Contrary to the primary assumption, entertaining and threatening strategies cannot be considered as equivalent elements of certain dimension. Instead, the threatening-induced message has to be reckoned as considerably dominant in news media reporting. In other words, the fear frame was selected as the most essential mode of presenting the picture of the real world-events. Consequently, the main hypothesis assuming the domination of entertaining and threatening strategies organizing televisual news media content can be only partially confirmed. In this respect the fear-related topics and frames should be considered as forming the most accessible and visible media communication strategy and fun-related topics and frames can be perceived as complementary ones.

When looking for reasonable explanations for fear-fun dimension (with the prevalence of fear as the results showed), the combination of the viewers’ emotional motivations with the peculiarity of changing watching preferences can be offered. What our research suggests is the emotionally loaded content and interpretation, no matter whether fear or fun, served as the news media’s solution in the competitive media environment. Emotional ingredients are not only an unavoidable component of journalistic practice, but also a strategic ritual institutionalized by

quality journalism, where prize-winning prestigious articles can be an example⁶³. As was demonstrated, the anecdotal leads infused with an emotional approach were present in over 60 percent of American Pulitzer Prize-winning articles. Emotion-related explanations can also take into account the viewers' sense of security as the rationale of media attractiveness. The feeling of being safe is probably one of the most essential factors evoking attention to the news. When media users experience something that disturbs that feeling, they become more attentive to narrative structures offered in the news⁶⁴. The fear that pervades news is also regarded as a core element of popular culture concept oriented to pursuing a "problem frame"⁶⁵, which is complemented by political communication studies demonstrating the effectiveness of threatening information and evocative imagery when supporting a desirable course of policymaking⁶⁶.

The dominance of fear over fun in the analysed content can be, at the same time, explained not only by changing patterns of media usage, but also adjusting journalistic practices. As social media users generally only react to the "news alert" (being less interested to the daily news⁶⁷), the topical and frame structure have to be designed in line with this pattern. Similar to reality shows that blend entertainment and information, present-day news programs use the strategy of blending information with entertainment in order to slow the decreasing number of viewers in favour of social media (defensive strategies against new media)⁶⁸. Employing

⁶³ K. Wahl-Jorgensen, *The strategic ritual of emotionality...*, p. 137.

⁶⁴ D. Zillmann, *Mechanisms of Emotional reactivity to media entertainments*, [in:] K. Döveling, C. Von Scheve, E. A. Konijn (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media*, New York-London 2011, pp. 101-115.

⁶⁵ D. L. Altheide, R. S. Michalowski, *Fear in the News...*, pp. 475-503.

⁶⁶ S. K. Gadian, *The Politics of Threat: How Terrorism News Shapes Foreign Policy Attitudes*, "The Journal of Politics", vol. 72 (2), 2010, pp. 469-483.

⁶⁷ T. Aalberg, A. Blekesaune, E. Elvestad, *Media Choice and Informed Democracy: Toward Increasing News Consumption Gaps in Europe?*, "The International Journal of Press/Politics", vol. 18 (3), 2013, pp. 281-303.

⁶⁸ A. Nguyen, *Facing 'The Fabulous Monster'*, "Journalism Studies", vol. 9 (1), 2008, p. 92.

emotions, preferably fear, in a story is often the easiest way out when looking for engaging narrative structure for a broad audience at a comparatively low cost. Furthermore, emotional authenticity is at present one of the main determinants of trustworthiness in the networked journalism age, and emotions that fuel engagement with news and information are considered a crucial building block of good journalism⁶⁹.

This study was focused on a selected country and the national media broadcast. Consequently, the results of the analysis cannot be directly extrapolated to other national media environments. However, using the central European example may add to our understanding of the actual salience of the emotional dimension of news media messages. Future studies, preferably taking a comparative cross-country perspective, may shed additional light on the news media tendency to apply entertainment and threats as the dominant communication strategies. In particular, future studies may explore whether the prevalence of a fear-induced message is the Western phenomenon (also with the Polish case) or a generalizable trend across modern democracies. The study also did not consider the consequences of the publics' preferences for entertainment including "fun" and "fear" in the media content. That should be the subject of a research project joining media content analysis and reception studies.

Abstract

The study offers a conceptualization of fear and fun as mediated emotions integrated into the dominant communication perspective, understood as an entertaining continuum (with fun on one side and fear on the other). The investigation aimed to verify the assumption that the dominant communication perspective used by

⁶⁹ C. Becket, M. Deuze, *On the role of Emotion in the Future of Journalism*, "Social Media + Society", vol. 2 (3), 2016, pp. 1-6.

news media is formed with fear and fun frames being the most popular communication strategies. The combination of thematic and framing analyses enabled to determine the relationship between the fear and fun frames and the relevant topics. Using the sample of 42 evening newscasts and 366 news items aired in 2015 in two prime time TV news broadcasts in Poland it was found that the strategies of entertaining and threatening cannot be considered as equivalent. Instead, the threatening-induced message has to be reckoned as significantly dominant in the news media reporting.

EMOCJONALNE STRATEGIE KOMUNIKACYJNE W TELEWIZYJNYCH PROGRAMACH INFORMACYJNYCH. TEMATY I RAMY INTERPRETACYJNE

Abstrakt

Studium oferuje konceptualizację „strachu” i „zabawy” jako „emocji medialnych” zintegrowanych w ramach dominującej strategii komunikacyjnej, rozumianej jako ‘kontinuum rozrywki’. Kontinuum to jest organizowane przez zabawę po jednej, a strach po drugiej jego stronie. Celem obserwacji było zweryfikowanie założenia, że dominująca perspektywa komunikacyjna stosowana przez media informacyjne jest wyznaczana głównie przez ramy związane z rozrywką oraz ze wzbudzaniem obaw. Połączenie analizy tematycznej oraz analizy ram interpretacyjnych umożliwiło określenie proporcji i relacji między poszczególnymi tematami i ramami. Materiał empiryczny pochodzący z dwóch polskich stacji telewizyjnych (TVP1, TVN) tworzyły 42 programy informacyjne wyemitowane w 2015 roku (366 newsów). Wyniki badań wskazały, że wspomniane strategie nie rozkładały się równomiernie, zauważono bowiem znaczącą przewagę strategii opartej na strachu.

Słowa kluczowe:

emocjonalne ramy interpretacyjne, rozrywka, rama zabawy, rama strachu, newsy telewizyjne

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Giovanni Barbieri , Roberto Mincigrucci, Sofia Verza

Who is the Most Populist? A Study of the Italian Political Leaders' Interviews during the 2018 Electoral Campaign

Key words:

populism, electoral campaign, leaders, Italy, holistic grading

Introduction

The Italian political landscape has been depicted by many authors as a “populist laboratory”¹, or even as “populist paradise”². For this reason, many Italian political leaders have been repeatedly considered populist, although there is little empirical evidence to support this. Actually, most of them are personalistic leaders who prefer to adopt forms of communication that bypass party mediation and that are based on simple and informal manners and ways of speaking³. However, this attitude has to be properly understood as an effect of political personalisation and of the mediatisation processes, and therefore it does not represent a feature that allows us to define those leaders as populist *per se*⁴. Not taking this into account would imply the risk of delimiting populism’s extension in a not valid way; that is to produce too many “false positives”.

¹ L. Zanatta, *Il populismo*, Roma 2013; M. Tarchi, *Italia populista. Dal qualunqueismo a Beppe Grillo*, Bologna 2018.

² G. Hermet, *Les populisms dans le mond. Une histoire sociologique XIXe-XXe siècle*, Paris 2001.

³ K. Weyland, *Clarifying a Contested Concept – Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics*, “Comparative Politics” vol. 34, 2001, pp. 1-22; P. Ostiguy, *The high and the low in politics: a two-dimensional political space for comparative analysis and electoral studies*, Kellogg Institute Working Paper #360, 2009.

⁴ C. Mudde, *The Populist Zeitgeist*, “Government and Opposition” 39 (4), 2004, pp. 541-563.

Based on these premises, the present study aims to measure the level of populism expressed by the main Italian political leaders during the 2018 national electoral campaign, and, consequently, to evaluate which leaders can be considered populist. For this purpose, our units of analysis are the television interviews granted by these leaders, and we will examine them through the pedagogical assessment technique of holistic grading, applied for the first time to the study of populist discourses by Hawkins⁵. Many political scientists and sociologists, acknowledging the merits of Hawkins' empirical researches, have indeed welcomed his analyses as positive developments in the field of the studies on populism. Such analyses could overcome the difficulties of assessment and measurement generally suffered by the discursive and ideological approaches to populism⁶.

Unlike the standard techniques of content analysis, holistic grading does not break a text or discourse in parts, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs and does not consist in counting the recurrence of certain – in our case “populist” – terms. Instead, it considers the text as a whole: the graders assess the discourses under study and assign them a score indicating the level of populism on the basis of both a rubric and some “anchor texts”⁷.

Initially, Hawkins analyzed the populist speeches of more than 40 chief executives and political leaders – focusing, in particular, on Latin America⁸; afterwards, he examined the leaders' speeches and party manifestos from 136 parties in 26 countries, from Western Europe and the Americas⁹. The main findings of these

⁵ K. A. Hawkins, *Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse*, “Comparative Political Studies” vol. 42, 2009, pp. 1040-1067; K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties in Europe and the Americas*, Paper prepared for presentation at Explaining Populism, Team Populism January Conference 2016.

⁶ See for instance: C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, P. Ostiguy (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford 2017.

⁷ K. A. Hawkins, *Is Chávez Populist?...*

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties...*

works were very encouraging: from a methodological perspective, holistic grading turned out to be a valid and reliable technique. From a cognitive perspective, Latin American leaders and parties on average proved to be more populist than the European ones.

Following Hawkins' perspective, this study tries to answer three main research questions: the first is methodological, while the other two are cognitive:

- Can the holistic grading technique be applied not only to written texts, such as those mostly taken into account by Hawkins, but also, as in our case, to "oral texts", such as those derived from television interviews?
- Who are the most populist Italian leaders? Can the use of holistic grading lead us to results which differ from the findings of previous studies?
- What kind of populism is expressed by those who proved to be the most populist politicians?

The relevance of the first question lies in its possible affirmative answer: if the aforementioned technique proved to be valid and reliable, the analysis of oral texts would not require their transcription, thus allowing a quicker completion of the work.

The salience of the second question lies in the above mentioned depiction of Italy as a prolific ground for populism. Regarding this point, however, it is necessary to say a few introductory words on the expected level of populism expressed by the six Italian political leaders considered in this analysis, and on their respective parties – namely Matteo Salvini (L – *Lega*/League), Luigi Di Maio (M5S – *Movimento Cinque Stelle*/Five Star Movement), Silvio Berlusconi (FI – *Forza Italia*/Go Italy), Matteo Renzi (PD – *Partito Democratico*/Democratic Party), Giorgia Meloni (FdI – *Fratelli d'Italia*/Brothers of Italy) and Pietro Grasso (LeU – *Liberi e Uguali*/ Free and Equals).

Both League and M5S are nowadays considered as the main examples of Italian populist parties; accordingly, their leaders' discourses should show high levels of populism. We assume this is the case for Salvini, even though – quite unexpectedly – Hawkins' analysis assigns a 0 score for the speeches of the previous League leader¹⁰. Instead, some doubts could emerge with regard to Di Maio. The M5S was forecasted by the polls as the probable winner of the election: it is then possible that Di Maio, in order to reassure the electorate and to broaden his electoral support, attenuated the populist tones of his speeches and tended to promote the image of M5S as a responsible party, fit to rule (this perhaps also explains why Di Maio always appears in public in a suit).

As for Berlusconi, he has been considered populist for a long time, especially when he decided to establish his "personal party" and enter politics in 1993. The numerous corruption scandals that shook Italy during the early nineties were the seeds of the FI leader's anti-establishment and populist rhetoric: discredit for the governing political parties, distrust of politics *per se*, a battle against corrupt elites and their communist allies, the necessity for radical change. From the outset, Berlusconi also presented himself as a newcomer to politics, as a self-made man temporarily active in politics, as a businessman coming from outside the corrupt and inefficient elite¹¹. Some doubts arise in depicting Berlusconi as populist today, after being in office as Prime Minister four times between 1994 and 2011: as Bonikowski and Gidron suggest, *the longer the political career of a candidate, the less credible the candidate's populist challenges may appear to the electorate*¹².

¹⁰ K. A. Hawkins, *Is Chávez Populist?*...

¹¹ M. Tarchi, *Italia populista*...

¹² B. Bonikowski, N. Gidron, *The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952-1996*, "Social Forces" 94 (4), 2016, pp. 1593-1621.

The same doubts emerge about Renzi. Some scholars, comparing the figure of Renzi to that of Berlusconi, point out the use of a similar populist style and rhetoric¹³. Nevertheless, we expect Renzi to obtain a low score, since he was the secretary of the centre-left mainstream party, one of the main promoters of the last three Italian governments and Prime Minister from 2014 to 2016.

As for the other two leaders, Meloni heads the right-wing niche party FdI, which is commonly considered a Eurosceptic party¹⁴, and sometimes also a populist one¹⁵: its leader's interviews should therefore show a considerable level of populism; whereas Grasso, who is the leader of the left-wing niche party LeU, represents an ambiguous case. He is a former judge, former chief of DNA (National anti-Mafia Directorate), and former President of the Senate; his numerous institutional roles make it difficult to think he would act as a populist. Nevertheless, the analysis carried out by Hawkins and Castanho Silva assigned the highest score of populism to another former judge – Antonino Ingroia – leader of *Civic Revolution*, a left-wing niche party very similar to LeU¹⁶.

Our data should also help us to understand if the level of populism expressed in the interviews could depend on both different phases of the electoral campaign and different type of talk shows – quality vs. popular – from which the interviews under analysis come. Regarding the first point, Bonikowski and Gidron¹⁷ have highlighted that the early stages of the campaign target the “more ideologi-

¹³ F. Bordignon, *Matteo Renzi: A 'Leftist Berlusconi' for the Italian Democratic Party?*, “South European Society and Politics” 19 (1) 2014, pp. 1-23.

¹⁴ L. De Sio, V. Emanuele, N. Maggini (eds.), *The European Parliament Elections of 2014*, Roma 2014; M. Valbruzzi, R. Vignati (eds.) *L'Italia e l'Europa al bivio delle riforme. Le elezioni europee e amministrative del 25 maggio 2014*, Bologna 2014.

¹⁵ R. F. Inglehart, P. Norris, *Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash*, Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty Research Working Papers, 2016.

¹⁶ K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties...*

¹⁷ B. Bonikowski, N. Gidron, *The Populist Style...*

cally extreme” political base of the leaders, whereas the later stages target the general electorate, the “medium voter”. It can therefore be supposed that populism decreased as the campaign neared the election day. Regarding the talk show typology, Mazzoleni¹⁸ noted that there is a “complicity” of popular media in the rise of populist rhetoric. If the established new media are the mouthpieces of the ruling classes, popular media or infotainment programmes are addressed to the “common people”, who may be more willing to embrace populist positions and anti-elite discourses¹⁹.

Finally, we will try to identify the possible different forms of populism expressed by the politicians that, according to the holistic grading assessment, prove to be the most populist.

The ideational approach to populism and the holistic grading technique

As stated above, this study analyzes the level of populism of the main Italian political leaders as it emerged in some television interviews they granted during the 2018 electoral campaign. For the scope of this study, such interviews are considered as specific types of discourses; this entails the adoption of a particular approach to populism, namely the ideational approach. Although much information on this approach can be found in Hawkins’ research, we deem it necessary to briefly summarize the characteristics of both this approach and the research technique that is going to be applied. Indeed, as Rovira Kaltwasser and others have recently highlighted, *part of the problem in the populism scholarship in political science [...] is not*

¹⁸ G. Mazzoleni, *Populism and the Media*, [in:] D. Albertazzi, D. McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, Basingstoke-New York 2008.

¹⁹ G. Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, B. Horsfield (eds.), *The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis*, Santa Monica 2003; T. Aalberg et al.(eds.), *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, New York-Abingdon 2017.

*[so] much the absence of sharp conceptualizations, but rather the tendency of scholars to avoid specifying their own understanding of populism*²⁰.

Three main definitions or conceptual approaches of populism currently dominate the scholarly debate: the political-strategic approach, the socio-cultural approach, and the ideational approach²¹.

Briefly, it can be stated that the first approach, which is mostly based on Weyland's works²², considers populism as a strategy to win and maintain the ruling power based on single, personalistic leaders who are supported by a large number of followers and on a direct, quasi-personal contact between a leader and his or her followers.

According to the second approach, as proposed in particular by Ostiguy²³, populism can be defined following a "high-low axis" as the "flaunting of the low". It consists in a specific relationship between political leaders and their supporters that is characterized by informal and coarse manners, tastes and ways of speaking; practices and repertoires inspired by cultural nativism; personalistic and unmediated models of authority and forms of leadership.

The third approach is probably the most widespread in the field of populism studies. Although the scholars who share this approach use different terms to define populism, such as those, for instance, of "language", "discourse", "thin ideology", political or communication "style", all of them *consider populism to be, first and foremost, about ideas in general, and ideas about 'the people' and the 'elite' in particular*²⁴.

²⁰ C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al., *Populism. An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art*, [in:] C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford 2017.

²¹ C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford 2017.

²² K. Weyland, *Clarifying a Contested Concept...*

²³ P. Ostiguy, *Populism. A Socio-Cultural Approach*, [in:] C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, Oxford 2017.

²⁴ C. Mudde, *Populism: An Ideational Approach*, [in:] C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook...*, p.29.

In this regard, Hawkins maintains that the populist discourse is constituted by the following five ideas:

- A *Manichaeon* and moral vision of politics, where good is embodied by “the people”, and evil by “the elite”;
- The people represent a homogeneous body with an identifiable will that must be considered as the rightful sovereign;
- The elite, on the contrary, is depicted as conspiring, powerful, and sinister. It has allegedly subverted the will of the people;
- A “systemic change” or a “rupture”, in terms of liberation or revolution, is then considered unavoidable;
- In order to overthrow the malicious elite and to make the will of the people effective, it is possible to resort to undemocratic means.

Hawkins and Castanho Silva also acknowledged that an *ideational approach along these lines lends itself to operationalization and measurement, since it identifies elements that should be present in a discourse for it to be populist*²⁵.

The holistic grading technique combines two different research instruments: a rubric, and a set of “anchor texts”. The rubric is designed on the basis of the aforementioned characteristics of populism, juxtaposing them with the elements that constitute the concept of pluralism. Thus it enables the evaluation of the discourses under analysis, specifying the qualities associated with a simple 3-point scale of 0 (*non-populist or pluralist*), 1 (*mixed*), or 2 (*populist*)²⁶.

The sample of “anchor texts” comprises examples of typical pluralist, mixed, and populist speeches by different politicians from different geographical areas, such as Robert Mugabe (graded 2), Evo Morales (2), Sarah Palin (between 1 and 2),

²⁵ K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties...*, p. 3.

²⁶ See: K. A. Hawkins, B. Kocijan, *Codebook For Measuring Populist Discourse. Populist Discourse Project at Central European University*, Unpublished manuscript, 2013.

Stephen Harper (1), George W. Bush (close to 0), Tony Blair (0), and Barak Obama (0).

In order both to pursue the research objectives highlighted above and to guarantee the comparability of the results, we decided to apply to our data the same rubric and the same “anchor texts” as used in Hawkins’ analysis.

The sample

The data presented below derive from the analysis of 24 interviews with the leaders of the six Italian parties that reached the electoral threshold during the 2018 electoral campaign. As stated before, the leaders analyzed are: Salvini (L), Di Maio (M5S), Berlusconi (FI), Renzi (PD), Meloni (FdiI), and Grasso (LeU).

In selecting the 24 interviews we adopted a three-stage sampling design. In the first stage, we decided to include the three most important free to air television broadcasters in Italy in the analysis: *RAI*, the public broadcaster, *Mediaset*, a private broadcaster controlled by the Berlusconi family, and *La7*, a private broadcaster owned by *Cairo Communication*. In this regard, the partisanship of the Italian media system has to be kept in mind: the Italian media system has always been considered as having a “high level of political/ideological parallelism”, since its media system has long reflected the major political divisions in society²⁷.

In the second stage of our sampling, we selected three political talk-shows (where political contents are central most of the time) for each broadcaster: *Porta a Porta* (*RAI*), *Matrix* (*Mediaset*), and *Otto e Mezzo* (*La7*). These talk-shows represent quality programmes, being mainly addressed to an interested and well-informed audience. We also considered an infotainment programme specialized in *soft news* and gossip, namely *Domenica Live* (*Mediaset*), as an example of popular programme in the Italian context. As stated in the introduction, this study assumes

²⁷ D. C. Hallin, P. Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Press and Politics*, Cambridge 2004.

that popular programmes may enhance the level of populism of the discourses; furthermore, the “market orientation” of these TV programmes may induce a simplification of complex political issues, conveying a Manichaeian vision of the world where every issue has a strong moral dimension.

Finally, we selected one interview of every leader for each of the above mentioned talk shows, thereby analyzing four interviews for each leader. The only exception regards Pietro Grasso, who has never been interviewed at *Domenica Live*. For this reason we analyzed two of his interviews at *Matrix*.

The period of analysis covers the two months preceding the election day, from January 8, 2018 until the end of the electoral campaign, on March 4. For each politician, we selected one interview in the first and one in the last week of the electoral campaign, while the remaining two interviews were respectively selected at the end of January and in the course of February. First of all, to make the selection, we considered it necessary to analyse the discourses held at different times of the electoral competition. Secondly, it was important to collect the speeches with the greatest audience potential, such as those located at the beginning and end of the electoral competition²⁸. Table 1 displays a summary of the interviews analyzed.

Before continuing our analysis, a final consideration on the source of our data must be made. Interviews differ from unidirectional speeches (such as Hawkins’ “anchor texts”), because the former are “mediated conversations” where the discourse may be influenced by several factors, even without manipulative purposes. Furthermore, the core characteristic of talk shows – where our interviews are carried out – is the spectacularization of dialogues: this feature is part of the process of mediatization of politics, where political contents have been adapted to the so called “media logic”²⁹, blending politics with popular culture³⁰.

²⁸ K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties...*

²⁹ D. L. Altheide, R. P. Snow, *Media Logic*, London 1979.

³⁰ G. Mazzoleni, W. Schulz, *Mediatization of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?*, “Political Communication” 16 (3) 1999, p. 247-261; J. Strömbäck, *Four Phases of Mediatization: An*

Table 1. Summary of analyzed interviews.

	Porta a Porta	Matrix	Otto e Mezzo	Domenica Live
Matteo Renzi	March, 2 nd	February, 26 th	January, 8 th	January, 28 th
Silvio Berlusconi	March, 2 nd	January, 16 th	February, 21 st	January, 14 th
Matteo Salvini	January, 18 th	February, 28 th	January, 19 th	February, 18 th
Giorgia Meloni	February, 27 th	January, 9 th	February, 2 nd	February, 11 th
Luigi Di Maio	January, 9 th	January, 24 th	March, 1 st	February, 18 th
Pietro Grasso	January, 16 th	February, 14 th , 26 th	February, 5 th	

Source: own elaboration.

Results

Reliability of the holistic grading technique on oral texts

The analysis was conducted by four different coders. Due to the small amount of interviews analyzed, it was not necessary or even appropriate to apply statistical reliability tests with enough significance to control and validate our results, but this does not mean that no control was maintained over the reliability of the technique.

Firstly, we paid particular attention to training the coders, adopting three phases of analysis in order to have a high degree of uniformity of judgement in the score allocation. The first phase of this training consisted in an in-depth study of the rubric and the “anchor texts” proposed by Hawkins and Castanho Silva³¹, evaluating through their definitions which kind of statements and political proposals could be considered “populist” rather than “pluralist”, thereby calibrating the coders’ yardstick. In this phase, all four coders analyzed two interviews in order to become familiar with the technique and to agree on the respective interpretations.

Next, the analysis was conducted by two coders at a time. In total, 6 interviews were coded by different pairs whose members alternately changed in order to guarantee a continuous debate among all the coders and homogeneity in the evaluations.

Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics, “The International Journal of Press Politics” 13 (3), 2008, p.: 228-246; C. Ruggiero, *La macchina della parola. Struttura, interazione e narrazione nel talk show*, Milano 2014.

³¹ K. A. Hawkins, B. Castanho Silva, *Mapping Populist Parties...*

Finally, the remaining 16 interviews were analyzed individually by each coder (4 interviews per coder).


As said before, the small number of interviews analyzed did not require applying any statistical test. However we considered as “critical” every case that presented a deviation equal or superior to 0.5 points from the average score obtained in total by each politician analyzed. As a result, we found six “critical” interviews. All of these have been double-checked by all the four coders together in order to verify if they were actually “atypical” interviews or if there were some mistakes in the codification. From this second control, it emerged that three interviews out of six were evaluated correctly, demonstrating that there may be a certain degree of volatility in the political discourse during the electoral campaign. The other three interviews, on the other hand, were not evaluated in a precise way, among other reasons because of a misinterpretation of some passages of the interviews by one of the coders. The scores assigned to these three interviews were corrected after a discussion among all the coders.

Going back to our first research questions, regarding the direct application of the holistic grading technique to oral texts, the analysis carried out in this study led to excellent results: only three out of the twenty-four interviews under analysis (12.5%) were wrongly evaluated. With the necessary precautions – careful training of the coders and an ex post control of the interviews significantly differing from the average scores – it is therefore possible to directly apply holistic grading to oral texts, without transcribing them. Consequently, the technique proved to be both fast and reliable analysis technique. However, in the case of an analysis involving a larger sample of interviews, the use of traditional statistical reliability tests would indeed be necessary.

Different levels of populism among leaders

Answering our second research question, we can now analyze – according to the holistic grading results – who the most populist Italian political leaders are. As shown in Figure 1, Salvini, Di Maio, and, once again and quite surprisingly, Berlusconi, appear to be the most populist leaders, even though, as we will see later, they convey different populist messages. In some cases, the findings do not validate our initial hypotheses. In particular, Di Maio proves to be more populist than expected, together with Berlusconi, while Meloni meets lower populist standards than expected.

Figure 1. Populism scores assigned to the leaders.



Source: own elaboration.

With regard to Salvini, the results of our analysis assigning him a score of 0.81 confirm the initial hypothesis and the previous scholarship, describing League, since the emergence of this party in 1991, as one of the foremost examples of populist political party in Italy.

Focusing on Di Maio, the results of this analysis contradict our initial hypothesis. The holistic grading results rank him in the top positions of our populist scale,

assigning him a score of 0.75. Although the M5S has been described as one of the preeminent populist parties in Italy and Europe, we would have expected lower results since the positive election poll forecasts led us to assume that Di Maio, in order to reassure the electorate and to broaden his electoral support, would attenuate his populist tones in order to present the M5S as a responsible party, fit for ruling the country. On the contrary, he has proved to be a “true” populist leader, faithful to his role and his guiding “thin ideology”, and also not interested in strategic electoral compromises and camouflages.

Berlusconi, leader of FI, proved to be the third most populist leader out of the six analyzed in this study, with a score of 0.69. Many previous analyses outlined his anti-establishment and populist rhetoric and portrayed him as one of the paramount populist leaders in the contemporary history of Italy. Contrary to our expectations, however, he continues to use populist discourses even today, despite being in office many times as Prime Minister, thereby being part of the “ruling elite” for a long time.

As expected, Renzi, leader of the mainstream centre-left Democratic Party (PD), obtained a low score of populism from the holistic grading analysis, namely 0.38. He was one of the main promoters of the last three Italian governments, and led the last one for two years (2014-2016). In his speeches, he mainly relies on practical evidence of the good conduct and results of the last government, such as the GDP rising, an increased Per Capita income and so on.

Meloni, leader of the right-wing niche party FdI, obtained a lower score of populism than expected, namely 0.38, the same grade as assigned to the PD leader Renzi. This result is quite relevant, since FdI is commonly considered by the research literature as populist, while our analysis contradicts this. In all of the interviews analyzed Meloni’s stance proved to be concentrated on practical issues, thus demonstrating a pluralist attitude. Such issues are specific, with particular emphasis on

very pragmatic questions, such as work, retirement and incentives for future families. Furthermore, she does not refer to the political adversaries as a malevolent minority endowed with plans of domination, and a general respect for institutions and the democratic system is implied. Therefore, according to Hawkins' scale, her speeches cannot be said to be populist.

Finally, the results of our analysis describe Grasso, leader of the leftist niche party LeU, as a completely non-populist leader. He scored 0 in the course of all four weeks studied, confirming our initial hypothesis. Grasso is a former judge, former chief of DNA (National Anti-Mafia Directorate), and former President of the Senate: possibly, his numerous previous institutional roles prevented him from acting as a populist.

Moving on to the possible influence of the different stages of the electoral campaign on the level of populism, no appreciable variations were observed in the course of time. Conversely to findings of Bonikowski and Gidron³² and our initial hypothesis, the early stages of the campaign were not characterized by higher degrees of populism, only to decrease as the election day drew nearer. The Italian politicians under analysis seem therefore not to adopt a strategic use of the discourses and not to distinguish, in this way, their political bases from the general electorate (Table 2).

Table 2. Scores assigned to the leaders in the analyzed period.

	1 th Period	2 nd Period	3 rd Period	4 th Period	Average
Berlusconi	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.50	0.69
Di Maio	1.25	0.50	0.75	0.50	0.75
Grasso	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Meloni	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.38
Renzi	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.38
Salvini	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	0.81
Average	0.54	0.42	0.54	0.50	0.50


Source: own elaboration.

³² B. Bonikowski, N. Gidron, *The Populist Style...*

With regard to the influence of the different type of talk shows on the level of populism, it has to be noted that the highest score of populism (1.25) was assigned to the interview with Di Maio, carried out on January 9 during the *Porta a Porta* talk show. This episode is somewhat unique, because it is the only case out of the 24 units of analysis where the journalists harshly criticized the stances and the policies of the leader interviewed, forcing him to exacerbate the tone of his speech.

Furthermore, if we do not include this episode in the assessment of the level of populism expressed in the four talk shows taken into consideration, we can also note how, in accordance to our expectations, the popular talk show *Domenica Live* conveyed a higher level of populism than the quality talk shows (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Level of populism expressed in the talk shows.



Source: own elaboration.

Italy: “the populist paradise”

The rubric used for the scope of this analysis includes a section of “Overall comments” that allows the coders to take note of the various elements characterizing a populist discourse, recording the relevant leaders’ quotes, and making short comments about them. This process of the holistic grading technique enables a better

analysis which, in turn, helps to identify the type of populism embodied by the different leaders under study.

It is well known that populism can assume different forms. The scholars have thus put forward many proposals of classification. Margaret Canovan³³, probably the first scholar who reasoned on this matter, distinguished between “agrarian populism” and “political populism”. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser³⁴, more than thirty years later, spoke of “agrarian populism”, “socio-economic populism” and “xenophobic populism”, and many other authors may be cited.

What type of populism is then expressed by the three leaders that, according to our findings, show the highest levels of populism? Does Italy really deserve to be labelled as a “populist paradise”?

With regard to Salvini, his interviews are characterized by references to the people perceived as *demos*, as the “common people”, and the urban “man of the street” and the rural man are romanticized and considered the incarnation of the national ideal. In this regard, he speaks about the requests he receives from workmen, farmers and fishermen. In the *Porta a Porta* interview on January 18, the leader actually brings real fish to the television studio, allegedly received as a present from some fishermen, as well as the sweatshirt of “Ideal Standard”, a factory closed down after being relocated abroad by a multinational corporation. Furthermore, Salvini likes to appear as “belonging to the common people”: he usually dresses, speaks, and behaves in a simple way.

However, his references to the people as *ethnos* are more frequent and emphasized. Therefore the populism expressed by the League leader takes on strong nationalist and anti-European traits. Indeed, the evil of the economic and political elites is one of the recurring themes in Salvini’s interviews, in particular in reference

³³ M. Canovan, *Populism*, New York 1981.

³⁴ C. Mudde C. Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism*, [in:] M. Freeden, M. Stears, L. Tower Sargent (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford 2013.

to the European elites. The previous government was allegedly colluded with them, allowing their power to surpass the Italian sovereignty (*Otto e mezzo*, January 19; *Matrix*, February 28). Moreover, we found in the League leader's interviews many references to the interests of the Italian people. These interests are always opposed to the interests of specific groups of "others", in particular foreigners and immigrants. In this regard, his main political slogan "Italians First" can be considered a clear expression of his "identitarian populism"³⁵. During the *Domenica Live* interview of February 18 he stated: *People who choose the League are choosing a clear concept, namely Italians first! [...] I have no problem with skin colour. My problem is to welcome in Italy only people who are respectful. If you arrive in Italy, and I welcome you to my house, and you start saying 'I don't like Nativity Scenes... I don't like the Baby Jesus... I don't like the crucified Christ', you'd better go back to your homeland and do what you want to do.*

Through these phrases, Salvini tried to convey a clear message, namely that "Italian culture is at stake", as he stated during the aforementioned *Porta a Porta* interview.

In order to assess the issues described above, Salvini invokes a "systemic change", another of the key indicators – according to Hawkins – for identifying a populist attitude. However, such a change does not assume revolutionary or apocalyptic tones, but can accordingly be reached through democratic means, such as the upcoming elections. In the *Porta a Porta* interview of January 18, he affirms that *I would need to be Prime Minister for at least 10 years in order to change things in this country.*

With regard to Di Maio, one of the key characteristics of his interviews is based on the fact that his party has always been an opposition force, thus allowing him to easily separate it from the other political parties. He conveys a moral point

³⁵ See: P. A. Taguieff, *L'illusion populiste*, Paris 2002.

of view on politics, clearly differentiating the categories of “good” and “evil” politicians. For example, in the January 24 interview at *Matrix*, he said that *both head and heart are needed for political reforms [...] and the heart was missing*. In the same interview, alluding to the frequent involvement of Italian politicians in illegal activities, he said: *If you are put on trial, then you are out [...], if some scandal emerges, you are out*. In the February 18 interview at *Domenica Live* he underlined that *the politicians in charge until now spent money for their private interests, while the M5S would allocate it to the citizenship income*. In the *Porta a Porta* interview he directly addressed the voters, asking people not to vote for old politicians: *I ask Italians not to vote for those who have led us to this situation, those who today are saying they want to solve our problems*. This confirms that the primary antagonistic relationship for M5S is between old and new politics, while for the *Lega* party we find a spatial/ cultural antagonism³⁶.

The kind of populism expressed by Di Maio is without a doubt the closest to an ideal form of “pure populism”, being essentially and almost solely founded on an anti-establishment and anti-elitist rhetoric, and locating itself outside the classical political right-left axis. For instance, during the *Otto e mezzo* interview he said: *In my opinion ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing’ are out-dated concepts*. Because of the lack of a clear political qualifier of M5S, Ivaldi, Lanzone and Woods³⁷ noted the party’s “fuzziness on the left-right spectrum”. The “people” are interpreted by the Movement in two different ways: as the common men and women, those who experience the difficulties of everyday life, and as the “Internet people”, since the M5S broadly resorts to online forms of communication and political action.

³⁶ G. Ivaldi, M. E. Lanzone, D. Woods, *Varieties of Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement*, “Swiss Political Science Review” 23 (4), 2017, p. 354-376.

³⁷ Ibidem.

Therefore, although the League and M5S share the same disapproval toward the traditional political parties and the political class, blamed for stealing popular sovereignty from citizens, they differ in the way they conceive “the people” – as *ethnos* and nation for the first, as *demos* for the second. Moreover, they differ with regard to the means deemed necessary to reacquire the allegedly lost sovereignty: while the League refers to a strong leader that embodies the popular will, M5S is more oriented towards the implementation of a participatory form of democracy³⁸. Di Maio stresses the importance of bottom-up participation when he explains his idea of leadership and the selection of candidates: *“I think the key point is working as a team. I don’t believe in the leadership of a single man ... The other parties are selecting their candidates behind closed doors. We have asked our registered members to choose them through the ‘Parlamentarie’ [online voting]*³⁹.

Berlusconi, finally, embodies a type of populism which is different again, namely the so called “neoliberal populism”. This kind of populism has been developed also thanks to leaders such as Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor and Alberto Fujimori, and it acquires a “nostalgic” form in Berlusconi’s discourses. Indeed, Berlusconi’s interviews contain the main objectives of neoliberal populism: the reduction of state power and intervention, the support for free market and, above all, the lowering of taxes. The measures undertaken to realize such objectives are considered necessary for triggering the industriousness and the initiative of citizens. During his speech at *Domenica Live* on December 14, he stated: “On many occasions I have said that our ‘lay religion’ implies lower taxes, lower taxes, lower taxes. Today we are oppressed by a fiscal tyranny”. Furthermore, the “nostalgic” undertone of Berlusconi’s populism comes to light when he recalls an archetype of the Italian political tradition: the struggle against communism. During the same interview he

³⁸ R. Biorcio, *Il populismo nella politica italiana. Da Bossi a Berlusconi, da Grillo a Renzi*, Milano 2015; M. Tarchi, *Italia populista...*

³⁹ *Matrix*, January 24.

stated: "I am back because I am needed. Today we are in a similar situation to 1994. In 1994 I joined the fray because without my party the communists would have ruled. With my intervention, we avoided this danger".

During the interviews for *Otto e Mezzo* on February 21, for *Porta a Porta* on March 2 and for *Domenica Live* on December 14, Berlusconi openly attacked the PD party as the perpetrator of a "*coup d'état*" which led to the fall of his government in 2011, and its "substitution with five non-elected governments". Furthermore, addressing the M5S, he referred to it as "unable to rule" (*Otto e Mezzo*, February 21) and "a sect that takes orders from an old comedian" – avoiding the respect that normal political rhetoric requires towards political competitors⁴⁰.

However, Berlusconi's interviews also address many practical issues, suggesting macro-reforms of the retirement and fiscal systems. The means presented for fulfilling his political program remain within democratic procedures, and never suggest non-democratic measures to obtain power or to prevent other parties from taking part in the electoral competition.

To conclude, as highlighted by many authors, populism can find a breeding ground in Italy. It is indeed able to assume different forms: from nationalist populism, to pure populism and neoliberal populism. It is therefore not wrong to depict Italy as a "populist paradise"⁴¹.

Final remarks

Our initial hypotheses have been confirmed only partially. Salvini, Di Maio, and Berlusconi proved to be populist leaders, regardless of the duration of their carrier or of their potential opportunity to be elected. The first conclusive consideration could therefore be that the leaders' populism is not something episodic, but is instead a distinctive characteristic: if a leader happens to be populist, he is "forever"

⁴⁰ *Domenica Live*, December 14.

⁴¹ G. Hermet, *Les populisms dans le mond...*

populist. Such a consideration is not conclusive, since it would need to be verified with a long-term analysis, which relates the leaders' level of populism to their respective parties' position in the government (whether ruling or oppositional).

This study also shows that in the context of an interview, the level of populism is affected by both the features of the television programmes and the attitude of the anchorman/anchorwoman and journalists towards the interviewee. Popular programs, such as *Domenica Live*, are addressed to a wide audience and are particularly sensitive to ratings, preferring entertainment, sensationalism and gossip to fair and reliable reports: they focus on the personal qualities and on the private life of the leader, and emphasize conflict. In short, as has already been argued, they tend to enhance the populist tone of the leaders' discourses and therefore become a sort of megaphone in their hands⁴².

This study found that the highest level of populism was reached by Di Maio when he was attacked by two journalists: this way of interviewing is unusual in the Italian television context, where the interviewers are usually compliant with the political leader. Conducting an interview in a conflictual way would therefore seem to trigger the populist discourses, and, consequently, to emphasize the differences between the populist politicians and those who adopt a pluralist worldview.

Our study also confirms the accuracy in depicting Italy as a populist paradise, where, as shown, three different kinds of populism, namely national/identitarian, pure/anti-elitism, and neoliberal, find a fertile ground for thriving.

The results of this study may seem foregone or not particularly innovative. In fact, the leaders who have obtained the highest scores of populism – namely Salvini, Di Maio, and Berlusconi – have generally been considered to be populist. Is it therefore really necessary to go through holistic grading to find out what might be already well known?

⁴² G. Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, B. Horsfield (eds.), *The Media and Neo-Populism...*

We believe it is actually worth doing, because, first of all, the adoption of this kind of technique has allowed us to empirically assess the level of populism in the political leaders' discourses, and, in general, of the leaders themselves, by avoiding basing the analysis on second-hand literature or, even worse, on conventional wisdom. Further interesting results may be reached by broadening the time-length of the analysis. Moreover, an additional interesting use of such technique could be comparison of the populism level of past political leaders to that of contemporary ones (e.g. Bossi with Salvini, Giannini with Di Maio). Finally, it has to be remarked again that not all our hypotheses have been confirmed: Di Maio and Berlusconi turned out to be more populist than expected, whereas Meloni basically did not prove to be populist at all. Moreover, we found that the level of populism does not seem to be affected by the different phases of the electoral campaign.

Some conclusive considerations can be drawn with regard to the holistic grading reliability in the context of interviews. Overall, the technique proves to be valid and reliable. However, some specifications opening the way for future research are needed. We treated the interviews as individual speeches, but they actually hold a dialogical structure that we took into account only in a marginal way. We underlined that the attitude of the interviewer towards the politician influences his populist (or pluralist) performance. Moreover, it has to be underlined that in the course of the interview the politician is not only in a constant unmediated relationship with the interviewer, but also in a mediated relationship with his or her competitors, especially during the electoral campaign. Some passages of the interview can therefore become an opportunity for answering previous criticisms received from other political rivals, or for attacking them. For future analysis, this implies the need to revise the rubric in order to take into greater account the dialogical structure of an interview, and make it more suitable for studying the political discourse in its context.

Abstract

The present study aims to measure the level of populism of the main Italian political leaders during the 2018 national electoral campaign, and, consequently, to evaluate which leaders can be considered to be the most populist. Our units of analysis are television interviews of six Italian political leaders: we examined them through the pedagogical assessment technique of holistic grading, applied to the study of populist discourses, following Kirk Hawkins' approach.

This study aims to answer three main research questions: can the holistic grading technique be applied not only to written texts, but also to "oral texts", such as television interviews? Who are the most populist Italian leaders? Which kind of populism is expressed by those who proved to be the most populist leaders?

The analysis is focused on twenty-four interviews conducted in four television programmes with the leaders of the six main Italian political parties: Salvini (*League*), Di Maio (*Five Star Movement*), Berlusconi (*Go Italy*), Renzi (*Democratic Party*), Meloni (*Brothers of Italy*), and Grasso (*Free and Equals*).

KTO JEST NAJWIĘKSZYM POPULISTĄ? ANALIZA WYWIADÓW Z WŁOSKIMI LIDERAMI POLITYCZNYMI PODCZAS KAMPANII WYBORCZEJ W 2018 R.

Abstrakt

Niniejsza analiza ma na celu zbadanie poziomu populizmu głównych włoskich przywódców politycznych podczas kampanii wyborczej w 2018 r., a w dalszej kolejności dokonanie oceny, którzy liderzy mogą być uważani za największych populistów. Jednostką analizy są wywiady telewizyjne z sześcioma włoskimi liderami politycznymi. Badania zostały przeprowadzone za pomocą pedagogicznej techniki oceny całościowej, stosowanej w badaniu dyskursów populistycznych, zgodnie z podejściem Kirka Hawkinsa.

Opracowanie ma na celu udzielenie odpowiedzi na trzy główne pytania badawcze: czy ocena całościowa może być stosowana nie tylko do tekstów pisanych,

ale także do „tekstów mówionych”, takich jak wywiady telewizyjne? Kto należy do grupy najbardziej populistycznych włoskich liderów? Jakiego rodzaju populizm prezentują ci, którzy okazali się najbardziej populistycznymi liderami?

Analiza koncentruje się na dwudziestu czterech wywiadach przeprowadzonych w czterech programach telewizyjnych z liderami sześciu głównych włoskich partii politycznych: Salvini (Liga Północna), Di Maio (Ruch Pięciu Gwiazd), Berlusconi (Forza Italia), Renzi (Partia Demokratyczna), Meloni (Bracia Włosi) i Grasso (Wolni i Równi).

Słowa kluczowe:

populizm, kampania wyborcza, liderzy, Włochy, holistyczna ocena

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Łukasz Jan Berezowski

Political Communication in the Post-representative Italian Democracy: towards a Digital Era of Populism

Key words:

populism, Italian politics, political communication, language of populism, social media

Introduction

In the language of the contemporary politics the term 'populism' represents one of the most recurring and contrasting concepts at the same time. There is a constant debate over 'populist politicians', 'populist parties' and 'endangering populism' in the political science, but the missing link in this debate is the political communication of populists from linguistic and extra-linguistic point of view. On the other hand, it seems quite peculiar that the notion in question is used almost exclusively in a negative connotation. Indeed, living in the times which are considered 'the age of populism', no one expressively self-acknowledges to be one of them. In a more rhetorical reception populism remains a sort of invective that is attributed to a political opponent as a way of unblinding or spotting evil human nature; in fact, it may be utilized as a sign of offence or insult, too. Several populists even admit that the hunt for them remains committed, but it has almost nothing to do with the witch hunt of the Middle Ages as some may maliciously argue.

Despite numerous characteristic traits of populism to be mentioned in the article and notwithstanding an extensive reference to selected study case examples, it is not yet possible to affirm that any consent among experts has been granted on the issue. As a matter of fact, the majority of research explored in the

next section may lead to a conclusion that the defined term is confusing, imprecise and polysemic.

Specifically, Italy appears to be fertile ground for the phenomenon of various populisms to happen. Rising unemployment, precarious work, low wages, economic and migratory crisis are the major problems of the contemporary social and political life that are reflected in civic attitudes. Many populist political figures of today (including Beppe Grillo and Matteo Salvini) have attracted indignant citizens of Italy disappointed with actions taken by previous governments (both center-left and center-right wing) who entrusted them by giving a mandate to exercise the political power in the name and for the account of the dominant majority. In exchange, the voters expect the ruling class to fulfill the given promises even though most of them are barely realistic from the outset.

In the following paragraphs of the present article it is aimed to outline the most influential populist leaders of Italian politics of the last decade (2010-2019) as well as to describe the most typical features of their discourse used in both verbal and non-verbal communication with their electorate. The analysis to be carried out includes both form-based and content-based aspects.

Populism: definition and typology

The term 'populism' derives from the Latin etymon *popŭlu(m)* which was originally supposed to refer to a social component building the State. However, historical and linguistic evolution of *popŭlu(m)* in English and many other European languages goes over the neo-Latin tradition and followed a much longer and more complicated itinerary. Admittedly, the analyzed lexem refers to a translation existent in several Western-European languages which derives from the Russian etymon *narodničesvo*. *Narod* in Russian (as well as *naród* in Polish) means 'people' whereas *narodniki* – 'populists'. The latter was used for the first time in 1870 to name a group of young Russian intellectuals going 'among people' trying to emancipate

the peasant classes. Inspired by the model given by Tsarist Russia, in the USA of 1890s the terms 'populism' and 'populists' were coined to denote the ideology and the members of People's Party, a left-wing agrarian faction of the time. That is where similar derivations emerged from later on and that is why claiming that the continuity between *popŭlu(m)* and 'populism' has been kept appears to be a short-sighted simplification.

When referring to lexicographic references, the Cambridge Dictionary, which announced populism the 'word of the year 2017', defines it as "political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want"¹. Such generic definition need to be explored in further details. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, apart from the first two aforementioned meanings (Russian and American ones) brings also the third origin of the term:

More generally, support for the preferences of ordinary people. The meaning has always been somewhat derogatory. In so far as specific set of populist beliefs can be identified, they involve defence of the (supported) traditions of the little man against change seen as imposed by powerful outsiders, which might variously be governments, businesses, or trade unions. These beliefs are disproportionately prevalent among the *petite bourgeoisie. Although the Russian populists were intellectuals going among the peasantry, **most populism is anti-intellectual in tone**. Movements which have been generally regarded as populist include *Peronism, *Poujadism, and the US presidential campaigns of Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996. Politicians of any party may appeal to populist sentiment when it suits them, and denounce such appeals when that suits them².

As a consequence, the notion of 'populism', in addition to its historical connotations, refers directly to a sort of anti-intelligentsia revolution by opposing well-

¹ See: <https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press>, 15.11.2019.

² G. W. Brown, I. McLean, A. McMillan, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics and International Relations*, 4 edition, Oxford 2018 [bold highlight by ŁJB].

educated and wealthy people to classes with a lower level of schooling and standard of living. Such a paradigm has also been related to US presidential campaigns of multimillionaire and Reform Party's founder Ross Perot and it might be associated with the running for presidency of the current US president Donald Trump in 2016. Both candidates were identified as anti-establishment representatives of society coming from outside the government and fiercely criticizing the ruling class. In particular, Donald Trump's message 'Make America great again' was aimed to attract attention of electorate seeking social changes (such as reform of healthcare system, facilities for young entrepreneurs, benefits for parents and children, support from the government in renting apartments etc.) without stating the funding source to keep those promises. It is therefore clear that the academic definition of 'populism' refers to the strict sense of the term, while the other retains the colloquial meaning of it. For scientific purposes of this analysis this first one shall be used having in mind, however, that the latter carries an evaluative load occurring in opinions and comments widespread by journalists and politicians themselves³.

In this assessment, account has to be taken from the Italian perspective, too. That is why it appears justified to mention one more definition of 'populism' taken from an Italian reference source, namely *Dizionario di politica* (Dictionary of Politics) by UTET:

Such political formulas can be defined as populist for which the main source of inspiration and constant reference point is the people considered as social, homogeneous aggregate and exclusive depositary of positive, specific and permanent values.⁴

³ Cf. criticism of populism provided by Matteo Renzi in his speech quoted in 3.3.

⁴ N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci, G. Pasquino, *Dizionario di politica*, Novara 2014, p. 735: '*Possono essere definite populiste quelle formule politiche per le quali fonte principale d'ispirazione e termine costante di riferimento è il popolo, considerato come aggregato sociale omogeneo e come depositario esclusivo di valori positivi, specifici e permanenti*'.

Nevertheless, reducing the concept of populism to people is not truly necessary to wind up the debate on semantics. It is not sufficiently clear why a reference to people shall be conceived as something negative, as it commonly occurs. On the other hand, the notion of people itself considered as vague and unspecified has undergone countless transformations of the meaning over the centuries and it is likely that behind these changes a tendency towards a connotative uniqueness is expected.

In addition to the above-mentioned definitions of the term 'populism', several typologies of this phenomenon shall be highlighted which result in concrete approaches listed according to the following categories [provided by the author]:

- **civic populism** that consists in the form of belief (which probably represents a deformation of the Swiss model of direct democracy) supported by a part of society that citizens themselves are supposed to govern directly the state bypassing legitimately elected representatives. Among demands expressed by advocates of such approach the following slogans shall be mentioned: 'we must restore the state and give it back to the citizens' or 'it is the people who rule the country, not the politicians';
- **constitutional (or anti-constitutional) populism** relates to the issues of the Basic Law of states worldwide. The mistake lies precisely in too literal understanding of its provisions or a detached interpretation of the global context, especially if the lines quoted are vague or superficial, and are therefore liable to cause confusion. Another side of this movement argues that 'the current constitution is bad and must be immediately amended or abolished, and subsequently a new one must be written';
- **anti-capitalist populism**: the supporters of that assumption believe that 'multinational corporations exploit their workers who are remunerated as slave labor'; 'capital cares about its interests, not ordinary people', 'international

companies are outlawed'). This attitude reflects the ideas of alterglobalism or anarchism of the extreme left;

- **economic or tributary populism** which has an extensive repertoire of very simple ideas limited to the following social views: 'we should be better paid', 'we want to work fewer hours', 'we want work, not job assistance', 'taxes we pay are too high', 'the rich should contribute more';
- **anti-EU or anti-euro populism**: expresses hostility towards the concept of EU-integration and single currency: 'EU takes away our freedom', 'we are to govern ourselves, not through Brussels bureaucrats', 'let us return to lira', 'let's abolish €'. The assumptions are based on the belief that before introducing single currency in 2002 and before signing the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, Italy was a stronger economy, so it is greater integration that has to be blamed for the problems struggled nowadays;
- **nationalist populism**: in the positive sense it means praise for the country and its landmarks that Italians are particularly proud of: 'Italy is the most beautiful country with a thousand of beaches, monuments and the sun'; in the negative sense national populists (also known as 'national chauvinists') oppose nativeness to external influences and deny any sign of foreignness perceiving it as menace to their own culture (even if favorable or useful): 'Italy is for the Italians only', 'Move along, strangers, away from Italy'.
- **anti-immigrant or anti-refugee populism**: it manifests through hostility towards people who arrived in Italy and who escaped from the persecution of war ('these immigrants are loafers who are taking the jobs of locals and they are invading us', 'these are terrorists, not refugees').

The construction of the proposed repertoire is thematically flexible and may be enhanced or developed depending on the current political situation of the coun-

try where populist slogans represent a sort of response to social attitudes at a determined moment in time. Some of its characteristics, though, are mostly stable over time.

Populism of the digital era: between political marketing and media management

As we read in Marco Revelli's *Populismo 2.0*, populism is 'no longer an ideology but, above all, an impetus and a language, actually a political style which is comprised of several contents'⁵. Indeed, while the populism of the past was thought to be a form of protest against an ideology (as a sort of counter-movement), the populism of today exhibits traits of an anti-ideology (especially in the case of anti-state and anti-system political groups). Subsequently, Revelli mentions three types of populism of the digital era in Italy: '*telepopulismo berlusconiano*' (TV populism of Berlusconi) '*cyberpopulismo grillino*' (cyberpopulism of Grillo) and '*populismo dell'alto di Renzi*' (high quality populism of Renzi)⁶. Likewise, Roberto Biorcio as quoted in Storace⁷, defines the transition of Salvini's movement as 'the passage from regionalism into national populism'⁸.

The major protopopulist of the Second Republic, in the opinion of above-mentioned scholars, is Silvio Berlusconi who, before turning to politics known as his '*discesa in campo*' (descend in the field) in 1994 was a businessman and a friend of Bettino Craxi (former leader of the Italian Socialist Party of the time). After the *Tangentopoli* scandal and subsequent collapse of *ancien regime* that governed the republican Italy from the end of the world war two, Berlusconi founded *Forza Italia*, a center-right party which formed several cabinets in the following two decades

⁵ M. Revelli, *Populismo 2.0*, Torino 2017, p. 3-4.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ E. S. Storace, *Retoriche populiste. Riflessioni sui linguaggi politici della sinistra moderata e della sinistra radicale*, [in:] *Rivista Internazionale della filosofia on-line*, Sesto San Giovanni 2018, n. 25, p. 82-101: http://www.metabasis.it/articoli/25/25_Storace.pdf, 15.11.2019.

⁸ R. Biorcio, *Il populismo nella politica italiana. Da Bossi a Berlusconi, da Grillo a Renzi*, Milano-Udine 2015, p. 9.

until his clamorous resignation in 2011. This period is technically and scientifically defined as the 'Second Republic', even though the term itself does not imply any changes to the Italy's political system on the constitutional level and, therefore, it is contested as such by some political scientists and lawyers.⁹

Berlusconi's case deserves undoubtedly a more extensive research, whom lots of studies have been dedicated to¹⁰, that is why a more developed description of the subject shall not be provided in this regard. However, it cannot be denied that Berlusconi's populism has given a go-ahead for other protagonists of the Italian political scene of the last 25 years; references to some of them shall be made in the following assessment as to analyze the strategies applied in their populist language.

Nevertheless, in the contemporary world political leaders have to pay attention not only to the messages they address to their electorates, but they should also obey the group of specialists hired to care about their political image. A real spin team acts in the shadow of politicians, helping them develop unique communicative skills to build, to affirm or to remodel, depending on the particular needs of a campaign, their individual reputation in the eyes of electors¹¹, as we read in Michele Sorice:

Inside the strategies of news management, communication experts – and in particular spin doctors – play a very important role. [...] In the process of news management [...] the leading role is covered by the figure of a spin doctor, that is an expert capable of managing communicative strategies of a political actor and of

⁹ Cf. P. Grilli di Cortona, *Il cambiamento politico in Italia. Dalla Prima alla Seconda Repubblica*. Roma 2007; Ł. J. Berezowski, *La «Seconda Repubblica Italiana» e la «IV Rzeczpospolita Polska»: su alcune analogie e mitologie di due sistemi politici inesistenti*, in: *Toruńskie Studia Polsko-Włoskie VI*, Toruń 2007, pp. 11-25.

¹⁰ Cf. Ł. J. Berezowski, *Zabić Berlusconiego? Współczesna polityka włoska widziana oczami twórców kultury*, [in:] T. Słomka (ed.) *Współczesne Włochy: państwo i społeczeństwo*. Warszawa 2009, pp. 117-134; Ł. J. Berezowski, *A Semiotic Analysis of Italy's Political Discourse. Silvio Berlusconi's Case*, [in:] M. Kopytowska, A. Gałkowski (eds.), *Current Perspectives in Semiotics. Text, Genres, and Representations*, Berlin-Bern-Bruxelles-New York-Oxford-Warsaw-Wien 2018, pp. 157-174.

¹¹ Cf. Storace, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

carrying out work (more or less obscure) of orienting the information. In fact, a spin doctor represents a media manager of the politician and uses a great deal of their time to manage relationships. [...] Indeed, the activity of spin doctoring, which in the late 1960s in the US was limited to building linguistic strategies and media appearance, now has become a sort of practice at the crossroads of many disciplines and professions: marketing, advertizing, journalism and public relations.¹²

It seems evident that also in Italy both traditional left-wing and right-wing parties of the turn of the 19th and 20 century (Partito Rifondazione Comunista, Democratici di Sinistra, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord), unlike the recent ones (Partito Democratico, Movimento 5 Stelle, Lega, Fratelli d'Italia), were unable to make use of the new language and the new media related to web marketing, social networking and, thus, remained attached to the methods of communication barely marketable these days (leaflets, posters, manifestoes). That is why the politics made by Bertinotti, D'Alema, Fini, Bossi and many others some decades ago would not simply earn any tangible benefits in the electronic era. The rhetoric and communicative potentials of the new Italian political groups implemented by their leaders (Renzi, Grillo, Salvini, Meloni) have indeed consistently proved to take over the historical electorate thanks to innovative communicating models, intimately connected with globalization, mass society and digitalization, especially thanks to the use of the aforementioned new media and social networking (Facebook, Twitter,

¹² M. Sorice, *La comunicazione politica*, Roma 2011, pp. 72-75: 'Nelle strategie di news management, gli esperti di comunicazione - e segnatamente gli spin doctor - ricoprono un ruolo molto importante. [...] Nel processo di news management [...] ha oggi assunto un ruolo centrale la figura dello spin doctor, cioè ell'esperto capace di gestire le strategie comunicative dell'attore politico e di effettuare un lavoro (più o meno oscuro) di orientamento dell'informazione. Insomma, lo spin doctor rappresenta il media manager dell'attore politico e usa gran parte del suo tempo per gestire relazioni. [...] In effetti, l'attività di spin doctoring, che alla fine degli anni Sessanta (negli USA) si limitava alla costruzione di strategie linguistiche e di apparenza mediale, è oggi diventata una pratica all'incrocio di diverse discipline e professioni: marketing, pubblicità, giornalismo, relazioni pubbliche'.

YouTube, weblogs etc.), examples of which are to be demonstrated in the next section of the article.

Recent Italian populists

Needless to say, populisms would be unable to occur if the two determining elements were missing: people and populists. Taking into account this thesis, the next step shall be presenting an outline of the most important players of the Italian political scene whose attitude is in line with provided characteristic features of populists.

This in-extent review of the selected political figures and attitudes shall be limited, given the editorial constraints, to four contemporary Italian politicians, representing both right-wing and left-wing populist parties. There are strong contrasts between them and, simultaneously, they do not always correspond to the strict and dichotomist criteria of the right and the left since some of the views they share are contradictory in terms of the classic divisions of political spectrum (e.g. combining libertarian free-market ideas with socialist welfare policy and conservative traditional values). Any sign of clear symmetry in their representativeness does not mean any author's preference to any of the parties described. For scientific purposes of the given work, the spoken words and actions value more than the views of single politicians. The speeches of political actors quoted in the article shall be acquired from their public rallies (especially delivered in the streets), parliamentary proceedings as well as their media appearances (all translations from Italian and bold highlights are provided by the author).

Figure 1. Recent Italian populist politicians, from the left: Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d'Italia), Matteo Salvini (Lega), Beppe Grillo (M5S), Matteo Renzi (Partito Democratico).



Source: <http://www.pagina99.it/2016/10/01/grillo-meloni-renzi-salvini-la-scienza-misura-il-populismo-italiano/>.

Beppe Grillo (Movimento 5 Stelle)

The first politician to be analyzed, who opens the overview of Italian populists of today, is considered one of the most complex, eccentric and folkloric personalities these days. This is Beppe Grillo (born 1948), who, being an actor, comedian and blogger, later in 2009 created a political project of protest called 'Movimento 5 Stelle' (Five Star Movement), directed against both Berlusconi and the right on the one hand, but criticizing the left on the other (which he had felt once spiritually related to). The program of his on-line party was first published in sections on the website *beppegrillo.it* and on a social networking site of Facebook. This is how he attracted several supporters on-line, but in real life, too, thanks to street demonstrations, funny and emotional speeches loaded with mockery and indignation towards politicians coming from all parties of the Italian political scene. Grillo's main areas of interest include ecology and nature protection, fight against corruption, opposition to single currency and water privatization, approval for free access to broadband Internet for everyone. Five Star Movement first emerged in 2013 with 25% of popular vote, which is the highest support that any single party has ever

had. However, the greatest success came up in the parliamentary elections of 2018 when the M5S obtained 227 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 112 in the Senate, which allowed its members to form a coalition cabinet with the separatist right-wing party Lega. Grillo has deliberately stayed behind the Parliament (or, as self-defined, 'in virtual office'), giving over his power to Luigi Di Maio (who has become a deputy prime minister responsible for economic development).

Figure 2. Beppe Grillo's blog.



Source: <http://www.beppegrillo.it/tutti-in-piazza-per-la-scuola-con-il-m5s/>.

In the following sections, selected words of his speeches shall be mentioned. The first three (1-3) date back to the time preceding his entry into politics after the parliamentary elections of 2013, whereas the other three (4-6) refer to the time when Five Star Movement already had its representation in parliament:

- (1) **Polluter countries**, including our own, **deserve a new Nuremberg trial**. The court, which is also an executioner, already exists. It is our Earth (2007)¹³;

¹³ Published on Beppe Grillo's blog, *Da La Cina è vicina*, 28.2.2007, http://www.beppegrillo.it/2007/02/la_cina_e_vicin.html, 15.11.2019: 'I Paesi inquinatori, compreso il nostro, meritano un nuovo processo di Norimberga. Il giudice, che è anche il boia, esiste già. È la nostra Terra'.

(2) In Italy [political] **parties** are only celebrating the **liturgy of power**. They pay attention to forms, rituals, laws and regulations. They no longer have programs, they are just average men who go around newspapers and TV stations to justify their presence. They **would not exist without media**, and indeed, they do not exist. They are just fiction, illusion (2009)¹⁴;

(3) The **current political and economic system** can **no longer be sustained**. We must think about **a new one**. We're talking about civilization, not politics. We have to **redesign the world** (2013)¹⁵;

(4) I considered **Napolitano** clever, but he is **bad**, it's a **man** who **violated the Constitution** (2014)¹⁶;

(5) Sicily is the place with 90 per cent of things it is worth living for: **food, climate, see, tourism, culture**. When you dig a hole, a Norman comes out... **It's got all**. Just change the political generations (2016)¹⁷;

(6) There were once transvestites and not transgenders... a trans can be a woman in stilettos or a man who speaks too much [...]. If you tell a joke about transgenders, you will have ten legal actions... **they get pissed off** (2017)¹⁸.

Beppe Grillo has been a politically incorrect personage since his first public appearance as comedian and actor. Being a disciple of his spiritual father Dario Fo (a Nobel

¹⁴ Published on Beppe Grillo's blog, *Democrazia e antidemocrazia*, 18.7.2009, http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/07/in_italia_i_par.html, 15.11.2019: 'In Italia i partiti sono solo i celebranti della liturgia del potere. Attenti alle forme, ai rituali, agli statuti, ai regolamenti. Non hanno più programmi, ma personaggi senza spessore che si aggirano sui giornali e in televisione per giustificare la loro presenza. Senza i media non esisterebbero, e in effetti, non esistono. Sono una nostra proiezione, un'illusione'.

¹⁵ As quoted in *Il Grillo canta sempre al tramonto*, DarioFo.it, 11.2.2013: 'L'attuale sistema politico ed economico non sta più in piedi. Siamo costretti a pensare a un mondo nuovo. Parliamo di civiltà non di politica. Dobbiamo riprogettare il mondo.'

¹⁶ As quoted in Grillo: «Napolitano cattivo, ha violentato la Costituzione», Corriere.it, 12.4.2014: 'Napolitano lo pensavo un saggio, invece è cattivo, è un uomo che ha violentato la Costituzione'.

¹⁷ As quoted in Grillo: «In Sicilia esperimentiamo il reddito minimo. La mafia? Qui non c'è», La Sicilia.it, 25.4.2016: 'La Sicilia è un luogo che ha il 90% di cose per le quali vale la pena vivere: cibo, clima, mare, turismo, cultura. Scavi un buco ed esce un normanno... C'è tutto. Basta cambiare generazione politica'.

¹⁸ Excerpt from TV show *Grillo vs Grillo*, as quoted in Grillo when deriding the transgender: *Sono donne col belino oppure uomini che parlano tanto. Proteste sui social*, Repubblica.it, 14.2.2017: 'Una volta c'erano solo i travestiti e non c'erano i transgender... un trans è una donna col belino oppure un uomo che parla tanto [...]. A fare una battuta su un transgender ti prendi dieci querele... si incazzano'.

prize winner of 1997 in literature who artistically represented a theater of the radical left), he strongly criticized the ruling class and partitocracy of the time¹⁹ (2-4), complained about the negligence of all governments in the field of protection of the natural environment (1), admired Sicily and the South of Italy (5). Surprisingly, however, Grillo behaved ambiguously towards LGBT communities: on the one hand, he supported the recognition of civil partnerships for same-sex couples in Italy, but on the other he declared reluctance to the transgenders' rights (6) that he derided beyond any censorship.

The populism of Grillo appears to be genuine: he does not have to pretend and seems reliable when expressing his thoughts. He has never run for any public office personally, but his face was plastered over posters and other campaign materials of the party. As claimed by Five Star Movement's leader, he wants to give Italy back to Italians and his job is just to make it happen. The use of digital technologies and social media helped him gather numbers of followers, especially in younger generations who, before 2013 and 2018, had never taken part in public elections and/or had been disappointed with the traditional party system of Italy.

Matteo Salvini (Lega)

Matteo Salvini (born 1973) currently holds the position of Federal Secretary of the *Lega* party (previously named *Lega Nord* after the founder and predecessor Umberto Bossi). Owing to his nomination in the party management in 2013, the group opened to new areas of voters. Despite being based in northern Italy (with separate ideas in their previous program), the Lega members gained over million votes in the South of Italy during the parliamentary elections of 2018. The electors were convinced not only due to assumed Salvini's charisma, but above all by his promises to

¹⁹ On this regard and many others Grillo seems to get closer to a Polish politician Paweł Kukiz, a former rock singer and populist (or vice versa), whose movement Kukiz'15 was linked with M5S during the electoral campaign for the European Parliament of 2019.

stop immigration crisis in the southern regions of Italy plagued by continuous embarks of boats coming from Africa. His language had never been delicate, but powerful, which he showed later on as deputy prime minister responsible for home office. Salvini's speeches mentioned in the below sections relate to both his term as opposition leader (7-11) and cabinet member (12-14):

(7) A **marriage** is between a **man** and a **woman** who **give birth to their children**.

Without family based on mummy and daddy the **society ends** (2012)²⁰;

(8) If one insults a footballer due to color of his skin, is an **act of racism** and must be condemned. **Overtaxing millions of citizens** just because they live in the North is an **act of racism, too**, and must be fought (2013)²¹;

(9) A **state** where a **company fails to sack an employee** as Schettino, **deserves to go bankrupt** (2013)²²;

(10) **Euro in the South, they don't deserve it**. Lombardy and the North [of Italy] can afford it. I want it in Milano, because we are in Europe. **The South**, though, **is like Greece** and needs a different currency. **They cannot afford euro** (2015)²³;

(11) **Let's fight ISIS** starting from the **money streams** that **finance them: oil and illegal immigration** (2016)²⁴;

²⁰ As quoted in T. Mackinson, *Lega contro il libro per bambini che parla di coppia gay*: "Via dalla biblioteca", *Il Fatto Quotidiano.it*, 11.2.2012: 'Il matrimonio è fra un uomo e una donna e i figli nascono da un uomo e da una donna. Senza la famiglia fondata su una mamma e su un papà la società finisce'.

²¹ Excerpt from Facebook page posted on 3.1.2013: 'Insultare un calciatore solo per il colore della sua pelle è un atto di razzismo, e va condannato. Super-tassare milioni di cittadini solo perché vivono al Nord è un atto di razzismo, e va combattuto'.

²² Ibidem: 'Uno Stato dove un'azienda non riesce a licenziare un dipendente come Schettino, si merita di fallire'.

²³ Excerpt from the speech delivered in Piazza Scala in Milan, 2.10.2012; quoted in A. Sicilia, *Caro Salvini le scuse al Sud non bastano*, *HuffingtonPost.it*, 16.2.2015: 'L'euro al Sud non se lo meritano. La Lombardia e il Nord l'euro se lo possono permettere. Io a Milano lo voglio, perché qui siamo in Europa. Il Sud invece è come la Grecia e ha bisogno di un'altra moneta. L'euro non se lo può permettere'.

²⁴ Excerpt from the official Facebook profile posted on 4.7.2016: 'Combattere l'ISIS a partire dalle fonti di denaro che lo armano: petrolio e immigrazione clandestina'.

(12) Never ever, an **alliance between Lega and M5S is fake news**, the same surreal invention as hunt for Salvini being racist, fascist and Nazi who scares kids (2018)²⁵;

(13) Whoever wants peace should support the right of Israel to exist and be secure. I have just been to the northern frontier of Lebanon, where the **Islamic terrorists of Hezbollah dig tunnels and arm their missiles to attack a stronghold of democracy** in the region (2018)²⁶;

(14) The **teachers** who **believe** that **God and Jesus are misplaced at school must be treated** (2018)²⁷.


Apart from the above-mentioned criticism of the EU policy concerning refugees and their alleged connections with terrorists (11, 13), Salvini opposed the single currency (10), exaggerated fiscality (8), protected the traditional values of the family (7, 14), criticized key state institutions after the Costa Concordia tragedy of 2012 (9). The only aspect of his policy that surprised was, primarily, his strong aversion to a political alliance with Five Star Movement, whom he made coalition with after the elections of 2018, and which he left after 15 months being too positive to succeed in the early elections supposed to be announced by Italian president Sergio Mattarella (after cabinet crisis of 2019) that actually did not happen.

²⁵ As quoted in the interview with Salvini: *Mai con i Cinque Stelle. Pauperisti*, Corriere.it, 7.3.2018: *'Mai nella vita, quella dell'alleanza Lega-M5S è una fake news, un'invenzione surreale come la caccia al Salvini razzista, fascista e nazista che spaventa i bambini'*.

²⁶ Excerpt from Salvini's tweet posted during his visit in Israel. *Difesa: "Dichiarazioni preoccupanti"*, Repubblica.it, 11.12.2018: *'Chi vuole la pace, sostiene il diritto all'esistenza ed alla sicurezza di Israele. Sono appena stato ai confini nord col Libano, dove i terroristi islamici di Hezbollah scavano tunnel e armano missili per attaccare il baluardo della democrazia in questa regione'*.

²⁷ Excerpt from Salvini's video speech published on video.corriere.it, 16.12.2018: *'Gli insegnanti che pensano che Dio e Gesù siano fuori posto a scuola vanno curati'*.

Figure 3. Matteo Salvini's Facebook fanpage.



Source: <https://pl-pl.facebook.com/pg/salviniofficial/photos/>.

Salvini, prior to the parliamentary elections of 2018, clearly understood that it is not sufficient, in order to rule Italy (or to enter the cabinet with other parties, at least), to scare off the southern Italians with African and Islamic immigrants only and at the same time to disseminate ideas of 'Nordic separatism'. He had to fight for the electorate of *Meridione* which was a while ago neglected and derided with defamatory terms such as *terroni* (southerners) and *fannulloni* (loafers) as well as to fight for votes of the central Italy including electors belonging to the Roman circle (once called by his predecessor Umberto Bossi 'thieves'). As a consequence of Salvini's rhetoric (and his consistent approach), the Lega stayed a populist party, but credible to his electorate, especially when talking about the introduction of restrictions towards boats of immigrants arriving in Italy. Salvini engaged himself in the project not solely through premeditated policy led by home office, but he personally appeared on beaches during the summer of 2019, talking to ordinary Italians, having selfie images shot shirtless with his female supporters (see fig. 4), which he later on published on his profiles in social media. Thus, he combined two channels of communication: traditional one with the latest electronic tools.

Matteo Renzi (Partito Democratico)

Matteo Renzi (born 1975) is one of the political leaders of the younger generation in the ranks of the centre-left in Italy. Back then, he was related to former prime minister of Italy and the president of the European Commission Romano Prodi. After the collapse of center-left coalition l'Ullivo, Renzi found himself one of the founding fathers of the new political group, Partito Democratico. After a decade (2004-2014) when he stayed in several offices in the regional authorities (as the prefect of province and mayor of Florence), he was hailed as 'a wonderful son of Italian politics' when in February of 2014 the president Giorgio Napolitano entrusted him with a mission of forming a new cabinet. Over three years of the term, until his clamorous dismissal in December of 2016 preceded by the failure of constitutional referendum, Renzi tried to consolidate various democratic and moderate forces in order to govern the country. In his speeches he used a lot of rhetorical figures and round words. Some examples to be quoted include the following:

(15) There comes a point where **courage** must be stronger than comfort while **hope** must take the place of resignation (2012)²⁸;

(16) The **government is like a bicycle**, the pedals make it move, otherwise you won't ride it. I support it to help it move (2013)²⁹;

(17) The **future** is not **a place to wait**, the **future** is **the place to conquer** (2014)³⁰;

(18) Catania is a **beautiful city**. I have just visited it from the top: squares, churches, the links between Roman and Greek culture. And you think, right away, in this theater, about the culture and how **great** our country is. It's a **land** with extraordinary **beauties** (2016)³¹;

²⁸ As quoted in *Il logo della "campagna elettorale"* di Matteo Renzi, il Post.it, 11.9.2012: 'Arriva un momento in cui il coraggio deve essere più forte della comodità e la speranza deve prendere il posto della rassegnazione'.

²⁹ As quoted in *Renzi e il PD che sogna*, Estense.com, 16.7.2013: 'Il Governo è come una bicicletta. Se pedala va, altrimenti no. Io faccio il tifo perché pedali'.

³⁰ As quoted in Scanzi A., *Renzi: slogan tanti, fatti pochi, coerenza zero*, ilFattoQuotidiano.it, 27.3.2014: 'Il futuro non è uno spazio da aspettare, il futuro è un luogo da conquistare.'

³¹ As quoted in *Renzi in Sicilia firma i patti per Catania e Palermo e riapre il viadotto sull'A19*: 'Mai più scandali come questo, Repubblica.it, 30.4.2016: 'Catania è una città bella. L'ho appena visitata dall'alto, piazze, chiese, il rapporto con la cultura romana e greca. E subito

(19) Policy making against someone is very easy, but policy making for something is **beautiful**, it is more difficult but **beautiful**. Be **proud** of this **beauty**. Never stop thinking that you make politics for our children and not for lobbies and their leaders (2016)³²;

(20) Whoever fights for ideas cannot be lost. You've got a wonderful idea, particularly at this stage of European political life. You wanted to bring citizens closer to public affairs, fight **populism**, simplify the system and bring citizens and companies closer together [...]. And you haven't lost it. Tonight you relax and tomorrow you will go to work feeling happy about your **commitment**, your **passions**, your **ideas** (2016)³³;

(21) In Italy Pd [Renzi's party] is a **barrage against populists**: those who break it, jeopardize the country (2017)³⁴.

Renzi, unlike his predecessors on the position of prime minister, meant to balance various radical opinions inside the coalition made up by parties which supported his cabinet. In order to implement his policy of agreement he needed to use mechanisms beyond political disputes, and hence the techniques to build the unity gathered around such universal values that could bind all the Italians, regardless of their political preferences. These mechanisms were reflected in the language he used. For this purpose, Renzi made very frequent reference to the concepts of 'beauty' (18 and 19), 'pride' (19), 'courage' and 'hope' (15), compared the government to a bicycle that must be pedaled (16), foresaw a brilliant future (17), praised the

pensi, in questo teatro, alla cultura e a quanto è grande il nostro Paese. Un paese di straordinarie bellezze'.

³² Renzi si dimette: il discorso integrale da Palazzo Chigi, Video.Corriere.it, 5.12.2016: 'Fare politica andando contro qualcuno è molto facile, fare politica per qualcosa è più bello, è più difficile ma più bello. E siate orgogliosi di questa bellezza. Non smettete mai di pensare che si fa politica pensando ai propri figli e non alle alchimie dei gruppi dirigenti'.

³³ Ivi: 'Chi lotta per un'idea non può perdere. Voi avevate un'idea meravigliosa, in particolare in questa stagione della vita politica europea. Volevate riavvicinare i cittadini alla cosa pubblica, combattere il populismo, semplificare il sistema e rendere più vicini cittadini e imprese. [...]. Per questo voi non avete perso. Stasera andando a risposare o domani andando a lavorare sentitevi soddisfatti dell'impegno, della passione, delle idee'.

³⁴ Excerpt from the interview by Aldo Cazzullo, «Abbiamo quasi un anno davanti per occuparci dell'Italia Uniti con Giuliano possibile il 40%», *Corriere della Sera*, 10.6.2017, p. 3: 'In Italia il Pd è la diga contro i populistici: chi piccona la diga, mette a rischio il Paese'.

South of Italy and Sicily even though they are not center of his party's electorate (18), he criticized populists for disseminating populism (20 and 21).

Figure 4. Matteo Renzi's Twitter profile.



Source: <https://twitter.com/matteorenzi/status/806502084564619264>.

The rhetoric of Matteo Renzi is believed to be an emanation of 'hot water policy' which may help maintain the power in the short run only, but in a longer perspective it must lead to failure, which the former prime minister experienced after the constitutional referendum of December 2016 he personally provoked and promoted.

Giorgia Meloni (Fratelli d'Italia)

The last political figure to be explored in the analysis is Giorgia Meloni (born 1977), the president-in-office of the right-wing party Fratelli d'Italia (formed after the split inside former Berlusconi's party Popolo della Libertà in 2014) and a member of the current parliamentary term. In the past she held the position of minister for youth in the fourth Berlusconi's cabinet and a vice-speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (she was first elected in 2006 at the age of 29 running from the list of Alleanza Na-

zionale, thus she became the youngest female MP). Meloni is known for her extremely conservative and ultra-Catholic views (in 2009 she supported a bill to save Eluana Englaro's life being in a vegetative state). She is Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant at the same time. Some of her most famous public speeches include as quoted below:

(22) [about Mussolini] He is a **complex person** that must be **recorded in history** (2009)³⁵;

(23) [on Englaro's case] I have always been convinced, about Eluana's case, that **defense of life** is the point we have to start from before every other aspect (2009)³⁶;

(24) You **made up stories** and you tell them all around. [...] This is intolerable. **You're gambling with our national pride, with our democracy** (2009)³⁷;

(25) Italy and Europe must face the **issue of euro** pragmatically and not ideologically, without any exclusion, because all the data gathered within last months confirm that the **single currency is not working** and it causes **recession** and **growing unemployment** even among nations who have greatly benefited from them by now (2014)³⁸;

(26) Now, of course, they speak again to **remove father and mother** from documents. Because **family** is an **enemy**. **National identity** is an **enemy**, **gender identity** is an **enemy**. Anything that defines us is an enemy. It's a game of single thought. They must remove everything we are because when we lose our identity, we will no longer have roots and be deprived of awareness and we will not be able to defend our rights. **It's their game**. We want us to be 'parent A' 'parent B'. LGBT sex. citizens X. And the laws. But we are not laws. We are people and

³⁵ Excerpt from TV broadcast *Chiambretti Night*, Italia 1, February 2009: '[su Mussolini] È un personaggio complesso, va storicizzato'.

³⁶ Dall'intervista di Talese L., La Meloni: "Caro Fini, ecco perché non ti seguo", *Il Giornale.it*, 8.2.2009: '[sul caso Englaro] sono convinta da sempre che, nel caso di Eluana, la difesa della vita sia il punto da cui bisogna partire prima di ogni altro ragionamento'.

³⁷ As quoted in: "Vittoria! Sì dalla Francia all'extradizione di Battisti", *GiorgiaMeloni.it*, 4.11.2009: 'Vi inventate delle cose false e le raccontate in giro per il mondo. [...] Questo è intollerabile. State giocando con il nostro orgoglio nazionale, con la nostra democrazia'.

³⁸ As quoted in: "Il degrado e la rabbia", *Il Tempo.it*, 9.11.2014: 'L'Italia e l'Europa devono affrontare la questione euro in modo pragmatico e non ideologico, senza preclusioni, perché tutti i dati degli ultimi mesi confermano che questa moneta unica non funziona e sta provocando recessione e disoccupazione anche in quelle Nazioni che finora ne hanno tratto un vantaggio competitivo'.


we depend on our identity. I'm Giorgia, I'm a woman, I'm a mother, I'm Italian, I'm Christian, **you won't take it away from me! I'm ashamed of a country which does nothing for the families** (2019)³⁹.

Meloni, as an advocate of the national right-wing views, made apology to Mussolini (22), opposed to admissibility of abortion (23), accused the ruling class (referring, obviously, to the left) for violating the democracy (24), criticized the introduction of single currency (25) and blamed LGBT movement for 'destruction of a traditional family model' (26). The tone of her speeches, when to quote several metaphors incurred ('gambling with national pride', 'it's their game' etc.), is boisterous and self-opinionated. When confronting her words with some of her historical predecessors (including Gianfranco Fini, who headed the post-fascist movement Alleanza Nazionale a decade ago), the content is almost identical due to like-minded political views but the issues are more up-to-date and the way she presents them goes beyond any accepted standards of a political debate. The natural environment of political communicating for Meloni is a political rally, this is where she feels the most comfortable when talking to her electorate. Her image in the flesh is much different than the one she cultivates on-line, for example via her Twitter account. Next to the pictures where we can observe a calm, well-groomed and balanced woman in her early forties, at the same time we see hostile and obscene messages posted in her recent Tweets such as: *la fregatura del fondo salva stati* ('a rip-off of state rescue fund), *questo governo è un insulto allo stato* ('this cabinet is an insult to the state',

³⁹ As quoted in *La Repubblica*, repubblica.it, 19.10.2019 [transcribed from YouTube streaming]: *'Adesso, chiaramente, riparlano di togliere la dicitura padre e madre dai documenti. Perché la famiglia è un nemico. L'identità nazionale è un nemico, l'identità di genere è un nemico. Tutto ciò che ci definisce è un nemico. È il gioco del pensiero unico. Ci devono togliere tutto quello che siamo perchè quando non avremo più identità, non avremo più radici, saremo privi di consapevolezza, incapaci di difendere i nostri diritti. È il loro gioco. Vogliono che siamo geinitore uno, genitore due. Genere LGBT. Cittadini X. E i codici. Ma non siamo dei codici. Noi siamo persone e dipenderemo dalla nostra identità. Io sono Giorgia, sono una donna, sono una madre, sono italiana, sono cristiana, non me lo toglierete! Mi vergogno di uno stato che non fa niente per le famiglie'*.

when talking about new Conte's government), *contro l'invasione* ('stop the invasion', while speaking of a bill aiming to confer Italian citizenship to everyone who was born in Italy). Meloni sounds authentic, but her style of communication is much different when speaking during a political rally and when being hosted in a TV program and in written, computer-mediated communication.

Figure 5. Giorgia Meloni in YouTube video streaming.



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KmaluGJWbEA>.

Conclusions

The presented overview of Italian populists and their language demonstrated not only the two opposite sides in terms of political views (the right-wing Salvini and Meloni versus the left-wing Grillo and Renzi), but also two different channels of communication (traditional one consisting in public appearances and rallies on the one hand and digital one involving the use of social media and computer-mediated tools on the other). The support from modern technologies as well as from IT experts, media consultants and spin doctors help populists of the digital era become even more credible in the eyes of the so-called doubting electorate, whose representatives, apart from being disappointed with the ruling class of the past, are at the same time ordinary citizens, employees, web users and expect the political class

to keep up with the reality they live in. Unlike the channel of communication, the messages broadcast on-line do not differ much in terms of the content than the ones expressed in real-time. Populists are known for the kind of discourse which barely provides instant solutions to heal the problems of the society, but those in the position of power are to be blamed for them. The solutions proposed, if anything, are mostly unrealistic to implement and the source of the financing is unknown, either. Some of the problems named as corruption, tax avoidance and VAT frauds are too complex to be battled with such generic solutions as strengthening penalties for committing these offences (as proposed by both Salvini and Grillo).

Consequently, some universal tendencies may be observed among all politicians and their speeches analyzed in the work. They are represented by the following attitudes of populist nature (that become typically noticeable not only in Italy, but also in other European and overseas developing countries, equally plagued by various social and economical problems):

- preference of the people instead of the civic society;
- presence of charismatic leader (or a group of leaders);
- reference to current or permanent anxieties and fears (such as immigration crisis, LGBT movement, terrorism, theories of conspiracy, poverty, illnesses etc.);
- mistrust and criticism of the ruling class on the whole, struggling against the establishment, defining the invisible enemy;
- emphasis on the national and traditional values (in the case of right-wing populism) or focus on international and cosmopolitan values (in the case of left-wing or anarchic populism);
- distrust towards capitals, banks, financial institutions, private property etc.;
- xenophobia and hostility towards diversities;
- euroscepticism, alterglobalism;
- silent support or open apology of totalitarian regimes of the past;

- orality and use of particular gestures in the discourse of leaders,
- speeches loaded with signs, mimicry, pantomime, fascinating figures of speech;
- use of colloquialisms, jargon, swear words, blasphemies and *ad personam* insults.

Specifically, the aforementioned social antagonisms assume the form of concrete messages, addressed to a target group that awaits them and declares openly to vote for a determined party or its leader even if their declarations are not covered by effective actions on the politicians' part who allegedly aim at improving the lives of citizens. Among the elements involved in the analyzed speeches the following ones are to be distinguished:

- disapproval of the single currency: Salvini (10), Meloni (25);
- discrimination against sexual minorities: Grillo (6), Meloni (26);
- criticism of populism: Renzi (20–21);
- criticism of immigration and of its alleged links with Islamic terrorism: Salvini (11, 13);
- criticism of the political system and/or of the partitocracy: Grillo (2-3);
- defense of the traditional and Catholic values: Salvini (7, 14), Meloni (23);
- appeal to universal values such as 'hope', 'courage', 'pride', 'future' etc.: Renzi (15, 17, 19);
- apology of Benito Mussolini and/or fascist doctrine: Meloni (22);
- anti-system and anti-State attitudes: Grillo (1, 3), Salvini (9);
- apparent defense of the values of democracy: Grillo (4), Meloni (24);
- glorification of beauty: Renzi (18–19);
- exaltation of the South of Italy: Grillo (5), Renzi (18);
- primacy of the North of Italy: Salvini (8);

- use of metaphors, comparisons, hyperboles, synecdoche and other rhetorical figures: Renzi (16, 18), Meloni (26).

In conclusion, it would be worthwhile to reflect briefly on the following question: is it really an insult to name a politician with the label 'populist'? The answer is negative since being a 'populist' is no offence, indeed it represents a new category in the description of political reality. How shall we juxtapose an 'old populist' who in the past time battled for equitable remuneration and 8-hour working time in factories with a 'new populist' who is vegan, opposes climate changes, rides their bike and supports same-sex marriages? An answer, even if not perfect one, may be found in Giuseppe Rinaldi:

[...] in the western countries of today the forms of old populism based on hard, permanent characteristics including country of origin, skin color, economic and social status are increasingly difficult. But permanent cultural labels such as language, religion or traditions become even more difficult. Nowadays, we observe a transition of populist forms into ones based on temporary distinctive features considered as unclear and evanescent. An enormous challenge that pops open when talking about the notion of people is based on increasingly softer elements perceived imagined or even imaginary. Since these elements are not of evident character, thus they must be built. This means that the features of new populism might be completely artificial or unnatural. One should bear in mind that the fact of being artificial does not imply these elements produce no effects, as explained in Thomas theorem: 'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequence']⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ G. Rinaldi, *Soggetti del populismo. Appunti Alessandrini (politica e attualità)*, 2007, <https://appuntialessandrini.wordpress.com/2017/03/28/i-soggetti-del-populismo/>, 15.11.2019: *'nei paesi occidentali oggi sono sempre più difficili le forme di populismo di vecchio stampo, quelle basate su caratteri permanenti, di tipo hard, come il territorio di provenienza, il colore della pelle, la condizione economica, la condizione sociale; ma stanno anche diventando più difficili quelle basate su marche culturali permanenti, come la lingua, la religione o le tradizioni. Si sta oggi così passando a forme di populismo basate su caratteri distintivi sempre più transitori o, comunque, alquanto labili e evanescenti. La possibilità di enorme portata che si apre è quella di una nozione del popolo giocata su elementi sempre più soft, assolutamente immaginati, talvolta decisamente immaginosi. Poiché questi caratteri non sono di per sé evidenti, allora devono essere costruiti. Il che è lo stesso che riconoscere che i caratteri distintivi del nuovo populismo siano del tutto artificiali e artificiosi. Si*

Abstract

The object of the present article is an analysis of the Italian political scene of the second decade of the 21st century (2010-2019) in terms of the language used by leaders of contemporary populist parties (Beppe Grillo of Five Star Movement, Matteo Salvini of League, Matteo Renzi of Democratic Party and Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy). In the theoretical part the author refers to definitions and typologies of 'populism' available in the applied sources; he explores this notion in both formal and content-based perspective with the use of English- and Italian speaking references so as to propose, simultaneously, his own taxonomy involving its specific characteristics. The evolution of populism till now is followed, taking into account historical and political background of Italy as well as considering new technologies and social media as a breeding ground for dialog between politicians and their electorate. In the practical part the author contrasts four aforementioned Italian political leaders and their discourse with particular attention to the typical aspects of their speech, the way they communicate with the voters and the political message they spread. The conclusion aims at providing an answer to the question if political communication of the digital era populists differs much from traditional ones, to what extent new media and modern technologies contribute to the process of communication and, finally, if labeling politicians of today 'populists' is still an insult since they self-identify as such.

noti bene che il fatto che siano artificiali non significa che non abbiano effetti, come chiarifica il teorema di Thomas [«Se gli uomini definiscono certe situazioni come reali, queste sono reali nelle loro conseguenze»].

KOMUNIKOWANIE POLITYCZNE W POSTREPREZENTATYWNEJ WŁOSKIEJ DEMOKRACJI: W STRONĘ CYFROWEJ ERY POPULIZMU

Abstrakt

Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza włoskiej sceny politycznej drugiej dekady XXI wieku (2010-2019) pod kątem języka używanego przez przedstawicieli partii populistycznych (m.in. Beppe Grillo z partii Ruch Pięciu Gwiazd, Matteo Salvini z partii Liga, Matteo Renzi z Partii Demokratycznej i Giorgia Meloni z partii Braci Włosi). W części teoretycznej autor przytacza stosowane w literaturze przedmiotu definicje i typologie terminu *populizm*, dokonuje formalno-językowej i merytorycznej wykładni tego zjawiska, posiłkując się źródłami angielsko- i włoskojęzycznymi, jak również tworząc własną systematykę cech mu właściwych. Śledzi ewolucję tego pojęcia aż do czasów współczesnych, uwzględniając uwarunkowania historyczne i polityczne Włoch, a także włączając w jego funkcjonowanie nowoczesne technologie, w tym media społecznościowe, jako podatny grunt do prowadzenia dialogu między liderami politycznymi i ich elektoratem. W części praktycznej autor zestawia ze sobą wypowiedzi czterech cytowanych wyżej polityków włoskich, zwracając uwagę na typowe aspekty ich języka, sposób porozumiewania się z wyborcami oraz głoszone treści w ich wypowiedziach. W konkluzji autor podejmuje próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, na ile komunikowanie polityczne populistów tzw. cyfrowej ery różni się od tych tradycyjnych, jaki przyczynek do tego wnoszą nowe media i nowoczesne technologie oraz czy nazywanie polityków populistami jest wciąż obelgą, jeśli współcześni politycy sami się nimi mienią.

Słowa kluczowe:

populizm, polityka włoska, komunikowanie polityczne, język populizmu, media społecznościowe

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Jacek Wasilewski

Media Narratives on Refugees in the Polish Press

Key words:

media, refugees, polish press

Introduction

The European Union was built on humanistic values. The migration of 2015 on the territory of Europe has happened on such a large scale for the first time since the Second World War. The number of people searching for shelter globally is increasing: in 2004 more than 17 million were registered, while the 2015 estimations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees speak of 21 million.¹ As much as 54% of refugees come from three countries: Syria (4.7 m), Afghanistan (2.9 m) and Somalia (1.1 m). How do countries reluctant to receive refugees proceed to keep the mask of a state that remains true to such values? What narratives are produced as a result of the fear of foreignness?

In September 2015, Polish government decided to accommodate seven thousands of refugees from the countries affected by the war. The conservative part of society strongly opposed to the idea. They feared the “flood” of foreign culture. The strategy of the Polish administration and its political opponents oscillated between facilitation of these fears and reference to such Christian values as compassion and providing assistance to the needy.

From the very beginning a refugee has been only a figure for the Polish

¹ *Raport: milion uchodźców i migrantów przybyło w 2015 r. do Europy*, 23.12.2015, <http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,449369,raport-milion-uchodzcow-i-migrantow-przybylo-w-2015-r-do-europy.html>, 09.08.2016.

society – not quite known, not settled in everyday life. Due to this fact, the media could freely assign specific attributes to this figure – one may say that a refugee was created by the “forth estate”.

The less real contact – as in the case of Poland, the bigger the role of the media – acting as bugbears or guides. For an average Pole, a refugee is not a real person but rather a construct created on the basis of an opinion from newspapers or television, which is proved by the words of the former Prime Minister, Ewa Kopacz, who stated that Poland would receive refugees, not those “seen on TV”².

What we were interested in were the emotions accompanying the either willing or forced accommodation of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa and the main narratives developed by media of different wings.

Political Events in Europe

The 2015 migration crisis is a long-term consequence of the Arab Spring of 2011. Even then people began crossing the Mediterranean Sea in pontoons, fleeing from Libya which was gripped by civil war, trying to get to distant Italian coast. The Mediterranean way became the main route for the coming immigrants. Later on, refugees began transiting from the Turkish coasts by the Aegean Sea. The number of victims continuously increased.

During the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Europe – on April 23rd, 2015 – a mobilisation was considered to prevent the loss of life of refugees on the sea. It was also declared to renew the intra-European solidarity and common responsibility of all member states. A month later, the European Commission proposed to automatically distribute the immigrants applying for refugee status among

² Rudziński L., *Ewa Kopacz: Polska może przyjąć więcej uchodźców niż zakładaliśmy. Społeczeństwo tego nie odczuje*, 20.09.2015, portal Polska Times, <https://polskatimes.pl/ewa-kopacz-polska-moze-przyjac-wiecej-uchodzcow-niz-zakladalismy-spoleczenstwo-tego-nie-odczuje/ar/8161149>, 28.08.2016.

all EU member states. A relocation plan was to be implemented in the EU member states while a resettlement plan was to refer to refugees from outside the European Union.

The proposal of the European Commission, announced in the communication of May 2015 – was rejected two months later, also because of Poland and France. The distribution of 40 thousand and the following 120 thousand immigrants directly affected by the migration crisis, applying for refugee status or other form of support and protection was received in September that year.

In consequence of the inflow of immigrants, the EU agenda included the issue of appointment of new border guards. If any of the member states comes under the migration pressure posing a threat to the Schengen area – the European Commission has the right to make a decision on intervention of the Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Poland on Refugees

The Polish government did not like the idea of the quota system proposed by the European Commission. Also the votes of the Polish politicians blocked the decision regarding the mandatory distribution of refugees among the member states. In the middle of the previous year, the then Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz from the centrist party PO declared that Poland might accommodate as many refugees as it could afford. She emphasized that there was no inconsistency between the care for the safety of the state and the citizens and offering support to people fleeing from civil war and saving their own lives and the lives of their families.

A turn in the matter of the European Commission's proposal took place on September 16th, 2015. It was occasioned on the one hand by an attempt to mitigate the tension with the western EU member states, and on the other hand – by the fact that the attitude towards refugees became a veritable bargaining chip for the election campaign that was gaining momentum. The right-wing PiS was against the

reception of refugees as it was a threat to the Polish identity, whereas PO in opposition to it could describe itself as a sympathizing and open party in order to grab the votes of the left wing. The lack of support was defined as anti-European bias. In her speech of September 20th, 2015, Kopacz underlined the lack of inconsistency between the protection of own state and the provision of support to the victims of wars or hunger. Thus she distinguished two types of incomers: economic immigrants and war refugees, declaring support only to the latter, "real refugees" – they were the only refugee figures which were safe for the populist election campaign. Therefore, Prime Minister Kopacz declared solidarity and unanimity with the European countries, but concurrently put Poland in the position of a host who has the right to decide who should be received under his roof.

The subject of migrants coming to Poland was one of the most important issues of the election campaign. As it turned out, a firm attitude towards refugees and reluctance to accommodate them certainly contributed to the win of PiS in the election of October 25th, 2015.

According to the Millward Brown election research carried out on a representative group of economically active Poles (2015), the biggest fears connected with the arrival of refugees to Poland included living at the costs of taxpayer (75%), terrorism (72%), large clusters of Islamists (70%) who bring their families, improper attitude towards women, reluctance to assimilation in Poland, imposing their rights and religion (65%), and vandalism. During the researched period, people, especially the younger, aged 0-20, were convinced that the mainstream media were not a reliable source of information in this respect – as they carried out a pro-immigrant propaganda, showing the polite picture of them. One may find on the Internet the commentaries of people from the countries to which immigrants came, which are ill-disposed towards refugees, and they are reliable sources of information. The entries, and most importantly the photos were to show the "real picture of immigrants" – aggressive men with smartphones, throwing away food over fencing and

devastating trains. Lots of such reports can be found on Facebook or forums, in comments under articles. Such voices of "ordinary people" seemed more authentic than the press.

In the FGI Millward Brown research (2015) the Poles alternatively agreed to accommodate people in dramatic situation – who left their countries gripped by war in the fear of their elementary safety. The respondents feel that in that case it bears the hallmarks of an impulse of solidarity and humanitarianism; it is a gesture of support in the situation that actually poses a threat to life. Especially to the weaker people – e.g. woman with children. Such individuals not only need more support but also cause less fears of aggression, terrorism, imposing their customs or rights to us. The respondents imagine that they will easier adapt to the Polish rules. However, they did not agree to receive dodgers who came to Europe to take advantage of the economic support offered by the EU member states, which was to be evidenced by the fact that after the arrival to Europe they did not stay in the first safe place but, with determination, they set off on a long journey to the rich states (Germany, Sweden). Poland or Hungary are not an attractive destination for them. Most of the respondents in the Millward Brown survey saw them as young and strong men who came to Europe to settle down and bring their families, relatives and take control over districts, establish their own enclaves; they might want to use their strength to blackmail the states receiving them – they might want to impose their own rules; they might be members of terroristic organisations and will make terrorist attacks, develop a terroristic network; additionally they hide their motivations/past, as they destroy the documents and refuse to get fingerprinted.

The threats to Poland according to the respondents are: the division into insiders and outsiders, ghettos, ritual killing of animals, harems and polygamy, no respect for tradition and establishment of mosques as a breeding ground for terrorism. In the opinion of the respondents, most of the refugees will not take up a job but instead will try to live comfortably doing nothing, taking advantage of the

support for as long as possible. According to the respondents, this results from their nature of nations which are not born to work. Choosing the richest states with extended social support made an impression that part of the respondents envy them the possible social support in Germany, which caused additional aggression.

Procedures – Poland

An application for refugee status should be submitted to the Border Guard, which can be done upon arrival or during the stay in Poland. The application should be filled out in Polish by a border guard. If the application has been accepted for consideration, a foreigner receives a temporary certificate of identity which entitles him and his children to stay in Poland for duration of the proceedings. The next stage of the proceedings is an interview in the Office for Foreigners, during which the incomer has to answer the questions of the officials. The application for refugee status should be considered within 6 months. After receipt of the decision, the applicant has to leave the centre for foreigners³.

The refugees who were granted the refugee status are entitled to legally stay in the state and acquire the civic rights. In 2015 in Poland the refugee status was granted to 348 foreigners, in 2014 – 262, in the majority of cases to the citizens of Syria⁴.

³ On the basis of the information provided by the Office for Foreigners, <http://udsc.gov.pl/uchodzcy-2/>, 20.08.2016.

⁴ The Office for Foreigners, *Podsumowanie: ochrona międzynarodowa w 2015 roku*, 23.05.2016, <http://udsc.gov.pl/podsumowanie-ochrona-miedzynarodowa-w-2015-roku/>, 20.08.2016.

Table 1. Refugee status granted to citizens of particular states in the years 2014-15.

State	Year	
	2014	2015
Syria	115	203
Iraq	0	24
Russian Federation	13	21
Stateless persons	22	20
Egypt	10	15
Belarus	14	14
Turkmenistan	0	12
Kazakhstan	22	0
Somalia	12	0

Source: own elaboration.

Objective and Subject of the Research

The migration crisis seemed to be a particularly good subject of research – over the period of several months it divided the public opinion and the attitude towards refugees became a determinant of the worldview. We wanted to check how objective the Polish press was in its attempts to reflect reality and to what extent it created its own version. The goal of our study was, most of all, to get the answer to the question how the figure of hero-refugee is constructed by the media and what narratives on him prevail in the media content.

The subjects of our research were five Polish newspapers – two daily papers: the left-liberal “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the right-Catholic “Nasz Dziennik”, and 2 magazines: the left-liberal “Polityka”, the right-conservative “W Sieci”.

The analysed periodicals were chosen in regard to their attitude towards individualism and community, and also the left or right inclination.

Right-wing newspapers.

1. “Nasz Dziennik” is a Polish nationwide newspaper of Catholic and national profile, the circulation of approx. 100 thousand copies.

2. “W Sieci” is the biggest right-wing conservative weekly in Poland, the circulation of 70 015. The weekly is conducive to the present ruling party (PiS), it is against PO and the Left. “W Sieci” very often refers to common Polish roots, identity and culture. It considers the nation as a strongly uniform formation which should go hand in hand under one white and red flag, whilst Catholic religion is its inseparable element.
3. “Polityka” is a weekly that is mostly defined as left-centrist or liberal-left. In June 2016 the weekly reached the circulation of 116 830 copies⁵.
4. “Gazeta Wyborcza” is a Polish nationwide social and political daily paper with left-liberal inclination.

The research covered the period of 11 months – from March 2015 to January 2016, while its body was formed by articles in which narratives appeared (according to the criteria of Jerzy Trzebiński, which will be referred to hereunder). Each article containing the word refugee or immigrant was analysed.

The objective of the research was to check:

- if, depending on the title and political inclination of a newspaper, the information concerning refugees appear in the form of diversified narratives;
- if the narratives change over time; if current events affected the way of presenting the refugees;
- what kind of people the refugees presented in the press are, if they are similar to the citizens of their target states or different;
- if the issue of different faith is important in the description of refugees.

Methodology

The analysis focused on two levels:

- the first is the plot level, to which narrative analysis can be applied, taking

⁵ Data coming from the website Teleskop,
<https://www.teleskop.org.pl/zkdp/index.jsp?p=publicDataNoReg>, 19.08.2016.

into account the described narrative categories, their determinants in the text and relationships between particular heroes proposed by Algirdas Greimas;

- the second level is the content analysis, which is based on the categories from the level of the language, and so appropriate terms, expressions, phrases or figures (such as irony), which construct a character as regards the characteristics of mind, appearance, etc. being presented to the reader.
- During the analysis we used archive of the Laboratory of Media Studies, University of Warsaw.

Definition of Narrative

According to the Polish psychologist, Jerzy Trzebiński, narrative is a way of understanding reality. It can be said that we understand the events and situations taking place around us as stories, while we find ourselves as characters from such stories. The relationships between us are the relationships of heroes bound up with narrative thread⁶. According to Jerzy Trzebiński, narratives have universal structure: a hero with specified intentions encounters difficulties, which as a result of the events taking place around the threatened goals are overcome or not⁷.

A narrative schema, which represents a given fragment of reality and allows its interpretation, consists of the following elements:

1. Heroes of the story taking place in any of the spheres (family life, work, living with neighbours).
2. Values of heroes, i.e. the world sphere states, either positive or negative for them, often connected with their intentions and action plans.
3. Complications, which may happen to heroes in the course of realisation of their intentions, as well as their helpers and opponents.

⁶ J. Trzebiński, *Narracyjne konstruowanie rzeczywistości*, [in:] J. Trzebiński (ed.), *Narracje jako sposób rozumienia świata*, Gdańsk 2001, p. 13.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 22.

4. And chances to cope with the difficulties and achieve the goal.

Therefore, narrative describes a hero with specified intentions, who encounters difficulties in their realisation, while the difficulties – in consequence of the events taking place around the intentional actions – are overcome or not⁸. The criterion of hero, goal and obstacles was the basis for qualification of texts as narrative in the research.

Encoded terms of heroes and goals were subsequently aggregated with the application of the narrative schema prepared by Greimas for a magical fairy tale⁹. The schema works the following way: on the basis of culturally available patterns and through specific episodes, the receiver attributes to heroes motivations to act. The change of relations between these elements and their order on the narrative axis changes the meanings of the whole narrative. An example may be the scheme of two events occurring at the same time: *He married her* and *she inherited will inherit*. Depending on the order of providing these facts, we attribute different motivations to the man.

The taxonomic model by Greimas consists of three elements: sender, subject, receiver¹⁰. There is an exchange among the three factors: the sender pushes the hero to act and establishes his goal, the content comprises the hero's actions in the course of achievement of the goal, while the receiver is someone who feels the consequences of the main hero's actions.

Narrative tells us how the hero approaches and is drawn away from the goal, with the support of benefactors and obstacles of antagonists.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 14.

⁹ A. J. Greimas, *Elementy gramatyki narracyjnej*, [in:] M. Głowiński (ed.), *Narratologia*, Gdańsk 2004, pp. 55-89.

¹⁰ J. Wasilewski, *Opowieści o Polsce. Retoryka narracji*, Warsaw 2012, p. 66.

Table 2. Analytical narrative levels according to Greimas.

	SENDER		SUBJECT		RECEIVER	
Communication level (meanings)	Sending (determining hero's goal)		Hero's goal		Receiving (the one who wins or loses due to hero's action)	
				DESIRE		
Dramatic level (of action)	HELPER [Benefactor]		Hero		OPPONENT [Adversary]	
		COOPERATION		CONFRONTATION		

Source: own elaboration.

Other Categories

We assume that the attitude towards the Syrian refugees would create the neighbour or outsider to inhabitants of Europe. Even if the other not necessarily differs from us – we create his figure on the basis of reverse of ourselves. So we researched how particular newspapers constructed the “other”.

Analytic categories resulted from aggregation of various approaches related to the figure of outsider. The vision of the otherness was achieved through interdisciplinary categories: psychological, cultural, linguistic, sociological studies. Their combination provides a better perspective of the vision. The code key categories come from theoretical approaches which are included in the following items:

1. *Stigma* by Erving Goffman, who distinguished types of scars and described the ways of exclusion.
2. *Unster dem Siegel der Verschwiegenheit die Psychologie des Klautches* by Klaus Thiele-Dohrman, who described how to construct narrative without contact with the other person.
3. *Tematy, które mi odradzano* by Jan Stanisław Bystron, who collected ethnographic material on attributing various characteristics of appearance and character to others.
4. *Le bouc émissaire (Kozioł ofiarny)* by Rene Girard – about designing the blame

for the crisis in a group.

Klaus Thiele-Dohrman notes that a gossip focuses on different characteristics of an outsider – extending them, attributing negative meanings to them, magnifying. This is a social penalty for being different, which condemns the other to exclusion. A gossip may be associated with the mechanism of projection, i.e. attributing to someone else the weaknesses which in fact may refer to us. The purpose of gossip is to create a common enemy. One goal consolidates members of a group, strengthens their bond: together they defend a just cause. In the case of refugees, a gossip appears long before they actually arrive to the state – an imaginary picture of a refugee is ahead of the real one. The fear of the outsider starts the process of building a barrier around own group. The incomers are attributed with the characteristics which, because of the created atmosphere of fear and hate, cannot be verified – therefore they may freely distort reality¹¹.

Basing on the study by Bystron, we determined categories which will be used to highlight the differences between us and the others:

1. appearance – skin colour, outfit, physical deformations;
2. language – bringing it down to the level of unintelligible and ridiculous cant;
3. food – eating forbidden animals, dishes considered disgusting;
4. faith – heterodoxy, which is called the “dog’s faith”;
5. customs – attitude towards women or the elders;
6. origin – descendants of a woman and a dog, but also illegitimate descendants;
7. magic powers – bringing diseases, casting spells;
8. personality traits – e.g. meanness or laziness, as well as being subject to inverted rules (“at the infant age – grey, at the old age – black hair”¹²).

A crisis always results in searching for the source being the reason why bad things are happening. According to Girard, the most frequent mechanism is putting

¹¹ K. Thiele-Dohrmann, *Psychologia plotki*, Warsaw 1980, p. 18.

¹² J. S. Bystron, *Tematy, które mi odradzano*, Warsaw, 1980, p. 315.

blame on a weak person who is unable to defend himself or herself and the elimination of which may be a sacrifice inverting the course of events. The figure of sacrificial victim becomes crucial during a crisis such as epidemic, religious conflict, drought, social crisis or a collapse of the state institution – i.e. anything that impends over the community. The community members select someone with certain sacrificial characteristics as the cause of the tragedy:

1. belongs to ethnical, religious minority;
2. is physically distinguished by: a disease, deformations, mutilation, defectiveness, ugliness;
3. comes from another country: foreigners do not have the right habits, are unable to respect the rules of the host;
4. is situated at the top of the social hierarchy: as a result of the crisis, the subjects turn to the governor, who is perceived as an oppressor and tyrant;
5. has extreme characteristics: vast wealth or total misery, excessive beauty or ugliness, unlimited promiscuity or absolute virginity¹³.

Code Key

On the basis of specified categories, which may be essential in the analysis of a refugee as a neighbour or an outsider in the media narratives, the code key was established with the following categories:

- Genre of article: information, journalism, reportage, interview, mention, commentary;
source of information: own – from the state officials, from a reporter on the spot, from an agency, author's opinion;
- Narrative positions of a refugee: hero (hero's goal), ally, antagonist (antagonist's goal); also who the victim or beneficiary of events is, what the

¹³ R. Girard, *Kozioł ofiarny*, Łódź 1987.

image of refugee is – positive or negative;

- Appearance: different skin colour, different outfit, ugliness/deformations, sex (man, woman, child, man with a child, woman with a child, family, group, group of men);
- Mood (happy, sad, disappointed, scared, disgusted, angry, surprised, determined), material status (wealth/poverty), education (educated/non-educated/no mention);
- Personality traits (stupid/smart, untruthful/truthful, sensitive/non-sensitive, having unnatural skills, aggressive/calm, intolerant/tolerant, dogmatic/liberal, lazy/hard-working, unable to behave/able to behave);
- Believers (no mention about religiousness, Islamists, Muslims, Christians);
- Discourse: expert/emotional.

Table 3. Code key.

Article	source
	title
	date
Source of information	own
	from a reporter on the spot
	from an agency
	author's opinion
Narrative positions of a refugee	the image of a refugee – positive or negative
	hero
	ally
	hero's goal
	antagonist
	the victim or beneficiary of events
	antagonist's goal
Appearance	different skin colour
	different outfit
	ugliness/deformations
	sex (man, woman, child, man with a child, woman with a child, family, group, group of men)

	mood (happy, sad, disappointed, scared, disgusted, angry, surprised, determined)
	material status (wealth/poverty)
	education (educated/non-educated/no mention)
Personality traits	stupid/smart
	untruthful/truthful
	sensitive/non-sensitive
	having unnatural skills
	aggressive/calm
	intolerant/ tolerant
	dogmatic/liberal
	lazy/hard-working
	unable to behave/ able to behave
Magical powers	terrorist
	rapist
	carrier of diseases
Believers	no mention about religiousness, Islamists, Muslims, Christians
Discourse	expert
	emotional
Genre of article	information, journalism, reportage, interview, mention, commentary

Source: own elaboration.

Results of the Analysis

The main variable, which was to affect the change of the narrative type or the number of published articles on refugees, were the dates of important political events:

1. September 6th, 2015 – publication of the UNO report, according to which 75% of refugees are men;
2. October 25th, 2015 – parliamentary election in Poland;
3. November 13th, 2015 – terrorist attacks in France;
4. December 31st, 2015/January 1st, 2016 – attacks on women in Cologne in Germany.

As regards the right-Catholic daily “Nasz Dziennik”, all the dates except for the election date were crucial for the changes in the narrative. There in not even

one article concerning the UNO report dated September 6th, 2015 in “Nasz Dziennik”, but its presence can be noted by a sudden increase in the number of articles on the immigration crisis. In the texts classified as narrative – since September a hero occurred more often as an illegal immigrant. Before, he had been described mainly as a refugee fleeing from the war. Since September immigrants had been described as a problem which divided the European countries. More attention was paid to the states or specific authorities and to how they coped with the immigration problem rather than to the refugees themselves.

After the attacks in France on November 13th, 2015 more articles were published about refugees, immigrants and terrorists, but the majority of the texts were not narrative. Part of the texts referred to assessing particular states, the ideas how to stop terrorism and to asking questions – who was responsible for it.

At the New Year's Eve women were attacked in Germany. Despite a great storm regarding the attacks and riots, there were not lots of narratives as to the said events. Most of the texts was without narrative, while the raped women were called victims only twice during the whole month.

Things were completely different in the case of the right-wing, conservative weekly “W Sieci”. All four dates significantly affected both the number of articles and the changing narrative referred to refugees. Since March (when the research began), “W Sieci” had tried to present the vision of the threat posed by occurrence of other cultures in Europe. During this period an economic immigrant appeared for the first time. The situation changed on September 6th, after the UNO report publication. In the next publication – of September 14th, five out of nine narratives described an economic immigrant. Whilst an immigrant who did not want to assimilate appeared only five times during the whole month, from among twenty eight narratives. Also in September, a terrorist became a more frequent category of the hero. A refugee appeared a couple of times and for the first time – a rapist.

Before the parliamentary election the weekly still maintained the narrative on economic immigrants. "W Sieci" described the inflow of immigrants as an economic threat to the state. The pre-election narrative on the reluctance to accommodate refugees who may divest the citizens of their jobs according to the editorial team turned out to be the best idea for discouragement of electors to vote for the liberal-centrist PO. After the attacks in Paris of November 13th, narrative on economic immigrants in the right-wing weekly "W Sieci" changed to narrative on terrorists. Economic issues were put on the back burner as the real threat of an attack appeared. Thus, half of the fourteen narratives published at the end of November referred to terrorists.

The hero defined as rapist, from March to the end of 2015, appeared only three times, after the New Year's Eve events in Cologne definitely covered other narratives with its number of occurrences. In the publication of January 11th only, 5 out of 6 narratives refer to a refugee as a rapist. Before September the description of a refugee was inconsistent, there was no element on which an emotional narrative against outsiders could be built. The first event of September 6th (UNO report) helped "W Sieci" to determine the narrative line to follow. The October election proved to be a perfect point to present refugees in bad light – as a threat to economy. The attack in Paris could make them terrorists, instead of non-integrating immigrants. The New Year's Eve in Cologne, on the other hand, attributed to refugees a new type of hero – a rapist.

As regards the left-wing daily "Gazeta Wyborcza" – the 6th of September was meaningful, but not as a date of the UNO report publication, because the newspaper mentioned it only once in all publications of the following week. It just happened so that on the 6th of September Pope Francis appealed to every parish to accommodate one family of refugees. In addition, two days earlier – on the 4th of September – "Gazeta Wyborcza" published a photo of a little refugee named Aylan whose body was thrown by the sea onto the Turkish seaside. Although plenty of

news was published on refugees and the migration crisis throughout the entire analysed week (7-12th of September), it was not related to the UNO report.

The UNO report did not become an axis of any narrative in the left-wing weekly "Polityka" either. The echo of the information which brought attention of the public opinion: a reportage describing a refugee camp with majority of men characterised as a "testosterone bomb" could be noticed in the narrative from October, some harassment incidents taking place in the camp were also reported.

The highest number of narratives on refugees appeared in October; it focused on various aspects of the migration crisis. One of the threads was for example the criticism of those whose aim was to protect the state against refugees and who were terribly afraid of the outsider – from the right wing, through patriotic organisations and the Visegrad Group. "Normality" of refugees was also noted. During this month, the heroes of narrative were not of one type, they were divided by sections: refugees form "the world of trillions of the poor which can flood Europe", but also "a seeming problem for the 40 million state"; sometimes it is "a testosterone bomb", another time "the sick poor"; immigrants from Ukraine against those who came from totally different cultural circle. Such diversity decreases subjectivism of the relations, it can be seen how flat the figure of stereotype refugee can be. Narratives were diversified also in respect of evaluation of the hero: six being positive, two negative (including one ironically), four neutral.

In November, i.e. the period after the win of the right-wing party PiS, refugees were presented four times as victims, once as frauds. This was rhetoric opposite to PiS.

Narrative changed dramatically after the New Year's Eve attacks in Cologne. All eight narratives, which appeared in January, were classified as negative (including two ironically). The hero from a victim became a fraud (6 times), a rapist (2 times) or a terrorist (1 time) – "problem". The change in looking at the figure of refugee was connected with the feeling of harm suffered by the European society

in relation to their values – individual safety, equality of women. Their trust was misused. The goal of a refugee changed in the press news: it transformed from an escape from danger in the barely defined necessity to get through to the EU member states.


It turns out that the left-wing weekly “Polityka” was not much susceptible to changes of its narratives on refugees in the context of current events. The news from Cologne was an exception, as it became a narrative axis for articles from the whole month. This was probably caused by its sensational character; it was also a breakthrough in perceiving refugees.

Attitude of Newspapers to Refugees

Over the period of 11 months, having investigated 200 articles on refugees and the migration crisis, we have determined that “Nasz Dziennik” did not have one constantly presented opinion concerning the problem in question. Most of the articles with narrative had neutral or negative overtone. Most rarely refugees were described positively, only 13 times. However, even in the cases when refugees were described negatively “Nasz Dziennik” did not express its opinion directly. The problem of refugees and the attitude towards them was often described through the prism of others. Usually it was mere, properly selected agency information; “Nasz Dziennik” cited anything and anyone, word by word, not expressing its opinion.


In the case of the “W Sieci” weekly paper – negative attitude appeared in more than 90% of the sample. In each of the cases, a refugee was a threat. From any possible perspective: he caused attacks, disturbed peace, implemented his rights, took work from the citizens, raped women, professed a non-peaceful religion. The only hero, not always negatively described, was a refugee, therefore neutral image (appearing in 8% of the texts) referred only to him. Positive image of the hero appeared only once – only in one text with an expert discourse.

Chart 1. Attitude of the “Nasz Dziennik” towards refugees.




Source: own elaboration.

Chart 2. Attitude of “Polityka” towards refugees.



Source: own elaboration.


Chart 3. Attitude of “W Sieci” towards refugees.



Source: own elaboration.

“Polityka” showed a rather positive attitude towards refugees. In October narratives were more diversified in respect of evaluation of the hero: six were positive, two negative (including one with the figure of irony), four neutral. Narrative changed immeasurably after the New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne. All eight narratives which appeared in January were negative (including two ironically). The immeasurable change in looking at the figure of a refugee was connected with the feeling of harm suffered by the European society.

Chart 4. Comparative chart showing the attitude of researched papers to refugees.



Source: own elaboration.

The above chart illustrates differences in presentation of the problem of the inflow of refugees to Europe. The biggest contrast can be observed between the conservative political weekly “W Sieci” and the political centrist weekly “Polityka”, which confirm their standpoints. The attitude towards refugees of the former was definitely negative, whereas the latter wrote about them mainly in a positive way. In “Nasz Dziennik” – due to the fact that it did not express its opinion as to the immigration crisis – the highest number of texts with neutral attitude was noted.

Genres

In the Catholic daily “Nasz Dziennik” the issue of migration crisis was described mainly in informational and journalistic texts. During the period from March 2015 to the end of January 2016 the texts were mostly informational and journalistic or in the form of short information (mainly agency information). In the majority of such text the attitude of the newspaper in question towards refugees was not expressed.

In the case of the right-wing weekly “W Sieci”, the situation was completely different. A column and a journalistic article, i.e. two most frequently appearing types of texts, constituted as much as 76%. An emotional discourse was presented most often in them.


In the left-wing weekly “Polityka” the majority of narratives on refugees could be found in journalistic texts, which seems to reflect best the newspaper line. Reportage, i.e. a subjective, as intended, but experimental picture of reality, was placed second, a column was ranked third. It seems that such a distribution of genres reflects the narrative lines of the opinions of the weekly papers.

Most publications on refugees in the liberal-left daily “Gazeta Wyborcza” was in the form of journalistic texts and commentaries. Nevertheless, they are usually not written by the journalists of “Gazeta Wyborcza”, but by experts, often foreign ones – professors of prestigious universities, political scientists, sociologists and philosophers. That is why the discourse in the vast majority of cases is an expert discourse.

Table 4. Genres describing refugees prevailing in the newspapers

	genre /1 st place	genre /2 nd place	refugee image
„Nasz Dziennik” right-Catholic daily	informational text	journalistic text	neutral and negative
„W Sieci” right-conservative weekly	column	journalistic text	negative
„Polityka” left-wing weekly	journalistic text	reportage	positive
„Gazeta Wyborcza” left-liberal daily	journalistic text	commentary	positive

Source: own elaboration.

Chart 5. Comparative chart of most frequently appearing genres in the three out of five newspapers.

Source: own elaboration.

Due to the fact that “Nasz Dziennik” wrote about refugees mainly in informational and journalistic texts, not expressing its opinion – an expert discourse prevailed in this case. Throughout the entire analysed period, an expert discourse appeared 174 times, whereas an emotional one only 31 times. In the case of “Gazeta

Wyborcza”, due to the fact that most journalistic texts were supported by statements of foreign experts: psychologists, political scientists or philosophers – an expert discourse also prevailed. In the case of the “W Sieci” weekly paper, the situation was the opposite. Due to the fact that columns definitely prevailed, the discourse was emotional. Among 153 analysed articles – only one represented an expert discourse. Similar situation referred to “Polityka” – narratives of this newspaper were dominated by emotional discourse – which was connected with the fact that more than half of the texts were represented by journalistic genres, while only one text represented an expert discourse – it was an informational article, which introduced the receiver with the research of Anna Lindlay and demographer Roger Zetter and with the UNHCR report. 14 analysed articles included both expert and emotional discourse.

Hero

Narratives on refugees were not uniform. With respect to the title and political line of newspaper, and subsequently genre, subject and author, they included various terms – therefore, a set of categories was established to make the dictionary of terms coherent and to show the roles assumed by the hero. This makes it possible to determine which figure was most frequent, which was rare for a given newspaper.

Table 5. Most frequently and most rarely appearing hero in all analysed newspapers.


	most frequently appearing hero	most rarely appearing hero
“Nasz Dziennik”	a refugee	an economic emigrant
“W Sieci”	non-assimilating	a rapist
“Polityka”	a refugee (victim)	non-assimilating
“Gazeta Wyborcza”	a refugee (fleeing from war and searching for shelter)	a rapist

Source: own elaboration.

Three out of five newspapers being the subject of the research have been thoroughly analysed so far – “Polityka”, “W Sieci” and “Nasz Dziennik”.

The analysis of the results showed that the most frequently appearing hero in the left-wing “Polityka” was a refugee-victim. Other types of hero appeared less frequently (several terms or roles of hero could appear in one narrative – they were not separated with respect to what kind of hero he eventually rendered to be in the narrative, i.e. what the narrative meaning was).

Chart 6. Most frequently appearing hero in the narrative of the “Polityka” weekly.




Source: own elaboration.

The most frequently appearing hero in “W Sieci” was an immigrant who did not want to assimilate. The next group was made up of narratives on terrorists, economic immigrants, refugees and rapists. An immigrant who did not want to assimilate was the most general and negative figure. His biggest victim is civilisation and the European culture, so an immigrant who does not want to assimilate seems to be the most appropriate to oppose it. The second frequent type of hero in narratives of this weekly paper was a terrorist who tried to impose his views by means of attacks and violence. Lower number of narratives referred to an economic immi-

grant who would upset the economy of particular states and would divest the citizens of the possibility to earn, as well as a refugee who wanted to settle in a social haven in Europe. The last type of hero was a rapist who appeared in “W Sieci” most often in January, which will be referred to hereunder.


Chart 7. Most frequently appearing hero in the narrative of the “W Sieci” weekly.



Source: own elaboration.


“Nasz Dziennik” most frequently wrote in general about a refugee; lower number of narratives was based on the figure of an immigrant and illegal immigrant. 1/6 constituted texts on terrorists. “Nasz Dziennik” most frequently called the hero a refugee, i.e. a decent man who dreamed of a peaceful family life far away from the war and the persecution being the reason of his escape. Due to the fact that the daily tried to be objective and only provide information without deep evaluation of the “flooding” immigrants – we read less about terrorists, economic emigrants or Christians. Despite the New Year’s Eve events in Germany, the newspaper not even once called them directly rapists. Respectively – a refugee, an immigrant or illegal immigrant take their place, i.e. the main names describing the incomers from Asia and North Africa.

Chart 8. Most frequently appearing hero in the narrative of the “Nasz Dziennik” newspaper.



Source: own elaboration.

Chart 9. Comparative chart of most frequently appearing hero types in the narrative of the three researched titles: “Polityka”, “W Sieci” and “Nasz Dziennik”.



Source: own elaboration.

According to the comparative Chart 9, the most frequently appearing hero in the left-conservative weekly “W Sieci” is an immigrant who did not want to assimilate, whereas in “Polityka” this hero belongs to the smallest group. The victim,

in turn, who flees from danger and unquestionably needs to be supported, constituted in the left-wing "Polityka" more than half of the heroes. In "W Sieci" such a category did not exist. In the Catholic "Nasz Dziennik", just like in "Polityka", we read most frequently about a refugee, however, in "Nasz Dziennik" he simply was a universal name of an incomer from the south, whereas in the left-wing weekly he was always a victim. In addition, the left-wing weekly presented refugees in more categories: as a victim, a fraud, an economic immigrant, a terrorist, an assimilating person, a rapist and as a non-assimilating person. This multitude bears witness to variety of perspectives. Different situation was in the case of "W Sieci", where all refugees were put to five bags: an immigrant who did not want to assimilate, an economic immigrant, a terrorist, a rapist and a refugee.

There were six categories in "Nasz Dziennik", but a refugee often corresponded to an immigrant or an immigrant to an illegal immigrant, not referred to by the analysed weekly papers. The daily, on the other hand, did not include any narrative related to refugees in the aspect of the lack of will to assimilate or showing such a will. No texts about refugees and rapists could be found either.

Most Frequent Narratives

On the basis of the analysis of hundreds of articles published during the 11 months, we determined what kind of narratives appeared most frequently in each of the analysed titles.

The right-conservative weekly "W Sieci": most frequently appearing hero type in this weekly paper was an immigrant who did not want to assimilate, he was supported by the European elites, the Poles wanted to disturb it, the European civilisation would become his victim, he was a Muslim, would form a group and his image was presented negatively.

The Catholic daily "Nasz Dziennik": did not present stories of particular persons; most of the texts with narrative on refugees were the information concerning

large groups. Most frequently, however, we read about a refugee travelling in a group, who fled from war or the Islamic State assault. He wanted to get through to Europe, find a job, an apartment and make his family feel safe. His allies were the European elites, i.e. Angela Merkel, the Brussels authorities and the centrist-liberal party PO, which without further thought would accommodate huge quantities of immigrants. They also often told the European countries to do the same, imposing specific amounts to them, counted in thousands. If the allies were the European elites who invited refugees to their states – the antagonist was the biggest opponent of the migration policy – Hungary with Victor Orban at the head. A refugee as the press hero was an Islamist Muslim, so it was obvious that the Christians would usually become the victims. Despite all that, “Nasz Dziennik” presented its stories in a neutral way, not disclosing its opinion.

In the left-wing weekly “Polityka”, the most frequently appearing hero type was a refugee-victim: fleeing from the war, needing care; his figure was associated with sadness. Concurrently, his education and diligence were noted. As often as the hard-working hero, the paper presented a refugee as someone dangerous and connected with terrorism, nevertheless it was clearly stated that the goal of the majority of refugees was fleeing from the war. The hero-refugee was presented in a group, the religious aspect was omitted. The ally of the refugee was the West, i.e. the EU member states, international organisations, heads of the European states, while the antagonist – the Right with the PiS party at the head. The opponent’s goal was to protect the state against danger. The image of refugee in most of the narratives was positive.

In the centrist-liberal “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the most frequently described heroes were refugees as people fleeing from the war and searching for shelter. Their antagonists were insensitive authorities of the European Union member states, whose goal was to protect their territories against the inflow of people.

Migration Crisis Victims

Depending on the title and political inclination of the newspaper – the victim of the migration crisis is a different group. Although e.g. “Nasz Dziennik” did not write much about the affected, the most frequent victims seemed to be the Christians. They received most compassion from Poland and the Polish Church, they were threatened by the Islamic State. According to “W Sieci”, the European civilisation, i.e. its identity and citizens, was harmed most. The same weekly paper defended the European civilisation, hating at the same time its “Western customs”. For “Polityka”, the victim was a starting figure – a refugee by definition was a man who fled from danger and who should be unquestionably supported. Lack of such support would leave him as a war victim of indifference of the European states. Refugees were often presented as a mass without empowerment being mentally and physically exhausted: sick and injured people, “poor wretches”, rarely resourceful people who had strength and will to start a new life: “vigorous and resourceful” were rather young people who came to Germany. The victim was defined not only by the terms used in his description, but primarily by his goal – it is either fleeing from war or persecution or (less frequently) an attempt to start a new life – which would indicate a refugee’s empowerment, which is often missing in narratives.

The Matter of Faith

In the texts referred to the migration crisis and refugees, the figure of hero was also analysed through the prism of the religion. In “Nasz Dziennik” the matter of faith appeared only in 1/6 texts. Most frequently (10%) heroes were Islamists and Muslims (jointly), then respectively – Muslims, Christians (5%), and also sporadically Muslims and Christians and Islamists. In “W Sieci” only in 15% of the texts with narrative structure the aspect of faith did not occur. Terms like *Islamists*, *Islamists and Muslims*, *Muslims and Christians* did occur but there was no narrative as to the refugees-Christians themselves. Muslims constituted a huge part (65.5%), as a softer

term for Allah believers. “W Sieci” combined religion with refugees; it believed that it was the source of misery. According to the newspaper, Islam is worse than Christianity because Christians tell to love while Islam is a non-peaceful religion. This allowed connecting Islam with radicals (terrorists) and with people who did not want to assimilate and wanted to implement their rights on the territory of Europe. The weekly paper wrote also about the impact of Islam on young people – the newspaper compared it to an assailant. The refugees with slogans from Koran would become more dangerous than those who traversed Europe without the Mahomet’s philosophy.

In the narrative constructed by the “Polityka” weekly, religious background was not an important element, which was evidenced by the advantage of narratives in which no thread of hero’s faith occurred. People were equal and deserved support regardless of their religious convictions – the authors seemed to speak. Therefore, a refugee in the left-wing “Polityka” was constructed as someone being closest and most similar to the receiver – thus evoking sympathy in the easiest way.

Describing on Appearance Categories

All the researched newspapers actually omit the appearance of the refugees coming to Europe.

Throughout the 11 months of the research, “Nasz Dziennik” wrote about the skin colour only three times, about different outfit – once, and there was not even one article about ugliness and deformations. “Polityka” also omitted this issue. It was raised in an article describing two types of refugees: settled in and migrating. The former were described as “cleanly dressed, without women in burqas”, the latter as those with darker skin, in worn shoes and with big rucksacks. The second example was the difference in outfit between participants of the Oktoberfest beer fest and the refugees camping out at the station – revealing dresses contrasted with travel jackets.

As regards sex, “Nasz Dziennik” – most frequently (1/3 of the texts) described whole groups of refugees, without diversification into men and women, men or children. In the “Polityka” the most frequent hero was a collective hero, presented as a mass or group. Depending on the content, it was either a wave or “the poor wretches”. The second, with respect to occurrence, type of hero was a man and then a child and a family. “Polityka” focused on refugees in general, an individual hero appeared relatively rarely, only in reportage.

As regards the presentation of moods, “Nasz Dziennik” most frequently attributed to refugees the word *determined* – it appeared in as many as 40% of texts. It was a lot, taking into account the fact that the next mood was *scared* – 4 %, and then *angry* and *sad*. The daily did not rather look at refugees with respect to their wealth or poverty. It mentioned it only in eleven texts.

It seems that the output emotion attributed to refugees by “Polityka” was despair. Escape from war, tramp, death of relatives – although emotions were not expressed directly, in consequence of the events it referred to, such a mood was connected to refugees. Sometimes their moods were defined explicitly but more often the key words were used which made the text and its reception more emotional. “The poor wretches”, whose life was a “hell” – by such terms a refugee was characterised as someone who would feel pain and was unhappy.

The weekly paper “W Sieci” positively evaluated refugees only once, in seven cases they were treated neutrally. 95% of narratives in this newspaper had a negative overtone in the context of refugees. No wonder if the main trait of a refugee according to this newspaper was being dogmatic, intolerant and aggressive. The weekly paper, as the last stronghold of truth in the deceitful EU, considered it to be its mission to inform the public about the threat posed by aggressive assailants.

Abstract

Each of the analysed newspapers, in the course of the afore-described research of selected periodicals, constructed its own profile of a refugee, not necessarily having references to the up-to-datedness or reality, which was based on the author's opinions or interpretations of academicians. Therefore, the content on refugees who were nit in Poland at that time was provided through the prism of such cognitive framework which we understand and accept. Thus, refugees are a puzzle added to this framework.

The multitude of refugee attitudes and stories, in combination with the worldview presented in a given medium, always led to a creation of a simplified schematic image of an outsider prevailing over other presentations. Depending on the profile of newspaper – the hero was always different, in "Nasz Dziennik" he was an ordinary refugee, "W Sieci" wrote mainly about immigrants who did not want to assimilate, "Polityka" about a refugee-victim, "Gazeta Wyborcza" on a refugee fleeing from war and searching for shelter.

What can worry is the tendency which may be observed between two weekly papers representing different views, namely the conservative "W Sieci" and the centrist "Polityka". The former speaks of immigrants coming to Europe only in negative way, mainly offending them, the latter – writes about them rather as of victims suffering unjustified harm who necessarily have to be supported. Such a difference is not so noticeable between the analysed daily papers. "Nasz Dziennik" and "Gazeta Wyborcza" focus on the general problem rather than the judgment of particular persons.

The researched papers rather do not change their narratives in reaction to political events. Instead of changing narratives the papers, like in the case of "Nasz Dziennik", change the number of articles, which significantly increases after each of the events.

One may conclude that the hero-refugee created by the media is usually a figurehead in a political game, a trigger to exacerbate the division between *us* and *them*. Besides (not taking into consideration „Nasz Dziennik”, where agency information is leading), in the majority of the titles an emotional discourse prevails.

Journalists more willingly present their convictions and prove that they, or the political parties they support, are right. The opinion narratives they construct, especially in the weekly papers, are diametrically opposed, are almost reverse. Such a strong diversity of opinions about refugees shows that the media often (especially in the case of controversial and difficult issues) distorts the picture of reality, creating its own version. Therefore, the opinion-forming press does not provide any information that is not the confirmation of its own political views.

NARRACJE MEDIALNE O UCHODźCACH W POLSKIEJ PRASIE

Abstrakt

Każda z analizowanych gazet, w trakcie opisanych powyżej badań wybranych czasopism, skonstruowała swój własny profil uchodźcy – niekoniecznie odwołując się do stanu aktualnego lub rzeczywistości – który opierał się na opiniach autora lub interpretacjach naukowców. Stąd też treści na temat uchodźców, których nie było w tym czasie w Polsce, przekazywano przez pryzmat takich ram poznawczych, które rozumiemy i akceptujemy. Uchodźcy są zatem elementem układanki dodanym do tych ram.

Mnogość postaw i historii uchodźców, w połączeniu ze światopoglądem przedstawionym w danym środku przekazu, zawsze prowadziła do stworzenia uproszczonego – dominującego nad innymi – schematycznego obrazu osoby z zewnątrz. W zależności od profilu gazety za każdym razem bohater był przedstawiany inaczej. Na łamach „Naszego Dziennika” był zwykłym uchodźcą, „W Sieci” pisało głównie o imigrantach, którzy nie chcieli się asymilować, „Polityka” – o uchodźcy-ofierze, natomiast „Gazeta Wyborcza” – o uchodźcy uciekającym przed

wojną i szukającym schronienia.

Niepokój wzbudza tendencja, którą można zaobserwować między dwoma tygodnikami reprezentującymi różne poglądy, a mianowicie konserwatywnym „W Sieci” i centrową „Polityką”. Pierwszy tygodnik mówi o imigrantach przybywających do Europy tylko w sposób negatywny, głównie ich obrażając, drugi – raczej jako o ofiarach, które doznają nieuzasadnionych krzywd i które koniecznie należy wspierać. Ta różnica nie jest tak widoczna w analizowanych dziennikach. „Nasz Dziennik” i „Gazeta Wyborcza” skupiają się na problemie ogólnym, a nie na osądzie poszczególnych osób.

Analizowane czasopisma raczej nie zmieniają narracji w wyniku reakcji na wydarzenia polityczne. Zamiast zmieniać narracje, podobnie jak w przypadku „Naszego Dziennika”, zwiększają znacznie liczbę artykułów po każdym z takich wydarzeń.

Można podsumować, że stworzony przez media bohater-uchodźca jest zazwyczaj figurą w grze politycznej, czynnikiem zaostrażającym podział między 'nami' a 'nimi'. Poza tym (wyłączając „Nasz Dziennik”, w którym przeważają informacje agencyjne) w większości tytułów dominuje dyskurs emocjonalny.

Dziennikarze chętniej przedstawiają swoje przekonania i udowadniają, że oni sami lub wspierane przez nich partie polityczne mają rację. Konstruowane narracje opiniotwórcze, zwłaszcza w tygodnikach, są diametralnie przeciwstawne, niemalże odwrotne. Tak duże zróżnicowanie opinii o uchodźcach pokazuje, że media często (zwłaszcza w przypadku spraw kontrowersyjnych i trudnych) zniekształcają obraz rzeczywistości, tworząc jej własną wersję. Tym samym prasa opiniotwórcza nie dostarcza żadnych informacji, które nie stanowią potwierdzenia jej własnych poglądów politycznych.

Słowa kluczowe:

media, uchodźcy, polska prasa

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Dariusz Krawczyk

Zagrożenie dezinformacją w cyberprzestrzeni źródłem szansy na wzrost społecznego zasięgu środków masowego przekazu

Słowa kluczowe:

prasa, nadawcy internetowi, media społecznościowe, manipulacja informacją, wizerunek

Wstęp

Postęp technologiczny powoduje, że narzędzia komunikacyjne coraz efektywniej wykorzystują potencjał cyberprzestrzeni. Nawet w wymiarze sublokalnym, odwieczną tablicę ogłoszeń w dzielnicowym ośrodku kultury zastępuje jej wirtualny odpowiednik w postaci profilu na Facebooku, kanału filmowego lub aplikacji mobilnej. Prasa lokalna, regionalna oraz ogólnokrajowa również coraz głębiej wrasta w sieć komputerową. Internetowa rywalizacja konkurencyjna trwa jednak nie tylko między profesjonalnymi redakcjami. O pozyskanie zainteresowania użytkowników zabiegają też nadawcy tworzący grupy dyskusyjne, wirtualne społeczności czy nieformalne platformy wymiany danych. Dostawcy treści prześcigają się w kreowaniu wiadomości atrakcyjnych dla odbiorców, lecz nierzadko zmanipulowanych albo niemających związku ze stanem faktycznym, który ponoć relacjonują. W internetowym modelu dystrybucji informacji zmarginalizowane zostało tradycyjne dziennikarstwo, oparte na normach prawnych i kodeksach etycznych. Wraz z nagromadzeniem pozainstytucjonalnych ośrodków udostępniających przekazy w mediach społecznościowych, dostrzegalnym problemem stało się upowszechnianie pogłosek, wiadomości nieprawdziwych, tzw. fake newsów, polegających na celowej dezinformacji.

macji, a także oszczerstw, pomówień i zniesławień przyprawionych agresją i przyjmujących postać hejtu nazywanego *mową nienawiści*. Media społecznościowe przyczyniają się do pogłębiania problemów interpretacyjnych w przypadku przekazywania wiadomości, które nie mają sprecyzowanego źródła i wyraźnie określonego autora lub też stanowią kompilację zawartości oryginalnej z niewyodrębnionym komentarzem czy modyfikacją. W warunkach, gdy cechy charakterystyczne dla satyry, polemiki czy parodii stają się atrybutami serwisów informacyjnych, pojawić się może zapotrzebowanie na działalność medialną zgodną z *etyką zawodową i zasadami współżycia społecznego*, prowadzoną w *granicach określonych przepisami prawa*¹. Dlatego w narastającym chaosie komunikacyjnym internetu należy spodziewać się impulsu do wzrostu społecznego zainteresowania dziennikarstwem opartym na zasadach rzetelności, obiektywizmu i staranności zawodowej.

Fake newsy w świetle wyników badania opinii przeprowadzonego wśród dziennikarzy

Współistnienie w sieci komputerowej środków masowego przekazu oraz innych nośników, jak media społecznościowe oraz narzędzia komunikacyjne pozwalające na upublicznianie niemoderowanych treści, które – posiadając znaczny zasięg społeczny i zbliżoną formułę kompozycyjną – nie wypełniają jednak funkcji przypisyanych prasie, stanowi czynnik sprzyjający dezinformacji na masową skalę. Fałszywe wiadomości, powstałe dzięki manipulacjom o różnym podłożu, nasileniu i stopniu finezji, określane są jako tzw. fake newsy. Można konstruować ich typologie z uwzględnieniem np. kryterium celu upowszechniania, aby wskazać na takie podstawowe kategorie jak: osiągnięcie zysku, wyrządzenie szkody, uzyskanie korzyści niematerialnych, popularyzacja bądź zwalczanie ideologii, wywarcie wpływu lub

¹ Art. 10 ustawy z dnia 26 stycznia 1984 r. – Prawo prasowe, Dz. U. z 2018 r. poz. 1914.

presji, zachęcenie do określonych zachowań. Mieści się w tym m.in. rywalizacja konkurencyjna, zemsta, „wandalizm” internetowy, czarny PR na zlecenie, nieformalne działania mające na celu zdobycie czy utrzymanie władzy itd. Fake newsy odnosić się mogą do wielu sfer – od polityki, religii, kultury, sportu, show biznesu, nauki i gospodarki po szeroko rozumiane życie społeczne. Mają wywołać np. niechęć, irytację, kontestację, czynny protest albo poprzez drwinę i wyszydzenie zniszczyć wizerunek czy przynajmniej nadszarpnąć reputację. W nawiązaniu do modelu Harolda Lasswella, warto też usystematyzować fake newsy w aspekcie: nadawcy, zawartości, odbiorcy, kanału dystrybucji czy z podziałem na zamierzony oraz osiągnięty skutek. Istnieją państwa, które wprowadziły prawo dla przeciwdziałania dezinformacji. I tak np. ustawodawca, konstruując w Malezji przepisy mające zwalczać fake newsy², określił je jako *wiadomości, informacje, dane i raporty, które są całkowicie lub częściowo fałszywe*, przewidując dla sprawcy, czyli *osoby która w jakikolwiek sposób świadomie tworzy, ofertuje, publikuje, drukuje, rozpowszechnia fałszywe wiadomości lub publikacje zawierające fałszywe wiadomości*³, karę pozbawienia wolności do lat 6 albo grzywnę wynoszącą nawet pół miliona MYR (ringgit)⁴. Uchwalone prawo spotyka się jednak z ostrą krytyką społeczną jako bariera dla wolności słowa.

Po badaniu przeprowadzonym na potrzeby niniejszego artykułu w 2019 r.⁵, wśród aktywnych zawodowo dziennikarzy okazało się, że przeważająca część pra-

² *Anti Fake News Bill* parlament Malezji przyjął 2 kwietnia 2018 r.

³ *Malezyjski bój o „lex fake” trwa*, materiał z 15 września 2018 r., <https://www.stopfake.org/pl/malezyjski-boj-o-lex-fake-trwa/>, 15.02.2019.

⁴ Ringgit jest walutą Malezji od 1967 r. Średni kurs NBP z 14 lutego 2019 r. wynosił 0,9449 PLN za 1 MYR, co oznacza wysokość grzywny na poziomie ok. 472 tys. zł.

⁵ Badanie własne autora przeprowadzone zostało 16 lutego 2019 r. w Zabrzu podczas spotkania środowiskowego dziennikarzy: TVP Info, TVN 24, TVN, Polsat News, TTV, Superstacji, Polsat, TVS, TVP3 Katowice, TVZ i TV Imperium oraz dziennikarzy z rozgłośni radiowych: RMF FM, TOK FM, Jedynka (Polskie Radio), Czwórka (Polskie Radio), Polskie Radio24, Pol-

cowników redakcji prasy, radia, telewizji i nadawców internetowych uznaje już kolportowanie fake newsów za zjawisko powszechne. Odpowiedzi takiej udzieliło 57,1% uczestników projektu badawczego. Przeciwnego zdania było 38% ankietowanych, którzy twierdzili, że fake newsy upowszechniane są incydentalnie. Podczas badania umożliwiono uczestnikom odniesienie się do poglądu, że dostępne w mediach społecznościowych nierzetelne wiadomości, często pozbawione możliwości identyfikacji źródła, zawierające wymysły bądź celowo spreparowane dane albo też będące wytworami tzw. czarnego PR, w dłuższej perspektywie mogą przysporzyć odbiorców profesjonalnym redakcjom. Zainteresowani pozyskaniem wiedzy o stanie faktycznym sięgną bowiem po treści udostępniane przez nadawcę cieszącego się zaufaniem, wynikającym z funkcjonowania zgodnego z normami prawa i kodeksami etycznymi. Dzięki temu zinstytucjonalizowane redakcje działające w cyberprzestrzeni zyskają szansę na pozyskanie i utrzymanie większego zasięgu społecznego. Takie przekonanie podzielała ponad połowa dziennikarzy (50,7%) biorących udział w badaniu. Natomiast 42,8% wyrażała obawę, że publiczność medialna nie stety oczekuje raczej rozrywki, a nie obiektywnego dziennikarstwa, a więc fake newsy stanowią realne zagrożenie dla profesjonalnego dziennikarstwa. Dlatego ludzie prawdopodobnie wybiorą atrakcyjny dla nich *produkt medialny* od jakiegokolwiek dystrybutora, niż poszukiwać będą wysokiej jakości *towaru* od markowego sprzedawcy. Tym bardziej że część oficjalnych mediów mniej lub bardziej świadomie wpisuje się w działania podważające zaufanie do tradycyjnego dziennikarstwa. Stanowi to nie tylko konsekwencję tabloidyzacji przekazów, lecz także wynikających z przyczyn politycznych lub ekonomicznych ingerencji w dobór tematów oraz formułę ich prezentacji.

skie Radio Katowice, Polskie Radio Kraków, Radio Piekary, Radio CCM, Radio FEST. Uczestnikami byli także dziennikarze „Gazety Wyborczej”, „Super Expressu” i „Trybuny Górniczej”. Łącznie odpowiedzi udzieliło 63 aktywnych zawodowo dziennikarzy.

Podmiot medialny jako zidentyfikowany nadawca treści w przestrzeni wirtualnej*Wprowadzenie*

Gdy informacje w cyberprzestrzeni podawane są przez środki masowego przekazu, a ich efektem jest czyn zabroniony, stosunkowo prosto sięgnąć można do procedur umożliwiających uzyskanie zadośćuczynienia, pełniącego rolę rekompensaty za krzywdy moralne, lub odszkodowania za ewentualną szkodę majątkową, spowodowaną przez publikację nieprawdziwych wiadomości. Zwykle zresztą osią konfliktem między prasą a osobami, które czują się pokrzywdzone skutkami aktywności zawodowej dziennikarzy, jest zderzenie praw jednostki z ideą wolności słowa. Warto przypomnieć, że *Sąd Najwyższy wskazał, akcentując istotną rolę zasady wolności słowa i prasy w społeczeństwie demokratycznym, odwołując się przy tym do regulacji prawa cywilnego i prasowego oraz norm konstytucyjnych i międzynarodowych, w tym orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w Strasburgu, że prawo do wolności słowa i prawo do ochrony czci mają jednakową rangę i jednakowy jest poziom udzielanej im ochrony prawnej. Żadnemu z tych praw nie można przyznać pierwszeństwa i żadne z nich nie ma charakteru absolutnego. W analogiczny sposób istota konfliktu pomiędzy wskazanymi powyżej wartościami rozpatrywana jest w orzecznictwie sądów europejskich*⁶. W sferze wirtualnej funkcjonują oczywiście środki masowego przekazu, które mogą być bezpośrednim adresatem powyższych wskazań. Należą do nich m.in. portale podmiotów medialnych, wobec których przepisy te znajdują zastosowanie, podobnie jak w przypadku tradycyjnej prasy, radia czy telewizji.

Sprawa komplikuje się w sytuacji, gdy portale takie udostępniają narzędzia pozwalające użytkownikom we własnym zakresie korzystać z bogactwa zasobów platform cyfrowych. Internauta ma wówczas do dyspozycji nie tylko telewizję i radia

⁶ Wyrok Sądu Apelacyjnego w Warszawie z dnia 15 lutego 2017 r., VI ACa 1935/16, Legalis.

internetowe, pliki multimedialne, dostęp do treści archiwalnych i upowszechnianych w czasie rzeczywistym, ale też komunikatory, fora dyskusyjne, aplikacje na urządzenia mobilne, konta, profile i kanały w mediach społecznościowych itd. Część z tych narzędzi pozwala użytkownikom współtworzyć lub modyfikować przekaz albo przynajmniej uzupełniać go własnymi komentarzami bądź innego rodzaju indywidualnym wkładem intelektualnym, co przy braku moderacji może być źródłem czynów zabronionych popełnianych już nie przez nadawcę, ale jego publiczność medialną. Urzeczywistnianie prawa do wolności wypowiedzi przestaje wówczas odgrywać rolę filaru demokracji, a staje się usprawiedliwieniem prymitywizmu, trywializowania, deprecjonowania, znieśławiania czy szeroko rozumianej mowy nienawiści. Tak więc w cyberprzestrzeni działają portale i profile w mediach społecznościowych należące do podmiotów medialnych funkcjonujących także na tradycyjnym rynku prasowym, radiowym lub telewizyjnym. Obecni są ponadto inni zinstytucjonalizowani nadawcy internetowi udostępniający serwisy ogólnoinformacyjne lub branżowe o zasięgu globalnym, ogólnokrajowym, regionalnym, lokalnym czy sublokalnym. Ofertę uzupełniają dostawcy treści adresowanych do poszczególnych grup odbiorców, których segmentację można przeprowadzić na podstawie m.in. kryterium wieku, profesji, poglądów, zainteresowań, potrzeb, oczekiwań, preferencji itd. Obok nośników zarządzanych przez profesjonalne redakcje lub przynajmniej zidentyfikowanych administratorów, istnieje sfera pozwalająca na upowszechnianie treści w ramach tzw. dziennikarstwa obywatelskiego. Od prezentacji internetowych społeczników i aktywistów, ale też nierzadko ludzi mających chorobliwą skłonność do dochodzenia rzeczywistych bądź urojonych krzywd, wiedzie prosta droga do obszarów umożliwiających publikowanie treści pozbawionych jakiegokolwiek weryfikacji, lecz docierających do szerokich grup odbiorców. Właśnie ta sfera rodzi najwięcej problemów prawnych, a zarazem powoduje wiele konfliktów międzyludzkich. Jedną ze szczególnie newralgicznych kwestii są w tym zakresie przepisy dotyczące wizerunku.

Ochrona wizerunku w sieci komputerowej

Problem efektywnej ochrony wizerunku w cyberprzestrzeni staje się coraz bardziej istotny. W sytuacji gdy niektórzy przekonują, że *obecnie internetowy świat stał się pierwotny wobec świata realnego i bardziej realny niż świat realny. Nie istnieją już gotowe wzorce tożsamości, w które można wpisać jednostkę. Aktualnie dominuje wezwanie, aby człowiek był taki, jak chce, a nawet codziennie inny*⁷, trudno jest w sposób bezpośredni przenosić do sfery wirtualnej rozwiązania stosowane dla porządkowania życia społecznego przez przepisy prawa⁸ oraz uregulowania dotyczące działalności środków masowego przekazu. Tym bardziej że internet pozwala korzystać z instrumentów, które mogą, lecz nie muszą być tożsame ze *środkami masowego przekazywania*⁹ (czyli prasą). Bogactwo narzędzi komunikacyjnych udostępnianych w cyberprzestrzeni powoduje, że część z nich można pojmować jako ekwiwalent dawnej kartki pocztowej, listu poleconego czy rozmowy telefonicznej, inne są niczym plakat na słupie ogłoszeniowym, a część odpowiada roli wypełnianej przez papierowe gazety bądź media elektroniczne. Od specyfiki danego nośnika treści zależy sposób, w jaki egzekwować należy obowiązujące prawo. Wśród przestępstw przeciwko czci wyróżnia się bowiem m.in. czyn polegający na pomówieniu osoby o *takie postępowanie lub właściwości, które mogą poniżyć ją w opinii publicznej lub narazić na utratę zaufania potrzebnego dla danego stanowiska, zawodu lub*

⁷ K. Garwol, *Wizerunek i tożsamość w sieci*, „Edukacja – Technika – Informatyka” 2018, nr 1, s. 111.

⁸ Przykładowo art. 23 kodeksu cywilnego precyzuje, że *dobra osobiste człowieka, jak w szczególności zdrowie, wolność, cześć, swoboda sumienia, nazwisko lub pseudonim, wizerunek, tajemnica korespondencji, nietykalność mieszkania, twórczość naukowa, artystyczna, wynalazcza i racjonalizatorska, pozostają pod ochroną prawa*, a art. 24 stanowi m.in., że *ten, czyje dobro osobiste zostaje zagrożone cudzym działaniem, może żądać zaniechania tego działania, chyba że nie jest ono bezprawne*. Z kolei art. 448 przewiduje w sytuacji naruszenia dobra osobistego, że sąd może przyznać odpowiednią sumę tytułem zadośćuczynienia. Zob. ustawę z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. – Kodeks cywilny, Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1145 z późn. zm.

⁹ W myśl art. 7 ustawy – Prawo prasowe.

rodzaju działalności¹⁰, co podlega grzywnie albo karze ograniczenia wolności. Jeśli jednak przestępstwo zostanie popełnione za pomocą środków masowego komunikowania, zagrożone jest ono nawet karą pozbawienia wolności do roku, a kwalifikacja z art. 212 § 1 lub § 2 k.k. będzie uzależniona od tego, czy ogólnodostępna sieć teleinformatyczna zostanie wykorzystana jako «środek masowego komunikowania», czy też jako środek «hermetycznej komunikacji interpersonalnej». Z pierwszym typem sytuacji mamy do czynienia wówczas, gdy treści tego rodzaju umieszczono, przykładowo, na forum danego serwisu internetowego bądź też w witrynie internetowej. Nie może być natomiast tak kwalifikowane np. przesyłanie pojedynczej osobie wiadomości za pomocą poczty elektronicznej¹¹. Bogactwo różnorodnych nośników treści w internecie i ich wzajemne oddziaływania mogą rodzić więc poważne trudności interpretacyjne.

Wizerunek jest prawnie chronionym dobrem osobistym. W ujęciu lingwistycznym wizerunek to *sposób, w jaki dana osoba lub rzecz jest postrzegana i przedstawiana*¹². Cytując aktualne orzecznictwo, odnaleźć można odniesienia do definicji Elżbiety Wojnickiej opublikowanej w pracy *Prawo do wizerunku w ustawodawstwie polskim*¹³, gdzie wizerunek określony jest jako *dostrzegalne, fizyczne cechy człowieka, tworzące jego wygląd i pozwalające na identyfikację osoby wśród innych ludzi. Rozpoznawalność osoby stanowi podstawowy warunek przyznania ochrony, jak i elementarną przesłankę ustalenia, czy doszło do naruszenia prawa do wizerunku*¹⁴.

¹⁰ Art. 212 § 1 ustawy z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. – Kodeks karny, Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1950 z późn. zm.

¹¹ J. Sobczak, K. Kakareko, *Gatunek dziennikarski jako determinanta odpowiedzialności dziennikarza. Wybrane aspekty prawne. Część piąta*, „Studia Medioznawcze” 2018, nr 3, s. 19.

¹² Definicja według Słownika Języka Polskiego PWN, <https://sjp.pwn.pl>, 6.02.2019.

¹³ Artykuł opublikowany został w „Zeszytach Naukowych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace z Wynalazczości i Ochrony Własności Intelektualnej” 1990, t. 56, s. 101-123.

¹⁴ M.in. wyrok Sądu Okręgowego w Gliwicach z dnia 24 czerwca 2014 r., II C 266/12, Legalis.

Warto zaznaczyć, że *prawo do wizerunku przysługuje osobie rzeczywistej. Na gruncie obowiązującego prawa polskiego trudno byłoby przyznać prawa osobiste (w tym prawo do wizerunku) postaci fikcyjnej*¹⁵. W tym kontekście pojawia się kwestia ochrony wizerunku tzw. nicka internetowego (ang. *nickname*), czyli identyfikatora lub oznaczenia internauty w sieci komputerowej, który chroniony może być na podobnej zasadzie jak przezwisko przypisane danej osobie lub pseudonim, którym się posługuje. Inaczej jest w przypadku oderwanej od personaliów tożsamości internetowej, a także fałszywych profili czy tzw. fejkowych¹⁶ kont w serwisach społecznościowych. W ocenie sądów *nie jest możliwe naruszenie dobrego imienia abstrakcyjnego użytkownika forum internetowego posługującego się wyłącznie określonym loginem, nie umożliwiającym identyfikacji tej osoby. Zatem o naruszeniu dobrego imienia powoda można by mówić jedynie wówczas, gdyby inni użytkownicy forum byli w stanie powiązać kwestionowane wpisy*¹⁷ z konkretną osobą. Równie częsta, lecz niosąca znacznie poważniejsze konsekwencje niż kalandrobienie dobrego imienia awatara, jest sytuacja, gdy anonimowy użytkownik, ukryty właśnie pod nieidentyfikowalną tożsamością internetową, narusza w sieci komputerowej czyjeś dobra osobiste.

Oczywiście należy wówczas podejmować próby dochodzenia swoich praw na drodze sądowej. W przypadku anonimowego użytkownika portalu, który upowszechnia pomówienia, treści oszczercze czy szyderstwa w formie tzw. memów, trzeba przede wszystkim precyzyjnie określić nadawcę. Tak było m.in. w przypadku prezesa organizacji osób niepełnosprawnych znieśliwionego w serwisie Demoty-

¹⁵ P. Ślęzak, *Ochrona prawa do wizerunku*, Katowice 2009, s. 24.

¹⁶ Według Słownika Języka Polskiego PWN *fejk* to potocznie *coś nieprawdziwego, fałszywego, podrobionego, niezgodnego z prawdą*. Źródło: Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN, <https://sjp.pwn.pl>, 6.02.2019.

¹⁷ Wyrok Sądu Apelacyjnego w Warszawie z dnia 18 stycznia 2017 r., VI ACa 1661/15, Legalis.

watory.pl. Wtedy to *dane rozpowszechniającego udało się ustalić policji dzięki informacjom od administratora portalu, który wcześniej nie przychylił się do żądania poszkodowanego o usunięcie obraźliwej treści. Pamiętać należy, że dostawca usługi internetowej, będący pośrednikiem pomiędzy autorem spornego materiału a poszkodowanym, «in genere» ponosi odpowiedzialność za treści publikowane przez użytkowników na jego stronie WWW*¹⁸. Można zresztą domniemywać istnienie chęci do współpracy, gdy weźmie się pod uwagę przepisy ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną, które mogą wyłączyć odpowiedzialność, gdy dostawca *taki nie wie o bezprawnym charakterze danych lub związanej z nimi działalności, a w razie otrzymania urzędowego zawiadomienia lub uzyskania wiarygodnej wiadomości o bezprawnym charakterze danych lub związanej z nimi działalności niezwłocznie uniemożliwi dostęp do tych danych*¹⁹.

Media społecznościowe generują też problemy związane z prawną ochroną wizerunku osób uczestniczących w postępowaniach przygotowawczych lub procesach sądowych. Użytkownicy udostępniający materiał multimedialny często nie posiadają wiedzy dotyczącej procedur publikacji danych obowiązujących w przypadku zatrzymanych, podejrzanych lub oskarżonych, albo procedury te lekceważą. Przykładem może być sprawa wykorzystania komunikatorów internetowych dla ujawnienia tożsamości Stefana W. zatrzymanego po ataku na prezydenta Gdańska Pawła Adamowicza²⁰. Zarzuty postawiono dwóm policjantom z Komendy Miejskiej Policji

¹⁸ Sz. Rubisz, *Memy internetowe w świetle prawa autorskiego*, „Zeszyty Prawnicze Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego” 2018, nr 2, s. 234.

¹⁹ Art. 14 ust. 1 ustawy z dnia 18 lipca 2002 r. o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną, Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 123 z późn. zm.

²⁰ Prezydent, po ataku nożownika, do którego doszło w niedzielę, 13 stycznia 2019 r., na scenie podczas finału Wielkiej Orkiestry Świątecznej Pomocy, zmarł nazajutrz w wyniku odniesionych obrażeń. Źródło: E. Oleksy, J. Gromadzka-Anzelewicz, *Paweł Adamowicz nie żyje. Prezydent Gdańska zmarł w szpitalu UCK 14.01.2019 po ataku nożownika na finale WOŚP. Gdańsk w żałobie!*, artykuł z 16 stycznia 2019 r., <https://dziennikbałtycki.pl>, 20.02.2019.

w Gdańsku, gdyż *jeden z funkcjonariuszy telefonem komórkowym nagrał odtwarzany na monitorze służbowym film zabezpieczony procesowo od stacji TVN. Następnie przekazał go koledze z wydziału, a ten udostępnił w grupie funkcjonariuszy za pośrednictwem WhatsApp*²¹. Prokurator w postępowaniu przygotowawczym powołał się na przepisy ustawy o ochronie danych osobowych²² oraz kodeksu karnego²³.

Czynniki utrudniające ochronę wizerunku w cyberprzestrzeni

Oddziaływania między cyberprzestrzenią a światem realnym są obustronne i wzajemnie przenikające. Drobnym, lecz wymownym przykładem jest hasztag (ang. *hashtag*), czyli słowo lub wyrażenie poprzedzone symbolem „#”, i jego mechanizm działania, gdyż *z jednej strony hashtagi w przestrzeni publicznej umożliwiają odbiorcom ich wyszukanie na portalu Twitter, a w konsekwencji wyświetlenie wszystkich wpisów opatrzonych przez internautów określonym hashtagem, a więc z założenia powiązanych tematycznie. Fakt, iż w komunikacji politycznej coraz częściej dostrzega się potrzebę korzystania z takich rozwiązań, niewątpliwie można uzasadnić możliwością skuteczniejszego dotarcia tą drogą do wyborców, ale także*

²¹ A. Łukaszewicz, *Stefan W. został pokrzywdzonym*, „Rzeczpospolita” z 14 lutego 2019 r., s. A14. Zdaniem dostawcy aplikacja WhatsApp oferuje bezpłatną, szybką, łatwą i bezpieczną komunikację poprzez wiadomości tekstowe i połączenia głosowe. Źródło: <https://www.whatsapp.com>, 20.02.2019.

²² Art. 107 ust. 1 ustawy z dnia 10 maja 2018 r. o ochronie danych osobowych, Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1781, stanowi: *kto przetwarza dane osobowe, choć ich przetwarzanie nie jest dopuszczalne albo do ich przetwarzania nie jest uprawniony, podlega grzywnie, karze ograniczenia wolności albo pozbawienia wolności do lat dwóch*.

²³ Zgodnie z art. 241 § 1 ustawy – Kodeks karny: *kto bez zezwolenia rozpowszechnia publicznie wiadomości z postępowania przygotowawczego, zanim zostały ujawnione w postępowaniu sądowym, podlega grzywnie, karze ograniczenia wolności albo pozbawienia wolności do lat 2*.

*z drugiej strony swoistą modą, wskutek której twitterowe hashtagi stają się istotnym elementem budowania wizerunku politycznego*²⁴. Używanie hashtagów – także w serwisach innych niż Twitter czy nawet poza sferą wirtualną – stanowi wyraz trendu kulturowego manifestującego otwartość na globalną wymianę idei, gotowość do podejmowania innowacji oraz sprawność i nowoczesność w działaniu. Internet jako narzędzie komunikacji pozwala bez skrępowania przedstawiać poglądy, co realizują funkcjonujące w cyberprzestrzeni media. Konflikty między swobodą prezentacji opinii, gwarantowanej środkom masowego przekazu, a dobrami osobistymi stanowią przedmiot refleksji w skali światowej. Stąd teza zakładająca, że *wolność prasy nie ma charakteru absolutnego, lecz doznaje ograniczeń i musi się mieścić w granicach wytyczonych przez prawo, wielokrotnie była podnoszona w orzecnictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka. Stwierdzano w nim, że prasa, korzystając z wolności, nie może przekroczyć granic ustalonych przez prawo, w szczególności tych, które dotyczą dobrego imienia i praw innych osób. Trybunał podkreślał, że swoboda wypowiedzi, będąc jedną z podstaw demokratycznej organizacji społeczeństwa, nie jest nieograniczona*²⁵. W ten sposób wymiar sprawiedliwości oddziela urzeczywistnianie wolności słowa od ochrony dóbr osobistych zagrożonych w przypadku bezprawnych działań mediów masowych. Prasa zmuszona jest wówczas do takiego konstruowania materiałów udostępnianych odbiorcom, aby nie naruszyć czci, swobody sumienia, domniemania niewinności itd. Jeśli jednak w redakcji zapada decyzja o przekroczeniu ustalonych granic, nadawca naraża się na odpowiedzialność. Nadal pozostaje jednak rozpoznawalnym podmiotem, wobec którego można kierować roszczenia. Praktyka komunikacji internetowej, a szczególnie z zastosowaniem mediów społecznościowych, przedstawia się zgoła odmiennie. Nie-

²⁴ A. Kapuścińska, *Kod kulturowy a nowe media na przykładzie znacznika „#”*, „Socjolingwistyka” 2018, nr 32, s. 160.

²⁵ E. Ferenc-Szydełko, *Prawo prasowe. Komentarz*, Warszawa 2008, s. 24.

*stety wolność słowa w sieci, która miała nam ułatwić funkcjonowanie, porozumiewanie się i nawiązywanie kontaktów międzyludzkich, stała się swego rodzaju chorobą, która niszczy od środka. Przestaje być kulturalnym przelaniem własnych myśli w eter, a coraz częściej staje się wzajemnym obrażaniem z poczuciem bezkarności*²⁶.

Istnienie procedur umożliwiających identyfikację sprawcy zniesławienia, który z początku wydaje się anonimowy, a następnie pozwalających pociągnąć go do odpowiedzialności, to tylko jeden aspekt zjawiska. Drugim jest uciążliwość i przewlekłość działań podejmowanych z wykorzystaniem rozwiązań prawnych. Jednocześnie efektywność technik reagowania na przypadki naruszania dóbr osobistych przez administratorów poszczególnych serwisów internetowych pozostawia wiele do życzenia. Mnogość internetowych platform komunikacyjnych stanowi kolejny problem zarówno w ujawnianiu czynów zabronionych, jak też w przeciwdziałaniu takiemu procederowi oraz wyciąganiu konsekwencji. Łatwość tworzenia i udostępniania treści bez oznaczenia autorstwa i źródła, gwarantującego minimalny chociażby poziom obiektywizmu, potęguje chaos informacyjny w internecie, stymulowany przez masowo fabrykowane fake newsy. Sytuacja taka stanowi zagrożenie dla przebiegu debaty publicznej odnoszącej się do zagadnień ważnych w życiu społecznym oraz partycypacji obywateli w sprawowaniu władzy na różnych szczeblach. Zalew tzw. hejtu torpeduje bowiem swobodną wymianę poglądów między ludźmi odnoszącymi się nie tylko do spraw kontrowersyjnych, lecz także w jakikolwiek sposób dla nich istotnych. Paradoksalnie wyzwala to jednak szansę na odzyskanie znaczenia przez klasyczne środki masowego przekazu, które funkcjonować muszą na podstawie norm prawnych i udostępniać wiadomości wiarygodne, chociaż konstruowane zgodnie z indywidualną linią programową poszczególnych redakcji.

²⁶ A. Latarska, *Wolność słowa w sieci*, „Progress. Journal of Young Researchers” 2018, nr 4, s. 37.

Poszerzenie dozwolonych granic wypowiedzi w cyberprzestrzeni

Specyfika cyberprzestrzeni powoduje, że wchodząc w świat wirtualnych relacji komunikacyjnych, należy spodziewać się systemu wartości, który nie jest tożsamy z powszechnie obowiązującymi zasadami. Odmienność ta polega z pozoru m.in. na zwiększeniu swobody dyskusji, łatwości prowadzenia szczerego i otwartego dialogu, a także naturalnym i bezceremonialnym wyrażaniu swojego stanowiska nawet wbrew opiniom innych internautów. Poszerzenie możliwości uzewnętrzniana prze-myśleń – niezależnie od kompetencji, a nierzadko też kultury – ma jednak swoją cenę. W cyberprzestrzeni wyjątkowo łatwo bowiem o wymysły, insynuacje lub szyderstwa, a interakcje mogą być nacechowane znacznym poziomem agresji. Co więcej, użytkownik korzystający z wirtualnych narzędzi komunikacyjnych *powinien mieć świadomość, że anonimowość sprzyja formułowaniu zdecydowanych, nieraz bardzo ostrych ocen i poglądów i każda osoba wystawia się na swoje ryzyko związane w szczególności z oceanami jej wpisów i prezentowanych poglądów. Granice tego, co dozwolone w wypowiedziach na forum internetowym należy wytyczyć inaczej, niż w przypadku innych form wypowiedzi, a ocena dopuszczalności użycia określonych zwrotów powinna być bardziej liberalna*²⁷. W konsekwencji następuje rozszerzenie granic wypowiedzi internetowej poza ramy przyjęte np. w tradycyjnych środkach masowego przekazu. Powszechność tego zjawiska, połączona z praktycznym brakiem dostępu do środków pozwalających efektywnie egzekwować przepisy odnoszące się do naruszenia dóbr osobistych, powoduje tworzenie charakterystycznej dla cyberprzestrzeni nadmiernie „wyluzowanej” konwencji komunikacyjnej. Anonimowość albo dość złudne jej poczucie nie jest głównym stymulatorem opisanego procesu. W mediach społecznościowych *mimo zachowania pełnej jawności nazwiska (bądź pseudonimu) oraz zdjęcia, które tym mocniej identyfikuje nadawcę wypowiedzi, wydaje się, że nawet osoby o wyższym wykształceniu i dobrej pozycji*

²⁷ Wyrok Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 26 kwietnia 2018 r., I CSK 418/17, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego Izba Cywilna – Zbiór dodatkowy 2019, nr B, poz. 20.

*obyczajowej w internecie pozwalają sobie na większe rozluźnienie językowe i stosują wyrażenia nieprzyzwoite*²⁸.

Podsumowanie

Analizując przypadki manipulacji informacjami można przyjąć, że „miękki” *fake news* opiera się na niewłaściwym połączeniu treści z ilustracją, błędnym kontekście, wyciąganiu fałszywych wniosków z prawdziwych przesłanek, pomyłce w tłumaczeniu itd. Upowszechnianie nieprawdy jest wtedy swoistym skutkiem ubocznym. „Twardym” *fake newsem* będzie celowo spreparowane kłamstwo, bo *zmanipulowana zawartość występuje wówczas, kiedy oryginalne (prawdziwe) informacje lub zdjęcia są modyfikowane celem dokonania oszustwa. Ostatnią kategorią są informacje o całkowicie sfabrykowanej zawartości. To przypadek, kiedy 100% zawartości jest fałszywa, a dystrybucja ma na celu wprowadzanie w błąd i działanie na szkodę*²⁹. Na powszechność manipulowania informacją wpływa zapewne popularność nośników wiadomości w cyberprzestrzeni przy braku norm, którym odpowiadać powinni nadawcy oraz wyjątkowo wątych kompetencjach komunikacyjnych adresatów. Odbiorcy przyswajają bowiem dystrybuowane przekazy, nie podejmując próby weryfikacji ich wiarygodności, a nie są one przecież materiałami prasowymi tworzonymi i wykorzystywanymi – w myśl przepisów – ze szczególną starannością i rzetelnością³⁰. Dlatego właśnie *wśród przyczyn wirusowego rozprzestrzeniania się fake newsów są nie tylko rosnąca popularność mediów społeczności-*

²⁸ A. Urzędowska, *Etyka czy etykieta? Charakterystyka komentarzy Facebooka w perspektywie poprawności językowej i obyczajowej*, „Studia Socialia Cracoviensia” 2017, nr 1, s. 184.

²⁹ B. Łódzki, „Fake news” – dezinformacja w mediach internetowych i formy jej zwalczania w przestrzeni międzynarodowej, „Polityka i Społeczeństwo” 2017, nr 4, s. 23.

³⁰ Dochowanie należytej staranności i rzetelności, a zwłaszcza sprawdzenie zgodności z prawdą uzyskanych wiadomości lub podanie ich źródła, należy do podstawowych obowiązków dziennikarza określonych w art. 12 Prawa prasowego.

wych, konkurencja, nacisk na nowości i sensację, strategie SEO zachęcające do «klikania», lecz również elementarne braki kompetencji medialnych u odbiorców – świadomości, jak działają media, znajomości zasad budowania przekazów, zasad filtrowania informacji i krytycznego podejścia do ich zawartości. W czasach, gdy znaczna część społeczeństwa odbiera i interioryzuje przekazy mediów, których nie tworzą profesjonalści, kontrola treści jest bardzo utrudniona³¹.

Istotą funkcjonowania mediów zinstytucjonalizowanych – w odróżnieniu od wielu innych podmiotów i osób działających w cyberprzestrzeni – jest stosowanie się redakcji do obowiązujących przepisów w zakresie wiarygodności upublicznianych informacji i dziennikarskich kodeksów etycznych. Rozpoznawalność nadawcy pozwala zarazem na efektywne prostowanie wiadomości nieścisłych albo wyciąganie konsekwencji prawnych za publikacje będące przestępstwami przeciwko czci. Świadomość sankcji karnych ułatwia profesjonalnemu nadawcy internetowemu funkcjonowanie zgodne z normami współżycia społecznego. Upowszechniając rzetelnie przygotowane materiały prasowe, dziennikarze zapewniać powinni dostęp do sprawdzonych i obiektywnych informacji. Ponosząc odpowiedzialność za słowo i posiadając stosowne kompetencje komunikacyjne – czym ponownie różnią się od wielu innych internautów – przekazywać mogą treści godne zaufania. Takie też przekonanie wyrażała większość dziennikarzy (57,1%) uczestniczących w opisanym projekcie badawczym, mającym na celu ujawnienie opinii na temat zasięgu manipulowania informacjami i ustalenie skutków tego zjawiska.

Obok wiary w istnienie społecznego zapotrzebowania na wiarygodne wiadomości, działaniem właściwym wobec wszechstronnych konsekwencji postępu technologicznego wydaje się tworzenie nowych rozwiązań legislacyjnych uwzględniających specyfikę cyberprzestrzeni, a szczególnie łatwość rozprzestrzeniania się

³¹ M. Chyliński, *Fałszywe wiadomości – antydobra w ekosystemie informacji*, „Com.press” 2018, nr 4, s. 20.

fake newsów. We Francji 20 listopada 2018 r. przyjęta została ustawa *przeciw manipulacji informacją, która ma na celu lepszą ochronę demokracji przed różnymi formami celowego rozpowszechniania fałszywych wiadomości*³², ukierunkowana głównie na masowe rozpowszechnianie fake newsów za pośrednictwem mediów społecznościowych w okresie kampanii wyborczych oraz działaniom takim podejmowanym z inspiracji innych państw. Ważną rolę odgrywać też mogą mechanizmy autoregulacyjne, jeśli oczywiście będą przestrzegane przez sygnatariuszy porozumień takich jak „Kodeks postępowania w zakresie zwalczania dezinformacji”³³, które zostało opublikowane 26 września 2018 r. W styczniu 2019 r. Komisja Europejska opublikowała sprawozdania podmiotów tworzących porozumienie. Wynikało z nich, że *poczyniono pewne postępy, zwłaszcza w zakresie usuwania fałszywych kont i ograniczania widoczności stron promujących dezinformację*³⁴.

³² *Lutte contre la manipulation de l'information*, publikacja z 4 stycznia 2019 r., <https://www.gouvernement.fr>, (15.02.2019).

³³ Code of Practice on Disinformation, artykuł z 26 września 2018 r., <https://ec.europa.eu>, (15.02.2019).

³⁴ Sprawozdania z działań podjętych do 31 grudnia 2018 r. oceniane przez Komisję Europejską wskazują, że:

– Facebook podjął lub podejmuje działania mające na celu wdrożenie wszystkich zobowiązań, musi jednak wyraźniej określić, w jaki sposób wykorzysta narzędzia służące wzmocnieniu pozycji konsumentów i zacieśni współpracę z weryfikatorami faktów i środowiskiem naukowym w całej UE.

– Google podjął kroki w celu wdrożenia wszystkich swoich zobowiązań, w szczególności mających na celu poprawę kontroli praktyk reklamowych, przejrzystości reklamy politycznej oraz zapewnienia użytkownikom informacji, narzędzi i wsparcia, aby wzmocnić ich pozycję podczas korzystania z internetu. Niektóre narzędzia są jednak dostępne tylko w niewielkiej liczbie państw członkowskich. Komisja wzywa również Google do wykorzystania wyszukiwarki internetowej do wspierania działań badawczych na szerszą skalę.

– Twitter potraktował priorytetowo działania podejmowane przeciwko podmiotom działającym w złych intencjach, zamykanie fałszywych lub podejrzanych kont oraz eliminowanie zautomatyzowanych systemów/botów (...).

– Mozilla ma wprowadzić na rynek unowocześnioną wersję swojej przeglądarki w celu zablokowania automatycznego śledzenia krzyżowego (ang. cross-site tracking), powinna jednak wyraźniej określić, w jaki sposób ograniczy to informacje na temat sposobów korzystania z przeglądarki przez użytkowników, które mogłyby być wykorzystywane w kampaniach dezinformacyjnych.

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest wskazanie na zjawisko upowszechniania wiadomości nieprawdziwych lub nieścisłych, któremu sprzyja zarówno poczucie anonimowości w sieci komputerowej, jak też trudności z ustaleniem nadawcy zmanipulowanych treści, nierzadko mogących również wyczerpywać znamiona przestępstwa. Fake newsy stwarzają oczywiście zagrożenie dla prawnej ochrony wizerunku, lecz paradoksalnie chaos komunikacyjny w cyberprzestrzeni stanowić może szansę na zwrot w stronę tradycyjnego dziennikarstwa opartego na staranności i obiektywizmie. Wyniki badania przeprowadzonego wśród aktywnych zawodowo dziennikarzy potwierdziły, że problem fake newsów jest postrzegany jako powszechny (57,1%), a dla ponad połowy ankietowanych dziennikarzy (50,7%) masowa dystrybucja w sieci plotek, wymysłów i oszczerstw faktycznie może sprawić, że odbiorcy poszukiwać będą wiarygodnych i rzetelnych informacji udostępnianych przez profesjonalne redakcje.

THREAT OF DISINFORMATION IN CYBERSPACE AS A SOURCE OF CHANCE FOR INCREASE OF SOCIAL RANGE OF MASS MEDIA

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to show the phenomenon of dissemination of false or inaccurate information, which is favoured by both the sense of anonymity in the computer network and the difficulties in determining the sender of manipulated content, often also meeting the legal criteria of a crime. At the same time, communication chaos in cyberspace may be an opportunity for traditional journalism focused on diligence and objectivity. The results of a survey carried out among professionally active journalists confirmed that the problem of fake news is perceived as common (57.1%), and for more than half of the journalists surveyed (50.7%)

Źródło: Komunikat prasowy Komisji Europejskiej, *Kodeks postępowania w zakresie zwalczania dezinformacji: Komisja wzywa sygnatariuszy do zwiększenia wysiłków*, Bruksela 29 stycznia 2019 r.

mass distribution of rumours, inventions and slanders in the network may actually result in that the recipients will look for credible and reliable information provided by professional editorial staff.

Key Words:

press, internet broadcaster, social media, information manipulation, image

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VARIA

Joanna Goćłowska-Bolek

Venezuelan Migration Crisis as a Growing International Challenge for Latin America

Key words:

Venezuela, migration, crisis, Latin America

Introduction. The political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela

Venezuela remains in a state of a serious political, economic and humanitarian crisis, marked by hyperinflation, high unemployment, escalating starvation, disease, crime and mortality rates, and resulting in massive emigration from the country¹. Shortages of food, medicine, hygienic supplies, electricity and drinking water became a common phenomenon². It is the worst economic crisis in Venezuela's history and the worst facing a country that has not experienced war since the mid-20th century³. The economy is in a phase of a deep collapse; Central Bank of Venezuela admitted that the GDP shrunk by nearly 48% in the years 2013-2018, and the inflation in 2018 exceeded 130 thousand percent. International Monetary Fund

¹ OAS, *Preliminary Report on the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the Region*, 8 March 2019.

² D. Biller, P. Laya, *Venezuela unemployment nears that of war-ruined Bosnia*, Bloomberg, 9 April, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-09/venezuela-unemployment-nears-that-of-war-ruined-bosnia-imf-says>, 1.08.2019.

³ A. Kurmanaev, *Venezuela's Collapse Is the Worst Outside of War in Decades*, Economists Say, The New York Times, 17 May 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/venezuela-economy.html>, 10.11.2019; The Economist, *A faint hope for Venezuela*, 1 July 2019, <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/07/18/a-faint-hope-for-venezuela>, 10.11.2019.

data indicates that the hyperinflation skyrocketed to the level of 1.3 m. percent in 2018 and forecasts the consumer price index of 10 m. percent in 2019. Joblessness will reach 44.3% in 2019 and will affect nearly half of Venezuela's labor force in 2020⁴. United Nations estimates that 94% of Venezuelan population currently lives in poverty, and one fourth of the Venezuelans urgently need humanitarian help. Over 4.5 m. people have already fled from the crisis-stricken country, which became the largest migratory challenge in the newest history of the region⁵.

The country flooded with weapons is also a home for many armed groups, including paramilitary fighting squads, commonly called *colectivos*⁶, organized criminal gangs, present and former guerillas from the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), and groups of rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which increases the probability of a violent internal conflict in the absence of political agreement⁷. Venezuela has become a very dangerous country, with one of the highest murder rates in the world⁸.

⁴ IMF, *Venezuela. Country Data*, <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/VEN>, 10.11.2019.

⁵ UNHCR, IOM, *Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela top Four Million: IOM and UNHCR*, 6 July 2019, <https://www.iom.int/news/refugees-and-migrants-venezuela-top-four-million-iom-and-unhcr>, 20.07.2019.

⁶ Human Rights Watch reported in 2014 that government forces *repeatedly allowed colectivos to attack protesters, journalists, students, or people they believed to be opponents of the government with security forces just meters away* and that *"in some cases, the security forces openly collaborated with the pro-government attackers* (HR Watch, *Punished for Protesting. Rights Violations in Venezuela's Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System*, Human Rights Watch, 2014). Since 2016, the police and security forces have killed nearly 18,000 people in Venezuela in instances of alleged "resistance to authority". There were 5,995 such cases reported in 2016 and 4,998 in 2017. Venezuelan security forces killed nearly 7,000 people in incidents they claimed were cases of "resistance to authority" in 2018 and the first five months of 2019, according to the government figures (HR Watch, *Venezuela: Extrajudicial Killings in Poor Areas*, Human Rights Watch, 18 Sept, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/18/venezuela-extrajudicial-killings-poor-areas>, 20.11.2019).

⁷ UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UNHCR, 12 July 2019, Geneva.

⁸ Venezuela has the third highest murder rate in the world (after El Salvador and Jamaica). The country loses 56.3 people per 100,000 each year to homicide. Caracas, the capital of

The opposition is organizing wide-scale protests against the increasingly authoritarian policy of Nicolas Maduro's government. Hundreds of protesters lost their lives. The United Nations report documents the use of torture against political prisoners⁹. Establishment of a Constituent Assembly in July 2017, which was granted nearly unlimited powers, finally sealed the destruction of Venezuelan democratic space, bringing forth widespread condemnation in the region and around the world.

On April 30, 2019, the Venezuelan opposition, led by the President of the Parliament, Juan Guaidó, who proclaimed himself a temporary president, took an attempt to overthrow the authoritarian government of Venezuela headed by Nicolas Maduro. However, the call for the uprising did not attract the support of critical mass of senior Venezuelan military commanders, and the efforts undertaken by the opposition and its supporters did not lead to overthrowing Maduro. Over half thousand Venezuelan soldiers fled to Colombia and Brazil, but most of the military authorities remained loyal to the regime, esp. the generals that held senior positions in the government and state companies and were crucial to maintain the reign of Maduro. Maduro showed a great efficiency in the use of dispersed violence, in order to discourage inhabitants from opposing the government¹⁰.

The Venezuelan crisis has drawn the attention of the whole world. Undoubtedly the vast oil reserves as well as other resources, including natural gas and gold, determined the attractiveness of this country. The geographic location within easy reach of the United States is also an important factor. Each side in the political battle in Venezuela has strong foreign supporters. Over 50 countries recognize Juan

Venezuela, is considered the second most murderous city in the world. With increasing political turmoil, this number has been increasing (WorldAtlas, *Murder rate by country*, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/murder-rates-by-country.html>, 12.11.2019).

⁹ UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*

¹⁰ J. Goćłowska-Bolek, *Wenezuelski kryzys migracyjny*, [in:] J. Goćłowska-Bolek (ed.), *Wenezuela na globalnej szachownicy. O co biją się światowe mocarstwa?*, OAP UW, Centre for Political Analysis University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2019.

Guaidó as a legal president of Venezuela. Guaidó, since he assumed temporary presidency, has coordinated actions with the administration of President Donald Trump, and Trump in his rhetoric has made the change of Venezuelan regime a priority – though rather apparent – for the foreign policy of the United States. However, despite the multiple mentions of president Trump about the fact that “all options are on the table”, and the great expectations of international and Venezuelan communities, it became gradually obvious that the US does not have any actual plans for military interventions in mind. It is highly probable that Trump’s administration did not have any strategy towards Venezuela from the very beginning and probably still has not got one. On the other hand, economic sanctions, which are currently directed mainly against Venezuelan oil industry, seem to be more severe for the people of Venezuela than for the Maduro’s regime.

Meanwhile the Maduro’s government still enjoys the support of Russia, Cuba, Turkey and China. It may be observed that China, which lent Venezuela about 60 bn. dollars in the last 12 years, and is trying to secure its economic interest in this rich in resources country, is limiting its public support for Maduro. The most important ally of Maduro is Russia. Russian military equipment and personnel sent to Venezuela will probably help maintain and operate sophisticated air defense system, which protects the capital and crucial military bases from air attacks. Russia also accepted the role of an ombudsman of Maduro’s regime in the international forum, including in the UN Security Council, demanding respect for autonomy and non-interference with internal issues of this country. Venezuela, therefore, remains immersed in a catastrophic deadlock. The majority of Venezuelans, both supporters of the ruling camp and the opponents of the revolution, are eagerly waiting for any meaningful result of the negotiations. Yet, the situation in Venezuela is not improving.

Literature review

There is shortage of contemporary studies in the field of the migratory issues in Venezuela, although the historical approach of the Venezuelan migration policy has been widely explored¹¹. Most of the studies analyse the impact of South-South migration on the income of migrants and natives, and welfare implications for the poor. Most of these findings suggest that policymakers should pay attention to the complex challenges that developing countries face not only as countries of origin, but also as countries of destination.

There are a few studies dedicated to selected issues¹². Many reports documenting the economic and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and highlighting the extent of Venezuelan migration have been published¹³. The topic of the Venezuelan crisis, including the problem of migration, is present in the global and local

¹¹ e.g. D. Ratha, W. Shaw (eds.), *South-South Migration and Remittances*, World Bank Group Working Papers, 2007; J. Durand, D. S. Massey, *New World Orders: Continuities and Changes in Latin American Migration*, "The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", vol. 630 (1), pp. 20-52.

¹² T. Hernández; Y. Ortiz Gómez, *La migración de médicos en Venezuela*, "Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública", 30 (2), 2011, pp. 177-81; P. Ceriani Cernadas, L. Feline Freier, *Migration Policies and Policymaking in Latin America and the Caribbean: Lights and Shadows in a Region in Transition*, [in:] D. J. Cantor, L. Feline Freier, J. P. Gauci (eds.), *A Liberal Tide? Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in Latin America*, London 2015.; T. Páez, M. Vivas, J. R. Pulido, *Comunidad venezolana en el exterior: un nuevo método de exilio*, Caracas 2017; A. Selee et al., *Creativity amid crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezulean Migrants in Latin America*, Migration Policy Institute and OAS, Jan. 2019; A. Betts, *Research in Brief: Venezulean Survival Migration as a Development Opportunity*, University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Center, "Reliefweb 12", 11 Mar. 2019, Oxford 2019; O. Van Praag, *Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis*, Wilson Center, 13 Sept. 2019, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugee-crisis>, 2.12.2019.

¹³ Migración Colombia, *Más de un millón cien mil venezolanos estarían radicados en Colombia*, December 2018, <http://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/index.php/es/prensa/comunicados/comunicados2018/diciembre-2018/9348-mas-de-un-millon-cien-mil-venezolanos-estarian-radicados-en-colombia>, 2.08.2019; UNHCR, *Number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela reaches 3 million*, 8 Nov. 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/11/5be4192b4/number-refugees-migrants-venezuela-reaches-3-million.html>, 2.11.2019; UNHCR, IOM, *Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela...*; IMF, *Venezuela. Country Data...*; UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*; et al.

media. However, the current state of Venezuelan migration crisis, as well as the potential consequences on the region still lack in-depth scientific elaboration. There is a lack of comprehensive scientific studies that would treat the problem of Venezuelan migration as an international problem.

Characteristics of the Venezuelan migratory crisis

The Venezuelan migration crisis demonstrates two characteristics that are uncommon for South America. Firstly, the crisis is originating in a country which in modern history has generally received migrants and refugees rather than has been the source of mass outmigration. There is no policy towards the migration problem within the neighbouring countries most affected by the exodus. Secondly, its dimensions are effectively regional and extremely fast growing, which requires a long-term, well-designed, carefully considered and planned response by Latin American governments¹⁴.

Historical approach

A few decades ago, Venezuela was one of the richest countries in Latin America, enjoying prosperity and a relatively high standard of living. Moreover, Venezuela pursued an exemplary migration policy for decades.

Venezuela was one of the co-founders of the International Organization for Refugees – the precursor of today's Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees – and one of the first countries in the world to adopt and implement its legal regulations. Venezuela remained open primarily to Europeans looking for a new homeland after the tragedy of the World War II, welcoming tens of thousands of people with open arms. President Betancourt's progressive policy was continued by

¹⁴ V. M. Mijares, N. Rojas Silva, *Venezuelan Migration Crisis puts the Region's Democratic Governability at Risk*, (GIGA Focus Lateinamerika, 6). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Lateinamerika-Studien, 2018, p. 4; UNHCR, IOM, *Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela...*

subsequent governments.¹⁵ Venezuela has become a magnet for immigrants and a flagship example of their successful integration. In the 1960s, Venezuela's society was made up of 530,000 foreigners, constituting about 7.5% of the population at the time. They came mainly from Italy, Spain and Portugal, but also from Germany, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland (at the beginning of this century there were nearly 4,000 Poles living there) and from the Middle East, mainly from Lebanon and Syria. Since the mid-1970s, Venezuela's economy flourished, and living conditions and access to public services became very attractive if compared to neighbouring countries, which attracted numerous immigrants from Latin American countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. Some of them were simply looking for better living conditions than in their home countries, while others were sheltering from cruel military dictatorships.

Emigration from Venezuela began, albeit to a small extent, in 1983, i.e. after the collapse of oil prices that triggered the debt crisis throughout Latin America. In contrast, the increase in emigration, especially of professionals, qualified staff and scientists, followed the announcement by President Hugo Chávez¹⁶ of the “Bolivarian Revolution”. According to the Venezuelan Institute of Economic and Social Research Andrés Bello, the causes of migration at the time were *poor personal development prospects and personal security threats*.

¹⁵ Presidents in the époque of the United States of Venezuela: Rómulo Betancourt (1945-48), Rómulo Gallegos (1948), Carlos Delgado Chalbaud (1948-50), Germán Suárez Flamerich (1950-52); presidents of the Republic of Venezuela: the Marcos Pérez Jiménez (1952-58), Rómulo Betancourt (1959-64), Raúl Leoni (1964-69), Rafael Caldera (1969-74), Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-79 and 1989-93), Luis Herrera Campins (1979-84), Jaime Lusinchi (1984-89), Octavio Lepage (1989), Ramón José Velásquez (1989-94), Rafael Caldera (1994-95).

¹⁶ President Hugo Chávez served *de jure* from 1999 until his death in 2013. His presidency was interrupted shortly in 2002 following a failed coup d'état attempt that put Pedro Carmona in office for one day.

Subsequent waves of emigration followed the coup attempt in Venezuela in 2002 and the re-election of Chavez in 2006. More than million Venezuelans emigrated within ten years, in 1999-2009, since Hugo Chávez became president. The scientists from the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) estimate that about 1.5 million Venezuelans (4-5% of the total population of the country) emigrated in the years 1999-2014.

During the Nicolas Maduro's presidency, emigration grew dramatically as the crisis deepened and began to affect Venezuelans with lower incomes, i.e. the weakest social group, so far faithful to Chavism. Initially, the most common migration scheme included departures of men who left their wives, children and elderly relatives to find work in the neighbouring countries or, less often, in the US to send remittances to their home country. As the crisis deepened, the money transfers could not meet the daily needs of the families in Venezuela; mothers and children often joined fathers.

After intensified protests against the policy pushed by President Maduro in 2014, the rate of emigration from Venezuela increased. During this time, along with the escalation of inflation and food and medicine shortages, mass emigration of the Venezuelan middle class began. In the years 2012-2015, the number of migrant Venezuelans increased by 2.9% per year. By the end of 2015, around 1.8 million Venezuelans had emigrated¹⁷.

During the constitutional crisis in Venezuela in 2017, which caused street protests and repression by the Maduro government, Colombia prepared for the increase in the number of Venezuelan refugees. According to the Colombian government, over 100,000 Venezuelans immigrated to Colombia in the first half of 2017. On the eve of the Venezuelan Constitutional Assembly elections in 2017, Colombia

¹⁷ A. Selee et al., *Creativity amid crisis...*

granted a special permanent residence permit to the citizens of Venezuela who entered the country before July 25; over 24 thousand Venezuelans applied for permanent residence in Colombia during the first 24 hours of the program. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees said host countries across Latin America had more than one million Venezuelans settling in 2014-2017.

After the controversial re-election of President Maduro in May 2018, emigration gathered an even faster pace. Migrant Venezuelans were convinced that Maduro's policy would not change and that conditions in the country would continue to deteriorate. In September 2018, the regional representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees officially compared the Venezuelan crisis with the migration and refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war. In November 2018, UNHCR and IOM published data showing that the number of refugees fleeing Venezuela since the Bolivarian Revolution in 1999 increased to 3 million, or about 10% of the country's population¹⁸.

In January 2019, the chairman of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, proclaimed himself the interim president of Venezuela, which resulted in increased street manifestations and increased violence by the Maduro regime. On April 30, 2019, Juan Guaidó tried to carry out a nationwide action that would remove Maduro from power, but his plan failed. Emigration increased again because Venezuelans, disappointed with the ineffectiveness of the opposition's actions, are increasingly convinced that they will not see a change of power in the near future, and thus their situation will not improve. In June 2019, the number of Venezuelans who have left their country was estimated at 4.5 million, and if the pace continues, it may double by mid-2020¹⁹.

¹⁸ UNHCR, *Number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela reaches 3 million*, 8 Nov. 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/11/5be4192b4/number-refugees-migrants-venezuela-reaches-3-million.html>, 2.11.2019.

¹⁹ UNHCR, IOM, *Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela...*

Causes of migration

According to the document *Comunidad venezolana en el exterior: un nuevo método de exilio*, by Tomás Páez, Mercedes Vivas and Juan Rafael Pulido²⁰, the scientists from the UCV, the intensification of Venezuelan emigration was caused by *both the economic and social collapse, widespread crime, uncertainty and lack of hope for leadership change in the near future*. High crime is the most important reason for emigration. Most “white collars” have escaped because of high crime rates, soaring inflation and widening government interference in every area of economic and social life. Studies have shown that the reasons for leaving the country included lack of freedom, high level of uncertainty, and the inability to provide living conditions for families.

Parents and relatives encourage young Venezuelans to flee the country for their own safety. Homicide rate per 100,000 residents increased from 25 in 1999 (when Hugo Chávez came to power) to 82 in 2014 (when Nicolás Maduro took power), and the number of kidnappings increased more than 20 times during this period. The increase in the number of murders since the beginning of the Chavez presidency is explained by experts by the increase in the corruption of the Venezuelan authorities, poor weapon control and a weak judicial system. Homicide rate per 100,000 residents reached a record value of 91 in 2016 (world record among countries without ongoing warfare) to fall to 80 in 2018, which places Venezuela among the countries with the highest levels of violence²¹. The second most important reason for emigration is the deteriorating economic situation of families, lack of work and lack of access to public services, mainly healthcare.

²⁰ T. Páez, M. Vivas, J. R. Pulido, *Comunidad venezolana en el exterior: un nuevo método de exilio*, Caracas 2017.

²¹ UNODC, *Statistics Online*, <https://dataunodc.un.org/crime/intentional-homicide-victims>, 2.11.2019.

The effects of migration

The effects on economy

Professionals like entrepreneurs, managers, but also accountants and lawyers have massively emigrated from Venezuela due to corruption, government price controls, food and medicine shortages and rising inflation. They went mainly to countries experiencing economic growth at that time, such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, where they joined the local labour market, usually occupying positions corresponding to their qualifications. The United States was also a frequent destination for their migration; however it usually offered them jobs below their qualifications.

It is estimated that 75% of around 20,000 of the most highly qualified employees of PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela) who left the company after strikes in 2002 emigrated to work in other countries. Venezuelan oil sector engineers began to work on oil rigs in the North Sea or tar extraction sands in western Canada (the number of Venezuelans in the Canadian province of Alberta increased from 465 in 2001 to 3,860 in 2011). Former PDVSA employees also joined the oil industry staff in neighbouring Colombia. After the PDVSA exodus, Venezuelan oil production fell drastically²². The phenomenon of the outflow of qualified employees continues during Maduro's presidency; in the years 2013-2019 more than 50,000 engineers and architects left Venezuela. Part of the Venezuelan workforce has been replaced by foreign workers, including the Chinese and Cubans.

The effects on education and science

Many Venezuelan emigrants are highly professional specialists. Initially, upper class Venezuelans and scholars emigrated during the Chávez presidency, while middle- and lower-class Venezuelans began to leave as conditions worsened in the country.

²² The Economist, *Venezuela's oil diaspora. Brain haemorrhage*, 19 July 2014, <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2014/07/19/brain-haemorrhage>, 20.07.2019.

It has caused a brain drain that affected the nation due to the large number of emigrants who are educated or skilled²³.

The results of the study by scientists from the University of Simón Bolívar (USB) indicate that 60-80% of students in Venezuela want to leave the country. This also applies to elementary and high school students. There are media reports of children fainting from hunger in schools. In Venezuela's border regions, the dropout rate is up to 80%, mainly due to poverty. In 2014, about 40% of mathematics and science teachers were missing in the primary and secondary education system. The Venezuelan government has tried to alleviate the teacher shortage by lowering requirements – one can become a teacher after having completed only two years of study. In 2018, 102 of 120 the USB's academic and teaching vacancies remained vacant. In 2014, 40% of Venezuelans who went abroad had a master's degree and 12% had at least a doctorate.

In 2011-2015, the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) lost over 700 out of their 4,000 academics. About 240 researchers left the USB in 2009-2014, and a further 430 researchers left in 2015-2017. Although other universities do not provide such data, it can be assumed that the situation is similar.

The main reasons for the emigration of researchers and teachers are high crime rates in Venezuela and low wages in the public sector. According to the president of the Venezuelan Academy of Physical, Mathematical and Natural Sciences, Claudio Bífano, *most of Venezuelan technological and scientific potential, built for over half a century, was lost during the presidency of Hugo Chavez*. Despite invest-

²³ A. Maria Delgado, *Venezuela agobiada por la fuga masiva de cerebros*, "El Nuevo Herald" 28 Aug. 2014, <https://www.elnuevoherald.com/2014/08/26/1828337/venezuela-agobiada-por-fuga-masiva.html>, 12.11.2019; El Impulso, *El 90% de los Venezolanos que se van tienen formación universitaria*, 23 Aug. 2014, <https://www.elimpulso.com/2014/08/23/el-90-de-los-venezolanos-que-se-van-tienen-formacion-universitaria/#>, 10.11.2019.

ing 2% of the country's GDP in science and technology, the number of articles published in international journals dropped from around 1,600 in 1997 (when science expenditure was 0.3% of GDP) to 1,000 in 2008-2012. Currently there is no such statistics published.

The effects on the healthcare system

Doctors and medical staff, especially from the private sector, are emigrating due to low wages and the Venezuelan government's rejection of the requirement to complete traditional six-year studies, which has significantly reduced education standards. Instead, the Bolivarian government introduced a Cuban training program for 'environmental doctors'. However, with the escalating crisis, the government limited funding for training of doctors, which led to the closure of medical education across the country.

According to the data of the Venezuelan Medical Federation, in April 2015 over 13,000 doctors emigrated from the country (over 50% of the total). The shortage of doctors affected both public hospitals and private clinics. In March 2018, 22,000 doctors left Venezuela. In 2018, the average salary of doctors was lower than \$10 a month. In Latin America, the qualifications of Venezuelan doctors are widely appreciated. However, Venezuelan doctors who have settled in the United States often become merely medical assistants, occupying positions well below their qualifications and education, or work in non-medical fields.

Directions of migration

Latin America, though heterogeneous, is a region well integrated in terms of culture. Venezuelans largely share the language, religion and traditions of their hosts and quickly integrate into the labour market as soon as they stand a chance. During

the migration crisis, solidarity of Latin American countries, openness and willingness to help can be observed²⁴. Countries in the region have generously opened their borders, providing Venezuelans with access to healthcare, education and employment²⁵.

In recent years, they have accepted over 4 million refugees from Venezuela. During many meetings on this issue, they agreed on the need for cooperation and exchange of information, as well as additional support for countries most affected by Venezuelan migration, such as Colombia. In November 2018, eight countries of the region signed a cooperation agreement in Quito on humanitarian response to the influx of refugees and migrants.

Most of the people who left Venezuela remained in Latin America. Most of them – 1.3 million – went to Colombia, followed by Peru – ca. 768,000. Chile has accepted 400,000 people, Ecuador 263,000, Brazil 180,000 and Argentina 130,000²⁶.

Massive human outflows from Venezuela could destabilize the politics, economics, and security of neighbouring nations and thus significantly harm regional economic and security interests. These challenges come at a particularly delicate time for Colombia, as it works to implement a historic peace process with former FARC guerrillas. An influx of refugees into formerly FARC controlled border communities could undermine stabilization efforts by imposing an added economic and humanitarian burden on local authorities²⁷.

Also threatened are the small Caribbean islands, where even a few thousand migrants could overwhelm local services and increase social tensions. Many of

²⁴ A. Selee et al., *Creativity amid crisis...*

²⁵ Migración Colombia, *Más de un millón...*

²⁶ UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*

²⁷ Migración Colombia, *Más de un millón...*

these countries lack legal frameworks and departments to process asylum seekers and migrants²⁸.

However, some countries are reaching their limits and will soon lose the economic capacity to receive other thousands of immigrants. For example, the relatively small Trinidad and Tobago (1.2 million inhabitants) received 40,000 Venezuelans and Panama (3.7 million inhabitants) received as many as 94,000 Venezuelans. Some countries (Aruba, Colombia, Panama, Peru, the US) report an increase in crime due to the influx of Venezuelan migrants²⁹.

Governments of countries most strongly affected by the inflow of Venezuelans call for a quick and decisive response from international organizations, including financial support. People crossing the border often have no savings due to hyperinflation. Most of them must travel huge distance on foot. They are often not prepared for the severe mountain climate in the places they have reached, which increases their vulnerability to illnesses. Among the migrants there are many ill people who have not been provided with medical care in their country for a long time, including children who require urgent health and psychological care. There are acts of violence (also sexual violence) among and against Venezuelans; they become victims of smugglers and human traffickers³⁰. Prostitution flourishes on the Colombian-Venezuelan and Brazilian-Venezuelan borders as one of the few ways to make money and support families³¹.

²⁸ UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*

²⁹ UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*

³⁰ F. Seminario, *La Organización Internacional para las Migraciones advirtió que los venezolanos pueden ser víctimas de discriminación, trata y prostitución forzada*, "Infobae" 2 May 2018, <https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2018/05/02/la-organizacion-internacional-para-las-migraciones-advirtio-que-los-venezolanos-pueden-ser-victimas-de-discriminacion-trata-y-prostitucion-forzada/>, 2.12.2019; UN, *Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic...*

³¹ Migración Colombia, *Más de un millón...*

Table 1. Population of Venezuelans in top receiving countries (as of July 2019).

Ranking	Country	Number of Venezuelans
1.	Colombia	1,300,000
2.	Peru	768,000
3.	Chile	400,000
4.	USA	351,114
5.	Spain	323,575
6.	Ecuador	263,000
7.	Brazil	168,300
8.	Argentina	130,000
9.	Panama	94,400
10.	Italia	49,831
11.	Trinidad and Tobago	40,000
12.	Mexico	39,500
13.	Guyana	36,400
14.	Dominican Rep.	28,500
15.	Curazao	26,000
16.	Costa Rica	25,700
17.	Portugal	24,603
18.	Canada	20,755
19.	Aruba	16,000
20.	Uruguay	8,600
21.	Bolivia	7,355
22.	Australia	4,500
23.	Paraguay	2,000

Source: Official data of the UNHCR and the IOM (2019).

International response

Those leaving the country are both general migrants and specifically defined asylum-seekers. There is a lack of consensus on whether to define the crisis as a refugee crisis. The UN has defined the flow of emigrants as “a mixed flow population”. For this reason, the UN has created a joint platform between UNHCR and IOM, called the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform, tasked with assisting those emigrating from Venezuela. UNHCR has issued a call to apply the wider definition

of refugee outlined in the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 to Venezuelan migrants, which would allow this group of individuals to be aided as refugees³².

In March 2019, UNHCR opened the “Integrated Assistance Centre” – a reception centre and the first refugee camp to offer support to vulnerable refugees and migrants from Venezuela in the border city of Maicao, in La Guajira region of Colombia³³. The number of immigrants and refugees has significantly burdened the efficiency of Colombian public services. There are increasing difficulties in enrolling children in school, providing basic health care, and even registering new arrivals by migration agencies. Thousands of Venezuelan families sleep in the streets of Colombian towns and cities, begging for a portion of food every day³⁴. There is also a need to adopt a policy that will allow Venezuelans to be freely resettled outside Colombia, receive legal work and access to health care and education for their children³⁵.

Countries which are highly affected by the migratory crisis – Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, Panama and Brazil – are interested in finding a fast solution to the Venezuelan problem. About half a million people have applied for asylum due to political harassment and violence. Hundreds of thousands of people lack a legal place to live, and thus access to employment, education and social services. This is one of the largest and fastest mass migrations in Latin American history that the United Nations has identified as *the largest exodus in recent Latin American and Caribbean history (...). The rate of outflow from Venezuela is staggering*, released

³² UNHCR, *Number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela reaches 3 million*, 8 Nov. 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/11/5be4192b4/number-refugees-migrants-venezuela-reaches-3-million.html>, 2.11.2019; UNHCR, *UNHCR opens reception centre near Colombian border to assist vulnerable Venezuelans*, Press release, 8 March 2019, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2019/3/5c822dcf4/unhcr-opens-reception-centre-near-colombian-border-assist-vulnerable-venezuelans.html>, 5.12.2019.

³³ UNHCR, *UNHCR opens reception centre near Colombian...*

³⁴ Migración Colombia, *Más de un millón...*

³⁵ S. K. O’Neil, *A Venezuelan Refugee Crisis*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 2018; UNHCR, *UNHCR opens reception centre near Colombian...*

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees³⁶ and the International Organization for Migration in a joint statement³⁷.

Tensions arising from the incoming thousands of migrants led some Latin American countries to stop entry for Venezuelans. As of December 2019, governments of 10 countries have introduced special visa requirements for Venezuelan citizens seeking to enter these countries³⁸. For many Venezuelans, it is impossible to obtain a passport, and in such a situation their status in the new country stays also questionable.

Final remarks and conclusions

The latest calculations show that Venezuela will be the world's worst refugee crisis in 2020 and most underfunded in modern history. The international community spent \$7.4 billion on refugee efforts in the first 4 years of the Syrian crisis versus \$580 million for Venezuelan refugees³⁹. The OAS report shows that international financial support in response to the Venezuelan crisis lags behind other world cases. While assistance per one Syrian refugee in 2018 reached 5,000 dollars, in the case of Venezuela it reaches only 2% of this amount, or \$100 per person⁴⁰. Only the UN financial plan for 2019 aimed at helping immigrants from Venezuela was only 21% implemented⁴¹.

³⁶ UNHCR, *UNHCR opens reception centre near Colombian...*

³⁷ UNHCR, IOM, *Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela...*

³⁸ O. Van Praag, *Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee...*

³⁹ N. Acevedo, *Venezuela will be world's worst refugee crisis in 2020*, NBC News, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/venezuela-will-be-world-s-worst-refugee-crisis-2020-most-n1099631>, 10.12.2019.

⁴⁰ E. Fieser, *Venezuela Exodus Is as Big as Syria's, Yet Got 1.5% of the Aid*, 20 Sep, "Bloomberg" 20 Sept., <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-20/venezuela-exodus-as-big-as-syria-s-got-1-5-of-the-aid-chart>, 2.11.2019.

⁴¹ OAS, *Preliminary Report on the Venezulean Migrant...*

The growing number of Venezuelans fleeing the country, often without a passport, is one of Latin America's priority problems today⁴². As the crisis in Venezuela shows no signs of subsiding, host countries must consider long-term, democratic governance solutions to address economic and humanitarian needs.

Forecasts presented by the Organization of American States⁴³ show that the exodus may reach 7.5-8.2 million people in 2020, i.e. it will significantly exceed 6.7 million people who fled Syria within eight years. It would be the largest contemporary migration crisis in the world. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan government denies any migratory crisis, arguing that other countries and the UN disseminating such information are trying to justify foreign intervention in Venezuela.

Eight million Venezuelan migrants would be a huge challenge for the region. Growing Venezuelan emigration may force Latin American governments to take a more determined approach to political change in Venezuela.

Abstract

Approximately 4.5 million migrants and refugees have left Venezuela as a result of the political turmoil, socio-economic instability and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, prompting the largest displacement in Latin America's recent history.

The purpose of the article is to explain the interrelated economic, social, and political factors causing the humanitarian crisis in the country that has triggered Venezuelans to flee.

The article will also analyze the effects of the flows of migrants and refugees, and the international response, on the basis of official numbers. As the crisis in Ven-

⁴² OAS, *Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States and the Panel of Independent International Experts on the Possible Commission of Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela*, 29 May 2018, <http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Panel-IndependienteVenezuela-EN.pdf>, 11.08.2019.

⁴³ OAS, *Preliminary Report on the Venezulean Migrant...*

ezuela shows no signs of subsiding, host countries must consider long-term, democratic governance solutions to address economic and humanitarian needs. Growing Venezuelan emigration may force Latin American governments to take a more determined approach to political change in Venezuela.

KRYZYS MIGRACYJNY W WENEZUELI JAKO ROSNĄCE MIĘDZYNARODOWE WYZWANIE DLA AMERYKI ŁACIŃSKIEJ

Abstrakt

Okolo 4,5 miliona migrantów i uchodźców opuściło Wenezuelę w wyniku zawirowań politycznych, niestabilności społeczno-ekonomicznej i trwającego kryzysu humanitarnego, co spowodowało największe przesiedlenia w najnowszej historii Ameryki Łacińskiej.

Celem artykułu jest wyodrębnienie powiązanych ze sobą czynników ekonomicznych, społecznych i politycznych, które powodują kryzys humanitarny, skutkujący masowymi wyjazdami Wenezuelczyków.

W artykule przeanalizowano również skutki przepływów migrantów i uchodźców oraz reakcję międzynarodową, bazując na oficjalnych danych. Ponieważ kryzys w Wenezueli wciąż trwa, kraje przyjmujące Wenezuelczyków muszą rozważyć długoterminowe, demokratyczne rozwiązania w zakresie zarządzania, aby zaspokoić ich potrzeby gospodarcze i humanitarne. Rosnąca emigracja wenezuelska może zmusić rządy Ameryki Łacińskiej do bardziej zdecydowanego podejścia do zmian politycznych w Wenezueli.

Słowa kluczowe:

Wenezuela, migracja, kryzys, Ameryka Łacińska

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Robert Nahapetyan

The Causes of the Velvet Revolution

Key words:

velvet revolution, Nicol Pashinyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Prime Minister of Armenia, "prime minister from the street"

The year 2018 is marked by the creation of a completely new and unprecedented political situation in Armenia. After the first decade of April of 2018, peaceful demonstrations, marches, mass demonstrations of civil disobedience started in Armenia. As a result of demonstrations and peaceful disobedience, Serzh Sargsyan, who for a decade held the post of president, resigned on April 23, after which, on May 8, the National Assembly nominated "people's candidate" Nicol Pashinyan for the post of RA prime minister.

What caused the necessity and the nature of the revolution in Armenia to be endemic?

The non-violent, velvet revolution in Armenia would not have been possible if the previous government's activities had not been so ineffective, if there had not been a general tendency for stagnation in socio-economic, political and foreign policy spheres for many years. The revolution would not have taken place if corruption had not become the source of institutional degradation.

The political motivation of Armenia's velvet revolution was Serzh Sargsyan's decision to take over the leadership of the country for the third time, but the wave

of popular protests was also triggered by socio-economic reasons. The economic reasons for velvet revolutions were mainly the accumulation of mid-term problems. Former Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan was elected Armenian Prime Minister on April 17, after which former Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia¹.

On April 23, Serzh Sargsyan submitted his resignation in consequence of people's demands. Karen Karapetyan seized the power as acting Prime Minister. The RA prime minister's election was scheduled for May 2, and when the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) voted against it, the election was postponed on May 8, in consequence of which Nicol Pashinyan became prime minister².

The protests in the first round of the revolution (April 13 – May 8, 2018) were aimed at suspending the third term of Serzh Sargsyan's tenure in the Republic of Armenia, which did not succeed in the first ten days of that phase. The movement started with “My Step” and “Deny Serzh” initiatives.

On April 17, 2018, the revolutionary leader, Nicol Pashinyan, announced in Armenia the “velvet revolution”. After Serzh Sargsyan's resignation, protests and other protest actions led to the dismissal of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia and the appointment of Nicol Pashinyan as prime minister.

On the morning of April 21, newly elected Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan issued a statement calling on Nicol Pashinyan to immediately stop the rallies and start talks at the dialogue table.

Nicol Pashinyan responded to Serzh Sargsyan by reporters that the only issue to discuss could be the removal of Serzh Sargsyan and the peaceful transfer of power.

¹ Serzh Sargsyan was elected prime minister of Armenia
<https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29173107.html>, 26.09.2019.

² Velvet Revolution, <https://www.civilcontract.am/news/velvet-revolution/t-avshya-heghap-okhowt-yown>, 26.09.2019.

On April 22, 2018, protest actions against Serzh Sargsyan's authority were resumed in the capital of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, and provinces. In the morning a public meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Nicol Pashinyan took place at Yerevan Marriott Hotel. Serzh Sargsyan replied to Nicol Pashinian 5 minutes after the meeting, saying that he had not learned his lessons from March 1 events and left. After the failed negotiations, the RA police subdivisions used special audio means at the end of the Artsakh street and arrested a number of protest participants, including Nicol Pashinyan. After the clashes in Yerevan, Gyumri, Vanadzor and other towns and villages, protest actions were resumed. Hundreds of citizens were taken to police stations. Protesting citizens in different settlements carried out thousands of marches, street blockings and road closures during the day. In the afternoon hundreds of demonstrators from the provinces of Armenia arrived in Yerevan. The rally of thousands of people in Yerevan and other major cities took place in the evening. More than 160,000 citizens participated in the rally in Yerevan's Republic Square. The result was the velvet revolution.

And what happened in Armenia in April-May: revolution or change of power? Of course change of power and this question are not rhetorical. Perhaps there is a need, at least in general terms, to introduce a unique social-political phenomenon called a revolution. The concept of revolution is derived from the old concept of "revolution", which means a twist, a deep, radical-qualitative change, which implies the development of the society as a leap forward compared to previous living conditions. In a wider sense, "revolution" means breakthroughs in all spheres of public life, from the political system to the social (moral) behavior and consciousness of the people (citizens). It should also be noted that there have been various comments on the positive or negative impacts of the revolution in the history of political thought (especially in the last four centuries) on the development of public life and no definite conclusions have been drawn.

Various interpretations of the revolution (positive or negative) are mainly conditioned by means and methods (violent or non-violent) that are implemented. In other words, if revolution is carried out by cruel, violent and bloody means and methods, the comments on such revolution are mostly negative. Unfortunately, it is necessary to note that almost all revolutions of the past were conducted with cruel and violent methods, and in this way tried to make “qualitative” changes in public life, including political, economic and spiritual-cultural changes. When “qualitative” transformations are applied in all directions, the ideological obligation is a natural practice and a particular social behavior with all its tragic consequences. In short, it can be noticed that almost all revolutions in the past made it a common feature that they were accompanied by violence and bloodshed, regardless of the scale.

Of course a question arises: Why do we agree with certain statement, with political and expert circles that underline that the popular total uprising in Armenia was not a revolution but a change of power?

Option one. The essence of the non-violent, velvet revolution in Armenia is absolutely “incompatible” with stereotypical concepts of traditional (or classical) revolutions accompanied by violence and bloodshed³. That is to say, no matter how long we look for comparisons with the past, it is hardly possible to succeed in finding the commonalities. It does not mean that there should be bloodshed, it does not coincide with the interpretation of the term 'revolution'.

Option two. The non-violent, velvet revolution was not large enough and, as we have already stated, the presence of 160,000 does not testify to its scale; the population of Armenia totals around 3 million.

Option three. The political process of change of power in its content and logical developments attempts to present mainly sub-contextual accents, which, in

³ L. E. Grinin, *Revolutions and the historical process*, “Philosophy and Society” vol. 3 (84), 2017, pp. 5-29.

general, does not imply the application of the political, legal and social responsibility. In other words, change of power implies a political process of handing the government “benevolently” as an obvious proof of broad-mindedness and pro-government attitude.

The revolution is a consequence of the lack of political and legal will to consistently eliminate the causes of permanent degeneration of people's socio-economic conditions, the unstoppable emigration and other negative phenomena. The victory of the revolution requires gradual elimination of many of the above-mentioned phenomena and imposes legal responsibility⁴. It needs to be noted that during the reign of Nicol Pashinyan, emigration was continuously increasing and economic growth was achieved through loans. Serzh Sargsyan stepped down voluntarily.

Option four. Taking into account the inevitability of fulfilling the requirements of the third option, the revolutionary viewers deliberately misrepresent the notion of “power change” and perform speculative interpretations.

These are all the bases for the development of new Armenia. The velvet revolution is a new opportunity for the establishment of democracy, the creation of market economy with free competition rules. The revolutionary euphoria will not last long. Our society is inspired, but at the same time, demanding and impatient.

The most difficult thing for Nicol Pashinyan is still ahead of him. It is important to succeed in the beginning of his activities, maintain a positive approach and support of all stakeholders. Serzh Sargsyan, however, has kept his dignity. Is this a guarantee that we have been completely relieved of possible shocks? Certainly not, there is no such guarantee. Therefore, what happens next will depend on Nicol Pashinyan.

⁴ A. Manvelyan, *Peculiarities of the Armenian Revolution*. Posted on 2018-05-19 (GMT +04:00), <https://www.azg.am/AM/2018051112>, 26.09.2019.

Apart from solving social and economic problems internally, it is not less important how our country will move forward in the foreign policy. The events in Armenia are a serious stimulus not only for the implementation of real reforms domestically, but also in terms of foreign policy diversification. Nicol Pashinyan has repeatedly stated that he will conduct a pro-Armenian policy, he highlighted the development of relations with neighboring Georgia and Iran as well as the balanced relations with Russia, the EU and the US, without taking any dramatic steps. It has been said that the policy of “and-and” will continue.

The velvet revolution Nicol Pashinyan proclaimed is an opportunity to get rid of a vicious circle once and for all. We overestimate external influence on any Armenian event. We begin to doubt ourselves in one thing, and we believe in that suspicion, making it a conviction; then we make judgments and conclusions based on that conviction.

Different representatives of the former government constantly emphasize in their interviews that “the Russians have never denied us anything”, we are only required to be tactful and understand the interests of Russia. Apparently, this is true. That is to say, from the statements of former officials, we can understand that we limit our maneuvering voluntarily when there is no need for it.

Consequently, we are required to draw the boundaries that will serve Armenia, but at the same time will not create controversy in our relations with partners and allies. After the revolution, we live in completely new Armenia. One of the most important issues of Nicol Pashinyan's government is to do everything to make sure that we no longer have limits, which means a new opportunity for the new Armenia and building a full-fledged partnership with strategic allies, taking into account their interests, but not forgetting the interests of Armenia, our citizens.

The velvet revolution, declared by Nicol Pashinyan, is a new opportunity for the establishment of democracy and the creation of market economy with free competition rules.

There were certain freedoms in our country, and under the conditions of their existence the transfer of power took place. But to achieve more, the parliamentary governance system needs to provide the above-mentioned opportunities. It is obvious that a very positive attitude towards Armenia has been formed around the world. This attitude can be used in the interests of Armenia's development, making our state attractive for investment, presenting the country as a regional initiating player, a stable and credible partner.

And then, on April 23, velvet revolution took place. What is most important, it was rather peaceful. It will be visible in the upcoming weeks, how the state governance system will change, what position will be taken, and what economic policy will be developed?⁵

Usually revolutions, even velvet ones, imply uncertainty and have a negative impact on the economy. In some cases, the economy is exposed to collapse, which cannot last for a long time. We hope that this will not happen in Armenia, and quite the contrary, the impact of the revolution will have a positive effect on the economy.

One of the most sensitive indicators of political shocks, the AMD exchange rate, remained unchanged. For many, this may seem odd, but there is one simple explanation: expectations are positive. In the streets was no chaos or uncertainty, but a real celebration full of optimism. One should not be surprised if the dram is even slightly appreciated in these conditions.

However, there are some important things to consider. It is crucial for the Central Bank to avoid the influence of political changes.

The Central Bank is an apolitical structure that must maintain its independence for financial stability. Secondly, the state should continue to work normally

⁵ "Velvet Revolution" took place in Armenia. International Media Response: <https://factor.am/49148.html>, 26.09.2019.

– tax and customs bodies, the Finance Ministry and so on. Taxes should be collected, pensions should be paid on time. In other words, we cannot expect and, moreover, demand sudden staff changes in the state system.

As for the positive effect, huge energy can be capitalized and turned into real economic growth. We have already mentioned that positive expectations are important for the development of the economy.

Secondly, one of the most important factors is confidence in the government and the authorities. The new government, naturally, will have enormous confidence at the initial stage. Most important is not to dissipate this resource.

In the right sequence of steps, this revolution of transition without victims will undoubtedly improve Armenia's reputation. It may seem strange, but this event can become an extremely effective PR and contribute to a considerable increase in the flow of tourists.

A great secret will not be revealed if we say that the combination of all these factors will also contribute to the inflow of foreign investments, with all its positive effects. Perhaps the above mentioned remarks are overly optimistic. However, it is not unrealistic and we should strive to maximize the benefit of this new reality.

But all this has wrongly been presented to the public. We must be careful about exaggerated expectations, and the government should refrain from false and empty promises. Success requires work and time, and difficulties are inevitable. But we have to realize that Armenia has a real development opportunity. It is unforgivable to miss it.

Thus, unlike with the government of Karen Karapetyan that did not receive either public or political support, since he could not complete the major promised reforms, the new government, which was formed after the revolution, with public vote has its chance now.

One of the programs of the new government is the study of the validity of natural monopolies – gas, electricity, water and communication tariffs. However, noticeable results have not yet been recorded.

Another issue is the study of bank interest rates to find out whether the banking system does not receive too high profits from loans to businesses and citizens.

At the same time, the wave of political awakening has given a positive impetus to the circles of Diaspora that can make great investments in Armenia.

But recent events make us think that Nicol Pashinyan's government is doomed to failure, and the “prime minister from the street” will be dismissed from that post because:

- the promises made during the days of revolution have not been fulfilled;
- the people are continually subjected to manipulation, in which there is a tendency to distract the people from reality;
- previously officials took bribes, and the budget was plundered not so obviously; now it is done legally – budget looting is made in the form of bonuses⁶;
- tax burden is increasing day by day, the frequency of changes in tax legislation projects does not promise anything positive in the near future;
- and, in the end, Yerevan is obviously overflowing with its citizens.

Abstract

The velvet revolution of 2018 seemed to be a light at the end of the tunnel for the Armenian people who were ready to hand over the post of prime minister to anyone except Serzh Sargsyan. Such a person was Nicol Pashinyan who had been mocked by the same people for many years, who came to power from the “street”

⁶ The Ministry of Finance has paid nearly half a million dollars bonuses. Official <https://www.24news.am/news/21837>, 26.09.2019.

and the same “street”, in my deepest conviction, will soon deprive him of the power.

PRZYCZYNY AKSAMITNEJ REWOLUCJI

Abstrakt

Aksamitna rewolucja z 2018 r. dawała nadzieję dla Ormian, którzy wyrażali gotowość przekazania stanowiska premiera każdemu oprócz Serzh Sargsyana. Takim człowiekiem był Nicol Pashinyan, wyśmiewany przez to samo grono osób przez wiele lat, który doszedł do władzy „z ulicy”, a w przekonaniu Autora, z tych samych powodów zostanie pozbawiony władzy.

Słowa kluczowe:

aksamitna rewolucja, Nicol Pashinyan, Serzh Sargsyan, premier Armenii

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ESEJE

Łukasz Scheffs

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość i kampania wyborcza, jakiej do tej pory w Polsce nie było

Wprowadzenie

Tadeusz Bodio i Andrzej Chodubski stwierdzili kiedyś, że *refleksja nad daleką i bliską przyszłością stanowi nieodłączny aspekt potocznego stylu działania i myślenia*.

W tych samych rozważaniach doszli jednak do przekonania, że *mimo wielu dawnych i współczesnych rozczarowań związanych z projektowaniem przyszłości, uczeni – wykazując dużą ostrożność – jednak nie rezygnują w swoich wysiłkach badawczych nad doskonaleniem warsztatu metodologicznego w zakresie przewidywania społecznego*¹.

W przewidywaniu zmian społecznych, które ma być działaniem naukowym a nie potocznym, stosowane są dwa podstawowe podejścia: eksploracyjne i normatywne. Pierwsze z nich polega na wnioskowaniu o przyszłości na podstawie wiedzy o przeszłości i teraźniejszości. Podejście eksploracyjne nade wszystko służy do opracowania prognoz ostrzegawczych, sporządzania możliwych scenariuszy zdarzeń społeczno-politycznych i gospodarczych. Z kolei podejście normatywne polega na przyjęciu pożądanej wizji przyszłości (jak być powinno) oraz poszukiwaniu okoliczności i warunków, w jakich przyjęte wizje mogą być spełnione. Podejście to służy

¹ T. Bodio, A. Chodubski, *O prognostyce w politologii*, „Studia Politologiczne” 2004, vol. 8, s. 261-262.

głównie rozwiązywaniu konkretnych problemów przyszłości. Wskazując na różnorodne możliwe scenariusze rozwoju sytuacji, zależnie od okoliczności i warunków, pozwala zarazem wybrać optymalne rozstrzygnięcie. W praktyce prognostycznej podejścia te raczej nie występują samodzielnie². W tej pracy dominowało będzie podejście eksploracyjne, a sama prognoza będzie miała charakter politologiczny.

Na wstępie podjętych rozważań chciałbym postawić dwa zasadnicze pytania:

- 1) dlaczego w maju, względnie czerwcu 2020 roku [obowiązywał wówczas stan epidemii wprowadzony na mocy rozporządzenia Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 20 marca 2020 r. w sprawie ogłoszenia na obszarze Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej stanu epidemii (Dz. U. poz. 491 z późn. zm.)], dojdzie do wyborów prezydenckich?;
- 2) dlaczego najpewniej wygra je ubiegający się o reelekcję Andrzej Duda?

Poszukując odpowiedzi na tak postawione pytania, stawiam hipotezę, że obecnie obserwujemy kampanię wyborczą, której zręby pojawiły się w myśleniu i działalności politycznej Jarosława i Lecha Kaczyńskich oraz ich ówczesnych i obecnych współpracowników jeszcze w latach 90. XX wieku, kształtując ostatecznie ich poglądy, sposób rozumienia i uprawiania polityki. Sama oś obecnego dziś sporu politycznego została z kolei ostatecznie zdefiniowana (nazwana) całkiem niedawno, ale jej podstawa jest niezmienna – zdecydowana krytyka przemian społecznych, politycznych, ekonomicznych i aksjologicznych, do jakich doszło w Polsce po 1989 r., a co za tym idzie: postulat całkowitej przemiany tej rzeczywistości. Jeszcze inaczej i bardziej stanowczo można zaryzykować stwierdzenie, że Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, a wcześniej Porozumienie Centrum, jest jednym z nielicznych, jeżeli nie jedynym ugrupowaniem na polskiej scenie politycznej, które, budując swoją strategię polityczną i wyborczą, pokusiło się najpierw o diagnozę, następnie prezentację planu

² Ibidem, s. 263.

działania i wreszcie jego implementację. Co więcej, czyniło to na przestrzeni ostatnich 19 lat swojego istnienia, zarówno w trakcie kolejnych elekcji wyborczych, jak i bieżącej działalności politycznej, a ukoronowaniem tych zabiegów może być ponowny wybór obecnego Prezydenta RP w wyborach zorganizowanych w trakcie ogólnoswiatowej epidemii wywołanej wirusem COVID-19.

Diagnoza polskiej rzeczywistości społeczno-politycznej

III RP to projekt nieudany zarówno pod względem: politycznym, ekonomicznym, jak i przede wszystkim społecznym. By zrozumieć to wielokrotnie replikowane stwierdzenie, należy zajrzeć w świat myślenia społecznego, a nie indywidualnego. Z poczynionych m.in. przeze mnie analiz na przestrzeni lat 2001-2011 wynika, że spór o to, czym jest Polska, jakie wartości są nadrzędne dla naszego społeczeństwa, ogniскуje się wciąż wokół kwestii ekonomicznych i obyczajowo-kulturowych. I ten właśnie spór determinuje następnie, jak i dlaczego głosujemy w poszczególnych wyborach³. Bardzo trafnie ujął to Krzysztof Jasiewicz, puentując, że to, jak ktoś w Polsce głosuje, nieustannie wyznaczane jest przez dwa niezmiennie czynniki: częstotliwość praktyk religijnych i subiektywne poczucie stabilności własnej sytuacji ekonomicznej; w skrócie: portfel i różaniec⁴. Bardziej enigmatycznie to nieustanny spór między indywidualizmem i kolektywizmem. Przy czym nie należy tych dwóch konstruktów teoretycznych utożsamiać z liberalizmem i socjalizmem. Są to bardziej złożone uniwersa, sprowadzające się do dwóch odmiennych tożsamości, które w konsekwencji determinują sposób widzenia i opisywania świata, także politycznego, odmiennych

³ Ł. Scheffs, *Kolektywizm i indywidualizm. Zachowania wyborcze w Polsce w latach 2001-2011*, Poznań 2016.

⁴ K. Jasiewicz, *Portfel czy różaniec? Ekonomiczne i aksjologiczne determinanty zachowań wyborczych*, [w:] R. Markowski (red.), *Wybory parlamentarne 1997: system partyjny, postawy polityczne, zachowania wyborcze*, Warszawa 1999.

wizji państwa, sposobów patrzenia na strukturę społeczną, wreszcie – norm i wartości, którym hołdują poszczególne jednostki, a w konsekwencji grupy społeczne⁵.

W przypadku środowiska prawicy, do jakiego zalicza się przedstawicieli Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, ten pogląd na Polskę współczesną sprowadzić można do myślenia o systemie oligarchicznym. Jego sens sprowadza się do przekonania, że doszło do uwłaszczenia nomenklatury, a następnie korupcyjnej prywatyzacji i gospodarki układowo-klientelistycznej. Beneficjentami transformacji ustrojowej okazali się wyżsi funkcjonariusze PZPR i członkowie aparatu administracyjnego państwa, którzy stali się głównymi udziałowcami spółek nomenklaturowych. Angażując minimalne środki finansowe, stawali się faktycznymi dysponentami składników majątku państwowego. Sprzyjała temu terapia szokowa w reformowaniu gospodarki, która, drastycznie obniżając poziom dochodów pracowniczych, eliminowała znaczącą część społeczeństwa z przekształceń własnościowych. Dodatkowo jeszcze przyjęty model prywatyzacji faworyzował zagraniczny kapitał, utrudniając formowanie się rodzimej klasy kapitalistów niepowiązanej z aparatem władzy. Tak rozumiana oligarchizacja pogłębiła zróżnicowanie ekonomiczne społeczeństwa i utrwaliła peryferyjne położenie polskiej gospodarki w międzynarodowym systemie podziału pracy. Co ważne, doprowadziło to do sytuacji, w której autentycznymi beneficjentami zmian polityczno-ustrojowych okazały się przede wszystkim elity i aparat partyjny⁶.

W bardzo podobny sposób diagnozę postawioną przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość odczytał Andrzej Antoszewski, pisząc: *Głównymi elementami diagnozy dokonanej przez PiS* [w przededniu wyborców z 2001 roku, niemniej artykułowanej po dzień dzisiejszy – przyp. red. Ł.S.] *były stwierdzenia o kryzysie państwa, zmarnowa-*

⁵ Ł. Scheffs, *Kolektywizm...*

⁶ K. Brzechczyn, *Polska 2015 – deKODowanie systemu*, „Arcana. Kultura – Historia – Polityka” 2016, nr 127-128, s. 37-39.

niu szans rozwoju, niewykorzystaniu potencjału społecznego Polaków i o pogłębiającym się podziale «Narodu na tych, którzy jakoś sobie radzą i tych, którzy znaleźli się na marginesie życia». Nacisk położony został na potrzebę oczyszczenia i naprawy państwa, zdecydowaną walkę z przestępczością i oczyszczenie elit, traktowane jako posunięcie «mające przywrócić Państwo Narodowi»⁷.

Koresponduje to z inną jeszcze opinią, będącą konsekwencją projektu badającego poglądy i postawy polityczne mieszkańców małego miasta w dwa lata po objęciu rządów w Polsce przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość w 2017 roku. Otóż z przeprowadzonych wywiadów pogłębionych (taka metoda została przyjęta we wspomnianym badaniu) wynika, że dzisiejsze poparcie dla Prawa i Sprawiedliwości silnie wiąże się z przekonaniem o skorumpowanym charakterze poprzednich elit politycznych i z akceptacją aktualnych programów społecznych, a także wizją wspólnoty, jaką oferuje swoim wyborcom to środowisko polityczne. Autorzy raportu, powstałego na bazie prowadzonych badań, określają taką postawę neoautorytaryzmem, który łączy przedstawicieli różnych klas, obiecując rozliczenie establishmentu, stworzenie dumnej wspólnoty narodowej i wzrost poczucia mocy zarówno wobec elit, jak i grup o określonej pozycji⁸.

Ten neoautorytaryzm ufundowany jest na swoistym rachunku krzywd – pamięci o tym, jakie zło i komu zostało wyrządzone. To najczęściej subiektywne poczucie przegranej (rzadziej wygranej) pozwoliło dokonać swoistej interpretacji historii, kreśląc kolejny (realny lub wyimaginowany, ważny bądź nieistotny) konflikt społeczny, użyteczny na pewno dla kształtowania się opcji politycznych. *Rachunek krzywd, jako czynnik organizujący tożsamość i podziały polityczne, może, ale nie musi dotyczyć indywidualnych krzywd fizycznych, materialnych czy moralnych jednostek. Często jest przekonaniem o krzywdzie grup społecznych, z którymi jednostka*

⁷ A. Antoszewski, *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość w polskim systemie partyjnym (przyczynek do dyskusji o systemotwórczej roli partii)*, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2011, nr 1, s. 80

⁸ M. Gdula, K. Dębska, K. Trepka, *Dobra zmiana w Miastku. Neoautorytaryzm w polskiej polityce z perspektywy małego miasta*, Warszawa 2017, s. 3

*się utożsamia: kręgu rodzinnego, społeczności lokalnej, grupy etnicznej, wyznania, klasy społecznej*⁹. Środowisko krzywdy, wraz z silnymi antagonizmami, zdaje się być zasadniczym czynnikiem utrzymującym poparcie i niechęć jednocześnie. Innymi słowy, wewnętrzne podziały, intensywnie przeżywana opozycja wroga i przyjaciela, jedności i obcości, rosnące poczucie konfliktu, a nawet trwające walki między politycznymi obozami, konsolidują coraz bardziej odległe od siebie elektoraty z ich alternatywnymi wykładnikami tożsamości i krzywdy¹⁰.

Tak opisany sposób myślenia: dekodowania rzeczywistości społeczno-politycznej i samookreślenia w niej wydaje się nawiązywać w dalszej kolejności do koncepcji dekapilaryzacji władzy. Punktem wyjścia dla tej perspektywy są badania i ustalenia dotyczące procesów i konsekwencji rozproszenia władzy. W złożonym świecie społecznym, nieobjaśnionym już za pomocą którejś z wielu wersji funkcjonalizmu bądź strukturalizmu, lecz za pomocą *complexity theory*, władza traci swą wyrazistość i intensywność, rozwarstwia się na niezliczone wymiary i wydaje się przenikać nie tyle instytucje, ile relacje. W rezultacie, posiadanie władzy oznacza przede wszystkim zdolność uruchamiania przepływów w określonych sieciach społecznych (...) Władza, która nie sięga po nagą przemoc lub czyni to w ostateczności i poczuwa się do obowiązku natychmiast się z tego tłumaczyć, zdaje się oczywiście bardziej demokratyczna, prowolnościowa i proobywatelska od tej, która siły użyć się nie waha. Paradoksalnie jednak, owa samoograniczająca się i powściągliwa władza jawi się dziś wielu jednostkom jako ta, która nie zasługuje na szacunek”¹¹.

Prezentujący koncepcję dekapilaryzacji władzy Rafał Drozdowski i Maciej Frąckowiak twierdzą, że ponownie duża część społeczeństwa woli być rządzona

⁹ M. Białous, I. Sadowski, *Na karuzeli krzywd. Historyczne źródła podziałów społeczno-politycznych w Polsce*, „Studia Politologiczne” 2013, vol. 29, s. 81.

¹⁰ M. Rakusa-Suszczewski, „Polityka krzywdy” PiS, „Przegląd Socjologiczny” 2018, nr 67 (2), s. 120.

¹¹ R. Drozdowski, M. Frąckowiak, *Dekapilaryzacja władzy*, „Studia Socjologiczne” 2017, nr 2 (225), s. 11.

wprost. Głównym źródłem autorytetu władzy ma być dla wielu jednostek jej wi-
doczność. Rozczarowanie systemem politycznym skutkuje rozglądaniem się za wła-
dzą, która byłaby silniejsza. Swoisty paradoks – rozczarowanie władzą powoduje
chęć jeszcze większej (lepiej) władzy. Oznacza to przejście od władzy kapilarnej do
jakiejś postaci władzy spektakularnej. Ma to być zarówno rezygnacja władzy z jej
dotychczasowej niewidzialności (niemożliwości zlokalizowania ośrodka faktycznego
sprawstwa), centralizacja, ostentacyjność praktyk rządzenia, bezceremonialność
(wyzbycie się skrupułów wynikających z faktu, że sprawowanie władzy miewa bez-
względne i siłowe oblicze), bezpośredniość oraz skłonność do ingerowania w ob-
szary, które dotąd nie były poddane regulacjom ze strony rządzących¹².

Tak odczytana przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość diagnoza doprowadziła w kon-
sekwencji do wyznaczenia nowej przestrzeni politycznej. Nastąpiła dalej idąca po-
laryzacja polityczna, oznaczająca dystans między podmiotami systemu partyjnego
a grupami społecznymi reprezentującymi odmienny sposób postrzegania rzeczywi-
stości. Wyznaczono w ten sposób kolejne pasmo, wokół którego ogniskują się pro-
cesy polityczne w Polsce – w mojej ocenie nieprzerwanie od zakończenia obrad
Okrągłego Stołu. Kolejno, były to bardzo proste, ale użyteczne dychotomie, które
pozwalają nam – obywatelom i im – politykom organizować i dekodować skompli-
kowane procesy społeczne. Najpierw był to podział postkomunistyczny, później
postsolidarnościowy, a obecnie postsmoleński. Wszystkie łatwe do umieszczenia na
osi czasu. Pasma postkomunistyczne sprowadzało się do sporu i oceny związanej z
historią i stosunku do PRL oraz kwestii, na ile III RP była jej kontynuacją. Podział
postsolidarnościowy to już spór w łonie partii swój rodowód wywodzących z Soli-
darności, który ogniskował się wokół oceny kondycji polskiego państwa, szczególnie
w obliczu licznych afer korupcyjnych. Pasma postsmoleńskie wyznaczyła katastrofa
lotnicza z 10 kwietnia 2010 roku i wszystko, co zadziało się od tego momentu,

¹² Ibidem, s. 13-15.

a wprost związane było z oceną zdarzeń na podsmoleńskim lotnisku¹³. Katastrofa smoleńska dała bowiem – podobnie jak kiedyś Okrągły Stół III RP – szanse na nowy mit polityczny¹⁴ – męczeńską śmierć w służbie umiłowanej ojczyzny i mitycznego bohatera L. Kaczyńskiego – stanowiących podstawę nowej, lepszej Polski (na pewnym etapie politycznej i ideologicznej aktywności Prawa i Sprawiedliwości IV RP). Obecnie mit smoleński przybiera postać struktury bardziej rozbudowanej, opowiadanej za pomocą wciąż nowych form wyrazu. Od tamtej pory powstało bowiem wiele wystaw, filmów, recitali „piosenki smoleńskiej”, odbyło się wiele wieców, marszów, happeningów¹⁵. Budowanie wspólnoty, kiedy postawiona została diagnoza i wytyczone osie podziałów politycznych, przybrało bardziej konkretny kształt, a sam mit smoleński stał się również tematem toczących się batalii wyborczych¹⁶.

Praktyka działania

Cechą charakterystyczną, szczególną powyższego opisu rzeczywistości jest specyficzny język zawierający nie tylko pewną ocenę obecnego stanu rzeczy, ale i gruntowną wiedzę na temat dokonujących się procesów społecznych¹⁷. Przewrotność, ale i skuteczność narzuconej narracji (opowieści politycznej i wyborczej) spowodowała, że nawet oponenci polityczni zaczęli posługiwać się tą swoistą nowomową

¹³ J. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, *Ocena III Rzeczypospolitej – płaszczyzna polaryzacji współczesnej polskiej sceny politycznej*, „Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Politologica” 2015, nr 14, s. 101-103.

¹⁴ Ł. Scheffs, „Polska solidarna” versus „Polska liberalna”. *O micie wytwarzającym symboliczne granice i pogranicza*, [w:] J. Miluska, A.M. Królikowska (red.), *Pogranicze terytorialne i pogranicze symboliczne. Koncepcje i badania*, Szczecin 2020.

¹⁵ P. Sendyka, *Narodziny „mitu smoleńskiego”*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego” 2013, t. 41, z. 1, s. 49.

¹⁶ A. Nyzio, *Znacząca nieobecność? Katastrofa smoleńska w kampaniach wyborczych 2015 roku*, [w:] M. Kułakowska, P. Borowiec, P. Ścigaj (red.), *Oblicza kampanii wyborczych*, Kraków 2016.

¹⁷ J. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, *op. cit.*, s. 104.

polityczną, choć oczywiście w ogóle lub w ograniczonym zakresie podzielali stawianą przez PiS diagnozę, a tym samym perspektywę widzenia otaczającej rzeczywistości¹⁸. Sens całej strategii komunikacyjnej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości pozostawał jednak niezmienny: przebudowa polskiej rzeczywistości, konieczność zbudowania nowej, lepszej wspólnoty – narodu oraz jednocześnie nieustanne wskazywanie potencjalnych wrogów¹⁹. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, jak żadna organizacja nigdy wcześniej, przywiązywało ogromną wagę do semantycznego znaczenia słów w dyskursie politycznym²⁰, hołdując w ten sposób zasadzie, że granice naszego języka wyznaczają granice naszego świata (sposobu myślenia)²¹. Próbuję w ten sposób napisać, że każda kolejna kampania wyborcza (w tym obecna – prezydencka) w wykonaniu polityków Prawa i Sprawiedliwości była przygotowana bardzo solidnie, co ma swój wyraz nawet we własnym języku, któremu ulegają wszyscy uczestnicy gry politycznej. George Lakoff zwraca uwagę, że fakt narzucenia języka (zarówno swoim wyborcom, jak i przeciwnikom) ma ogromne znaczenie, ponieważ idee są podstawami myślenia, a język ich nośnikiem²². Język wpływa na posiadaną ramę interpretacyjną. Co istotne, autor ten zwraca również uwagę, że *prawda musi pasować do posiadanej przez człowieka ramy, aby ów człowiek ją zaakceptował. Jeśli fakty nie pasują do ramy, rama zostaje, a fakty się odbijają (...)* Podstawowe pojęcia nie mogą zostać zmienione tylko dlatego, że ktoś przedstawi nam fakty. Można zaprezentować ludziom fakty, ale – aby nadali im sens – muszą one pasować do struktur, struktur wcześniej mających reprezentację w mózgu. Inaczej fakty wejdą tam tylko po to,

¹⁸ K. Kłosińska, M. Rusinek, *Dobra zmiana*, Warszawa 2019.

¹⁹ I. Kępka, *My naród – czyli kto? Kategoria my – oni w przemówieniach Jarosława Kaczyńskiego z okazji rocznic smoleńskich*, „Media – Biznes – Kultura. Dziedzictwo i komunikacja społeczna” 2017, nr 2, s. 122-123.

²⁰ B. Kudra, *Semantyzacja ideologiczna słowa w tzw. dyskursie smoleńskim*, [w:] K. Jachimowska, B. Kudra, E. Szkudlarek-Śmiechowicz (red.), *Słowo we współczesnych dyskursach*, Łódź 2014, s. 35.

²¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Warszawa 1970, s. 67.

²² G. Lakoff, *Nie myśl o słoniu! Jak język kształtuje politykę*, Warszawa 2011, s. 31.

*aby zaraz wyjść z powrotem*²³. Ma to znaczenie przy obserwacji swoistego leksykonu czy wręcz kanonu słów, jakim posługują się politycy Prawa i Sprawiedliwości.

W kolejnym ruchu należało stworzyć, powołać albo jedynie odnaleźć i zjednoczyć wszystkich, którzy myślą podobnie, mają subiektywne poczucie straty, a nie potrafią wskazać jej przyczyny. Następnie pozostało przekonać ich wszystkich, że wspólny wróg jest ten sam, a lider nowego ruchu posiada monopol na naznaczenie wroga; stygmatyzację przeciwników politycznych. Jest to zresztą cecha szczególna języka większości prawicowych przywódców politycznych. Charakteryzuje go konieczność podporządkowania, oczekiwanie służebności, antykomunizm, radykalizm retoryczny. W polskich warunkach systemowych towarzyszy mu dyskredytacja PRL i III RP, chęć lustracji i dekomunizacji, konserwatywny światopogląd i przyzwolenie dla prosocjalnych rozwiązań w polityce społecznej i gospodarczej. Sam lider, który posługuje się takim językiem, postrzegany jest jako niekwestionowany, niezłomny, zawsze konsekwentny, nieustępliwy, kryształowy, zawsze ma rację i nie dyskutuje się z nim. Jego główne przesłanie jest niezmiennie i sprowadza się do podtrzymywania dychotomii w społeczeństwie, podziału na „my” i „oni”, „przeciwnik” i „przyjaciel”²⁴. Taki sposób kreacji wynika z ogólnej strategii tworzenia różnorodnych relacji, które polityk nawiązuje, podtrzymuje, rozwija, zrywa, odnawia, z których korzysta w realizacji swoich celów indywidualnych i celów swojej formacji politycznej²⁵.

Za światem wspólnego języka pojawia się również świat podobnych przeżyć, doświadczeń, lęków i obaw. Ponownie pojawia się lider, będący tym razem uosobieniem nowego ruchu i wyrazicielem poglądów jego członków. Kwintesencją jego obecności i demonstrowanego sposobu myślenia jest kontestacja transformacji

²³ Ibidem, s. 48.

²⁴ J. Zamana, *Styl przywództwa Jarosława Kaczyńskiego. Analiza retrospektywna*, „Studia Krytyczne” 2016, nr 2, s. 206.

²⁵ M. Kwiatkowski, *Polityk w przestrzeni międzyludzkiej. Przypadek Jarosława Kaczyńskiego*, „Studia z Nauk Społecznych” 2017, nr 3, s. 157.

ustrojowej (systemowej) i podział na „wygranych” i „przegranych”²⁶. Na marginesie, ustalenia psychologii polityki dowodzą, że subiektywne poczucie krzywdy jest o wiele większe i determinuje do bardziej zdecydowanych działań, niż subiektywne poczucie wygranej. Innymi słowy, obrońcy obecnego systemu, nawet jeżeli jest ich więcej, nie są tak zdeterminowani w działaniu jak jego przeciwnicy, niezadowoleni ze zmian²⁷.

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość nie tylko więc zdefiniowało podstawowe obszary sporów i konfliktów społecznych, urazów i bolączek, ale dodatkowo za ich pośrednictwem dokonało polaryzacji społecznej²⁸, tworząc „pakiety wyborcze”²⁹, z których na przestrzeni ostatnich 15 lat (przynajmniej od 2005 roku) dokonujemy politycznych wyborów, sądząc, że mamy autentyczną możliwość elekcji różnych opcji. Tymczasem wybór jest dramatycznie prosty: „my” i/lub „oni”. *«Pakiety» obejmują ideologie, lojalności, światopoglądy, definicje sprzymierzeńców i wrogów, ale również pewne platformy instytucjonalne. Źródłem podziałów były zawsze najważniejsze, «epokowe» konflikty społeczne w danym kraju, a ich nośnikiem partie polityczne. Warto podkreślić, że mowa tu o podziale, co implikuje istnienie wyraźnych linii demarkacyjnych, a nie o konkurencji wielu równorzędnych opcji, a to dlatego, że logika i kształt instytucjonalny rywalizacji politycznej narzuca krystalizowanie się przeciwieństw (...) Główne opozycje mogą się oczywiście zmienić, ale każdy okres naznaczony jest dominacją konkretnych akcentów, definiujących osie podziału politycznego*³⁰.

Obecny sukces Prawa i Sprawiedliwości wynika z jednej strony z umiejętności wczucia się w najsilniejsze – to znaczy najbardziej mobilizujące – sentymenty

²⁶ M. Białous, I. Sadowski, *op. cit.*

²⁷ K. Skarżyńska (red.), *Podstawy psychologii politycznej*, Poznań 2002.

²⁸ P. Górka, *Polaryzacja polityczna w Polsce. Jak bardzo jesteśmy podzieleni*, Warszawa 2019.

²⁹ Zob. W. Łukowski, I. Sadowski, Podział społeczno-polityczny w Polsce. Kilka uwag teoretycznych, „Przegląd politologiczny” 2013, nr 29.

³⁰ Ibidem, s. 13.

i resentymenty. Z drugiej strony rola tej formacji polega również na tym, że do zasadniczych kwestii różniących między sobą obywateli „dopina” ona z czasem kolejne – takie, które początkowo są poboczne, ale za sprawą uporczywego akcentowania mogą wędrować ku jądrze podziału³¹. Jeżeli jest to organizowane w sposób planowy i systematyczny, to wówczas może być skuteczne niezależnie od zorientowania obywateli. Wyborców można bowiem generalnie podzielić na takich, w przypadku których np. akt głosowania jest wypadkową bardziej refleksyjnych decyzji, uzależnionych od jawnych postaw i wartości. Drugi typ stanowią ci, u których ważnym wyznacznikiem głosowania są postawy utajone. Za ich decyzją wyborczą nie stoi wiedza, ale spontaniczne, zautomatyzowane decyzje wywołane przez symbol, nazwisko, postać polityka³².

Odnosząc się do popularności Prawa i Sprawiedliwości Mikołaj Rakusa-Suszczewski relacjonuje: *Sympatiom wyborców towarzyszy dość powszechne zadowolenie z życia na poziomie niemal analogicznym do wskaźników popularności partii rządzącej w Polsce. Według danych ośrodka badawczego CBOS pozytywne trendy dotyczą wielu obszarów życia: rośnie poczucie, że ogólna sytuacja w kraju zmierza w dobrym kierunku; sytuacja polityczna oraz gospodarcza poprawiają się, rodzinom żyje się lepiej, a ludzie są coraz bardziej zadowoleni z własnej sytuacji materialnej. Co ciekawe, wzrasta także liczba osób zaangażowanych społecznie. Jest to tendencja z pewnością rzadko spotykana w najnowszej historii Polski. Trzeba jednak zaznaczyć, że tych którzy oceniają aktualną sytuację w kraju dużo bardziej krytycznie, lub wręcz źle, jest niewiele mniej (...) Opinia publiczna w Polsce jest zatem bardzo spolaryzowana, a władza, jakkolwiek popularna, jest przez dużą część społeczeństwa nielubiana. Kontrowersyjne reformy systemu sprawiedliwości i edukacji, kontrowersyjny styl w polityce międzynarodowej, wyzywające działania w obszarze ochrony*

³¹ Ibidem, s. 14.

³² N. Maliszewski, H. Suszek, Z. Abdulqadir, Ł. Wojciechowski, *Utajone postawy polityczne w sytuacji kryzysowej na przykładzie wyborów prezydenckich w 2010 roku*, „Czasopismo Psychologiczne” 2017, t. 23, nr 1, s. 22.

środowiska i zdrowia, działania policji, służb specjalnych itp. spotykają się niemal każdego dnia z potężną krytyką nie tylko opozycji politycznej, rozlicznych organizacji pozarządowych i inicjatyw obywatelskich, ale też dużej części społeczeństwa polskiego i międzynarodowej opinii publicznej, w tym rządów państw i ważnych instytucji chroniących ład demokratyczny na świecie i w Unii Europejskiej. Wysokie poparcie dla partii rządzącej, które można bez wahania interpretować jako sukces polityczny, okupione jest zatem wewnętrznym konfliktem społecznym, przygnębiającymi animozjami w przestrzeni publicznej i życiu prywatnym. Głębokie i rozdzierające poczucie wzajemnej niechęci, wrogości, a nawet nienawiści, przypomina cichą «wojnę domową» (...) Powszechne poczucie zadawanego gwałtu, niezrozumienia i niesprawiedliwości dotyczy jednak wszystkich, zarówno zwolenników, jak i przeciwników «dobrej zmiany»³³.

Rafał Miernik w swojej ocenie idzie o krok dalej, twierdząc, że biorąc pod uwagę ostatni wynik wyborczy oraz poparcie dla Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, można domniemywać, że partia ta nie tylko odpowiada na potrzeby społeczne (rzeczywiste lub wygenerowane) wybranych w trakcie kampanii segmentów wyborców, ale także poszerza swoje grono odbiorców, sprowadzając jednocześnie inne partie polityczne do roli mało znaczących oponentów. Nie tylko trafnie diagnozuje ona problemy społeczne, ale proponuje i wdraża określone rozwiązania, szczególnie dużą wagę przywiązując do polityki społecznej, jako narzędzia przynoszącego poparcie społeczne. Inne rozwiązania z kolei, np. niezwykle istotne zmiany ustrojowe, przeprowadza niejako „przy okazji”³⁴.

³³ M. Rakusa-Suszczewski, *op. cit.*

³⁴ R. Miernik, *Reformy Prawa i Sprawiedliwości – nowy kierunek rozwoju państwa czy skuteczna strategia wyborcza*, „Studia Politicae. Universitatis Silesiensis” 2018, t. 20, s. 101-102; por. A. Z. Kamiński, B. Kamiński, *Źródła ułomności ładu konstytucyjnego w postkomunistycznej Polsce: dziedzictwo przejścia ustrojowego*, „Studia Polityczne” 2018, t. 40, nr 4.

Oceniając z perspektywy czasu, należy stwierdzić, że bez wątpienia pomocne w realizacji planów i założeń Prawa i Sprawiedliwości były poszczególne wydarzenia społeczno-polityczne, do jakich doszło na przestrzeni ostatnich lat. Dla realizacji projektu „dobrej zmiany” konieczne były bowiem symbole, czy lepiej: uproszczenia dla postawionej diagnozy i aplikowanych rozwiązań, które miały jednocześnie zaradzić opisanemu stanowi rzeczy. Z jednej strony był więc symbol narodowej zdrady, wiarołomstwa, układów, nielegalnych interesów – afera Rywina, z drugiej odniesienie do wartości, wspólnych bohaterów, ikony własnego ruchu – katastrofa smoleńska. Tu rzeczywistość polityczna sama podpowiedziała rozwiązania³⁵. A później, przy okazji każdych kolejnych wyborów, przyglądając się zmianie rozkładu elektoratów na mapie Polski, wszyscy mniej życzliwi Prawu i Sprawiedliwości wspólnie – niejako nie dostrzegając dokonujących się przeobrażeń – próbowali się przekonywać, że wychylenia wyborcze są niewielkie, a Prawo i Sprawiedliwość jest partią o potencjale najpierw 25%, później 30 i 35%³⁶. A kiedy obóz Zjednoczonej Prawicy osiągnął w ostatnich wyborach parlamentarnych wynik 42%, to publicyści, a często i ludzie nauki przekonywali, że biorąc pod uwagę ogromny wysiłek medialny, finansowy i propagandowy, nie można tego wyniku wyborczego klasyfikować w kategorii zwycięstwa. Czyżby?

Większość z nas bawiły dowcipy i memy ośmieszające czy też ukazujące w karykaturalny sposób polityków i działania Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Tymczasem obóz Zjednoczonej Prawicy organizował festyny, miesięcznice smoleńskie, zbiorowe wyjazdy do siedziby medialnej Radia Maryja. Budując mit nowej wspólnoty, politycy Prawa i Sprawiedliwości doprowadzili do pogrzebu tragicznie zmarłej pary prezydenckiej na Wawelu. Zainicjowano budowę kolejnych pomników upamiętnia-

³⁵ A. Bejma, *Od afery Rywina do katastrofy smoleńskiej – nowe (utrwalone) podziały społeczno-polityczne w Polsce*, „Studia Politologiczne” 2013, nr 29.

³⁶ I. Sadowski, *Lokalne i kontekstowe czynniki krystalizacji elektoratów w nowym podziale politycznym*, „Studia Politologiczne” 2013, nr 29.

jących ofiary smoleńskie, odstonięto niezliczoną liczbą tablic pamiątkowych, nadano nazwy rondom i ulicom, skwerom i parkom, słowem: ukonstytuowano nowy ruch społeczny. W naukach politycznych wszystkie te działania, którym oczywiście towarzyszy klasycznie uprawiana polityka, określa się mianem alternatywnej partycypacji politycznej. Jest to prowadzenie swobodnej działalności politycznej ogniskującej się wokół poszukiwania nowych kanałów wywierania wpływu na politykę i komunikację z potencjalnym elektoratem³⁷. Tym samym udało się tej formacji zbudować ruch oddolny, nawet jeżeli tylko pozorowany, a w konsekwencji swoje własne „społeczeństwo obywatelskie”. Zaakcentowano w ten sposób nową tożsamość polityczną³⁸, tworząc jednocześnie silną identyfikację partyjną wyborców; ich afektywną orientację względem ważnego zbiorowego obiektu w środowisku politycznym, którym w tym przypadku jest Prawo i Sprawiedliwość³⁹.

Tworząc swoją podmiotowość, celowo lub przypadkiem, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość nie tylko zdefiniowało rzeczywistość dużych grup społecznych, funkcjonujących w naszym społeczeństwie, ale dodatkowo wpisało się w tak częstą postawę romantyczno-pragmatyczną, którą zdajemy się – mniej lub bardziej – wszyscy posługiwać. Ta myśl ogniskuje się wokół dwóch odmiennych wizji Polski i dwóch innych sposobów jej opisywania. Wartościami nadrzędnymi w tej opowieści, niezależnie od siebie, są jedynie dwa podmioty polityczne: państwo i naród, pozostałe elementy sceny (krajowej i międzynarodowej) to wyłącznie środki w walce politycznej⁴⁰.

³⁷ T. Godlewski, *Zjawisko alternatywnej partycypacji politycznej w Polsce*, „Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne” 2013, nr 39, s. 50.

³⁸ A. Ilców, *Tożsamość partii politycznej w procesie komunikowania politycznego*, „Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne” 2013, nr 37.

³⁹ R. Markowski, *Identyfikacja partyjna w nowych demokracjach: przypadek Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, „Studia Polityczne” 2013, nr 32, s. 47.

⁴⁰ W. Paruch, *Między romantyzmem a realizmem – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość o polityczności*, „Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis. Studia Politologica” 2015, nr 15.

Reasumując, można ponownie, powracając do opracowania A. Antoszewskiego wskazać za autorem, że *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* [obecnie chyba jako jedyna formacja polityczna na polskiej scenie politycznej – przyp. red. Ł.S.] *utrzymało zdolność określania dynamiki rywalizacji politycznej, zarówno na arenie wyborczej, jak i parlamentarnej, niezależnie od tego, czy było partią rządzącą, czy opozycyjną. Pomimo przegranych w 2007 r. wyborów parlamentarnych, narzuciło swoim konkurentom konieczność zajęcia stanowiska w konflikcie Polska liberalna a Polska solidarna, który samo wyznaczyło jako główną oś rywalizacji politycznej. Skutecznie przejęło postulaty lewicy w kwestiach gospodarczych i socjalnych, zachowując wizerunek partii prawicowej w kwestiach wizji państwa i jego moralnych fundamentów. Zdołało ukształtować elektorat, odróżniający się od elektoratów innych partii cechami socjodemograficznymi i postawami politycznymi i silnie z PiS się identyfikującymi (...) Nie ulega wątpliwości, że aktualna postać polskiego systemu partyjnego w znacznej mierze ukształtowana jest przez rozmiar poparcia dla PiS oraz strategię tej partii wobec jej rywali*⁴¹.

Zamiast zakończenia

Jak jednak poczynione do tej pory uwagi mają się do dwóch, zasadniczych dla tej analizy, pytań zawartych we wprowadzeniu?

Po pierwsze, prowadzone w tej pracy rozważania miały przywieść nas do myślenia o niezwykle wręcz determinacji polityków i zwolenników Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, a co za tym idzie – kandydata tego środowiska politycznego na prezydenta, do udziału w zbliżających się wyborach. Wspólnie podzielana wizja rzeczywistości, tożsamy świat wartości, jednolity kod komunikacyjny oraz akceptacja dla dotychczasowych działań politycznych, to najlepszy dowód nie tylko dla wytworzenia

⁴¹ A. Antoszewski, *op. cit.*, s. 92.

się w tej grupie określonej tożsamości politycznej, ale także silnej identyfikacji partyjnej – emocjonalnego przywiązania do określonego środowiska politycznego – Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, a w dalszej kolejności do determinacji udziału w akcie głosowania.

Po drugie, według jednego z ostatnich badań Ipsos dla OKO.press, którego wyniki opublikowano 2 maja 2020 roku (w chwili, gdy powstawał ten tekst), jeśli wybory prezydenckie odbędą się w maju, Andrzej Duda może liczyć na 63% głosów wśród osób deklarujących swój udział w wyborach. Biorąc zaś pod uwagę całość złożonych działań, które towarzyszą obecności Prawa i Sprawiedliwości na polskiej scenie politycznej, a przecież obecny prezydent jest kandydatem tej formacji, i do tej pory zapewniły temu ugrupowaniu pozycję dominującą, trudno nie prognozować jego sukcesu wyborczego.

Po trzecie, równie ważnym czynnikiem jest ogłoszony stan epidemii i rozniesiony spór polityczny, który dotyczy forsowanych przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość regulacji prawnych związanych m.in. z wyborami korespondencyjnymi. Analitycy rynków mikro- i makroekonomicznych są zgodni: utrzymujący się stan ogólnoswiatowej epidemii przyniesie w konsekwencji poważny kryzys ekonomiczny. Dotknie on wszystkie rynki świata, w tym polski. Jego symptomy już można obserwować, a w niedługim czasie natężenie zjawisk negatywnych z nim związanych wzrośnie. Co to oznacza dla prognozy wyborczej, która wieści możliwe zwycięstwo w wyścigu wyborczym na urząd Prezydenta RP Andrzeja Dudy? Otóż, o ile prawdziwe jest twierdzenie, że pozytywna ocena gospodarki zwiększa prawdopodobieństwo głosowania na partię/kandydata aktualnie sprawującego władzę obozu politycznego, gdyż dobre wyniki ekonomiczne zwiększają szansę reelekcji, a słabe osiągnięcia gospodarcze zwiększają prawdopodobieństwo wyborczej porażki⁴², nietrudno wnosić, że w przededniu nieuchronnego raczej kryzysu gospodarczego odwlekanie elekcji,

⁴² M. Kotnarowski, R. Markowski, *Polityczne preferencje w czasach kryzysu: ekonomiczne motywy głosowania w polskich wyborach w 2011 roku*, „Studia Polityczne” 2013, nr 32.

jakby nie było zagrożonej stanem epidemii, nie leży w interesie tego kandydata. Skoro zaś aktualnie sprawujący władzę są zapleczem politycznym prezydenta, nie trudno prognozować, że wybory odbędą się jeszcze w maju 2020 roku.

Czy coś może zagrozić tak nakreślonej projekcji nieodległej przyszłości politycznej w Polsce?

Determinacja rządzącego obecnie środowiska politycznego, by wybory na urząd Prezydenta RP odbyły się w możliwie najszybszym terminie, jest znacząca. Tym, co wydaje się zagrażać tym planom – zadając jednocześnie kłam podniesionym przeze mnie twierdzeniom, że wybory prezydenckie w Polsce odbędą się w maju/czerwcu i najpewniej wygra je Andrzej Duda – zdają się być jedynie bieżące wydarzenia polityczne. Oto kolejny raz, na naszych oczach, odbywa się spektakl polityczny. Jak często bywa w takich przypadkach, przypada nam w nim jedynie rola widowni, która obserwując grę, najchętniej zajrzałaby za kulisy spektaklu⁴³. Niestety, jak również często bywa w takich przypadkach, nie jest to nam dane. I choć w konsekwencji taki ewentualny zwrot przebiegu zdarzeń uczyni podjętą tu prognozę nietrafną, a postawione hipotezy fałszywymi, o tyle nie zmieni to mojego poglądu na samą praktykę politycznej aktywności Prawa i Sprawiedliwości na przestrzeni ostatnich lat.

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Autorzy

dr Giovanni Barbieri – adiunkt na Wydziale Nauk Politycznych na Uniwersytecie w Perugii.

dr Łukasz Jan Berezowski – adiunkt w Zakładzie Italianistyki na Uniwersytecie Łódzkim.

dr Joanna Gocłowska-Bolek – ekspertka do spraw Ameryki Łacińskiej, adiunkt i zastępca Dyrektora w Ośrodku Analiz Politologicznych UW.

dr Dariusz Krawczyk – wykładowca akademicki, biegły sądowy z zakresu komunikacji społecznej i zarządzania, naczelnik Wydziału Kontaktów Społecznych Urzędu Miejskiego w Zabrzu.

dr Roberto Mincigrucci – pracownik naukowy na Wydziale Nauk Politycznych na Uniwersytecie w Perugii.

Robert Nahapetyan – doktorant na Wydziale Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

dr hab. Ewa Nowak-Teter – profesor w Instytucie Nauk o Komunikacji Społecznej i Mediach Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej.

dr Łukasz Scheffs – adiunkt w Zakładzie Marketingu Politycznego i Socjotechniki Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.

dr hab. Jacek Wasilewski – adiunkt w Katedrze Antropologii Mediów na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim.

Sofia Verza – doktorantka na Wydziale Nauk Politycznych na Uniwersytecie w Perugii.



Authors

Giovanni Barbieri – Assistant Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Perugia.

Łukasz Jan Berezowski – PhD, Assistant Professor at the Department of Italian Studies, University of Łódź.

Joanna Goćłowska-Bolek – PhD, Expert on Latin America at the Center for Political Analysis (OAP UW).

Dariusz Krawczyk – PhD, Academic Lecturer, Expert Witness in the Field of Social Communication and Management, Head of the Social Contacts Department in the City Hall in Zabrze

Roberto Mincigrucci – Post-doc Researcher at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Perugia.

Robert Nahapetyan – PhD student at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw.

Ewa Nowak-Teter, PhD, DSc, Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Communication and Media Science, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University.

Łukasz Scheffs – PhD, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Marketing and Sociotechnics, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań.

Sofia Verza – PhD student at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Perugia.

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