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Introduction

In the world where rules, practices and institutions often viewed as anchors of political systems come under challenge, the academic community focuses attention either on the elements of political order which offer new explanatory potential, or search for methodologies which can capture the new dynamics of politics. In this project we attempt to do both: we bring conceptualizations and ways of studying leadership to the core of attention. Comparative and case study approaches seem a natural choice for such a project.

In the academic research we aspire to build methodologies which allow for solid measures to support qualitative statements, as having specific measures allows us for making comparisons. Yet, when talking about "strong" or "weak", "good" or "bad" leadership, we rarely participate in critical evaluation of methodological bases of such conclusions. Too often do we rationalize that it is *the* theory that primarily drives our investigations, so instruments with which we approach leadership phenomena are important, but not essential parts of the research process.

Of course, one of the key reasons for this lack of methodological involvement is the ambiguity of the very concept of "leadership". That is why we may feasibly ask: provided that there are hundreds of definitions of "leadership", how can we be sure that there is a truly legitimate method of studying this phenomenon?

The list of problems, however, seems to be much longer. Students of leadership seem to be involved in an endeavor which requires us to answer other questions, e.g.:

- By what methods can leadership be studied best? Can leadership be measured effectively?

- What are our reference points when we want to define the quality of leadership: imagination or reality? Comparison with the past or current situation? Personalities or circumstances?
- What research methods are appropriate; from what fields of study may they come? How to draw conclusions from studies done by diverse methods?
- Can effectiveness of leadership be predicted? Does it help us study how leadership emerges, lasts, evolves or ends when we have measures of leadership?

Posing such (and the like) questions helps us gain insight to the already existing or just conceived methods of studying and measuring leadership - methods which might allow us to "harden" often intuitive and casual judgments as to the quality of leadership. And these questions regard not only political scientists. On the contrary, it seems that efficient and practical methods of leadership studies can be developed at the juncture of various fields of study: sociology, history, psychology, management in various areas of public life: politics, administration, non-governmental organizations, or business.

In this volume we want to present research that challenge the mentioned problems at theoretical, methodological and empirical levels.

In *Presidents vs. Washington – Some Remarks on the Nature of the Policy Making Arena in the Time of Trump*, Bohdan Szklarski aims at providing a theoretical insight for the analysis of presidential leadership which utilizes the knowledge about the dynamics of political environment of leaders. Leadership is viewed as an element of the political system which has a potential for maintaining its equilibrium. He focuses on the "competition between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the political arena in Washington" which seems to result in "anarchic conditions" of the presidential practice. He shows how the presidency of Donald Trump utilizes these tendencies and how it changes the rules of the political game, from at positive-sum to a zero-sum game.

Studying Leadership in Democratic Parliaments. Clues from Complex Systems Theory and Polish Case, by Krzysztof Kasianiuk, is an attempt at showing how Complex Systems Theory (CST) could be utilized for analyzing behavior in political organizations. He not only sees CST as a conceptual tool that is supposed to explain leadership, but also one that shows what should be analyzed to make a strong case on organizational leadership. Working on the case of the Polish parliament, he provides a list of structural and functional conditions of communication between relatively equal actors oriented at leadership roles.

Inkumbenci w Sejmie, czyli przyczynek do charakterystyki posła z długoletnim stażem parlamentarnym [Incumbents in Polish Parliament: on the character of parliamentarians with long service], by Paulina Czernek, is an empirical study of long-term parliamentary incumbents in Poland. She aims at answering the questions regarding individual and institutional traits of incumbents, seeking for their profiles and career paths. The study was based on the quantitative comparative study, within a dataset of purposively selected incumbents from seven full term, between 1991 and 2015. As a result, the author identifies a model that could be used in more comprehensive and comparative studies.

Another research tool is provided in *Leadership in Polish Political Parties* by Anna Paczeński and Maria Wincławska. The authors approach the analysis of party leader positions from the personal leadership perspective, and identify key conditions that influence the positions of leaders. Based on this, authors develop a scale of strength of party leadership in their respective organizations, and validate it in an empirical study. The scale has been validated on the example of six Polish major political parties.

Many of the ideas in the articles have been discussed during the conference held in Warsaw, on June 12-13, 2018 – *Measuring (the Quality of) Leadership*. This was an event organized jointly by Collegium Civitas, OAP UW - Centre for Political Analysis of the University of Warsaw, Leadership Studies Division at the American

Studies Center of the University of Warsaw, Leadership and Methodology Sections of Polish Political Science Association, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and Faculty of Political Science and International Studies University of Warsaw.

We want to express our gratitude to all the institutions involved in the organization of this event. We also want to thank all of the scholars that decided to join it. We wish it to be followed by other similar events. We hope they will help us further in our methodological inquiries in the field of leadership studies.

Bohdan Szklarski

Krzysztof Kasianiuk

Bohdan Szklarski

Presidents vs. Washington – Some Remarks on the Nature of the Policy Making Arena in the Time of Trump

Keywords:

equilibrium, centripetal, centrifugal, continuity, change, leadership style, presidency, Trump

The Washington political scene is often described as anarchic, i.e. permeated by a multitude of often incompatible demands forwarded simultaneously by a multiplicity of actors. It is a space in which politicians operate relatively freely and, if successful, may aspire to the role of leaders, so long as they do not cross the imaginary line of accepted behavior. Actors in Washington face a specific situation produced by the mix of compromise/ consensus building (centripetal) and disuniting (centrifugal) forces. To get elected, presidents must present themselves as good outsiders, yet in order to get meaningful legislative accomplishments, they need to be good insiders, too. Donald Trump is by no means in a unique situation in that regard.

Difficulties in management of these tendencies are only compounded by the polarization, or as some claim even tribalization, of American politics¹. This change of the main political arena from the corridors of power to TV or smartphone screens has further aggravated the disjunction of the political process and forced political leaders to focus their attention on the competition for the most public aspect of it,

¹ P. Beinart, *Civility Has its Limits*, "The Atlantic", 8 October 2018, p. 27.

namely for the political agenda. In this game Washington players need superb *going public* skills².

This essay has one principal goal to describe the anarchic conditions in which presidency functions and to analyze the competition between the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in the political arena in Washington³. The anarchy comes from the fact that at any given moment numerous political actors exert often incompatible claims regarding the nature of desired policies. It has often been the unwritten role of the president to manage these tensions and to convert them into a legitimate public policy, or at least to a milieu where compromise is possible.

The tendency which we have witnessed since Donald Trump's coming to office in January 2017, seems to be different - to exploit this anarchy for personal power reasons by turning the Washington scene into a permanent battleground which represents a departure from a positive-sum game definition of politics to a zero-sum vision

Anarchy as leadership situation

A leadership situation might be defined as a condition when leader's activities and presence are called for and legitimized as necessary steps. This fairly rare situation might be an actual need caused by circumstances or a manufactured perception. In short, a leadership situation is a moment when leader's action is accepted as natural and necessary i.e. legitimate⁴. These are the moments of great opportunity for leaders who desire to take charge of events and moments of tremendous pain for those lacking proper skills. Crises and sudden disturbances such as 2008 economic

² S. Kernell, *Going Public. New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, Washington 1986.

³ K. Ruscio, *Leadership in Organized Anarchy*, "Public Administration Review", vol. 76, No.3, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12536>.

⁴ H. Sims, S. Faraj, S. Yun, *When should a leader be directive or empowering? How to develop your own situational theory of leadership*, "Business Horizons", vol. 52, No. 2, March-April 2009, p. 150 (149-158).

near collapse of the banking system or 9/11 are naturally viewed as "leadership situations". However, as the experience of Reagan and Carter indicate, such circumstances might arise from the shifts in public mood, too⁵. Typically, leadership situations are moments of disequilibrium in a system, so one might imagine them as being induced by rhetoric full of dramatic images of a "country in ruin". What is important from a functional standpoint is that such special moments need to be recognized as leadership situation by more than just leaders, party or other actors wishing to sell their "services". A leadership situation is a special moment when public expectations, other principal (elite and organized) actors behavior and public mood are right, or shall we say ripe, for a leader's taking initiative. One might define *leadership situation as a moment when the coupling of three crucial dimensions of politics is possible: policy mood (among the public and elites), political preferences (of key actors) and institutional dynamics (regime disturbance)*. Nothing is pre-defined in such moments, though previous experience may serve as indication of direction in which the politics might evolve.

It is up to individual leader's skills whether such moments are utilized to advance their position and agenda. Donald Trump's divisive campaign rhetoric, in 2016 showed him as eager to create such a moment for himself. The goals would be the (further) delegitimization of Washington elites (as establishment) and presentation of himself as a outsider (people's politician) which was supposed to legitimize heightened battleground like mobilization of supporters and unilateralism as the "only possible" way to overcome the resistance of the "old order" which should be "drained as swamp" or even "locked up" as an enemy of America. In order to succeed, such tactics needs a permanent perception of urgency as the context legitimizing unorthodox behavior of the president and erratic nature of his policies.

⁵ J. Stimson, *Public Opinion in America. Moods, Cycles and Swings*, Boulder 1999, p. 20.

To create this sense of urgency, Donald Trump uses intense social media communication⁶.

Twitter rhetoric as a form of communication is considered a perfect tool for creating proper condition for a manufactured leadership situation as it is likely to be: (1) *ridden with ambiguous language and unverifiable claims*; (2) *saturated with frequent uses of ad hominem claims which generate substantial media coverage*; (3) *yielding to emotional and simplistic claims which are taken at face value*; (4) *easily disseminated throughout the political scene to unprofessional receivers who possess no intellectual tools to verify the claims*⁷.

The relationship between deliberation and governance is but one aspect of modern leadership that needs to be accounted for. The other one is the relationship between the personal-psychological and institutional-procedural dimensions of leadership. The third, no less important factor determining the range of power of contemporary presidents, is their relationship with the media and their skill in controlling the coverage of the White House. All these themes need to be balanced if they are to serve American democracy⁸, yet it is not clear whether they need to be balanced in order to serve the president in his current daily actions.

The fact is that in a fragmented, polarized, personalized and media dominated political sphere, the consequences and causes of political phenomena, i.e. events and decisions, have become decoupled. Neither their causes nor the consequences can be controlled by political leaders, therefore, in order to maintain high levels of support, they focus on the public procedures, which create the image of effective leadership in action. In plain language it might be said that postmodern

⁶ F. Zamudio-Suarez, *After Trump's Election, Political Scientists Feel New Urgency*, "The Chronicle of Higher Education", vol. 63, no. 17, December 2016, p.13.

⁷ L. Harris, P. Harrigan, *Social media in politics. The ultimate voter engagement tool or simply an echo chamber?*, "Journal of Political Marketing", 33 (3), 2015, p. 12. (pp. 10-15).

⁸ S. Levitsky, D. Ziblatt, *Jak umierają demokracje*, Łódź 2018.

leadership is equal to "guardianship"⁹, or "going through the motions", or to signaling action. When it happens, we, as observers, on the one hand, have a sense of continuity and stability; on the other hand, we criticize it for mediocrity and ineffectiveness.

When we look at all presidents since Ronald Reagan, we notice how such critical evaluations dominate. When a different kind of a president or just a candidate for the presidency appears (Sanders and Trump in 2016), the first reaction of the mainstream media and seasoned analysts is to reject them as too radical and unpresidential¹⁰. So on the one hand, we criticize political leaders and political elites for wasting energy and doing a lot of "marching in place"¹¹, yet at the same time we disqualify those who offer themselves as alternatives to such politics.

Fragmentation of the policy process in Washington D.C. since the mid-1970s

The situation of political elites, facing increasingly ambiguous attitude of the public since the mid-1970s, resulted in a "permanent campaign" tactics¹² that successfully combined the requirements of efficient representation (activism) with culture (anti-establishment rhetoric). It was of no consequence for actors that these connotations were taken from separate levels of conceptualization of politics. Naturally, it all happened at a certain cost. The victims of this process are the notions of public good, long term planning, and compromise. There were also two consequences for the very political process: declining partisanship and party discipline and increased personalization of political process at the micro-level, i.e. when the final versions of

⁹ R. Rose, *The Postmodern President. George Bush Meets the World*, Chatham 1991, p. 25-27.

¹⁰ O. Jones, *The Sanders movement is bigger than Bernie*, "The Guardian", 26 July 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/26/sanders-movement-bernie-hillary-donald-trump> (15.12.2018).

¹¹ R. Rose, *The Postmodern President...*, op. cit., p. 307.

¹² N. Ornstein, T. Mann, M. Malbin, *The Permanent Campaign and Its Future*, Washington 2000.

bills are put together, for instance during the mark-up sessions in committees¹³. All these developments had an impact on the nature of the leadership situation.

The confounded nature of the policy-making environment in today's Washington has bred a demand for a new type of political leader – a Washington outsider, or a crusader against Washington establishment. Five out of last six presidents belong in that category: Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush Jr. and Trump. Their election was more in response to the public or perhaps even populist (anti-establishment) sentiment than a reaction to specific socio-economic situation. Yet, the demand for the insider skills is still highly valued in Washington. Presidents usually compensate for their own deficiencies in insider experience or skills by hiring people who possess such qualities to prominent positions in the White House.

Outsiders do not have it easy when they win. Descriptions of the policy making process leave no doubt that even the ablest public orators and clear popular mandate holders face a daunting task when it comes to prevailing in the legislative game¹⁴. Pushing an initiative through this maze of ambitious egos, intra-institutional rivalry and crisscrossing jurisdictions requires patience and skills not of a solitary hero but a supreme team-worker and bargainer. Persuasion, not demand is the key to success, which often comes long after a measure has been proposed. When for a non-controversial piece of legislation it may take two years to pass through Congress, it is foolish to expect quick results.

In the times when visibility is often the key to success, much effort of the Washington actors goes to staging public performances which are supposed to promote an issue, not even any particular solution to it. Publicity wins support and defines the shape of Washington agendas. In the fragmented and personalized context of Washington, moving an issue from the public agenda to a political agenda

¹³ Ch. Deering, S. Smith, *Committees in Congress*, Washington 1997, p. 43.

¹⁴ T. Penny, M. Garrett, *Common Cents. A Retiring Six-Term Congressman Reveals How Congress Really Works and What We Must Do to Fix It*, New York 1996.

and later to the policy agenda requires great perseverance. Only few actors are capable of doing it: the President, naturally, and key leaders of Congress, and perhaps some most efficient lobbyist whom we never hear about.

The process of the fragmentation of the policy making process was accelerated or precipitated by a series of crucial developments in and around the American political system: defeat in Vietnam, the Energy crises of the 1970s, Watergate, congressional "revolution" of 1974, proliferation of committees and subcommittees, TV broadcasting of congressional proceedings, budget deficit, talk radio, 24-hour news channels, the rise of soft money and PACs and superPACs, the rise of special interest and the permanent campaign phenomenon.

They all indicated one thing: the power of America, the power of the presidency, the power of democracy is limited. In a much fragmented and polarized political environment the forces that shape America's fortune are not controlled from the White House only. In the new context of complex socio-economic and political entanglements defining "the people" became increasingly problematic. For 2016 the American National Election Study concluded that the average distance between Democratic and Republican core partisans increased by almost 1/3 since 1980¹⁵. That constation was a necessary prerequisite for the development of a new type of the presidency – the postmodern presidency.

The post-modern presidency in search for power

Successful leaders should be able to control/mobilize resources necessary to turn key items on their agenda into policies. In terms of resources–expectations relationship, the post-modern-presidency is characterized by the awareness of the gap between the legitimate public expectations and the system's/presidency's ability to

¹⁵ L. Bartels, *The Rise of Presidential Extremists*, "New York Times", 12 September 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/opinion/campaign-stops/the-rise-of-presidential-extremists.html> (13.10.2018).

satisfy them¹⁶. That gap, in Carter's language was "the malaise" that bled America's strength, in Trump's colorful language it was the "swamp". As usual, in the moment of crisis America looks up to her presidents to provide guidance and purpose. That is one of the paradoxes of American democracy: the presidency is becoming weaker and exposed to multilateral attacks, yet simultaneously, the public sees it as the best possible force that can overcome the crisis¹⁷. Rose, by pointing to the fact that a post-modern presidency operates in the condition of a gap between expectations and resources/capabilities, turned our thinking about the institution back to the tracks of tools at president's disposal.

If the gap is inevitable, the presidency must at least create appearances that it is still in control in order to retain its legitimacy. This brings us to the discussion of available tactics. Discussion of Neustadt's persuasion as necessary tactics will be useful at this point. Samuel Kernell distinguished three basic forms of presidential actions in search for necessary resources: going Washington, going public and going international¹⁸. Each form assumes that persuasion, negotiation, and bargaining are necessary. Each case represents principal target group which the president must focus on. *Going Washington* means that a president must be an ultimate insider, i.e. cultivate backstage deals, backscratching, smoke-filled room old fashioned politics of trading favors and creating a web of personal obligations that form a maze of power. A good example of such tactics is LBJs masterful coalition building to pass the Civil Rights Act 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Whenever new inexperienced presidents like Bush Jr. or Trump nominate such seasoned insiders as Dick Cheney or Rience Priebus (respectively) to key White House positions, we praise them for appreciating the insider role.

¹⁶ R. Rose, *The Postmodern President...*, op. cit., p. 25-27.

¹⁷ A. Reeves, J. Rogowski, *Public Opinion Toward Presidential Power*, "Presidential Studies Quarterly", vol. 45, No. 4, December 2015.

¹⁸ S. Kernell, *Going Public. New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, Washington 1986.

By *going international* Kernell implies that a president must be a multilateralist, cooperate with international institutions and seek alliances with other foreign actors. It sounds like a definition of Obama's presidency. For instance, in order to maintain prices of gas in check, American presidents since Nixon must solicit support of Saudi Arabia. Bush's Desert Storm coalition is another example of such tactics.

The third tactics of *going public* dates back as far as Woodrow Wilson's tour of the country to sway public opinion in favor of the League of Nations. It was a clear attempt to by-pass Congress and put direct pressure on the public with the expectation that public support will then be a handy tool in pressuring Congress into compliance. Carter's "TV fireside chats", Reagan's Star Wars speech, Bush's pre-Desert Storm media barrage, as well as Clinton's government shut down conflict with Republican Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1995 had the ingredients of going public tactics: president as champion of public interest, broad availability to the media, transparency of moves, visibility, reliance on rhetoric, staging of media events used to garner support. Donald Trump contributes to this tactics by staging regular campaign style rallies with his supporters whose cheers and waving are a background for presidential speech. He adds to this constant presence in the social media.

In either policy activity forum the president must perform his leadership with a clear set of priorities in mind. In either case, his first task is to gain access to the relevant agenda setting process. His preeminence as a central "fixture" in the system gives him advantage in all three fora, however, as Jimmy Carter or George Bush Sr. learned it, it does not guarantee success¹⁹. One of the presidential advantages in the policy making process is his ability to move the issues to the public arena, through a vast array of "going public" tactics, thus allowing him to claim "issue ownership". Donald Trump is a perfect illustration of a leader who uses all kind

¹⁹ G. Healy, *The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power*, Washington 2009.

of communication channels to air his policy proposals and overwhelm other actors in Washington by his simple and emotional claims²⁰.

In the era of post-modern presidency where the powers of the office are more often performed than exercised, the visibility of presidential actions in the agenda setting stage of political process is the key to his image as a successful leader.

Policy making process as organized disorder

In the fragmented and media dominated political environment in Washington, actual policy making is not easy to accomplish. In short, the process of arriving at decisions in Washington can be depicted as "disjointed incrementalism", a term which combines in one concept two prominent theories of public policy making²¹. Disjointed meaning fragmented and scattered at many venues where at any given moment elements of "the big decision" are made. Incrementalism refers to the scope of change that is usually included with every decision. At best it is an improvement, a partial reevaluation, an addition to an already existing body of solutions within a given issue area, such as for instance: some government standard, a quota, a tax shelter, an exemption, a postponement of a deadline, a new prerogative, some new procedure, or a new appointment.

When a president manages to control the agenda setting stage, he comes close to being able to impact on the remaining stages of the policy process: specification of alternatives, authoritative allocation of resources for those alternatives and eventually the implementation of the decision made by political actors²².

²⁰ T. Collins, Trump's itchy Twitter thumbs have redefined politics, "C-Net Magazine", 20 January 2018, <https://www.cnet.com/news/donald-trump-twitter-redefines-presidency-politics/> (14.11.2018).

²¹ F. Baumgartner, B. Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, Chicago 1993; R. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, New York 1995.

²² R. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, op. cit., pp. 24-26.

At each stage there are rivals whose interpretation of the problem runs against president's wishes.

These rivals may come from the president's party as well. Donald Trump learned it several times when he tried to change immigration or health care policy. Obamacare was saved from president's challenge by a spectacular thumb down of John McCain, a Republican candidate for the presidency in 2008 and Trump's immigration executive orders were twice nullified by Federal judges in remote parts of the country and when he eventually got it right, some major cities (San Francisco, New York, Chicago, San Jose, Washington D.C.) reinforced their status as sanctuary cities and proclaimed their resistance to Trump rules²³. This is an illustration that politics in Washington today may be erratic and requires skillful maneuvering in order to reach success.

For someone interested in a solution to a particular problem: joblessness, prescription drug benefits, national security, immigration, health care or judicial appointment, it is crucial to see the item move from one agenda to another. Such transfer of items between agendas takes place through the following means: 1) through the mobilization of the relevant publics by leaders; 2) through education, i.e. diffusion of ideas in professional circles and among policy elites; 3) through change in the party control or intra-party ideological balances brought by elections. The final push that can rearrange Washington agendas is naturally a sudden crisis, like oil crisis, presidential assassination, invasion of Kuwait, or an act of terror which alter the priorities held by the actors and the public. Yet such crises happen too rarely to be incorporated into the model of presidential leadership as one of leading variables.

²³ L. Rough, *Exploring the top immigrant-friendly cities in USA*, "Remitly. Promises Delivered", 2018, <https://blog.remitly.com/lifestyle-culture/sanctuary-cities-in-united-states/> (17.12.2018).

President's role in the management of Washington political agenda

In spite of the apparent deficiency of modern Washington, here is where we come to the crucial role of the presidency and find a real room for presidential leadership and for its specific kind – symbolic leadership. In order to make sense out of this contention, it will be necessary to bring back the discussion of the resources-expectations gap, Kernell's three tactics, and Neustadt's focus on persuasion. They will all help explain the presidential superiority and the need for a new form of leadership. From Bob Woodward²⁴ or Wolf²⁵ we have learned that Donald Trump prefers to do politics by a less academic way. He trusts his own intuition more than his advisers. In the agenda setting games he trusts his social media skills and personal charm more than political insiders. Therefore, his administration has already had more turnovers at the top positions than any of his predecessors. The Brookings Institution counted the number at 64 % on the president's "A team" as of December 14, 2018²⁶. After last insiders or "watchdog advisers" whose role was to "protect the president from himself"²⁷ such as Chief of Staff gen. John Kelly and Pentagon chief gen. John Mathis were let go, Donald Trump was left surrounded by much less reputable "yes men" who were unable to give him such good access to the old policy making establishment and hurt his ability to shape the political agenda from the inside.

Let us first conceive of the agendas in a more dynamic sense as streams of action, simultaneous, yet fairly independent of one another. Each of them has its inherent dynamics and can be said to correspond to a particular stage in the policy

²⁴ B. Woodward, *Fear. Trump in the White House*, New York 2018.

²⁵ M. Wolff, *Fire and Fury. Inside the Trump White House*, New York 2018.

²⁶ K.D. Tenpas, E. Kamarck, N. Zeppos, *Tracking turnover in the Trump administration*, "A Brookings Report", 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration/> (18.12.2018).

²⁷ D. Choi, *John Kelly is reportedly letting Trump do whatever he wants – even if it means, impeachment*, "Business Insider", 19 June 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com/john-kelly-donald-trump-white-house-marine-2018-6?IR=T> (18.12.2018).

making process. First there is a problem of recognition. An issue must be perceived as important and given prominence by lay and expert participants in general discourse. At the next stage, an issue is discussed by political professionals, i.e. organized political actors who articulate and refine policy alternatives. They are the so called "policy entrepreneurs" who constitute the policy community or the policy stream²⁸. There may be as many policy communities as there are issue areas in politics. The third stream where political discussions have an impact is the political stream or public consciousness. At this level of policy moods, public opinion swings, political discussions acquire ideological fervor. It is here that much of the recent two presidential contests have taken place. It is the area where "culture wars" are fought.

There three streams or circles in which policy ideas are discussed and policy proposals formulated traditionally are not coordinated, which contributes to the perception of political chaos. Yet the latent and manifest goal of policy entrepreneurs and the public is to see a professionally done public policy that reflects dominant value preferences. The key to achieving such a condition is the coupling of the streams²⁹. Each such moment when public mood, elite behavior and dominant ideology coalesce represents a *leadership window of opportunity*.

The separate streams come together most easily at critical times when a disruption of political system cuts through political routines: a problem is immediately recognized, a solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for the change and political constraints do not prohibit action. 9/11 and 2008 fiscal crisis bailout were the latest moment of disruption and coupling in American politics. George Bush took full advantage of the first one. Congress passed the Patriot Act 1 and 2, re-focused the public agenda on the conservative message and by fighting two wars: in Afghanistan and Iraq and by coupling the latter one with anti-terrorist

²⁸ F. Baumgartner, B. Jones, *Agendas and Instability...*, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

²⁹ R. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, op. cit., p. 178.

ideology, he stretched the "disruptive" moment till the election of 2004. When its jolting effect wore off, it became necessary for Bush to invoke its memory by occasional "threat warnings" and manipulations with color-coded alerts to position himself in the center of all three streams. On a regular basis, or in the long run such scare tactics may prove counterproductive and must exhaust the nation's reservoir of support. In 2008 Bush and Obama who continued his recovery policy managed to get the public, the policy entrepreneurs and the decision-makers to agree on the philosophy of government intervention as the best way to avert a meltdown (or Armageddon) of the capitalist system³⁰.

Such doubts as to the feasibility of manufacturing fear as a long term strategy do not prevent political leaders from resorting to such tactics for short term effects. There is no better illustration of such thinking that Donald Trump's use of the "illegal immigrants' caravan" marching towards the American border through Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. The president built military compounds along the border and sent there 5,000 regular troops in case the immigrants were to storm the border. Media was full of reports by journalists specially dispatched to the "war zone" by their owners. They heightened the hype by focusing on what might happen when the confrontation erupted. Well, nothing happened. The migrants did reach the border but attempted no crossing. Instead, they settled in the makeshift tent camps organized by the Mexican authorities. The journalists moved there to report on the hardships and individual life stories of some of the would be

³⁰ R. Lenzner, *The 2008 Meltdown And Where the Blame Falls*, "Forbes", 2 June 2012, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/06/02/the-2008-meltdown-and-where-the-blame-falls/#1429fe5fa72a> (13.11.2018).

immigrants. All this was happening as if live on television and in other internet media outlets in the last weeks before the midterm elections³¹. Trump and the Republicans did well in the Senate and gubernatorial races and their losses in the House were smaller than expected.

Presidents usually utilize other methods that give them natural advantage over other actors and allow either to couple the streams (very unusual) or to dominate them individually (more common)³². Since the mid-1970s when the post-modern "imperiled"³³ presidency became a fact of life and the public and elite awareness of the permanence of the gap between resources and expectations became acknowledged, presidents focused on the (public) agenda setting stage as his principal method of assuring steady levels of support. When a president becomes a champion of the right issues, he can be seen as effective representative of a problem. Successful promotion of his definition of a problem almost automatically gives his solutions preeminence which allows at least for a partial coupling of the streams. Intense social media presence can bring similar results as evidenced by Trump's radicalism in calling Mexican immigrants thieves, sick people, or rapists.

Presidential domination of the political agenda

According to the presidential research, a president is much more likely to dominate agendas rather than outcomes. Three out of four respondents said that a president's interest in an issue was very or somewhat important for them when they

³¹ A. Ahmed, K. Rogers, J. Ernst, *Midterms 2018: How the 'migrant caravan' became part of trump campaign strategy*, "Independent", 25 October 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/midterms-2018-election-migrant-caravan-us-update-tracker-trump-asylum-a8601401.html> (20.12.2018).

³² P. Light, *The President's Agenda. Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter*, Baltimore 1985, pp. 10-12.

³³ C. Mackenzie, *The Imperiled presidency. Leadership challenges in the twenty-First Century*, New York 2016.

were formulating their position³⁴. Before President Carter gave a lot of concern to the issue of high costs of hospital care, only 18% of Americans considered the matter important. By 1979 that was a major issue for 83% of Americans. Similarly powerful effects of president's concern, over the same period of time 1976-1979, were seen in the area of transportation deregulation. Initially, trucking deregulation was embraced by 16% of the people, by 1979, after 1978 airline regulatory reform endorsed by Carter, the rate of support for trucking issue rose to 83%³⁵. Both swings in the rate of public support came after president's successful *going public* on both issues. Carter successfully defined the problem of costs and regulation and focused people's attention on those relations which won him public praise, however, when it came to the *inside game*, he was unable to forge high rate of support into elite endorsement of his policy alternatives in spite of his party controlling both chambers of Congress. Carter's advantages in extracting things from the system agenda (public game) and moving them to the policy/governmental agenda were greater than his ability to dominate alternatives or outcomes (inside game). The same seemed to be true with regard to Reagan and the Star Wars, Clinton and the issue of gays in the military or even Obama with his seemingly successful health care reform.

Typical presidential advantages in the agenda-setting game include: preeminence, organizational resources, unitary decision-making entity, command of public attention (bully pulpit), popularity (particularly the high cost of opposing him), his personal involvement (impression of priority). We may add to it general cultural preponderance towards the White House, its symbolic power and the strength of the socialization in school texts and in the media which tend to focus heavily on the White House as the symbol of representative government³⁶.

³⁴ R. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, op. cit., p. 175.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ G. Healy, *The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous...*, op. cit.

A president must always be ready with a rhetorical offensive in the problem stream. In order to recognize windows of opportunity, a president must be a policy entrepreneur himself, or must solicit their assistance at the right moment. When leadership opportunity windows open, people move energy, attention, advocacy and political capital in the direction set by the president when he manages to focus the system on his vision³⁷. Windows of leadership opportunity exist as a perception. Other actors estimate the chances of president's success as an incentive for their own involvement on his side or against him (Carter, Clinton or Obama on the national health care program, Trump on the immigration reform).

Proposals/ideas float around in discourses, solutions are available, all that is needed is the fact they must be attached to political events to gain "momentum". Political stream (mood) must be favorable – sensing the mood change often triggers opening of a window. Therefore, proper control of public discourse – persuasion and definition of a situation are crucial for presidential success as a leader.

For that one needs to be an insider. In a polarized setting, control of the agenda is difficult. Tribalization of audience makes it virtually impossible to reach to people beyond the hard core supporters. Such limited reach communication has an impact on the president's ability to couple the streams and move the most important pieces of his agenda forward.

Coupling of all three streams is best. Presidents' unique position in doing it in the first two years of a term comes as a natural advantage over opponents (campaign, elections, honeymoon, new institution, innovation, expectation, and cultural deference). However, in order to perform the coupling, a new president must rely on policy entrepreneurs to couple the previously separate streams: hook solutions to problems, proposals to political momentum, and political events to policy pro-

³⁷ P. Light, *The President's Agenda...*, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

posals. The situation must be handled very discretely and gently since these entrepreneurs who provide so badly needed connections are the fixtures in Washington establishment, in the same establishment who the President very likely campaigned against in his bid for office. Donald Trump by all accounts failed to couple streams to build strong support for his key policies in his first two years with two exceptions: getting the Supreme Court nominees approved by the Senate (Gorsuch and Kavanaugh) and getting a tax cut in the first year of his administration.

Both Reagan and Bush Jr. were able to overcome this apparent trap by appointing highly respected aides with a lot of Washington experience who stayed with them for a long duration and delegating some of their presidential responsibility to them, without losing the connotation of freshness for their whole administration. The public regarded their inside appointments as signs of political wisdom. It is interesting that neither Carter in 1976 nor Clinton in 1992 could follow their footsteps. Their hands-on leadership outsider campaign message prevented them from reaching into the pool of Washington entrepreneurs. Consequently, they dragged on the process of administration formation far too long, which prevented them from enjoying the full fruits of the "new beginning" syndrome.

Policy windows open by either of two ways: a new compelling problem may appear, usually as a result of an emergency or crisis, developments which not only have the power of moving pieces through agendas in most unexpected manner but also disrupt the order of things with regard to the positions of actors on the political scene. This latter quality may be unwelcome.

The other way of opening the leadership window of opportunity is by less dramatic and more endogenous happenings in the political stream. It may come from system internal failure. Paradoxically, the political congestion that permeates the Washington policy making environment may be an advantage for the president who is eager to play the role of active leader and who has the skills and sufficient

control of resources (aides, coalition support, respect etc.). Congestion and incrementalism present leaders with an opportunity to break up the stagnation, stimulate vivid discourse, initiate action, and mobilize supporters.

In other words, a window of leadership opportunity may be constructed with proper management of the public sphere. For post-modern presidents the tactics that allows for the apparent coupling of the streams to generate the impression of efficiency is the substantive form symbolic politics³⁸. To create the image of efficient and caring leader who listens and understands the needs of the public and "reads the times", presidents appoint special representatives, organize task forces, create committees, or conduct consultations with bi-partisan elites. This way they communicate their interest and attention. Such actions are reported by the media with very little follow up as to the actual effectiveness of such bodies. Donald Trump's public consultations with Congressional leaders from both parties after the Parkland school shooting conveyed exactly such a message to the general public – the president was determined to resolve the problem of gun control. Many such actions take place in public, at the agenda setting stage of policy making, with the use of *going public* means. Their effect is the apparent closing, or narrowing, of the expectations – resources gap. Proper execution of symbolic leadership requires good command of the media.

Overall, the situation of power fragmentation and dysfunctional polarization among major institutional actors affects the decision making process in Washington. It is hard to see it as driven by coherent-rational-goal-oriented thinking. Instead, it assumes the form of "disjointed incrementalism" when decisions become

³⁸ B. Szklarski, *Przywództwo symboliczne: między rządzeniem a reprezentacją. Amerykańska prezydentura u schyłku XX wieku*, [Symbolic leadership: between governance and representation. American Presidency at the end of the 20th century] Warszawa 2006, p. 237.

a product of momentary opportunities, fleeting emotions, values and contextual factors³⁹.

The elusive nature of presidential success

New challenges bring new ways of coping with them. Symbolic politics is one of them. When the success of presidential policies is less certain or more costly, the occupants of the White House seek alternative means to achieve their results. Today's success is measured more by how well one "moves in a certain direction" than by actually "getting there". Success is a perception, not a hard fact. Legitimate leaders are those who manage to convince the followers that they serve them well. With the wide dissemination of such terms as "gridlock", "deadlock", or "divided government" the public has been prepared for the lack of substantive effects of policies. Consequently, the stage has been set for symbolic politics which puts premium on image, ceremony, and ritual. A public rally or a speech staged in front of a prison communicates the message: this president is tough on crime. A child-lifting-and-kissing media event set in a day care center says volumes about president's support for single mothers and though such images are *impermanent categories, malleable by definition, they leave lasting, sometimes painful imprints on the fabric of people's lives*⁴⁰ and perceptions, we might add.

Modern leadership is communication of meaning that reinforces the legitimacy of the current policies. *Political forms come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves* – says Edelman⁴¹. The hopes and anxieties of men determine the meaning they ascribe to the events they witness or experience via TV.

³⁹ Ch.E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making-Process*, Englewood Cliffs 1968, p. 12.

⁴⁰ S. Ewen, *All Consuming Images. The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture*, New York 1999, p. xvii.

⁴¹ M. Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Chicago 1985, p. 2.

The presidency has extraordinary advantage in this competition for people's support. It is true that on the one hand it is burdened with the inflated expectations of a "single executive image", yet it also enjoys the center stage in the political theatre, which gives it virtually unlimited access to the eyes and ears of Americans. Their position as the ones accorded "mythical legitimacy"⁴² allows the presidents to use the symbolic aspects of leadership to command the hearts and souls of Americans. And this is what counts in politics today in a post-industrial world where economic differences lose significance and ideologies rise out of the grave where they were prematurely buried. After Hume and Madison we might repeat that emotions drive human beings, not reason.

The fact that those symbolic appeals are a necessary component of winning power in electoral campaigns has been accepted for quite some time now. My contention is that symbolic appeals to myths, keywords, rites, and signs are becoming increasingly important for maintaining and managing power, too⁴³. They simplify and organize our perception of reality. Generally, for the political system symbolic politics accentuates continuity and stability. Thus it becomes a force preventing excessive disunity and violence. This is possible because politics of symbols operates within a certain, fairly clearly defined area bounded by shared memory, tradition, and belief system. This common public space in the United States, according to Schlesinger, is a product of uninterrupted development, remarkable for its absence of fundamentally divisive cleavages⁴⁴.

With Donald Trump it seems to be different. The president resigned from at least three symbolic activities with strong centripetal potential, all to the surprise of commentators who saw his weakness as a bridge builder. Trump declined to

⁴² D. Nimmo, J. Combs, *Subliminal Politics. Myth & Mythmakers in America*, Englewood Cliffs 1980, p. 68.

⁴³ B. Szklarski, *Przywódstwo symboliczne...*, op. cit.

⁴⁴ A.M. Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America. Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, New York 1993, p. 136.

throw the first pitch to open the baseball season in 2017, he did not attend the annual Washington correspondents' dinner and squabbled with the NBA LA Clippers stars over their visit after they had won the championship. It has been customary for presidents to perform such small bridge building tasks if not for the purpose of advancing their policy agenda but for the confirmation of them understanding the axiological significance of presidential leadership. President Trump pays lip service to this centripetal role, yet his rhetoric and social media activism simultaneously undermine such efforts, thus contributing to the chaos in Washington.

Instead, he prefers to blur the distinction between governance and campaigning by holding campaign style rallies, and through personalized emotional and divisive public messages which accentuate his understanding of politics as a zero sum game. These efforts consolidate his hard-line base and accentuate his personal role in politics in the guise of "me politics". Such tactics leaves other participants no choice, they can be either with him or against him. He approaches policy making as if it were a referendum on him. He made no secret of this tactics when prior to the 2018 midterms, he toured the key states with over thirty public meetings offering himself as an object of evaluation. Such potentially divisive and definitely risky tactics seems to have paid off as Republicans did better than expected in both chambers of Congress and in the gubernatorial races. In a polarized and tribalised political context, the general public seems to mind such centrifugal behavior and mentality less than the members of the power elite, some of whom, the so called "never Trump brigade", offer very critical remarks about Trump's style and contents⁴⁵.

When the sphere of consensus is disrupted, as it seems to be today, leadership becomes a more risky endeavor. We see it in the Trump White House: his key

⁴⁵ S. Sullivan, *The last stand of Congress's Never Trump brigade*, "The Washington Post", 2 December 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/the-last-stand-of-congresss-never-trump-brigade/2018/12/02/55babb72-f41a-11e8-aeaa-b85fd44449f5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9bc78552c55f (18.12.2018).

advisers quit on him after a while when they realize that the president is unwilling to respect the unwritten rules of American democracy: self-restraint (or forbearance) and respect for others actors in the system (mutual toleration)⁴⁶. What we are witnessing is perhaps a manifestation of a switch from white house operating in the political system understood as a positive sum game (or to be precise a sequence of games happening simultaneously) to a White House seeing the environment through a prism of zero-sum game: where the unwritten rules are respected only as long as they serve the master of the game – the president.

Donald Trump sees himself as Mr. America - a walking symbol of America's exceptionalism, yet he fails to cater to the need for centripetality. Instead of building (even only symbolic) bridges across the aisles, he antagonizes other actors and delegitimizes the procedures or "folkways" of Washington, which for decades have been the axiological glue of the otherwise anarchic system. It is not enough to have lips full of big words such as America, patriotism, national interest when they are increasingly perceived by the public and other key actors as self-serving and divisive. The first reactions to Trump's unilateral decision to withdraw troops from Syria and abandon American commitments to allies in the region (primarily the Kurds) have invited highly critical reactions even from president's Republican allies, such as Senator Lindsey Graham or former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel who said bluntly in the CNN interview on December 20, 2018 that *Donald Trump is not fit to be president at any level*.

Successful leadership has been said to require constant reinforcement of existing orientations and affirmation of shared values. Mary Stuckey suggests that the president has become an *interpreter-in-chief [...]* a *presenter* broadcasting for a *dramatized society*⁴⁷. Thanks to the use of rhetoric which is to reassure rather than convince or sway, political discourse is centered on engineering of consensus.

⁴⁶ S. Levitsky, D. Ziblatt, *Jak umierają demokracje...*, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁷ M. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-In-Chief*, Chatham 1991, p. 5.

Donald Trump's public communication is as far away from Stuckey's prescriptions for successful leadership as can be.

Conclusions

The communication process dominated by ceremony and symbolism contributes to consensus building not by "rationality and fact-finding" but by manipulation of existing beliefs and attitudes.

However, symbolic leadership and persuasion alone are not enough to win and sustain successful leadership if they are inconsistent with the definition of office adopted by the president. Richard Nixon, in spite of his electoral landslide success in 1972, failed to become an all American president just as Donald Trump seems to be losing his battle to perform such a role⁴⁸. In a polarized political setting as we have in Washington today, political leadership calls for a lot more than intense and multidirectional communication aimed at mobilizing supporters against his opponents, which seems to be Donald Trump's prescription for success.

Leadership requires a mix of centrifugal mobilization of the hard line supporters (tribalised, yet they are an indispensable aspect of presidential leadership today), and centripetal symbolic and compromise oriented activities which demonstrate and reinforce respect for the informal rules of liberal democracy. Symbolic leadership builds favorable climate for compromises and prevents excessive disunity. Only when such a mix of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies is practiced can presidents successfully claim to control the political agenda in Washington and exercise power in the form of leadership. Such seems to be the message from Washington to Donald Trump.

⁴⁸ *Presidential Approval Ratings – Donald Trump*, "Gallup", 19 December 2018.

Abstract

American political system boasts of two qualities which in the opinion of many scholars make it exceptional. One is the high level of continuity in institutions and practices and the other one is the ability of the system to remain in the state of equilibrium. In both cases the role of leadership has been crucial for bringing balance between innovation and stability, or in general between the (centrifugal) forces of division and the (centripetal) forces of cohesion. From yet another perspective, such balancing act requires a president to successfully perform two seemingly incompatible roles: that of an insider – a Washington commoner who focuses on governance (and continuity), and the political outsider who champions representation (and change). That ability to act as an equilibrator has worked both in the domestic and international spheres and it has been one of the crucial roles presidents are supposed to perform. Unlike his predecessors, Donald Trump seems to be pursuing policies and performing in style which question the validity of the commitments and roles practices by his predecessors. This article looks at the relationship between American presidents and Washington and presents how Donald Trump fits in the picture.

PREZYDENCI VS. WASZYNGTON – KILKA UWAG NA TEMAT CHARAKTERU ARENY TWORZENIA POLITYKI W CZASACH D. TRUMPA**Abstrakt**

Wyjątkowość amerykańskiego system politycznego w ocenie wielu badaczy bierze się z dwóch jego cech. Pierwszą jest niezwykle wysoki stopień ciągłości władzy – zarówno w ramach instytucji politycznych, jak i praktyki działań, podejmowania decyzji. Drugą stanowi zdolność systemu do pozostawania w stanie równowagi. W obu przypadkach rola przywództwa była kluczowa dla zapewnienia równowagi między innowacją i kontynuacją, lub ogólnie między (odśrodkowymi) siłami podziału a (dośrodkowymi) siłami spójności. Jednocześnie, zachowanie takiej równowagi wymaga

od prezydenta równoczesnego wypełniania dwóch pozornie wykluczających się ról – insidera z Waszyngtonu, który koncentrując się na zarządzaniu dba o ciągłość i politycznego outsidera, który stawia wyzwania i dąży do zmian i szuka legitymizacji przede wszystkim w poparciu społecznym. Umiejętność równoważenia miała znaczenie zarówno w sferze krajowej, jak i międzynarodowej i była jedną z kluczowych ról dotychczasowych prezydentów. Donald Trump działa odmiennie – zarówno w kwestii kluczowych polityk, jak i stylem działania zdaje się podważać ważność zobowiązań i działań swoich poprzedników. W artykule autor analizuje relacje pomiędzy amerykańskimi prezydentami a ich waszyngtońskim otoczeniem oraz próbuje odpowiedzieć na pytanie o miejsce Donalda Trumpa w systemie ciągłości i równowagi.

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**Studying Leadership in Democratic Parliaments. Clues from Complex Systems
Theory and Polish Case**

Keywords:

leadership, democratic parliaments, complex systems, Poland

Introduction

Democratic parliaments are fruitful fields of analysis for students of leadership, although scholars focus on various aspects of political processes and use different conceptual frameworks to design and conduct studies¹. Regardless of theoretical background, it seems that there are at least two ways in which leadership could be studied in the context of parliamentarism – by focusing on the relationship between parliaments and their respective political environments, and by focusing on internal operation of parliaments.

In many parliamentary studies researchers seem to point out that parliaments provide different functions to their respective political systems (e.g. representation of voters or the whole community, control of executive, legislation power), and the activity of leaders in the environment of parliaments could be a significant factor in this process. This variation of systemic functions is reflected

¹ One of these frameworks is a systemic analysis which spread into political science in a variety of ways. See: D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1979; B. Sinclair, *Dilemmas and Opportunities of Legislative Leadership in a Non-Parliamentary System: The US case*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 1999, vol.5, no. 3-4, pp. 283-302.

in democratic parliaments, including post-communist ones, and it is an equally verified statement for "old" and "new" democracies². For instance, studies on executive-legislative relations in Hungary and Italy showed that parliaments could gradually lose their significance to the advantage of the executive, which seems to be an effect of activity of leaders external to the legislative branch of government³. Also another study, based on longitudinal data of the German political system, showed that although institutional design of the political system could remain relatively stable, the legislative-executive relations may vary, depending on the leadership style of the chancellor⁴.

However, it is too often only tacitly acknowledged that parliaments are also forums and dynamic spaces of communication between relatively similar political actors⁵. These should be analyzed as relatively isolated and evolving complex systems, although it is also still debated what kind of complexity-directed theory the researchers should start with to approach the political phenomena⁶. Firstly, the exchange of compositions in representative assemblies makes it possible to call them democratic⁷. This is shown e.g. by the studies on the continuity and change of the

² D.M. Olson and G. Ilonszki, *Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist Parliamentary Development*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2011, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 234-255; G. Ilonszki, D.M. Olson, *Questions about Legislative Institutional Change and Transformation in Eastern and East Central Europe: Beyond the Initial Decade*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2011, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 116-127.

³ J.W. Schieman, *Hungary: the emergence of chancellor democracy*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2004, vol. 10, no. 2-3, pp. 128-141; M. Cotta, *The rise and fall of the "centrality" of the Italian Parliament: transformations of the executive-legislative subsystem after the Second World War*, "Parliaments in the modern world: changing institutions", 1994, pp. 59-84.

⁴ L. Helms, *Germany: chancellors and the bundestag*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2004, vol. 10, no. 2-3, pp. 98-108.

⁵ K. Krehbiel, *Information and legislative organization*, Michigan 1992.

⁶ D. Byrne, *Complexity theory and the social sciences: An introduction*, Routledge 2002; K.D. Bailey, *Sociology and the new systems theory: Toward a theoretical synthesis*, Albany, NY 1994.

⁷ J.A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, socialism and democracy*, Routledge 2013; N. Xenos, *Democracy as Method: Joseph A. Schumpeter*, "Democracy, December", 1982.

compositions of political parliamentary elites in democratizing countries⁸. Secondly, the high number of deputies involved in many networks of communication (e.g. parties) forms a basic structure for the complexity of decision-making process⁹. Within the space of parliaments, individual MPs, committees, political parties, and external stakeholders struggle for power and decide on substantial issues, which takes place both formally and informally¹⁰. In effect, "leadership in parliaments" could be seen as an interaction between various political actors, through which political actors influence other political actors to attain goals and interests, within formal arrangements of the decision-making process in an assembly¹¹. This provides a basis for another strand of studies on leadership in the context of democratic parliaments, namely the one that regards the role of internal institutional design and complexity of parliamentary situation as a primary source and regulating factor of leadership¹².

Complexity in the context of leadership and democratic parliaments has also been studied, yet not in the sense the "complexity" concept carries in complexity

⁸ W. Wesołowski, *Polityka i sejm: formowanie się elity politycznej: praca zbiorowa*, Warszawa 1998; G. Shabad, K.M. Slomczynski, *The Emergence of Career Politicians in Post-Communist Democracies: Poland and the Czech Republic*, "Legislative Studies Quarterly", 2002, vol.27, no. 3, pp. 333-359; E. Nalewajko and W. Wesołowski, *Five Terms of the Polish Parliament, 1989-2005*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2007, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 59-82.

⁹ K. Strøm, *Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies*, "European journal of political research", 2000, t. 37, no. 3, pp. 261-290; B. Sinclair, *Dilemmas and Opportunities of Legislative Leadership in a Non-Parliamentary System: The US case...*, op. cit.

¹⁰ M. Shaw, *Parliamentary committees: A global perspective*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 1998, vol. 4, nr 1, pp. 225-251. C. Friedberg, *From a Top-Down to a Bottom-Up Approach to Legislative Oversight*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2011, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 525-544. C. Volden, A.E. Wiseman, *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress: The Lawmakers*, Cambridge 2014.

¹¹ The definition leaves groups, organizations and institutions out of the scope.

¹² I.S. Khmelko, *Internal Organisation of Post-Communist Parliaments over Two Decades: Leadership, Parties, and Committees*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2011, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 193-214;

science. Political scientists tried to reflect on the problem of complexity by analyzing e.g. electoral designs and roles of political parties. It seems to be a straightforward assumption for scholars that it is the political parties that are supposed to simplify the decision-making process within parliaments, as parties are assumed to aggregate goals and interests of individual politicians, and hence play a representative function for interest, pressure groups, and various groups of voters alike¹³. This field has been studied with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, such as "representative" or "elitist"¹⁴. For that reason, "leadership" in democratic parliaments could be a term applied to all these contexts, in which parliament is analyzed as composed of actual leaders and the systemic mechanisms that help recruit actual leaders, like the roles of party organization in the ballot¹⁵.

However, one of the key internal parliamentary characteristics is a high level of complexity of interactions resulting from the high number of MPs involved in multi-faceted networks. In effect, the question on leadership in parliaments also refers to the degree to which a parliament, as an organization, is open to the emergence of different types of "leadership" within its boundaries. This "internal dimension of leadership" refers to the problem of the degree of freedom parliamentarians possess, and the mechanisms they use to pursue individual and collective goals in the context of other political actors¹⁶. It encompasses opportunities of individual

¹³ K. Deschouwer, *Political parties in multi-layered systems*, "European urban and regional studies", 2003, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 213-226; C. Kam, *Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2001, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 89-126.

¹⁴ H. Best and M. Cotta, *Parliamentary representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries*, Oxford 2000; E. Semenova, *Parliamentary Elites in Central and Eastern Europe: Recruitment and Representation*, Routledge 2013, vol. 3.

¹⁵ M.N. Htun, M.P. Jones, *Engendering the right to participate in decision-making: electoral quotas and women's leadership in Latin America*, [in:] *Gender and the politics of rights and democracy in Latin America*, New York 2002, pp. 32-56.

¹⁶ K. Strøm, *Rules, reasons and routines: Legislative roles in parliamentary democracies*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 1997, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 155-174.

politicians and coercive mechanisms, both at the level of parliamentary party groups and the institutional setting of the decision-making processes in parliament. This paper focuses on the last of the aforementioned meanings of parliamentary leadership, and especially on the problem of situational complexity of individual MPs. The article is aimed at answering the question, what prerequisites parliaments possess that enable researchers to regard these institutions as complex systems in which leadership process might emerge.

In the first part of the article an outline of analytical framework of systems is provided by delineating differences between "systems", "networks" and "sets" – some of the terms that are often used when analyzing parliamentary behavior. Next, complex systems concepts are explained through examples drawn from the existing research on parliaments conducted within political science. Finally, the previously outlined complexity science framework is applied to an example of a two-chamber parliament – the Polish one. A Polish case is used because several interesting processes take place there – it is considered a relatively stable parliament, with stable parliamentary rules of conduct, yet it seems that many backbenchers increasingly seek for a space of unconstrained political activity, which may hypothetically result in gaining leadership roles within its boundaries. In the final part of the article conclusions on the applicability of complex systems approach to studies on leadership in parliaments are presented.

Sets, networks and systems

"Sets", "networks" and "systems" should be considered as different, although they share common characteristics. Here, "a set" refers to a collection of elements, whereas "a system" refers to a collection of elements that are organized. The latter

also means that elements are interdependent and provide functions in their environment¹⁷. Between "sets" and "systems" one may distinguish "networks". Sets whose elements are related could form a "network" by providing relations and structuring communication patterns. However, "networks" could not be considered "systems" unless the nature of dynamic interdependence of elements is traced and/or external function of such interdependence is identified.

In parliamentary studies a "set" one may call a collection of MPs newly elected in popular vote. The same collection of MPs assigned to a committee one could call a "network". The same collection of MPs, yet working within legislative or government oversight process, one may call a "system". In all three cases of the above analytical concepts mentioned it is necessary to be able to consider different objects "elements". The main difference lies in the level of organization of "elements".

The very difference between "sets", "networks" and "systems" affects the perspective not only on which, but also on how parliaments could be studied. Analyzing "sets" means analyzing elements that may be observed separately, one by one, as they are homogenous at the level of traits (and variables). When one refers to "sets", one may easily categorize properties and classify elements to diverse sets accordingly. This makes e.g. descriptive statistical analysis possible. Thus, the statistical distribution of properties (e.g. "variable values") assigned to individual MPs could also be the basis for providing hypotheses and conclusions.

¹⁷ Note that this definition shows synergy between different aspects of systems. It is thus a more commonly used view of systems used by scholars, which integrates structural and functional aspects of system identification. One may, however, focus on these aspects separately and draw conclusions from them. A.D. Hall, R.E. Fagen, *Definition of System*, "General Systems", 1956, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 18-28; B.R. Gaines, *General System Identification—Fundamentals and Results*, [in:] *Applied General Systems Research*, ed by. G.J. Klir, New York 1978, pp. 91-104. For an application of identification models to leadership, see: K. Kasianiuk, *White box, black box and self-organization: a system-to-environment approach to leadership*, "Kybernetes", 2016, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 126-140.

For instance, one may wish to know what the social composition of parliaments is. At the set level, one may approach counting the number of MPs of different sex and gender, the number of parliamentarians with different levels of education, or the number of those who were born and raised in specific areas of the country (e.g. rural or urbanized)¹⁸. Sets in parliamentary studies could be also useful to classify different kinds of events (e.g. legal propositions of government vs. legal propositions of parliamentarians)¹⁹.

Analyzing "networks" means analyzing structural properties that could be treated as "connective" for elements. It enables to seek for structural features of the object of the study, e.g. population, society or other type of organization, including parliament²⁰. This means that properties of elements could provide a basis for treating them as related. In parliamentary studies, membership in a parliamentary party group or membership in a standing committee could be the simplest examples. Each MP could be a member of a committee ("a node"), and in that way become an element of a network that has links and relations ("vertices") to other nodes. Of course, several relations between elements could vary and be dynamic over time. The same can be said for the parliamentary party group. Many studies concerning voting behavior rest on the assumption of cohesion between elements that are supposed to stem e.g. from the network nature of parliamentary party groups²¹. At this level, however, the researcher is only able to determine what the

¹⁸ In Poland, in a two-chamber parliament, there are 560 parliamentarians (460 in Sejm and 100 in Senate). E. Nalewajko, W. Wesołowski, *Five Terms of the Polish Parliament, 1989–2005*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2007, vol.13, no. 1, pp. 59-82.

¹⁹ A. Dudzińska, *System zamknięty. Socjologiczna analiza procesu legislacyjnego*, Warszawa 2015.

²⁰ S. Wasserman, K. Faust, *Social network analysis: Methods and applications*, Cambridge 1994, vol. 8; R.K. Ahuja, *Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications*, India 2017.

²¹ A. Pajala, A. Jakulin, W. Buntine, *Parliamentary group and individual voting behaviour in the Finnish parliament in year 2003: a group cohesion and voting similarity analysis*, "Pre-print, available at http://www.soc.utu.fi/valtio-oppi/mopi/misc/pajala_jakulin_buntine_vers", 2004, vol. 1; S. Jenkins, *Examining the Influences over Roll Call Voting in Multiple Issue Areas: A Comparative US State Analysis*, "The Journal of Legislative Studies", 2010,

structural conditions of what happens in parliaments are. One is not able to conclude how and why it happens. Both seem close to possible, when one applies a systemic framework.

Analyzing "systems" means studying organized elements that together function in a specific way. Since elements are organized, their relations start to be specific. The interrelations (seen also at the "network" analysis level) make it possible for elements to interact. However, the interaction is based on feedback loop mechanisms, and this may have various results. The system is not merely the sum of its parts. It is more of a result of interaction between elements which are autonomous and interdependent at the same time²².

Complex systems and parliaments

Although there are no formal definitions of "complex systems", there are many concepts that researchers apply to analyze what they treat as complex systems. That is sometimes called Complex Systems Theory, or Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) framework²³. Among features the complex systems seem to show, seven should be treated as valuable for the students of leadership, and for the sake of this article they will be classified into three configurations: 1) "numerosity" and "connectivity", 2) "autonomy", "locality" and "adaptation", 3) "non-linearity" and "emergence"²⁴. In short, if there are many interacting elements and there are many different types

vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 14-31; L.L. Wade, P. Lavelle, A.J. Groth, *Searching for voting patterns in post-communist Poland's sejm elections*, "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", 1995, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 411-425.

²² Y.P. Rhee, *Complex systems approach to the study of politics*, "Systems Research and Behavioral Science", 2000, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 487-491.

²³ D. Byrne, *Complexity theory and the social sciences: An introduction...*, op. cit.; R.K. Sawyer, *Social emergence: Societies as complex systems*, Cambridge 2005.

²⁴ J.K. Hazy, J.A. Goldstein, B.B. Lichtenstein, eds., *Complex Systems Leadership Theory. New Perspectives from Complexity Science on Social and Organizational Effectiveness*, Mansfield, MA 2007.

of relations, interactions lead sometimes to emergent phenomena, and hence one may consider a complex system, which gives rise to leadership phenomena.

Numerosity and connectivity

"Numerosity" is the first prerequisite of complexity. "Numerosity" in parliamentary studies refers to the effect in which a few MPs and relations between them influences the overall functioning of the parliamentary system. "Connectivity" in a parliament denotes here the number of links enabling mutual communication between MPs. These are the aspects of systems that were previously referred to as "sets" and "networks".

To show how "numerosity" and "connectivity" are linked, one may try to describe a system in which each element is supposed to be connected to all other elements. For a dyad, a system composed of 2 elements, one needs to gain information on 2 elements and 1 mutual relationship; but to describe a triad, one needs information about 3 elements and 3 mutual relationships. The set of 4 elements requires also knowledge on 6 relationships, 5 elements requires knowledge on 10 relationships, etc. In the example, the number of elements increases the number of relationships. This equals the minimal number of information bits one needs to include into analysis, when approaching the description of a system. As a result, along with a high number of elements, the number of relations grows, and thus the level of "connectivity" grows. This also influences the level of complexity of a system.

To go further, let us consider an example of a set of newly elected MP's. In Poland, 460 Sejm deputies and 100 Senators are elected based on different rules of electoral law. In effect, the number of parliamentarians is relatively high (560 altogether), which naturally influences the number of connections ("level of connectivity between elements"), and the types of networks formed. However, the difference in the dynamics of activity between both chambers should be seen not only

due to the number of elements and relations between them in each chamber, but also between the chambers as well.

Autonomy, locality and adaptation

"Autonomy" refers to the problem of the freedom a MP presents in relation to other MPs. Although, when it comes to the meaning of a "mandate", based on the basis of electoral law in Poland, MPs could all be considered equal and free ("autonomous"), their capacity to act in parliament could be heavily dependent on, although not restricted to, structural features of local situations of MPs.

In parliamentary studies MPs are elected by citizens that form constituencies, so each MP has the same formal status at the beginning of the term as related to one's representative function. However, MPs become dependent in various dimensions due to other factors. For instance, it seems that to certain degree MPs are subordinated to party leaders' decisions in parliamentary party groups. And in parliamentary committees MPs become subordinated to committee leaders and decision-making procedures. All this makes the "autonomy" a legitimized problem from the point of view of complexity science to be applied in leadership studies.

"Locality" refers to the problem of local situation and activity of MPs. MPs could be randomly distributed in space (that could be considered abstract or physical), but they could also be locally organized. Naturally, these organizational dimensions of "locality" affect the flow of information, and work flow in the network, hence influencing the overall functioning of the system. More importantly, "locality" of individual MPs determines the ways MPs perceive and analyze their parliamentary environment. It also points to the problem of communication between elements that are distributed within the system without centralized control.

To illustrate this problem, consider a set of MPs that are supposed to sit in the main hall of a parliament. Not only in Poland, but also e.g. in the United Kingdom, one of the key organizing factors that influence the placement of a chair of an

MP in the main forum are party affiliation and position in the party hierarchy. MPs do not simply "take chairs". They are seated, according to their rank. Leaders sit in the center or in the front, backbenchers sit in further rows. For this reason, "locality" could be considered both in a topological, and in communication sense. Party leaders are naturally in the center of communication processes. Communication patterns of backbenchers are naturally much more constrained. Thus, it seems that leadership of backbenchers is less probable than leadership of parliamentary party leaders. However, it does not necessarily need to be the case. As different "adaptation" activities and strategies occur in parliaments.

"Adaptation" refers to the problem of the behavior parliamentarians present in the context of their local situation and autonomy²⁵. Using the example above, adaptation process of a parliamentarian would mean the paths one follows, e.g. when trying to overcome the low level of information available. This would further require the answer to the question of what a parliamentarian does to know more about the basis and logic of political and substantial decisions. This, in turn, paves the way to their varying adaptation strategies, ability to gain influence, and playing leadership role. Since individual MPs possess capacity to adapt to local environment, they should, at least hypothetically, also be able to synchronize their goals or to cooperate, either temporarily or in the long run. They might form "local structures".

²⁵ S. Forrest et al., *Complex Systems: Mechanisms of Adaptation*, 1994.

Non-linearity and emergence

"Non-linearity" and "emergence" in parliamentary system refers to the dynamics, evolution and properties of such a system. Hence, complexity of parliamentary system could be viewed as the result of interaction between MPs in an assembly, which is based on feedback-loop mechanisms²⁶.

"Non-linear" systems are opposed to "linear" ones. "Linear" systems fulfill two "superposition principles": "homogeneity" (which means that output is always proportional to input), and "additivity" (which means that we can add the effects of actions of every element in isolation to another element, and the result will be the sum). Fulfilling the "superposition principles" makes it possible to conduct mathematical analysis, e.g. " $1+1=2$ ".

Parliaments and parliamentary groups do not necessarily fulfill the "superposition" criteria. Theoretically, the result of cooperation between two or more parliamentarians on the legal act will be different than the result of work of an individual parliamentarian. However, even interactions between the same MPs of the same parliamentary groups have unpredictable results. The operation of every parliament could be manifold, depending not only on the formal structure but also on the political structure and locally – on the parliamentarians' individuality. Although two or more parliamentarians may have the same formal positions within parliament (e.g. be "backbenchers" of the same party group), most probably they will have different perspectives on the issues under consideration, and at least slightly different goals and interests. Their communication will give rise to new ideas. Hence, the interactions will be slightly different, depending on the characteristics of parliaments, groups, decision making process, etc.

If parliaments were linear systems, we could relatively easily predict its internal dynamics. For instance, in the Polish case it would be easy to predict which

²⁶ P.A. Corning, *Synergy, Cybernetics and the Evolution of Politics*, "International Political Science Review", 1996, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 91-119.

political parties were more apt to form a governing coalition, basing on their traits. In fact, such analyses are conducted (e.g. from the rational choice theory standpoint), but rarely are the predictions in line with empirical data²⁷. Moreover, even if parties were homogenous, it would be more rational to predict that parties with the same political history would easily form a coalition, e.g. because of their common experience. However, at one point of time, the same group of parliamentarians might stand for and at another time against governmental propositions. This seemed to be the case e.g. in Poland in 1989, at the very start of transformation process²⁸. Hence, parliamentary party groups are themselves non-linear systems, and one might not predict their behavior in isolation to their context, history and goals.

Non-additive interactions of non-homogenous elements in a system may result in "emergence" of local structures, especially when parliaments are composed of parliamentarians not affiliated to parliamentary party groups, or when these groups are in the process of decomposition.

It is important to note that local interactions are horizontal, but translate to hierarchical organization as well; they all affect each other. Interactions of elements result in different "local" properties, which translate to emergent properties of the system.

²⁷ A. Blais, *To vote or not to vote?: The merits and limits of rational choice theory*, Pittsburgh 2000; B.R. Weingast, *A rational choice perspective on congressional norms*, "American Journal of Political Science", 1979, pp. 245-262; M. Laver N. Schofield, *Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe*, Michigan 1998.

²⁸ In 1989, some parliamentarians of minor political groups, decided to opt for a different governing coalition, which fostered the line and pace of the transformation process. Compare: P. Kowal, *Koniec systemu władzy*, Warszawa 2012; M. Chmaj, *Sejm "kontraktowy" w transformacji systemu politycznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Lublin 1996; I. Jackiewicz, *Parlament w procesie transformacji. Sejm kontraktowy i Sejm I kadencji*, "Konsolidacja elit politycznych w Polsce", 1991, vol. 1993, pp. 129-161.

Definition of leadership in a complex system

In a vast part of leadership studies, leadership is defined *inter alia* as a relationship between the one who "leads" and the ones who "follow". In these studies it is taken for granted that if "leadership" is actually to take place, there should be a number of actors that are involved in the relationship and this relationship is to a certain degree "special"²⁹. If there are many elements and relations between them, one may speak of a situation that is complex.

One of general definitions of leadership in complex systems states:

*Leadership in complex systems takes place during interactions among agents when those interactions lead to changes in the ways agents expect to relate to one another in the future. This change could be due or changes in a perceived purpose, strategy or objective, or to changes in perceived norms as to acceptable choices, behaviors and communication*³⁰.

Hence, leadership of an individual MP in parliament encompasses one's ability to provide visions and goals to parliamentary environment, which requires stimulation of "non-linear processes" and influence on "emergence" of politically oriented structures³¹. Consequently, leadership could be a process through which a process of "structural" or "functional" change may take place. "Sets" may become "networks", and "networks" may become "systems", through the active involvement, and decisions of particular MPs.

²⁹ W. Küpers, J. Weibler, *Inter-leadership: Why and How Should We Think of Leadership and Followership Integrally?*, "Leadership", 2008, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 443-475.

³⁰ J.K. Hazy, J.A. Goldstein, B.B. Lichtenstein, *Complex Systems Leadership Theory. New Perspectives from Complexity Science on Social and Organizational Effectiveness...*, op. cit., p. 7.

³¹ See Easton on political system.: D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life...*, op. cit.

Based on the above, we will define "leadership in parliament" as following:

Leadership in parliament is a process through which alternation of organizational functions and structures in parliament takes place. Leaders could be seen as both providing visions, goals, and making use and affecting different forms of parliamentary activity, e.g. overcoming political party groups' communication patterns, forming new caucuses.

The definition presupposes that in parliament there should exist identifiable MPs who have a peculiar capability of influence, and not necessarily identifiable, yet significant "other actors", who voluntarily decide to remain under the influence of the first (people, groups or even organizations). All this should be observable in parliaments. Parliament is understood here as a complex system, which means that 1) it is relatively separate from other political institutions; 2) it provides specific functions in the political system; 3) and there are many actors – MPs – cooperating and competing at different levels (e.g. parliamentarians, parliamentary party groups), communicating and working on the basis of formal and informal arrangements (external – e.g. constitutional, and internal – e.g. rules and codes of conduct).

To conduct research on leadership in parliament, one needs to be able to trace how a MP influences actions of other MPs. On a systemic level of analysis, one needs to show the dynamics of causal relationships within a parliament, and their results. But there are many sets, networks and systems in parliament. So, is it possible to trace leadership in a complex parliamentary environment? How one could define such leadership?

Tracing leadership as an emergent phenomenon in parliament

Modern parliaments are based on legal regulations, and hence if one wishes to study leadership in parliaments, one needs to take account that formal aspect of

parliamentary behavior. Leadership will be considered as based on formal setting of an individual MP in parliament. It is assumed that formal setting shapes MP's capability to act and to gather support in parliament. This is one, although not the only one, of the key dimensions in which complexity may be studied.

What should one consider when commencing a study of leadership in a complex system of parliament based on formal rules of behavior? The Polish case will help here with further examples. Polish parliament is a bi-cameral system with multiple parliamentary party groups, and MPs are elected in popular vote. The election takes place based on different electoral rules – multi-mandate districts with proportional rule of casting seats for Sejm, and single-mandate majoritarian for Senate. At the same time, political committees that gain a certain level of popular support in elections are entitled to refund the campaign expenses. In addition, there is a subsidy from the state budget for the parties who gain at least 3% of support individually, and 6% if they formed campaign coalition.

Since 1989, the beginning of transformation process, the basic formal structure of parliament has remained relatively stable. The decision-making process underwent only minor changes as well. For a vast part of post 1989 history, each of the chambers has been led by the Speaker (*marszałek*), who is supposed to cooperate with chambers' Presidium (of Sejm or Senate), and Council of Elders (for Sejm) or Council of Seniors (for Senate), as well as standing, extraordinary and special committees³². Parliamentary work takes place in sessions, and each bill goes through a three-step legislative process. Each of the steps is called "a reading" (*czytanie*).

³² Sejm Presidium is composed of Vicespeakers (elected from parliamentary party groups), and the Council of Elders of heads of parliamentary party groups and other bodies, if necessary. *Sejm bodies*, <http://opis.sejm.gov.pl/en/organysejmu.php> (accessed: 2.11.2018); *Senate*: <https://www.senat.gov.pl/en/about-the-senate/regulamin-senatu/> (accessed: 2.11.2018).

Numerosity and connectivity

There are 560 MPs (460 Sejm representatives and 100 Senators), which provides a basic number of elements of a set. Parliamentarians also form different networks whose level of connectivity is restricted to a few parliamentary party groups at the beginning of the term. Once MPs enter parliamentary structure, party groups decide on the number of their representatives in standing committees³³.

The most important type of connection in Polish parliament is political party group affiliation³⁴. An MP may be a member of a single parliamentary party group. If the number of MPs in a group equals or exceeds 15, it entitles a representative of a group to participate in the meetings of Council of Elders which fosters influence on the Sejm agenda. MPs do not need to be formally members of political parties whose committee they were elected from. These committees are called "electoral committee of voters" – *komitet wyborczy wyborców*). Hence, sometimes, MPs remain "non-partisan" outside parliament, and "partisan" in parliament. The moment a government is formed, MPs become agents in the government-opposition struggle, and throughout the term they are perceived as members of faction within their respective political party group.

³³ In majority of terms, there were fewer party groups at the beginning and more at the end of the term.

³⁴ Note that in many cases political groups in parliament were not formed as parties in the party register, which entitles parties to receive subsidies from the state budget for political parties. Such was the case of Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*). At first, it was a civic movement, later the leaders decided to register it in the party register. Also a more recent one, Kukiz'15, was a political movement that emerged on the basis of leadership of ex-rock music artist (Paweł Kukiz) struggling for an alternation of electoral law towards single majoritarian vote. Kukiz'15 has been a political movement until 2018, but it is possible that it will change its formal status before the elections in 2019.

Moreover, since each MP is elected in an electoral district, each parliamentarian is subject to influence by their constituencies and interest groups. Quite often, regional links are especially important³⁵.

Table 1. Types of politically driven connections between MPs.

Connection type	Chamber (Sejm and/or Senate)
Parliamentary political party group (partisan and non-partisan)	Both chambers
Parliamentary political division (government vs. opposition)	Both chambers
Parliamentary political party group faction	Both chambers
Interest/pressure group	Both chambers
District	Both chambers, different for Sejm and Senate
Region	Both chambers, different for Sejm and Senate

Source: own elaboration.

Within the formal organizational structure of parliament, there are standing, special and investigation committees. Investigation committees work only as a Sejm, single task and temporary body. Standing committees may form subcommittees, and they often cooperate within a legislative process. The number of committees vary. In 2018 there have been 29 standing committees in Sejm and 16 in Senate.

Table 2. Types of formally driven connections between MPs.

Connection type	Chamber (Sejm and/or Senate)
Standing committee	Both
Subcommittee	Both
Special committee	Both
Investigation committee	Sejm

Source: own elaboration.

³⁵ E.g. one of the most enduring interest group is the link between the MPs elected in the Silesian region and their constituency. Silesia is perceived as one of the most important industry region, in which e.g. coal mining is taking place.

Autonomy, locality and adaptation

During the term, many other forms of activity prove to be a network and systems generating processes. Hence, leadership in parliaments could be studied by analyzing how relatively autonomous MPs localize themselves, adapt within parliamentary structures and influence others to form new local structures. By analyzing individual and collective forms of parliamentary activity one may seek individual adaptation strategies, and hence – leadership.

Naturally, voting is a sole power of an individual MP. In Poland, each parliamentarian is autonomous at least in the constitutional law sense. MPs are representatives of the whole nation and their decisions are not bound by the formal instructions of constituencies. In Poland, MPs may hence act purely individually or collectively. In Sejm, MPs may issue interpellations, questions, questions on current accounts, and statements, individually, in pairs or in larger groups. At the same time, they may submit bills or drafts of resolutions to be issued by the chamber, although there must be at least 15 deputies to do this. Senate is a more collective oriented chamber. For instance, a bill could be submitted only by the chamber as a whole.

One of the most important ways parliamentarians can act autonomously is formation of inter-parliamentary or a bilateral friendship group (*grupa bilateralna*), and of parliamentary working group or "team" (*zespół parlamentarny*). In the United Kingdom these are called all-parliamentary party groups (APPGs) and in the United States of America – caucuses. Friendship groups are similar in consecutive parliaments. Parliamentary working groups seem to depend heavily on the composition of parliaments and interests and goals of individual MPs³⁶.

³⁶ This aspect of political activity has not been yet studied comparatively, although some case studies have been conducted. See: R.J. Dilger, M.E. Glassman, *Congressional Member Organizations: Their purpose and activities, history, and formation*, Congressional Research Service, Washington 2009; T. Hyland, *Mindful nation UK—report by the mindfulness all-party parliamentary group (MAPPG)*, Oxford 2016; K. Kasianiuk, *Zespoły poselskie*

Table 1. Autonomous activity and local structures available for MPs adaptation in the Polish parliament.

Connection type	Chamber
Voting	Sejm, Senate (individual or collective)
Interpellation (<i>interpelacja</i>)	Sejm (individual or collective)
Question (<i>zapytania</i>)	Sejm (individual or collective)
Question on current accounts (<i>pytanie w sprawach bieżących</i>)	Sejm (individual or collective)
Statement (<i>oświadczenie</i>)	Sejm (individual or collective)
Submission of a bill	Sejm (min. 15 MPs), Senate as a whole
Submission of draft resolution	Sejm (min. 15 MPs), Senate as a whole
Inter-parliamentary / bilateral friendship group (<i>stała delegacja parlamentarna / grupa bilateralna</i>)	Sejm and Senate
Parliamentary working group / team (<i>zespół parlamentarny</i>)	Sejm (min. 15 MPs), Senate as a whole

Source: own elaboration.

Non-linearity and emergence

Leadership might be especially traceable when studying interactions between MPs and emergence of local structures. One of the ways one may start this kind of research is by analyzing formation of inter-parliamentary party groups or working groups. When doing it, one may seek processes through which operation ("function") and structures are changed. One may focus e.g. why certain groups within a parliament emerge, or why a modification of structures of parliamentary party groups is taking place. One may also ask for the reasons for modifying a status and goals of standing and special committees, or caucuses (and all-parliamentary party groups). It is also worthwhile to study the dynamics of relations between different MPs in committees or individual activity of parliamentarians, such as questioning the government. By comparing individual and collective activity (e.g. goals, bills),

i parlamentarne jako formy samoorganizacji parlamentarzystów. Wyniki polskich badań eksploracyjnych, "Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne", 2016, vol. 20, pp. 124-140.

one may draw conclusions on the cause and effect mechanisms within the legislative or oversight process, and hence on the level of influence of individual MPs on the activity of a group or a whole.

Summary and Discussion

The goal of this article was to show how concepts used in complex systems scholarship could be used in research on leadership in parliaments. Leadership was considered as an organizational feature of parliament, and parliament was treated primarily as a space of communication between individual members of parliaments (MPs). The traits of complex systems were analyzed using an example of one of bicameral democratic parliaments – Polish Sejm and Senate. This brings conclusions on the possible application of complexity framework to the parliamentary leadership field of research.

Based on the analysis, it is possible to conclude that leadership could be seen as an emergent phenomenon, for which complexity of parliamentary processes is an important prerequisite. There are many structural and functional features of parliament that show strong foundation to support this statement. Firstly, high number of MPs in a single term (560 in Poland), may be related and linked in a variety of ways, based on formal and informal basis (e.g. districts vs. regions). Within parliament, MPs are also linked both formally – based on rules of the chambers – and informally, based on political affiliation (e.g. political party group), or substantial interests (e.g. parliamentary teams). This multi-network structure gives opportunities to pro-active oriented MPs for the development of their own communication networks. Configuration of these links could be the first step towards theory-building of internal parliamentary operation.

At the same time, multi-faceted relations and work on the issues under parliamentary scrutiny make it possible for the MPs to interact and to foster their vi-

sions and goals. Since MPs influence one another through a feedback-loop mechanism, system they are immersed in is essentially "non-linear", and hence becomes highly dynamic. This gives rise to emergent properties such as leadership, at least potentially. In studies on leadership in parliamentary systems, it is possible to focus either on "non-linearity" or "emergence", which relates to "functional" and "structural" aspects of every system³⁷³⁸.

However, some of the links between parliamentarians spread out of parliament (e.g. party, district), and some are directly dependent on parliamentary structure (e.g. committees, friendship groups, parliamentary working groups). This makes it necessary to provide clear criteria under which a system is extracted from its environment to be able to conduct a study on leadership within parliament.

Abstract

This article aims at introducing some of the concepts used in complex systems theory to the field of research on leadership in parliaments. Leadership is considered as an organizational feature of parliament, a phenomenon stemming from its structural and functional aspects. At the same time, parliament is treated primarily as a space of communication between individual members of parliaments (MPs). Complex systems theory concepts are applied to a relatively stable bi-cameral democratic parliamentary system – as it is in the Polish case. In effect, complex systems concepts are a valuable framework for operationally feasible research on leadership within parliaments.

BADANIE PRZYWÓDZTWA W DEMOKRATYCZNYCH PARLAMENTACH. WSKAZÓWKI Z TEORII SYSTEMÓW ZŁOŻONYCH I PRZYPADEK POLSKI

³⁷ K. Kasianiuk, *A system-cybernetic approach to the study of political power. Introductory remarks*, "Kybernetes", 2018, vol. 47, no. 6, pp. 1262-1276.

³⁸ D. Griffin, *The Emergence of Leadership*, Routledge 2002.

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu jest włączenie niektórych koncepcji używanych w badaniach nad systemami złożonymi do badań nad przywództwem w parlamentach. Przywództwo jest rozpatrywane jako cecha organizacyjna parlamentu – jako zjawisko wynikające z jego cech strukturalnych i funkcjonalnych. Natomiast parlament rozumiany jest jako przestrzeń komunikacji między indywidualnymi postaciami. Koncepcje pochodzące z teorii systemów złożonych są zaprezentowane na przykładzie względnie stabilnego dwuizbowego demokratycznego systemu parlamentarnego, za który uznano przypadek Polski. W rezultacie, koncepcje pochodzące z teorii systemów złożonych uznano za wartościową ramę dla badań przywództwa w parlamencie.

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Paulina Czernek

Inkumbenci w Sejmie, czyli przyczynek do charakterystyki pośta z długoletnim stażem parlamentarnym

Słowa kluczowe:

poseł, inkumbenci, polityk wielokadencyjny, wybory parlamentarne, Sejm

Wstęp

W niniejszym artykule identyfikacji poddane zostaną elementy kariery politycznej inkumbenta – czyli polityka z długoletnim stażem parlamentarnym. Termin „inkumbent” pochodzi z języka łacińskiego (*incumbens*), a najczęściej wykorzystywany jest w krajach anglojęzycznych (ang. *incumbent*)¹. Tam też pojęcie to nie odnosi się jedynie do sfery polityki, ale jest używane także w odniesieniu do kwestii przedsiębiorczości. Inkumbentami nazywane są zatem osoby zajmujące wysokie, eksponowane stanowiska w danej firmie, np. prezes czy dyrektor. Określenie to można również stosować w odniesieniu do przedsiębiorstw, będących liderami w danej branży². Na polskiej scenie badawczej termin ten został rozpowszechniony przez Jarosława Flis, który w swoich analizach wielokrotnie badał problematykę wyborów, zarówno na poziomie samorządowym, jak i centralnym. W swych publikacjach

¹ J. Flis, *Partie polityczne w wyborach prezydentów miast*, „Studia Politologiczne” 2011, t. 20, s. 144 i n.

² <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/incumbent.asp>, 2.05.2018.

krakowski uczony wiele uwagi poświęca samym wyborom samorządowym, jak i lokalnym politykom wielokadencyjnym, np. prezydentom miast³. J. Flis jako inkumbentów definiuje „sprawujących władzę włodarzy zabiegających o reelekcję”⁴, twierdząc przy tym, że urzędujący polityk starający się o reelekcję jest zjawiskiem na tyle istotnym, że wymaga osobnego określenia⁵. Ze względu na rozległość oraz interdyscyplinarność terminu, podmiotem niniejszych analiz uczyniono jedną z podkategorii inkumbentów, jaką są parlamentarzyści wielokadencyjni.

W polskim czasopiśmiennictwie naukowym termin „inkumbent” nie jest często stosowany⁶. Pojęcie to zostało użyte przez Dominikę Kasprovicz, Kamila Marcinkiewicza, Radosława Marzęckiego w pracy: *Kapitał wyborczy w polskiej polityce. Analiza ilościowa wyników wyborczych inkumbentów w wyborach parlamentarnych 2005-2011*. Powyżsi autorzy wskazują, że inspiracji do własnych analiz dostarczyły im m.in. badania Jarosława Flisa⁷. Definicji inkumbenta za Jarosławem Flisem używa

³ Zob. J. Flis, *Partie polityczne w wyborach...*, op. cit.; M. Bukowski, J. Flis, A. Hess, A. Szymańska, *Rządzący i opozycja. Partie sejmowe i lokalne w małopolskich wyborach samorządowych 2014*, Kraków 2016.

⁴ J. Flis, *Partie polityczne w wyborach...*, op. cit.; M. Bukowski, J. Flis, A. Hess, A. Szymańska, *Rządzący i opozycja...*, op. cit., s. 9 i n.

⁵ J. Flis, *Partie polityczne w wyborach...*, op. cit., s. 144 i n.

⁶ Autorka pracy wyszukała terminy „*incumbent*” oraz „inkumbent” w bazie Katalogu Zbiorów Bibliotek UJ oraz w katalogu elektronicznym Biblioteki Uniwersytetu Śląskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach. W żadnej z powyższych baz nie znaleziono wyników wyszukiwania.

Jednocześnie należy zauważyć, że termin „*incumbent*” jest dużo bardziej rozpowszechniony poza granicami Polski. W wyszukiwarce Google Scholar odnaleziono 51 publikacji, w których znalazło się słowo „inkumbent” oraz 425 000 z angielskim odpowiednikiem tego pojęcia (*incumbent*).

Podobną tendencję zaobserwowano dzięki narzędziu Brand24, służącemu monitoringowi Internetu i mediów społecznościowych. W okresie 2.04.2018-2.05.2018 r. pojawiło się 111 wzmianek dotyczących terminu „*incumbent*”, natomiast nie odnaleziono żadnych wyników dla słowa „inkumbent”. W przeważającej części termin ten odnosił się do dziedziny polityki. Na podstawie tej krótkiej analizy zauważyć można jednak, że w krajach anglojęzycznych termin ten funkcjonuje nie tylko w sferze naukowej, ale również w języku popularnym.

⁷ D. Kasprovicz, K. Marcinkiewicz, R. Marzęcki, *Kapitał wyborczy w polskiej polityce. Analiza ilościowa wyników wyborczych inkumbentów w wyborach parlamentarnych 2005-2011*, „*Studia Politologiczne*” 2015, t. 37, s. 280.

również Łukasz Kubisz-Muła w artykułach dotyczących reelekcji wójtów, burmistrzów i prezydentów miast⁸. Pojęcie „inkumbenta” stosowane jest również przez Sławomira Bartnickiego. W swoich pracach nie dokonuje on dogłębnych konceptualizacji terminu, co może dowodzić, że uznaje on termin za powszechnie znany i zrozumiały dla analiz politologicznych. S. Bartnicki poświęca wiele uwagi zjawisku określanemu jako *incumbency advantage*, czyli częstej reelekcji osoby sprawującej urząd w poprzedniej kadencji. Zajmuje się on również źródłami przewagi podczas wyborów polityków sprawujących urząd nad nowymi postaciami. W swoich opracowaniach S. Bartnicki skupia się w głównej mierze na wyborach bezpośrednich władzy wykonawczej na szczeblu samorządowym. Dysertacje Sławomira Bartnickiego z wykorzystaniem terminu „inkumbent” pochodzą z lat 2016-2018⁹. Można zatem uznać, że definicja Jarosława Flisa jest powszechnie stosowaną i przyjętą bezdyskusyjnie, a co za tym idzie – za zasadne uznano odwołanie do niej w niniejszym opracowaniu.

Na polskim rynku wydawniczym występują pojęcia pokrewne do „inkumbenta”, np. „polityk wielokadencyjny”. W opracowaniach traktujących o reelekcjach osób sprawujących urząd publiczny terminy te są często używane wymiennie. Jest to pojęcie bliskoznaczne, aczkolwiek należy wskazać różnice pomiędzy termi-

⁸ Zob. Ł. Kubisz-Muła, *Zjawisko reelekcji prezydenta miasta w świetle wyników badań exit poll z wyborów samorządowych w Bielsku-Białej*, „Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne” 2016, nr 1, s. 119 oraz idem, *Niektóre polityczne skutki reelekcji wójarza gminy – analiza na przykładzie miejscowości z województwa kujawsko-pomorskiego, świętokrzyskiego i opolskiego*, „Polityka i Społeczeństwo” 2017, nr 3, s. 20.

⁹ Zob. S. Bartnicki, *Uwarunkowania przewagi kandydatów w wyborach bezpośrednich do gminnej egzekutywy*, „Acta Politica Polonia” 2016, nr 2, s. 35; idem, *Egzemplifikacja efektu inkumbenta w wyborach bezpośrednich kierowników gminnej egzekutywy w Polsce i jego strukturalne uwarunkowania*, „Acta Politica Polonia” 2017, nr 3, s. 55; idem, *Wybrane determinanty poparcia kandydatów podczas wyborów gminnego organu wykonawczego*, „Studia Wyborcze” 2017, t. 23, s. 107.

nami. Problematyką wielokadencyjności w polskiej literaturze badawczej szczegółowo zajmował się Maciej Drzonek¹⁰. Pojęcie to badacz odnosi najczęściej do prezydentów miast, którym poświęca wiele uwagi w swoich analizach. Zakłada on, że wielokadencyjnym prezydentem jest włodarz miasta, który został wybrany w wyborach bezpośrednich przynajmniej trzy razy z rzędu¹¹. Wielokadencyjność według M. Drzonka to *pewien status, który można osiągnąć w wyniku wyborów bezpośrednich*¹². Badacz przyjmuje, że wielokadencyjny prezydent nigdy nie przegrywa wyborów, zarządza miastem do momentu podjęcia samodzielnej decyzji o rezygnacji z udziału w kolejnych wyborach.

Należy zatem wskazać, że istotną różnicą między pojęciem inkumbenta a polityka wielokadencyjnego jest okres, w którym poddaje się ich analizie. W momencie wyborów polityk zabiegający o reelekcję powinien być nazywany inkumbentem. W pozostałych przypadkach, takich jak np. analiza lub ocena kadencji na danym stanowisku publicznym, zasadne wydaje się być stosowanie w odniesieniu do polityka pojęcia wielokadencyjności.

Wzorując się na dotychczasowej praktyce stosowanej w polskim czasopiśmiennictwie oraz mając na uwadze cel artykułu, jakim jest identyfikacja cech wybranych polityków w różnych okresach ich politycznej kariery, autorka w niniejszej pracy używać będzie terminów „inkumbent” i „polityk wielokadencyjny” wymienienie. Inkumbentami nazywani będą zatem politycy, którzy po raz kolejny zostali wybrani do sprawowania tych samych publicznych funkcji. Jak wspomniano wyżej, analizie poddano podkategorię – wielokadencyjnych parlamentarzystów. Badania

¹⁰ Zob. M. Drzonek, *Reelekcje prezydentów miast w wyborach bezpośrednich w Polsce*, Kraków 2013; idem, *Wielokadencyjność prezydenta miasta po wejściu Polski do UE – przypadek Gdyni*, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2014, nr 4, s. 177; idem, *Wielokadencyjność bez afiliacji partyjnej?: spostrzeżenia po reelekcjach „wiecznych prezydentów” w 2014 r.*, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2016, nr 1, s. 81.

¹¹ M. Drzonek, *„Wieczni prezydenci” są do pokonania. Spostrzeżenia po wyborach samorządowych 2014 roku*, „Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis” 2015, t. 15, s. 211.

¹² M. Drzonek, *Wielokadencyjność prezydenta miasta...*, s. 178.

przeprowadzono na próbie 39 posłów, którzy sprawowali ostatnią – VII kadencję w Sejmie RP lub/oraz pełnili ważną funkcję w państwie (Prezydent RP, Prezes Rady Ministrów). Najważniejszym kryterium kwalifikacji inkumbentów było ich przynajmniej pięciokrotne sprawowanie funkcji w Sejmie, licząc od 1991 r., czyli od daty pierwszych wolnych wyborów¹³. Liczba sprawowanych kadencji nie jest przypadkowa. Pięcio-, sześć- i siedmiokrotny wybór tych samych polityków do Sejmu RP może wskazywać, że nie był to wybór incydentalny, a raczej celowa decyzja elektoratu. Co za tym idzie, grupa tych polityków powinna posiadać wspólne cechy, które mogły decydować o ponownych reelekcjach. W przypadku jednej lub dwóch reelekcji można mówić o sprzyjającej sytuacji politycznej bądź losowym wyborze. Ciężko traktować jednorazowy ponowny wybór jako efekt celowego działania elektoratu. Przywołany wyżej M. Drzonek jako inkumbentów określa prezydentów, którzy swoją funkcję pełnią już trzykrotnie, zaliczając ich do kategorii wiecznych. Z pewnością trzy- bądź czterokrotnego wyboru posła na to samo stanowisko nie można traktować jako incydentalnego. Rozszerzenie jednakże wskazanej w niniejszej pracy próby badawczej istotnie zwiększyłoby liczbę jednostek analizy, która w badanych trzech kadencjach i tak jest wysoka. Co za tym idzie, autorka pracy uznała, że 39 posłów stanowi dostateczną liczbę jednostek do przeprowadzenia skutecznej analizy, sprawdzającej czy, a jeśli tak, to jakimi wspólnymi cechami odznaczają się inkumbenci sprawujący kilkakrotnie swoją parlamentarną funkcję. Należy również zaznaczyć, że wzięcie pod uwagę jedynie siedmiu pełnych kadencji znacznie ograniczyłoby materiał badawczy i *a contrario* warto wspomnieć, że niektórzy z badanych inkumbentów sprawowali funkcję w polskim parlamencie dłużej niż siedem kadencji, tj. jeszcze przed 1991 r.

¹³ Należy zaznaczyć, że przerwa w sprawowaniu mandatu (z powodu przegranych wyborów lub rezygnacji z udziału) nie ma dużego znaczenia dla przedmiotu niniejszej pracy. Uzyskanie mandatu po przerwie dalej będzie uznawane za reelekcję.

Dotychczasowe doświadczenia badawcze dotyczące polskiej sceny politycznej wskazują, że w głównej mierze badania ogniskowały się wokół kwestii wielokadencyjności oraz reelekcji. Inkumbent jako jednostka analizy służyła natomiast np. zbadaniu kapitału wyborczego polskiej polityki (D. Kasprowicz, K. Marcinkiewicz, R. Marzęcki). W swych badaniach badacze skupiali uwagę na szansach inkumbentów na reelekcję i determinantach poparcia (S. Bartnicki), związkach między wynikami głosowania a uwarunkowaniami socjometrycznymi wyborców (Ł. Kubisz-Muła). W pracach tych analizowano także wielokadencyjność na poziomie samorządowym. Mało miejsca poświęcano natomiast konkretnym cechom wybranych polityków. W niniejszej pracy autorka podda analizie sylwetki 39 posłów oraz sprawdzi, jakimi wspólnymi i odtwarzalnymi cechami odznaczają się posłowie sprawujący kilkakrotnie swoją parlamentarną funkcję. Po rozeznaniu polskich badań nad inkumbentami zarysowuje się luka poznawcza, którą autorka pragnie zapełnić swoimi badaniami przyczynkowymi.

Cel pracy

Celem pracy jest odpowiedź na pytanie: kim są wielokadencyjni politycy w polskim Sejmie oraz przedstawienie wybranych elementów kariery politycznej inkumbenta. Zakładając, że wyniki wyborów parlamentarnych odzwierciedlają zaufanie społeczeństwa, zidentyfikowane zostaną cechy, jakimi odznaczają się politycy, którzy zostali nim obdarzeni przez wyborców.

Zakłada się, że inkumbenci to grupa osób posiadających zespół wspólnych i odtwarzalnych cech. Rozumie się przez to, że dla przebadanej grupy inkumbentów będzie można wskazać od kilku do kilkunastu wspólnych cech. Kategoria analityczna badana będzie w kilku wymiarach, których związek i poziom stanowi założenie badawcze pracy, a jest to wysoka stabilność przynależności politycznej, wysoki poziom aktywności politycznej, stałość kandydowania i reprezentowania okręgu wybor-

czego. Wydaje się również, że inkumbenci charakteryzują się zestawem czterech odtwarzalnych danych socjodemograficznych, rozumianych jako płeć męska, pozostawanie w związku małżeńskim, bycie osobą wykształconą oraz pochodząca z dużego miasta. *Nota bene*, cechy te są charakterystyczne dla osób przynależących do elit politycznych.

Oprócz charakterystycznych dla wszystkich cech można wyodrębnić także determinanty drugiego planu. Nie będą one definiować całej grupy, ale będą pokazywać jej różnorodność. W tym kontekście zastanawiające jest, czy pewne cechy wspólne odnaleźć można także w obrębie konkretnych grup inkumbentów.

Weryfikacja przyjętych założeń implikuje konieczność udzielenia odpowiedzi na trzy zasadnicze pytania badawcze:

- 1) Jakimi cechami socjodemograficznymi charakteryzują się osoby inkumbentów?
- 2) Czy można wskazać wspólne powtarzalne elementy kariery politycznej inkumbentów?
- 3) Czy któraś z wymienionych kategorii badawczych (cechy personalne i systemowe) w największym stopniu definiuje inkumbenta?

Metoda badawcza

Na wstępie należy zaznaczyć, że badanie ma charakter przyczynkowy, a wnioski z niego płynące będą charakteryzować tylko i wyłącznie tę grupę badawczą. Mając świadomość ograniczonego materiału badawczego, autorka poza zakresem zainteresowań pozostawia zatem analizę porównawczą względem innych polityków. Niewątpliwie badania komparatystyczne mają niekwestionowanie większy walor poznawczy, jednakże opisane w niniejszym artykule badania w zamyśle swym stanowią wstępny element szerszej całości analizy polskich inkumbentów politycznych.

W tej pracy analizie zostały poddane kariery polityczne 39 polityków wybranych celowo. Podstawowym kryterium doboru było pełnienie funkcji posła pięć, sześć lub siedem razy w latach 1991-2015. Próbę wybrano spośród posłów, którzy sprawowali mandat podczas VII kadencji Sejmu i/lub pełnili ważną funkcję w państwie (Prezydent RP, Prezes Rady Ministrów)¹⁴.

Materiałem badawczym są sylwetki wskazanych w poniższej tabeli posłów oraz ich kariery polityczne. Jednostką analizy jest inkumbent. Stanowi on indywidualną postać podlegającą badaniom według autorskiego klucza kategoryzacyjnego.

Tabela 1. Inkumbenci w polskim Sejmie pod względem liczby pełnionych kadencji.

7 kadencji	6 kadencji	5 kadencji
Iwiński Tadeusz	Bury Jan	Ajchler Romuald
Kalemba Stanisław	Kaczyński Jarosław	Budnik Jerzy
Łybacka Krystyna	Komorowski Bronisław	Czykwini Eugeniusz
Pawlak Waldemar	Pawlak Mirosław	Dorn Ludwik
Stefaniuk Jerzy	Sawicki Marek	Graś Paweł
Śledzińska-Katarasińska Iwona	Tomaszewski Tadeusz	Jarmuziewicz Tadeusz
Zych Józef	Ujazdowski Kazimierz Michał	Jurgiel Krzysztof
Żelichowski Stanisław	Wenderlich Jerzy	Kasprzak Mieczysław
	Zbrzyzny Ryszard	Lipiński Adam
	Rzymiełka Jan	Macierewicz Antoni
		Miller Leszek
		Piechociński Janusz
		Polaczek Jerzy
		Radziszewska Elżbieta
		Schetyna Grzegorz
		Sobecka Anna
		Szejnfeld Adam
		Tchórzewski Krzysztof
		Tusk Donald
		Zaborowski Zbigniew
		Smirnow Andrzej

Źródło: opracowanie własne.

¹⁴ Dla przykładu, Bronisław Komorowski sześciokrotnie wygrał wybory parlamentarne, a następnie wybrany został na Prezydenta RP.

Autorka pracy odchodzi od badań kampanii wyborczych oraz przekazów medialnych na rzecz identyfikacji cech posłów, którzy osiągnęli długoletni sukces parlamentarny. Stworzone kategorie badawcze zostały podzielone na dwie części. Pierwsza z nich to analiza cech personalnych, w której znajdują się informacje dotyczące prywatnego życia polityków. W tej części wyróżniono pięć mniejszych kategorii: stan cywilny, wiek w momencie obejmowania stanowiska posła po raz pierwszy, miejsce pochodzenia, wykształcenie oraz zawód. Druga część badań to analiza cech systemowych, w której wyróżniono pięć elementów: przynależność partyjną, okręg wyborczy, listę wyborczą, wyniki wyborów oraz funkcje sprawowane w karierze politycznej. Wymienione wyżej kategorie badawcze posłużyły do przeprowadzenia analizy identyfikacyjnej wybranych elementów kariery politycznej inkumbenta.

W analizie zebranego materiału badawczego zastosowane zostały przede wszystkim metody ilościowe. Taka forma pozwoliła na uzyskanie przejrzystego schematu cech inkumbenta.

Jako metodę badania stopnia aktywności posłów wybrano rangowanie. Rangowanie odbywało się w podziale na trzy poziomy: makro, mezo i mikro. Poziom makro obejmował wszystkie funkcje pełnione na arenie międzynarodowej. Inkumbenci obejmują przede wszystkim stanowiska w organach Unii Europejskiej. Do tej kategorii zaliczone zostały również funkcje sprawowane w Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej oraz Delegacji Sejmu i Senatu do Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego Rady Europy. Na poziomie mezo wyróżnione są stanowiska obejmowane w państwie. Zaliczono do nich funkcje w Sejmie RP, rządzie, a także na szczeblach samorządowych. Poziom mikro to stanowiska obejmowane przez badanych na poziomie partyjnym. Za każdą pełnioną funkcję w danym obszarze posłowie mogli otrzymać od 1 do 3 pkt, w zależności od ważności obejmowanego stanowiska (np. na poziomie mezo punktacja mogła wyglądać w następujący sposób: Prezes Rady Ministrów – 3 pkt, Minister – 2 pkt, Przewodniczący Komisji Sejmowej – 1 pkt).

Zapewne nie wszystkie funkcje, jakie pełnili posłowie, zostały uwzględnione.

W najwyższym stopniu problem ten występuje w przypadku funkcji pełnionych w partii. Wynikać to może z niepodania obsadzanych stanowisk do publicznej wiadomości. Można założyć, że informacja, która nie została udostępniona, ma śladowe znaczenie z punktu widzenia wyborcy oraz nie ma wpływu na podejmowane przez niego decyzje.

Analiza danych

Cechy socjodemograficzne inkumbentów

Wśród 39 inkumbentów są tylko 4 kobiety. Niska ich liczba może wynikać z faktu, że parytet płci został wprowadzony dopiero przy zmianie Kodeksu wyborczego w 2011 roku¹⁵. Inkumbenci to osoby posiadające małżonka. Wśród nich znajduje się tylko jeden kawaler – Jarosław Kaczyński.

Badani posłowie rozpoczynali pracę w Sejmie najczęściej w wieku 35-49 lat. Jako że mandat posła można sprawować od 21. roku życia, nasuwa się wniosek, że sejmowa kariera inkumbentów zaczynała się w dojrzałym wieku. Inkumbentem, który jako najmłodszy objął stanowisko posła, był Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski (29 lat).

Prawie połowa badanych posłów (41%) pochodzi ze wsi. Może to dowodzić, że społeczeństwo w Sejmie reprezentują nie tylko osobistości z dużych miast, ale także ludzie z mniejszych miejscowości, przypuszczalnie znający życie i realia osób mieszkających poza metropoliami. Jak wynika z badań, największym zaufaniem wyborcy darzą inkumbentów pochodzących ze wsi oraz z miast o liczbie ludności do 50 tys. mieszkańców.

¹⁵ A. Dudek, *Historia polityczna Polski 1989-2015*, Kraków 2016, s. 640.

Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że wykształcenie jest istotną kwestią dla inkumbentów. Aż 75% badanych posiada przynajmniej tytuł magistra. Wśród inkumbentów znajduje się siedmiu doktorów, jeden doktor habilitowany. Szesnastu badanych studiowało nauki społeczne, do których zaliczane są m.in. politologia i prawo¹⁶. Jako że bycie parlamentarzystą jest „zawodem” inkumbentów przynajmniej od pięciu kadencji, wybrany kierunek nauki wydaje się być odpowiednim. Zanim politycy zostali posłami byli czynni zawodowo. W 26 na 39 przypadków wykonywana przez nich praca była zgodna z uzyskanym wykształceniem.

Kariera polityczna inkumbentów

Analizie poddana została kariera polityczna wybranych polityków wielokadencyjnych. Na koniec VII kadencji Sejmu wśród inkumbentów znajdowało się 10 polityków należących do Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego (PSL), 9 do Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej, 9 posłów z Platformy Obywatelskiej, 9 będących członkami Prawa i Sprawiedliwości oraz 2 nienależących do żadnej partii politycznej w momencie przeprowadzania analizy¹⁷.

Wśród 8 posłów, którzy najdłużej zasiadają w polskim Sejmie, 5 z nich należy do Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego i w wyborach parlamentarnych w latach 1991-2015 startowało z listy wyborczej tego ugrupowania. Dwoje z inkumbentów od początku swojej kariery parlamentarnej związanych jest z Sojuszem Lewicy Demokratycznej. Tylko jedna osoba (Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska) jest przedstawicielką prawicy. W latach 1991 i 1993 startowała z listy wyborczej Unii Demokratycznej,

¹⁶ Sześć obszarów nauki zostało wyróżnionych przez OECD/EUROSTAT/UNESCO. Uchwałą nr 430/2009 Rady Głównej Szkolnictwa Wyższego z dnia 14.05.2009 r. dodano dodatkowy obszar sztuki. W rankingach kierunków studiów często pojawia się także kierunek określany mianem: „nauki ścisłe”, który na potrzeby tej pracy został zakwalifikowany jako ósmy obszar kształcenia wyższego.

¹⁷ Ludwik Dorn deklarował się jako poseł niezrzeszony, jednak przez dłuższą część swojej politycznej kariery należał do PiS. Posłem niezrzeszonym został również Jerzy Budnik, który pod koniec VII kadencji wystąpił z PO, do której należał od 2001 r.

w 1997 r. Unii Wolności, a od 2001 r. na stałe związana jest z Platformą Obywatelską¹⁸.

Badanych posłów cechuje wysoka stabilność przynależności politycznej. Inkumbenci, którzy byli członkami ugrupowań postsolidarnościowych, pod koniec VII kadencji Sejmu należeli do partii o charakterze prawicowym. Zmiany przynależności partyjnej do 2001 r. wiążą się zazwyczaj z tworzeniem nowych ugrupowań, koalicjami i wcielaniem jednych partii do drugih¹⁹.

Najwierniejsi swojej partii są posłowie PSL. Przywiązanie do tradycji i niechęć do zmian widać chociażby na podstawie zmian ugrupowań partyjnych, a właściwie ich braku. Wydawać się może, że wśród badanych inkumbentów panuje przekonanie, że przynależność do PSL jest „na całe życie”.

Posłowie z SLD również są przywiązani do swojego ugrupowania. Większość inkumbentów z lewicy należała wcześniej do Socjaldemokracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, a następnie zasilili szeregi Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej.

Z wyjątkiem PSL, którego posłowie nie zmieniali partyjnej przynależności, w pozostałych ugrupowaniach zawsze znalazł się ktoś, kto chociaż na chwilę wystąpił ze swojej partii. W PiS taką osobą jest Ludwik Dorn, który razem z braćmi Kaczyńskimi zakładał tę partię²⁰. Następnie odszedł do założonego przez siebie ugrupowania, ale po krótkim czasie znowu wrócił do PIS. Aktualnie deklaruje się jako poseł niezrzeszony, choć w Sejmie zazwyczaj siedział w bliskim sąsiedztwie polityków Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Jako poseł niezrzeszony pod koniec VII kadencji Sejmu deklarował się również Jerzy Budnik. We wrześniu 2015 r., po 14 latach, wystąpił z Platformy Obywatelskiej. Wśród badanych polityków pojawiła się jedna osoba, która zmieniła partię na opozycyjną. Mowa tutaj o pośle Andrzeju Smirnowie, który

¹⁸ <http://sledzinska-katarasinska.pl/o-mnie>, 25.06.2018.

¹⁹ A. Dudek, *dz. cyt.*, s. 427 i n.

²⁰ *Trzeci bliźniak na listach PO*, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/trzeci-blizniak-na-listach-po-6034074476843649g/3>, 15.03.2018.

w 2014 r. wystąpił z PO, a w marcu 2015 r. oficjalnie wstąpił do Prawa i Sprawiedliwości²¹. W SLD osobą, która postanowiła zmienić ugrupowanie, był Leszek Miller. Efektem odejścia było stworzenie nowej partii politycznej, czego skutkiem było nieotrzymanie mandatu posła.

Inkumbenci to osoby wierne nie tylko swoim preferencjom wyborczym, ale także związane z miejscem pochodzenia. 20 na 37 było wybieranych niezmiennie z tego samego okręgu wyborczego. Pozostali posłowie nie zmienili okręgu więcej niż trzykrotnie. Taki stan rzeczy mógł wiązać się ze zmianą miejsca zamieszkania celem intensywniejszego rozwoju dotychczasowej kariery politycznej (np. w związku z pełnieniem ważnych funkcji w państwie lub rządzie, wymagających przeniesienia się do stolicy). Zdarzało się również, że politycy, którzy zmienili okręgi wyborcze, często pozostawali w obrębie jednego województwa.


Partie polityczne do wyborów w 2001 r. można podzielić na postkomunistyczne i postsolidarnościowe oraz inne (np. PSL), natomiast od wyborów w 2001 r. trafniejsze zastosowanie ma podział na lewicę i prawicę. Stosując powyższe rozróżnienie, można stwierdzić, że posłowie, którzy podczas pierwszych wyborów opowiedzieli się za jedną z wyżej wymienionych preferencji, zostali jej wierni. Żaden z posłów do 2001 r. nie zmienił strony politycznej. Politycy, którzy startowali z list wyborczych Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej i Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego, nie zmienili nawet partii politycznych. Pozostali posłowie zmieniali ugrupowania, jednak było to wynikiem wcielania jednych partii do innych i tworzenia nowych ugrupowań politycznych.

Trzymając się powyższego rozróżnienia partii, analiza list wyborczych inkumbentów została oparta na podziale na lata 1991-2001 i 2001-2015. W pierwszym przypadku najwięcej posłów startowało z list ugrupowań postsolidarnościowych.

²¹ Poseł Andrzej Smirnow przeszedł do klubu PiS, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1187640-Posel-Andrzej-Smirnow-przeszedl-do-klubu-PiS.html>, 19.03.2015.

Takie partie wybrało 20 z nich. Kolejna co do wielkości grupa badanych opowiada się za partiami zdefiniowanymi jako „inne” (10 postów startowało z listy Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego, a jedna osoba z Komitetu Wyborczego Prawosławnych). Najmniej liczną grupę stanowią badani, którzy znaleźli się na listach partii postkomunistycznych (8 osób).

Wykres 1. Listy wyborcze inkumbentów w latach 1991-2001.



Źródło: opracowanie własne.


Jak wspomniano wcześniej, rok 2001 można uznać za istotny pod względem zmiany nomenklatury dotyczącej analizy polskiej sceny politycznej. Od tego momentu większe zastosowanie ma różnicowanie partii wedle klasycznego ujęcia prawica vs. lewica. Inkumbenci nadal nie zrezygnowali z dotychczasowych wyborczych przynależności politycznych. Zmianom uległa jedynie struktura sceny politycznej, ponieważ przed wyborami w 2001 r. powstały dwie silne partie polityczne – Platforma Obywatelska oraz Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Obie partie są prawicowe, a politycy, którzy do nich należą, przed ich utworzeniem byli często w szeregach tych samych ugrupowań. Na 39 badanych 30 z nich od 2001 r. startowało w wyborach parlamentarnych z list tego samego ugrupowania. 9 wyjątków to posłowie należący do SLD.

W związku ze słabnącym poparciem władze partii zdecydowały się przed wyborami w 2007 r. na utworzenie koalicji – Lewica i Demokraci – ugrupowania politycznego stworzonego w celu alternatywy dla silnej centroprawicy. W skład tej koalicji weszli członkowie SLD wraz z przedstawicielami Unii Pracy, Partii Demokratycznej – demokraci.pl i Socjaldemokracji Polskiej²². Liczba mandatów, które otrzymała LiD, nie była wysoka (53).

Wśród badanych inkumbentów tylko dwoje zmieniło listę wyborczą podczas ostatnich czterech kadencji Sejmu. Byli to Anna Sobecka i Antoni Macierewicz, którzy zamienili Ligę Polskich Rodzin (2001-2005) na Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (2007-2011).

Wyniki analizy list wyborczych w latach 2001-2015 niewiele różnią się od tych w latach 1991-2001. Ponad połowa badanych, którzy startowali w wyborach z list partii postsolidarnościowych, w obecnym rozróżnieniu zasiłowała szeregi partii określanych jako prawicowe. Lewica reprezentowana jest przez 23%, czyli 9 osób. Partia centrowa to PSL, z list którego startowało 10 posłów.

Wykres 2. Listy wyborcze inkumbentów w latach 2001-2015.



Źródło: opracowanie własne.

²² A. Dudek, *dz. cyt.*, s. 595 i n.

W przypadku obydwu podziałów aż 51% inkumbentów startowało w wyborach z ugrupowań postsolidarnościowych (podział obowiązujący do 2001 r.) i prawicowych.

Zdarzało się, że partie polityczne zawiązywały między sobą koalicje, licząc na wyższy wynik w wyborach parlamentarnych²³. Część inkumbentów należąca w 1997 r. do takich partii jak Porozumienie Centrum czy Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe, brała udział w wyborach z ramienia AWS. Wyjątkiem okazał się wtedy Jarosław Kaczyński, który opuścił partyjnych kolegów i wystartował z listy Ruchu Odbudowy Polski.

Inkumbenci to przede wszystkim liderzy w swoich ugrupowaniach. Na listach wyborczych najczęściej zajmowali pierwsze trzy miejsca. Wśród badanych posłów dziewięciu z nich w każdych kolejnych wyborach zajmowało pierwsze miejsce na liście wyborczej. Są wśród nich znani polityczni liderzy, np. Donald Tusk, Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller i Janusz Piechociński. Jarosław Kaczyński tylko raz zajmował drugie miejsce na liście wyborczej. Z przeprowadzonej analizy wynika, że na wysokich miejscach na listach umieszczani są politycy rozpoznawalni, którzy piastowali ważne funkcje w państwie lub w partii.

Liczba głosów uzyskanych przez inkumbentów w wyborach parlamentarnych może zależeć od frekwencji w danych wyborach. Analizując liczbę głosów każdego badanego polityka, zobrazowano jego poparcie na tle całej Polski oraz komitetu wyborczego, z którego brał udział w wyborach (zob. Tabela 2 oraz Tabela 3).

Tabela 2. Wyniki wyborów parlamentarnych – procent ze wszystkich ważnie oddanych głosów w obrębie danego komitetu wyborczego.

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska	0,60%	1,02%	1,99%	0,74%	0,81%	0,43%	0,29%
Tadeusz Iwiński	0,99%	0,81%	1,12%	0,65%	7,32%	0,87%	0,93%

²³ Za przykład może posłużyć koalicja Lewica i Demokraci, która powstała przed wyborami parlamentarnymi w 2007 r.

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
Krystyna Łybacka	0,51%	1,09%	2,39%	1,67%	1,40%	1,15%	1,40%
Stanisław Kalemba	0,76%	0,46%	0,90%	0,57%	0,95%	0,92%	0,88%
Waldemar Pawlak	3,22%	3,66%	2,58%	1,48%	1,61%	1,71%	2,04%
Jerzy Stefaniuk	1,70%	1,00%	1,02%	1,31%	1,01%	0,92%	0,88%
Józef Zych	1,69%	1,05%	1,15%	0,63%	1,16%	1,30%	0,58%
Stanisław Żelichowski	0,58%	0,55%	0,47%	0,32%	0,43%	0,45%	0,54%
Jarosław Kaczyński	5,19%		1,12%	11,67%	5,37%	5,28%	4,71%
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski	0,13%		0,27%	2,09%	1,47%	1,42%	0,61%
Tadeusz Tomaszewski		0,63%	0,57%	0,41%	0,91%	1,12%	0,95%
Jerzy Wenderlich		0,36%	1,08%	0,98%	0,81%	0,56%	1,61%
Ryszard Zbrzyzny		0,68%	0,62%	0,37%	0,72%	0,52%	1,01%
Jan Bury	0,33%	0,66%		0,84%	1,47%	1,49%	1,30%
Mirosław Pawlak		2,06%	0,85%	0,51%	0,81%	0,97%	0,53%
Marek Sawicki		0,24%	0,91%	0,56%	0,79%	0,76%	1,99%
Bronisław Komorowski	0,41%	0,59%	0,46%	8,44%	1,48%	2,08%	
Jan Rzymetka	1,62%		0,13%	0,50%	0,31%	0,13%	0,14%
Jerzy Budnik			0,32%	0,34%	0,29%	0,19%	0,15%
Paweł Graś			0,15%	0,49%	0,42%	0,53%	0,66%
Tadeusz Jarmuziewicz			0,38%	0,32%	0,34%	0,28%	0,25%
Elżbieta Radziszewska			0,35%	0,40%	0,57%	0,50%	0,34%
Grzegorz Schetyna			0,74%	0,29%	0,53%	0,81%	1,20%
Adam Szejnfeld			0,35%	0,56%	0,93%	0,86%	0,81%
Donald Tusk	4,62%			3,39%	2,78%	7,97%	6,66%
Krzysztof Jurgiel			1,24%	1,16%	1,35%	0,54%	0,83%
Adam Lipiński	1,59%			0,64%	0,56%	0,62%	0,59%
Jerzy Polaczek			0,15%	1,51%	1,23%	1,08%	0,52%
Anna Elżbieta Sobecka			0,26%	1,80%	1,46%	0,29%	0,16%
Krzysztof Tchórzewski	1,02%		0,14%		0,27%	0,43%	0,53%
Antoni Macierewicz	2,55%		2,09%	2,43%		0,77%	0,97%

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
Romuald Ajchler		0,13%	0,09%	0,27%		0,65%	0,81%
Eugeniusz Czykwin	74,1%			0,22%	1,06%	0,67%	1,21%
Leszek Miller	3,71%	3,00%	3,51%	2,73%			1,52%
Zbigniew Zaborowski		0,37%	0,78%	0,16%	0,95%		0,80%
Mieczysław Kasprzak		0,34%		0,46%	0,95%	0,72%	0,57%
Janusz Piechociński	0,37%	0,47%		0,62%		0,92%	0,97%
Ludwik Dorn			0,02%	1,41%	1,25%	1,58%	0,43%
Andrzej Smirnow	0,80%		0,45%		0,36%	0,16%	0,13%

Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Tabela 3. Wyniki wyborów parlamentarnych – procent ze wszystkich ważnie oddanych głosów.

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska	0,074%	0,108%	0,267%	0,093%	0,196%	0,177%	0,113%
Tadeusz Iwiński	0,119%	0,166%	0,303%	0,268%	0,828%	0,114%	0,077%
Krystyna Łybacka	0,062%	0,222%	0,648%	0,686%	0,158%	0,151%	0,116%
Stanisław Kalemba	0,066%	0,070%	0,066%	0,051%	0,066%	0,082%	0,074%
Waldemar Pawlak	0,279%	0,564%	0,189%	0,133%	0,112%	0,153%	0,170%
Jerzy Stefaniuk	0,147%	0,154%	0,075%	0,118%	0,071%	0,082%	0,073%
Józef Zych	0,146%	0,162%	0,084%	0,057%	0,081%	0,115%	0,048%
Stanisław Żelichowski	0,051%	0,085%	0,035%	0,029%	0,030%	0,040%	0,045%
Jarosław Kaczyński	0,452%		0,062%	1,109%	1,450%	1,695%	1,408%
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski	0,016%		0,093%	0,199%	0,396%	0,455%	0,182%
Tadeusz Tomaszewski		0,128%	0,155%	0,169%	0,103%	0,147%	0,078%
Jerzy Wenderlich		0,073%	0,293%	0,402%	0,091%	0,073%	0,133%
Ryszard Zbrzyzny		0,139%	0,169%	0,151%	0,082%	0,068%	0,083%
Jan Bury	0,029%	0,102%	0,000%	0,076%	0,102%	0,133%	0,109%
Mirosław Pawlak		0,317%	0,062%	0,046%	0,057%	0,087%	0,044%
Marek Sawicki		0,037%	0,067%	0,050%	0,055%	0,068%	0,166%
Bronisław Komorowski	0,050%	0,062%	0,155%	1,070%	0,357%	0,863%	0,000%
Jan Rzymetka	0,121%		0,017%	0,063%	0,075%	0,055%	0,054%

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska	0,074%	0,108%	0,267%	0,093%	0,196%	0,177%	0,113%
Tadeusz Iwiński	0,119%	0,166%	0,303%	0,268%	0,828%	0,114%	0,077%
Jerzy Budnik			0,109%	0,043%	0,071%	0,080%	0,059%
Paweł Graś			0,052%	0,062%	0,101%	0,222%	0,257%
Tadeusz Jarmuziewicz			0,051%	0,041%	0,082%	0,114%	0,098%
Elżbieta Radziszewska			0,047%	0,051%	0,137%	0,207%	0,134%
Grzegorz Schetyna			0,099%	0,037%	0,127%	0,337%	0,471%
Adam Szejnfeld			0,046%	0,071%	0,225%	0,355%	0,318%
Donald Tusk	0,346%			0,431%	0,671%	3,310%	2,609%
Krzysztof Jurgiel			0,421%	0,110%	0,364%	0,175%	0,249%
Adam Lipiński	0,139%			0,061%	0,151%	0,200%	0,178%
Jerzy Polaczek			0,051%	0,143%	0,333%	0,347%	0,155%
Anna Elżbieta Sobecka			0,089%	0,142%	0,117%	0,094%	0,049%
Krzysztof Tchórzewski	0,089%		0,048%		0,072%	0,139%	0,159%
Antoni Macierewicz	0,223%		0,116%	0,191%		0,248%	0,291%
Romuald Ajchler		0,026%	0,024%	0,111%		0,085%	0,067%
Eugeniusz Czykwin	0,091%			0,091%	0,120%	0,088%	0,099%
Leszek Miller	0,445%	0,611%	0,952%	1,119%			0,125%
Zbigniew Zaborowski		0,076%	0,212%	0,065%	0,107%		0,066%
Mieczysław Kasprzak		0,052%		0,041%	0,066%	0,064%	0,048%
Janusz Piechociński	0,032%	0,072%		0,055%		0,082%	0,081%
Ludwik Dorn			0,008%	0,134%	0,338%	0,506%	0,130%
Andrzej Smirnow	0,040%		0,152%	0,000%	0,087%	0,065%	0,049%

Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Z opracowanego materiału wynika, że największe poparcie mają posłowie, którzy pełnią istotne funkcje w partii (np. prezes) oraz w państwie (np. premier, minister). Najwięcej głosów na tle wszystkich inkumbentów otrzymali Jarosław Kaczyński, Donald Tusk, Leszek Miller. Liczba głosów liderów PSL – Waldemara Pawłaka i Janusza

Piechocińskiego nie wskazuje, że są oni ulubieńcami wyborców. Mimo to Waldemar Pawlak od pierwszej kadencji utrzymywał swoje stanowisko w Sejmie²⁴. Podobnie wyniki prezentują się w przypadku innych ugrupowań. Wysoką liczbę głosów otrzymywał zazwyczaj prezes partii. Wyniki inkumbentów uzyskane w wyborach parlamentarnych w latach 1991-2015 nie przekraczają 11%²⁵. Wyjątkowym przypadkiem jest tutaj Eugeniusz Czykwin. Jego poparcie w 1991 r. wynosi aż 74,15%²⁶! Ciekawe zjawisko można zaobserwować w przypadku Mirosława Pawlaka. Jego poparcie utrzymuje się na dość niskim poziomie. Największą liczbę głosów, która znacząco odstaje od wyników uzyskanych w kolejnych wyborach, otrzymał w 1993 r., kiedy po raz pierwszy startował do Sejmu RP. Wydaje się, że może to być zasługą znanego nazwiska, identycznego jak byłego prezesa PSL²⁷.

Nie wszyscy inkumbenci sprawowali swój mandat nieprzerwanie. Analiza zgromadzonego materiału badawczego pozwoliła zauważyć, że przerwa w sprawowaniu mandatu jest niekorzystna dla inkumbenta i skutkuje uzyskaniem mniejszej liczby głosów w kolejnych wyborach.

Aktywność polityczna inkumbentów

Uczestnictwo w obradach Sejmu to tylko część pracy inkumbentów. Badani posłowie w swojej politycznej karierze pełnią wiele dodatkowych funkcji. Obejmują one prace zarówno podczas sprawowania mandatu, jak i w przerwach między kaden-

²⁴ Zmiana w przypadku W. Pawlaka nastąpiła w wyborach parlamentarnych w 2015 r. Polityk nie uzyskał wówczas mandatu parlamentarzysty po raz pierwszy od 1985 r.

²⁵ Procent policzony został dla jednego kandydata ze wszystkich ważnych głosów oddanych na komitet wyborczy, z którego startował dany inkumbent.

²⁶ Wysokie procentowe poparcie posła w obrębie swojej listy jest konsekwencją ordynacji wyborczej, która obowiązywała w wyborach do Sejmu w 1991 r. i braku progów, a także niską liczbą kandydatów w Komitecie Wyborczym Prawosławnych.

²⁷ Na efekt „znanego nazwiska” uwagę zwrócono w dysertacji D. Kasproicz, K. Marcinkiewicz, R. Marzęcki, *Kapitał wyborczy w polskiej polityce...*, op. cit., s. 281 i n.

cjami. Pełnione funkcje to m.in.: prace w komisjach sejmowych, stanowiska w Sejmie RP (np. marszałek Sejmu – Bronisław Komorowski, Józef Zych) albo w Radzie Ministrów (np. prezesowie rady Ministrów – Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller, Jarosław Kaczyński, Donald Tusk). Dodatkowo inkumbenci obejmują stanowiska w partiach politycznych, do których należą (najbardziej prestiżowe stanowisko to prezes partii, którymi byli m.in. Waldemar Pawlak, Janusz Piechociński, Leszek Miller, Donald Tusk, Jarosław Kaczyński). Odkąd w 2004 r. Polska weszła do Unii Europejskiej, politycy sprawują także funkcje w Parlamencie Europejskim oraz innych instytucjach w Europie (np. Przewodniczący Rady Europejskiej: Donald Tusk, eurodeputowani: Tadeusz Iwiński, Krystyna Łybacka, Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski, Jerzy Wenderlich, Adam Szejnfeld, Zbigniew Zaborowski). Badani inkumbenci w przerwach między kadencjami obejmowali stanowiska w innych instytucjach publicznych, takich jak: Trybunał Stanu, Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Senat oraz na szczeblach samorządowych.

Tabela 4. Aktywność inkumbentów w życiu politycznym (z podziałem na obszary).

Lp.	Inkumbent	Makro	Mezo	Mikro
7 kadencji				
1.	Iwona Śledzińska-Katarasińska	0	6	3
2.	Tadeusz Iwiński	3	1	10
3.	Krystyna Łybacka	2	3	4
4.	Stanisław Kalemba	0	3	8
5.	Waldemar Pawlak	0	14	3
6.	Franciszek Jerzy Stefaniuk	0	4	6
7.	Józef Zych	0	11	10
8.	Stanisław Żelichowski	0	10	12
6 kadencji				
1.	Jarosław Kaczyński	0	12	10
2.	Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski	2	6	8
3.	Tadeusz Tomaszewski	0	6	7
4.	Jerzy Wenderlich	5	2	7
5.	Ryszard Zbrzyzny	0	2	2
6.	Jan Bury	0	5	5
7.	Mirosław Pawlak	0	3	3

8.	Marek Sawicki	0	12	8
9.	Bronisław Komorowski	0	11	10
10.	Jan Rzymek	1	5	0
5 kadencji				
1.	Jerzy Budnik	0	5	2
2.	Paweł Graś	2	7	7
3.	Tadeusz Jarmuziewicz	0	4	5
4.	Elżbieta Radziszewska	0	5	0
5.	Grzegorz Schetyna	0	13	12
6.	Adam Szejnfeld	2	8	0
7.	Donald Tusk	3	12	7
8.	Krzysztof Jurgiel	0	14	6
9.	Adam Lipiński	0	4	11
10.	Jerzy Polaczek	0	8	6
11.	Anna Elżbieta Sobecka	0	2	0
12.	Krzysztof Tchórzewski	0	7	2
13.	Antoni Macierewicz	0	5	2
14.	Romuald Ajchler	0	1	4
15.	Eugeniusz Czykwin	0	1	5
16.	Leszek Miller	1	12	15
17.	Zbigniew Zaborowski	3	3	7
18.	Mieczysław Kasprzak	0	8	8
19.	Janusz Piechociński	0	7	7
20.	Ludwik Dorn	0	13	6
21.	Andrzej Smirnow	0	2	1

Źródło: opracowanie własne.


Piastowanie przez inkumbentów różnych stanowisk w Sejmie i poza nim niewątpliwie wpływa na poziom ich aktywności w życiu politycznym. Powyżej zaprezentowano tabelę, w której za pomocą rang określono poziom aktywności posłów w latach 1991-2015 w trzech obszarach: mikro, czyli partyjnym, mezo, czyli państwowym oraz makro, czyli międzynarodowym.

Na płaszczyźnie makro aktywnych było jedynie 9 posłów. W obszarze mezo najbardziej aktywni są posłowie, którzy w Sejmie są nieprzerwanie od 1991 r. Może wynikać to z faktu, że w odniesieniu do pozostałych inkumbentów mieli najwięcej czasu i możliwości na objęcie stanowisk. Wśród aktywnych posłów znajdują się premierzy oraz ministrowie. Najwięcej rang na płaszczyźnie mikro otrzymali przede

wszystkim prezesi partii oraz posłowie pełniący w niej ważne i wysoko cenione funkcje.


Wśród inkumbentów znalazło się czterech premierów, prezydent RP i wielu ministrów. Warto zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że wysoki poziom aktywności niekoniecznie oznacza obejmowanie istotnych stanowisk w państwie albo w partii. Dużą liczbę rang zdobyli posłowie pełniący mniej znaczące funkcje, ale często zmieniający stanowiska.

Wykres 3. Aktywność 7-kadencyjnych inkumbentów w życiu politycznym (ogólna klasyfikacja).




Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Wykres 4. Aktywność 6-kadencyjnych inkumbentów w życiu politycznym (ogólna klasyfikacja).



Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Wykres 5. Aktywność 5-kadencyjnych inkumbentów w życiu politycznym (ogólna klasyfikacja).



Źródło: opracowanie własne.

Na podstawie analizy zgromadzonego materiału stworzono skalę aktywności inkumbentów w życiu politycznym. Rozciąga się ona od 2 (najmniej aktywny poseł) do 28 (najbardziej aktywny poseł) punktów. Wśród badanych polityków nie ma żadnego, którego poziom aktywności wynosiłby 0. W czołówce znajdują się byli Prezesi Rady Ministrów, Prezydenci, Marszałkowie Sejmu, ministrowie i liderzy partyjni. Waldemar Pawlak, jako były Prezes PSL i Prezes Rady Ministrów, nie wypadł najlepiej na tle inkumbentów pełniących podobne funkcje.

Zakończenie

Celem niniejszego artykułu była identyfikacja elementów kariery politycznej inkumbenta – polityka z długoletnim stażem parlamentarnym. Zaufanie, jakim regularnie obdarzani są wybrani politycy, wydaje się być tak silne, że niektórzy z nich od kilkunastu lat są wybierani na to samo stanowisko. Taka sytuacja ma miejsce między innymi w Sejmie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Od 1991 r., czyli od daty pierwszych całkowicie wolnych wyborów parlamentarnych, 39 posłów pełniło mandat więcej niż czterokrotnie.

Odpowiadając na pytania badawcze, można wskazać, że badani inkumbenci charakteryzują się wspólnymi cechami socjodemograficznymi. Cechami pierwszoplanowymi są: płeć męska, pozostawanie w związku małżeńskim, posiadanie wyższego wykształcenia oraz pochodzenie ze wsi lub miast do 50 tys. mieszkańców. Pierwsze trzy wskaźniki mogą charakteryzować osoby przynależące do elit politycznych. Wśród danych socjometrycznych wyróżniono także dominanty drugiego planu. Należą do nich wiek, w jakim rozpoczęli pracę w Sejmie RP, oraz zgodność wykonywanego zawodu z wykształceniem. Warto wskazać, że większość inkumbentów rozpoczęła karierę poselską w przedziale wiekowym 35-49 lat. Mandat poselski można sprawować od 21. roku życia. Nasuwa się zatem wniosek, że analizowani posłowie zaczęli karierę parlamentarną w dojrzałym wieku.

Wbrew początkowym przypuszczeniom nie da się wskazać wspólnych powtarzalnych elementów kariery politycznej dla wszystkich inkumbentów. Choć wyodrębnione w artykule pewne cechy uznaje się za wspólne dla badanej grupy, nie ma możliwości pokazania między nimi istotnych zależności. Nawet jeśli za istotną cechę wynikającą z analizy kariery politycznej posłów uzna się np. niski poziom fluktuacji poglądów, to dalej nie ma możliwości wskazania odpowiadających temu danych socjodemograficznych. Jeśli wiodąca jest przynależność do partii postsolidarnościowych i prawicowych, to nie da się określić, że ich politycy są najbardziej aktywni. Jak wskazano wyżej, prawie połowa posłów pochodzi ze wsi, jednak sam fakt nie determinuje lokalizacji posła na politycznej mapie podziału lewica vs. prawica.

Wedle oceny autorki badanych inkumbentów w największym stopniu definiuje stałość poglądów politycznych. W przypadku PSL każdy inkumbent stale i nieprzerwanie należy do tego ugrupowania. Zmiany w innych partiach wiązały się zazwyczaj z tworzeniem nowych oraz istotną zmianą polskiej sceny partyjnej, jaka miała miejsce w 2001 r.

Kolejną istotną kwestią są przeprowadzone badania aktywności politycznej, które mogą nieść ze sobą pewne wątpliwości. Należy stwierdzić, że analiza nie jest miarodajna, ponieważ badano aktywność inkumbentów w różnych przedziałach czasowych. Nawet najaktywniejszy poseł w 1993 r. nie mógł otrzymać punktów za pełnienie funkcji w Unii Europejskiej, ponieważ Polska nie była wtedy jej członkiem. Dodatkowo należy mieć na uwadze, że posłowie o najdłuższym stażu parlamentarnym mogli otrzymać więcej punktów niż politycy wybrani do Sejmu pięcio- lub sześciokrotnie.

Istotną cechą związaną z aktywnością inkumbentów, która zdecydowanie definiuje ich kariery polityczne, jest piastowanie najwyższych stanowisk w państwie. Wśród badanych posłów znajduje się były Prezydent RP – Bronisław Komo-

rowski, czterech Prezesów Rady Ministrów – Waldemar Pawlak, Leszek Miller, Jarosław Kaczyński oraz Donald Tusk, a także piętnastu ministrów. Ich aktywność w obszarze pełnienia władzy na poziomie państwowym jest najwyższa.

Jak wynika z przeprowadzonych badań, posłowie, którzy najdłużej utrzymują się w polskim Sejmie, mają żony, ukończyli studia i są dojrzałymi politykami. Inkumbenci cechują się również wysoką stabilnością przynależności politycznej. Może właśnie dlatego wyborcy przyzwyczaili się do nich i odpowiada im taki przewidywalny układ w parlamencie. Czy taki stan rzeczy wynika z mocno ugruntowanych poglądów, czy raczej z lenistwa elektoratu?

Na powyższe pytanie trudno jednoznacznie odpowiedzieć. Wyniki ostatnich wyborów parlamentarnych wskazują, że społeczeństwo chciało zmiany. W obecnej kadencji Sejmu wskazane wyżej elementy kariery politycznej inkumbenta nie uległy zmianom. Zmianie uległa liczba. Na 39 badanych inkumbentów aktualnie w Sejmie zostało ich tylko 12.

Abstrakt

W artykule autorka poddaje identyfikacji elementy kariery politycznej inkumbenta – czyli polityka z długoletnim stażem parlamentarnym. Celem pracy jest: odpowiedź na pytanie kim są wielokadencyjni politycy w polskim Sejmie oraz przedstawienie elementów kariery politycznej inkumbenta. Badanie objęło siedem pełnych kadencji Sejmu, czyli lata 1991-2015. Identyfikację modelu poprzedza analiza zgromadzonego materiału badawczego, czyli sylwetek i elementów kariery 39 posłów dobranych celowo. Przeprowadzone badanie ma charakter przyczynkowy, a wspomniany model został wskazany przede wszystkim na podstawie ilościowej i porównawczej analizy personalnych oraz instytucjonalnych cech posłów. Opisane w niniejszym artykule badania w zamyśle swym stanowią wstępny element szerszej całości analizy polskich inkumbentów politycznych.

INCUMBENTS IN THE PARLIAMENT – A CONTRIBUTION TO A PROFILE OF THE LONGEST SERVING MEMBER IN THE POLISH PARLIAMENT

Abstract

The author of the article aims to identify a political career of an incumbent – the longest-serving politician. The objective of the present work is to answer the question: who the longest-serving politicians in the Polish Parliament are as well as to present the career path of an incumbent. The time range taken into analysis encompasses seven terms of office of the Polish Parliament, namely the years 1991-2015. The identification of an incumbent is preceded by the analysis of the research material gathered, that is the profiles and the political careers of the 39 MPs chosen individually. The study conducted is of contributive nature and the aforementioned model has been identified on the basis of the quantitative and comparative analysis of the MPs' personal and institutional characteristics. The research described in the present article is intended to provide a preliminary element to the wider analysis of the Polish political incumbents.

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Leadership in Polish Political Parties

Keywords:

personalization of leadership, political parties, strength of party leader

Political activities have always been directed, influenced, or at least represented by individuals¹. However, in modern times we can observe that the phenomenon of personalization of politics has been stronger than it was in the past. Some researchers analysing the personalization of political parties describe this process as manifestation of their presidentialization². The position of party leaders is being strengthened not only within political formations³, but also externally, as voters often perceive parties as being personified by their recognizable leaders⁴. The party leaders also often become a public image of their parties in the media⁵. A common belief about a growing role of the party leaders in politics is also observable in Poland. And it is not an illegitimate assumption. Recently as many as three political

¹ O. Halldén, *Personalization in Historical Descriptions and Explanations*, [in:] "Learning and Instruction", 1998, nr 8 (2), p. 131.

² See: T. Poguntke, P. Webb (eds), *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford 2005; G. Passarelli (ed.), *The Presidentialization of Political Parties: Organizations, Institutions and Leaders*, London 2015.

³ L. Karvonen, *The Personalization of Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*, London 2010.

⁴ A. Renwick, J-B. Pilet, *Faces on the Ballot. The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*, Oxford 2016.

⁵ J-B. Pilet, W. Cross (eds), *The Politics of Party Leadership. A Cross-National Perspective*, Oxford 2016.

groupings have crossed the threshold of representation in their first-ever parliamentary elections, having the surname of their leader as a part of their own name. The first one was the Palikot's Movement in 2011, and in 2015 Ryszard Petru's Modern, and Kukiz'⁶. At the same time two of the main political parties on the Polish political stage, since 2005: Law and Justice and Civic Platform⁷, have also been associated mainly with their leaders.

Personalization of political parties

The concept of personalization of politics means different things to different authors. Laurie Karvonen defines personalization as a phenomenon, when individual actors (politicians, leaders) have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities⁸. Rudy Andeweg and Joop van Holsteyn, analyzing the personalization of voters' behavior, differentiate between first-order and second-order personalization⁹. The first one refers to the growing role of party leaders, the second one to the greater importance of individual candidates in the general election. Meital Balmas and her colleagues write about two types of personalization: centralized and decentralized¹⁰. *Centralized personalization implies that power flows upwards from the group (e.g. political party, cabinet) to a single leader (e.g. party leader, prime minister, president) and decentralized personalization means that*

⁶ Paweł Kukiz is a rock singer who unsuccessfully ran for presidency in 2015. After loosing, he formed a coalition of associations and put up a joint list in the parliamentary elections. Because it is not a political party, but rather a political 'movement' composed of different entities, we did not include it in our research project.

⁷ In the case of Civic Platform this was the case till its leader Donald Tusk took the position of the President of the European Council in 2014 and automatically resigned from the function of the party chairman.

⁸ L. Karvonen, *The Personalization of Politics*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁹ R. Andeweg, J. van Holsteyn, *Second Order Personalization: Preference Voting in the Netherlands*, paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik 2011.

¹⁰ M. Balmas, R. Gideon, T. Sheaffer, S.R. Shenhav, *Two Routes to Personalized Politics: Centralized and Decentralizes Personalization*, [in:] "Party Politics", 2014, nr 1, p. 37-51.

*power flows downwards from the group to individual politicians who are not party or executive leaders (e.g. candidates, members of parliament, ministers)*¹¹.

The literature review on the topic leads to the conclusion that personalization of politics is analysed primarily in three specific areas: institutions (political parties, government), media, and the electoral systems. In the first area, attention is concentrated on institutional mechanisms and rules enhancing the power of individuals within parties and executives¹². In the second area, the scholars who study media personalization examine whether and why individual politicians attract constant media attention rather than political parties, institutions or issues¹³. In the third, the researchers of the voting behaviour and electoral systems point to the way citizens formulate their preferences and vote for personalities instead of parties¹⁴.

Ian McAllister stipulates three consequences of the personalization of politics. *First, political leaders are now important not just for voter conversion, but for mobilization as well, traditionally the major function of the political parties. To the extent that voters respond to the personalities of the leaders (either positively or negatively) their probability of voting will increase. Second, leaders now hold their positions by virtue of a personalized mandate, rather than because of a support base within the party. This means that leaders can appeal to voters over the heads of the party, bypassing party factions and activists. Third, once a leader is popularly*

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 37.

¹² See: T. Poguntke, P. Webb (eds), *The Presidentialization of Politics...* op. cit.

¹³ D. Campus, *Mediatization and Personalization of Politics in Italy and France: The Cases of Berlusconi and Sarkozy*, [in:] "The International Journal of Press/Politics", 2010, nr 15 (2), p. 219-235; P. van Aelst, T. Sheafer, J. Stanyer, *The Personalization of Mediated Political Communication: A Review of Concepts, Operationalizations and Key Findings*, [in:] "Journalism", 2012, nr 13 (2), p. 203-20.

¹⁴ I. McAllister, *The personalization of politics*, [in]: R. Dalton, H-D. Klingemann (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, Oxford 2007, p. 571-588; D. Garzia, *Party and Leader Effects in Parliamentary Elections: Towards a Reassessment*, [in:] "Politics", 2012, nr 32 (3), p. 175-85; A. Renwick, J-B. Pilet, *Faces on the Ballot. The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*, Oxford 2016.

*elected, the personalized mandate that he or she possess will convey considerable policy autonomy, with little or no recourse to the party machinery*¹⁵. Some scholars, like Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda for example, argue that broadening the selectorate to all the party members strengthens the rank-and-files¹⁶, while others, like William Cross and Richard Katz, claim that the grassroots are much more atomized than the activists and middle level party officials, and so it is easier to control them and direct according to the leaders' wishes¹⁷. As a consequence, the power within the party goes from theoretically well-organized, competent, and motivated activists to the grassroots. However, since the members are usually less informed and do not possess comprehensive or sufficient knowledge of complex party intricacies, in reality the power of the leader and the party management increases¹⁸.

The researchers dealing with personalization of politics or the presidentialization of political parties have not reached a consensus whether this phenomenon is universal and empirically proven¹⁹. Not developing this fascinating political science debate further, even without extensive empirical research, it can be stated

¹⁵ I. McAllister, *The personalization of politics*, op. cit., p. 583.

¹⁶ R. Harmel, K. Janda, *An integrated theory of party goals and party change*, [in:] "Journal of Theoretical Politics", 1994, nr 6 (3), p. 259-287; W. Cross, A. Blais, *Who selects the Leader?*, [in:] "Party Politics", 2012, nr 18 (2), p. 127-150.

¹⁷ J.D. May, *Opinion structure of political parties: The special law of curvilinear disparity*, [in:] "Political Studies", 1973, nr 21 (2), p. 135-151; R.S. Katz, P. Mair, *Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party*, [in:] "Party Politics", 1995, nr 1 (1), p. 5-28; R.Y. Hazan, G. Rahat, *Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*, Oxford 2010; W.P. Cross, R.S. Katz, *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*, Oxford 2013; G. Schumacher, N. Giger, *Who Leads the Party? On Membership Size, Selectorates and Party Oligarchy*, [in:] "Political Studies", 2017, nr 65 (1S), p. 162-181.

¹⁸ P. Webb, *The Modern British Party System*, London 2000; S. Scarrow, *Parties without Members? Party Organization in a Changing Electoral Environment*, [in:] Dalton R.J., Wattemberg M.P. (eds), *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Oxford 2002, p. 79-101; B. Wauters, *Democratizing Party Leadership Selection in Belgium: Motivations and Decision Makers*, [in:] "Political Studies", 2013, nr 62, p. 61-80.

¹⁹ Discussion on this subject is covered by A. Renwick and J-B. Pilet in the book *Faces on the Ballot. The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe*, Oxford 2016, p. 7.

that the leader's position in each and every political party is different. According to Angelo Panebianco (1988), party leaders differ in their degree of freedom of choice, meaning that in some parties leaders effectively determine for example: candidate selection, platform construction, goal formulation, whereas in others, the rank-and-file, mid-level activists, delegates to congress, or other potential veto players limit the degree of freedom of choice for the party leader²⁰. These discrepancies emerge first, from different statutory regulations, and informal conventions and practices within the parties, and second, from personal characteristics of the leader and situational context of his or her leadership. Among the formal, statutory regulations we find institutional prerogatives of the leader (who can hold the name of: party president, chairperson, first secretary, etc.) or customary rules of the party. Among the informal factors we find for example: the leaders' personality, charisma, or abilities. Taking into consideration and analysing both, formal and informal conditions, we can place the modern parties on the scale describing the strength of their leadership. At one end of the continuum we will find parties built around the leader's authority (leader-oriented parties), and at the other end parties with a high degree of depersonalised leadership, in which the role of the leader would be restricted only to coordinating the work of central party organs or representing the party outside.

Scale of the strength of party leadership

Public opinion usually does not have major problems with determining which party leader plays a significant role in politics. The citizens also usually know what the leader's position within particular political party is, though obviously their insight in this matter is limited. This type of common sense knowledge is based mainly on the media coverage of internal party affairs. Scientific analysis of the strength of the

²⁰ A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge 1988; G. Schumacher, N. Giger, *Who Leads the Party?* op. cit., p. 163.

political leadership poses a greater challenge because it requires an objective tool which takes into consideration the complexity of leader's power and position within the organization, and which allows comparisons between the parties. The scale of the leadership strength is such an instrument. The designed tool is based on two dimensions: institutional (legal) framework, and the party's internal practice, based on party's rituals, customs, traditions, and conventions. When analysing the leader's position within the party, we took into consideration these of their prerogatives that fulfil the three criteria: 1) they have to be vital, determinant of the superiority of the leader over other party organs; 2) have to be discretionary, expressing the authentic will of the leader; 3) have to be exercised by the leader in practice, not only written down in the statutes. Though columnists often allow themselves to comment on personalities of different politicians, imputing even to some character flaws, we intentionally eliminated the personality of the leader and situational factors from the scale because they are difficult to measure objectively. Character traits, because political scientists do not have sufficient tools to do so, and situational factors are too dependent on situation to be taken into consideration when designing such a scale. Of course we realise that psychological and situational factors are not indifferent if one wished to evaluate a particular leader in a given time, but a good research tool should be considerably simple and applicable in different contexts.

The scale is constructed on the basis of two sources. The first one is a legal source, by which we mean parties' constitutions. Some political scientists question the study of party statutes. For example Panebianco compared party statutes to the written constitutions of the states, saying that statutes do not describe party structures any better than constitutions describe political systems²¹. We, however,

²¹ A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, op. cit.

believe that parties' constitutions should be analyzed as *fundamental and indispensable guide to the character of a given party*²² from which a *normative vision of the party organization and function* can be read²³. The second source of data we used in constructing the scale of leadership strength is an analysis of political parties' practice. This kind of data can be obtained either by means of participatory observation of the party's internal life, for example during party meetings, congresses, conventions etc. (if the researcher gets access to such events), or by conducting in-depth interviews and surveys with party officials, activists, and other members. The scale we developed was tested on six Polish political parties: Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), Modern (N), the Polish People's Party (PSL), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Together Party (R).

The position of the leader in the party is analysed in four dimensions: 1) leader's prerogatives in the party organization; 2) role of the leader in the selection of electoral candidates and in approval of coalitions with other parties; 3) rules and practices of leader's election, and 4) role of the leader in parliament. Each dimension is composed of factors, and each factor is divided into three components which have their own values. The details are explained in Table 1. However, it does not mean that every analysed dimension is equally important in determining the strength of leadership. This is why, on the basis of literature and observations of party internal life and affairs that we have been doing for over a decade, we distinguished four necessary conditions the party has to fulfil in order to be described as having a strong leader. In our scale these necessary conditions get 4 points each to indicate their importance for the scale, while the rest of the parameters can reach maximum two points. The higher score the party gets, the stronger the party leader is. Nevertheless, these necessary conditions are not sufficient. So even if these four

²² R.S. Katz, P. Mair, (eds), *Party Organizations. A Data Handbook in Western Democracies 1960-90*, London-Newbury-New Delhi 1992, p. 7

²³ R. Smith, A. Gauja, *Understanding party constitutions as responses to specific challenges*, [in:] "Party Politics", 2010, nr 16 (6), p. 756.

indispensable requirements are fulfilled, but in other categories the party does not get any additional points, we do not describe the party leader as strong.

Table 1. Factors of the party leader's strength.

	Factor	Components and their values
1.	Position of the leader among other party organs	0 – leader as a coordinator of the party organs' work, but without decisive voice
		1 – mixed role of the leader, depending on the matter
		4 – leader is independent of other party organs in their main decisions
2.	Nominating the candidates to party organs, to his/her 'inner circle'* (with which the leader cooperates closely, as party boards or councils)	0 – members of other party organs propose candidates
		1 – leader propose candidates, but they have to be formally approved by other party organs
		2 – leader themselves chooses their closest co-workers (co-optation)
3.	Possibility of creating party units	0 – leader has no power in this respect
		1 – leader creates party units as a part of another party organ
		2 – leader creates party units themselves
4.	Influence on nominating leaders of lower organizational levels in the party	0 – regional/local structures choose their chairperson regionally/locally
		1 – leader can propose a chairperson on lower levels of party organizations, but this proposal must be approved by regional/local structures
		4 – leader can appoint a chairperson on lower levels of party organizations
5.	Leader as organ of appeal	0 – other party organ acts as the appeal commission
		1 – leader's decisions must be approved by other party organs
		2 – leader is the ultimate instance of appeal
6.	Final decisions on the electoral lists in national or European elections	0 – a collegial organ approves the lists
		1 – leader as part of another party organ approves the lists
		4 – leader in person and at their discretion sanctions the electoral lists
7.	Decisions on electoral or governmental coalitions	0 – made by party's organs
		1 – made by the leader as part of another party organ
		2 – made by the leader in person and at their discretion
8.	Means of electing the leader	0 – by Congress/Convention

	Factor	Components and their values
		1 – mixed way of electing the leader (e.g. different means of the election in different rounds of voting; the collegial organs have the right to decide on the selectorate)
		2 – by all party members
9.	Competitiveness of the last 3 leaders' elections ²⁴	0 – there were at least two candidates running and the elections were competitive (the second candidate got more than a third of the votes)
		1 – there are at least two candidates running, but the elections were not very competitive (the second candidate did not get a third of votes)
		4 – only one candidate runs for the office
10.	Role of the leader in parliament	0 – leader does not designate the caucus chairperson and does not have a decisive voice on the key issues in the caucus
		1 – leader designates the caucus chairperson, but does not have a decisive voice on the key issues in the caucus
		2 – leader becomes the caucus chairperson or has a decisive voice on the key issues in the caucus

Source: own elaboration.

* M. Duverger, *Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (3rd ed.). London 1969, p. 151.

The two leader's elections factors (8 and 9) require a further comment because the literature on that subject is ambiguous. We acknowledge in our scale that the leader's strength increases with the growing selectorate. The leader is stronger when elected directly by members or even members and party sympathizers (those who do not hold a 'party card') because this weakens the influence of the organized internal interest groups in the party (factions, middle level groups, etc.). However, because the literature is not conclusive in this aspect, we have not decided that

²⁴ In the "new" parties, in which there were fewer than 3 elections, we analyse all the elections there were; in the "old" parties, in which there were more elections, we take into consideration the last three elections in order to avoid the effect of situational factor. We realize that the data for new and old parties differs, and that the situational dimension can occur in "new" organizations, but this is the best we can do in this situation.

electing the leader by the broad selectorate is a necessary condition to consider him/her a strong leader. The second assumption is about the leader's election competitiveness. The more competitive they are, the weaker the leader's position is after the election. It is so because the elected leader has to unify the party and reconcile the factions supporting different competitors, including the main rival. This process is difficult and time-consuming. Its failure can lead to a split in the party, departure of well-known politicians, and potentially, in consequence, also to departure of some rank-and-files. This can further lead to decline in popular support, electoral defeat and change of the leader²⁵. Similar processes have already been observed in many political parties. So we consider the level of 'competitiveness of internal elections' indicator as vital (necessary condition) to the strength of party leadership.

When testing the tool in the Polish Peoples Party (PSL), we came to realize that even if the constitution of the party has a provision that at least two people have to compete for the leadership, the election not always must be competitive. For example in the 2016 leadership race in this party, the rival of the current leader prised his opponent instead of presenting his own program during the party congress. This situation shows explicitly that when the numbers are being assigned, one needs to take into consideration not only the statutory provisions of the party, but should also have some knowledge about the party internal practices. Otherwise the statutory regulations alone can give a delusory impression of the leader's actual position in the party and lead to a false conclusion. As a result, in the election of the PSL leader in 2016 the party got '2' points because the competitor of Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz was only a formal competitor.

In the scale we introduce the party can get from 0 to maximum 28 points. In order to consider a leader to be a strong one, four necessary conditions must be

²⁵ See more: M. Winclawska, *Unia Wolności. Partia polityczna w okresie transformacji*, Warszawa 2010, p. 33-37.

fulfilled (which already gives the party 16 points), and additionally at least four points must be gathered by the party from other components. It means that the leader of the party can be described as strong, when the party would collect about 2/3 of all the possible points in the scale. Table 2 presents results of the six Polish parties researched with our tool.

Table 2. Scale of the leadership strength in Polish political parties.

	Leader's powers	PiS	PO	N	SLD	PSL	R
1.	Position of the leader among other party organs	4	1	1	0	0	0
2.	Nominating the candidates to party organs, to his/her 'inner circle'	2	1	2	2	1	0
3.	Possibility of creating party units	1	1	0	0	0	0
4.	Influence on nominating leaders of lower organizational levels in the party	4	0	1	0	0	0
5.	Leader as organ of appeal	1	0	0	0	0	0
6.	Final decisions on the electoral lists in national or European elections	4	1	1	0	0	0
7.	Decisions on electoral or governmental coalitions	2	0	0	0	0	0
8.	Means of electing the leader	0	2	0	1	0	-
9.	Competitiveness of the last 3 leaders' elections ²⁶	4	3	2.5	1.3	1.7	-
10.	Role of the leader in parliament	2	1	1	1	2	-
	Sum	24	10	8.5	5.3	4.7	0

Source: Own research (participatory observations and IDIs) and constitutions of researched political parties.

Analysis of the scale shows that Law and Justice is the most personalized party in the Polish party system²⁷, which goes along with the public image of that organization. The party chairman has the widest range of competences in comparison

²⁶ Even though the values for this factor are a integral number, after dividing it by 3 (number of elections) the result can become a decimal.

²⁷ Similar conclusions were reached by Cristina Bucur and Iain McMenamin who in their article *Poland: The Presidentialization of Parties in a Young Democracy* wrote that despite favourable systemic factors for consolidating the leaders' position, this process can be only observed in Law and Justice (C. Bucur, I. McMenamin, *Poland: The Presidentialization of*

with the leaders of other researched parties. As in other parties, he conducts party affairs, but he also presides over the Political Council, the Political Committee, and has the major influence on the work of the parliamentary group (even if he is not formally its chairperson). Moreover, he can create and disband party organizational units, and appoint and dismiss their leaders. These powers demonstrate his supreme position and significance within the party²⁸. Law and Justice fulfils each and every necessary condition in the strong leadership scale.

The leaders of Civic Platform and Modern have less power in the parties than the chairman of Law and Justice, yet more than the leaders of the Polish People's Party and Democratic Left Alliance. The Civic Platform leader has wide authority, and directs and represents the party in public life. He presides over the National Board and the National Council, and may propose meetings of other bodies (e.g. the parliamentary group). What can be observed in this party is the great impact of informal factors on the leader's position. The influence of D. Tusk (2003-2014) on the party was much greater than the impact of his successors: acting leader E. Kopacz (2014-2016) and G. Schetyna (since 2016).

The leader of the Modern Party is not much weaker, at least when it comes to the formal regulations of the position. However, high competitiveness of the last leader's election weakened this position within the party. It is so because the new leader, Katarzyna Lubnauer, has to unite the party again around her and reconcile the factions supporting her opponent in the election, and the founder of the party, Ryszard Petru.

The Together Party does not have any one-person organs in its structure, and the highest executive organ, which is the National Council, is composed of 11 people, so it is impossible to assign the party any values in points 8 and 9. What is

Parties in a Young Democracy, [in:] Passarelli G. (ed.), *The Presidentialization of Political Parties: Organizations, Institutions and Leaders*, London 2015, p. 107-123).

²⁸ See: K. Sobolewska-Myślik, B. Kosowska-Gąstoł, P. Borowiec (eds), *Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries*, Kraków 2016, p. 321.

more, the Together Party has not crossed the threshold in any parliamentary elections so far, so also in point 10 we cannot assign any value to the party.

Party elite and the rank-and-files about the party leaders. Qualitative research results

The qualitative research data analysed in this paper comes from two sources. In the years of 2016 and 2017, our research team conducted 58 in-depth interviews with parties' elites (members of the central office, MPs and MEPs), and at the end of 2017 we conducted six focus groups interviews with the rank-and-files, one for each of the researched parties.

All interviewees from PiS – that is the party in which, according to our scale, the leader's position is the strongest – congruently underlined the advantages of one-person leadership. One of the MPs said: *there are no parties in Poland with full internal democracy. At least I do not know such parties. If the party is to have a consistent message, a strong leader must manage it, a leader whose position in the organization is firm. This person must influence the party and has to shape it. This was the situation in Civic Platform under Donald Tusk's leadership and still is in Law and Justice. Wise leader listens when there is time for discussion, chooses co-workers when there is time to choose them, and takes decisions when there is time to take them* (PiS1_2016). Our interlocutors from PiS prised the leader spontaneously whenever a question on party internal democracy mechanisms was raised. All of the interviewed MPs and members of the party central boards were paying tribute to the leader and his position in the party. For example: *In our party the president has got an ultimate authority. Of course there are elections for party's vice-chairmen, chairpersons in districts, but it is the leader who presents all the candidates. Theoretically the participants of the party congresses can also propose the candidates... But there are no expectations, not mention the pressure, for more internal democracy. It stems from the charisma our leader has. Simple as that* (PiS5_2017).

Another person, a MEP stated that *perceiving our party as autocracy is undeserved*, but he added immediately: *since we are in the state of constant siege, we need to be an efficient party. Thanks God there is the man who is in charge, who is on the ball* (PiS8_2017). Much less attention the party leader got in the focus group conducted in Law and Justice. The participants almost seemed to avoid the topic. Even when answering the questions who or what influences the party public image the most, they underlined the importance of the grassroots and the local leaders in this aspect.

The confidence in one-person leadership was presented rarely among the parliamentarians and the party elite of Civic Platform, and the interviewees seemed more to theorise on that matter than to describe the reality they know from the party. One of the MPs has admitted that it is easier to administer the party in an authoritarian manner because otherwise it resembles *driving a car with two people holding the steering wheel* (PO5_2017). But, as he hurried to explain what he meant by authority, it was: a strong, legitimised decision centre composed at most of two or three persons who take the key decisions, even if the collegial party organs are more numerous. The issue of authoritarian managing of the party came back in the following interview with a party MP. *Political parties which are managed in an authoritarian manner are more efficient in many cases because the process of decision making is simpler. Nevertheless, there are also many more chances to commit mistakes, and there is a risk of destroying vital intraparty democratic processes. Bare efficiency is not a value*, the person added (PO10_2017). Motive of the leader was present in the focus group interviews with the grassroots of Civic Platform. The respondents have claimed that the leader is responsible for the party image and gave the example of D. Tusk. In the opinion of one of the participants, *Tusk was good at troubleshooting, went wherever he had to go (...), knew how to behave, and was simply a mate, but at the same time he got charisma, and could be harsh and decisive*. At the same time the respondents underlined that their party works as if the

politics was a team sport, *in which the individuals are very important, however very rarely determine the score of the game. [In the party] we have many personalities, we have people whom we call leaders, however our current leader [Grzegorz Schetyna - A.P., M.W] is not the personality who would determine the result of the game. The game is played by the whole team.*

In interviews with MPs of the Modern Party, the situational context of the conversations was strongly present. The IDIs with the party elites were conducted at the time when its founder and first chairman was losing support among the members²⁹. As a consequence, the interlocutors were divided in assessing him. Among our respondents there were both his supporters who were saying that *there are a lot of personalities in our party and sometimes it is very difficult to pass something democratically. It happens that sometimes we ask Ryszard [the party leader - A.P., M.W] to make a decision because we cannot reach a conclusion. We are lucky to have him with his authority, him who holds us together, whom we trust. He proved many times that his decisions were the right ones* (N5_2017). The more critical parliamentarians were trying to put their criticism of the leader in a broader context of the party leadership in Polish political parties. For example, one of the interlocutors said that *a system of parties with authoritative leaders dominates, in such a system the members resemble believers, either genuine or fake. These kinds of parties are great mechanisms to breach people's moral rules, and to create opportunists. People are afraid that if they do not win a seat in parliament, it will be extremely difficult for them to get a regular job on the market. This fear is advantageous to parties with strong leaders. The person who is in Sejm does not have a place to go back to, so is totally dependent on the leader's will and becomes his/her pawn that can be freely moved around* (N4_2017).

²⁹ In the end he lost the leadership contest in the Modern Party in November 2017, when 48.5% of delegates supported him, and 51.5% supported his challenger.

In the "old" parties, the Polish People's Party and Democratic Left Alliance, for which the value on the strength of leadership scale is lower, the interlocutors did not devote much attention to the party leaders. One of the MPs from PSL said: *there is no more democratic party in Poland than the Polish People's Party. Is there a party in which the Congress chooses its leader but the National Board can remove them from office? (...). Our leader does not know the day or the hour, which from the point of view of internal democracy is a very positive phenomenon* (PSL4_2017). Another respondent underlined that the party is *not leader oriented. In Law and Justice everyone waits for Jarosław Kaczyński to make decisions. In the Polish People's Party we influence our leader to a great degree* (PSL6_2017).

Respondents from the focus groups from SLD have agreed that the party chairperson always has the largest impact on the party image. One of the interlocutors underlined that: *it is obvious in the leader-oriented parties, like Law and Justice. The leader there gives instructions and orders*, but others added that also in more *democratically led parties*, by which they meant their own organization, a strong and distinctive leader is like a magnet which attracts voters.

Also in the Together Party respondents did not pay much attention to the question of a party leader. One of the members of the National Board pointed out to advantages of collective, rather than one-person leadership. This person said *we are deeply convinced that the collegial model of decision taking saved us at least few times from foolish ideas, and several times allowed us to come up with good ones. Of course this is time-consuming. But democracy is time-consuming. Of course the army with an authoritarian commander is faster, yet the one in which collegial decisions are made is wiser. It is not like that in our party that nobody takes decisions alone, however, we stress on the key decisions to be taken collectively* (R3_2017). Another person has pointed out that the party has a substantial problem when co-operating with the media. The journalists usually would like to invite the same person from the party to represent it, the one who they identify as the leader. *But we*

as a party which underlines the rule of collective leadership cannot allow such situations. On the other hand, however, being stubborn in proposing another person from the party, we can end up with no representative of our party in the program (R2_2017). Members of the Together Party who participated in the focus group talked even less about party leadership than the representatives of the party elites. At the beginning of the interview they declared that this issue does not concern their party. They underlined the collegial character of party governance and team activities within the party – factors that, in their opinion, differentiate their party from other Polish political parties.

Conclusions

The analysis allows us to distinguish three types of parties according to the leadership strength. In organizations which stem from the communist times, these are the Polish People's Party and Democratic Left Alliance, both the formal and informal positions of the leader is the weakest. Transformations of these parties, allowing them to adapt to the democratic regimes, was based on the common legacy and ideology, and not on the leaders. Both of these organizations changed their leaders several times without any spectacular incidents. The changes were rather smooth and did not result in any secession, which indicates the high degree of institutionalization and depersonalization of the leader's position in these parties.

The second pattern, observable in Law and Justice, Civic Platform and Modern, is more "leader dependant", however the degree of this dependency is different in each of these organizations. All three of these parties were created by and around the politicians who soon became the main assets of their organizations and systematically were strengthening their positions within them. The leader of Law and Justice was most successful in this aspect, however, this is the only party from that group that has not gone through the leadership change yet. And learning from the examples of the remaining two in this group – Civic Platform and Modern,

where the leadership position was weaker in the party and the parties themselves seemed to have undergone the process of value infusion (Huntington 1965), and still most of the leadership changes resulted in greater or smaller secessions, the leadership change in Law and Justice, speaking cautiously, may be difficult.

The last type of the party is the model represented in our research by the Together Party. This group underlines its idea of collective leadership and has abandoned the concept of one-person organs. However, even this party could not avoid the phenomenon of personalization. The party's environment, the media and the public opinion in a way "chose themselves" the party leader. Adrian Zandberg, one of the national board's member, against the party's official position, became to be perceived as the leader, and the party is being often described as the "Zandberg's party".

Because our ambition was not only to explore the party leader's strength in the Polish political parties but also to offer a useful tool to assess the leadership strength in different parties and party systems, it is worth considering for what purposes the knowledge on the leadership strength in the party can be used. First of all, it is a tool to compare the strength of the leaders of political parties in a given party system, which was presented above. Second of all, the scale can be used in comparative analysis of the political parties from the same ideological family, either from the same party system or from different systems. Third of all, the leadership strength can be used as a variable to research other phenomena in political parties and in their environment. Assessing the leadership strength in chosen political parties can become a starting point in the research of: party institutionalization, its stability, building the party image, incentives of joining the party, media coverage of the party, or electoral behaviour. And this exemplary catalogue does not exhaust all the possibilities of using the scale.

Abstract

Personalization of party leadership is a key concept around which the narrative of this article is woven. We present a research tool that in an objective way allows comparisons between the positions of political leaders in their organizations. The factors constituting the leader's position were distinguished and on that basis a scale of the leadership strength was framed. Its applicability was tested on six Polish political parties which in the 2015 parliamentary elections crossed the threshold for receiving the public money. The research was done as a part of the grant "Political Parties and their Social Environment. An Analysis of the Organization and Communication Activities of Polish Political Parties" financed by the Polish National Science Centre.

PRZYWÓDZTWO W POLSKICH PARTIACH POLITYCZNYCH

Abstrakt

Artykuł analizuje kwestię personalizacji przywództwa w partiach politycznych i proponuje narzędzie badawcze, które w sposób zobiektywizowany pozwala porównywać pozycję liderów partyjnych wewnątrz ich organizacji. W tym celu zidentyfikowane zostały czynniki konstytuujące pozycję liderów i na ich podstawie skonstruowana została skala siły partyjnego przywództwa. Jej użyteczność przetestowano na przykładzie sześciu polskich partii politycznych, które w wyborach parlamentarnych w 2015 r. uzyskały poparcie wyborcze upoważniające je do otrzymywania subwencji budżetowej. Badanie zostało przeprowadzone w ramach grantu "Polskie partie polityczne w relacji z otoczeniem społecznym – analiza strategii organizacyjnych i komunikacyjnych" finansowanego przez Narodowe Centrum Nauki³⁰.

³⁰ Project "Political Parties and their Social Environment. An Analysis of the Organization and Communication Activities of Polish Political Parties" financed by the Polish National Science Centre (nr 2015/18/E/HS6/00763) conducted by: Anna Paczeński, Maria Winćławska, Barbara Brodzińska-Mirowska and Michał Jacuński.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Competitiveness of the leader's elections in Law and Justice.

Date	Supporters of the leader	Opponents of the leader	Leader
2001	100.00%	0.00%	Lech Kaczyński
2003	n/d	n/d	Jarosław Kaczyński
2006	98.48%	1.52%	Jarosław Kaczyński
2010	95.14%	4.86%	Jarosław Kaczyński
2013	97.50%	2.50%	Jarosław Kaczyński
2016	99.31%	0.68%	Jarosław Kaczyński

Since the beginning of Law and Justice, only one person run in each elections for the leadership. However, there were elections when he had some opponents who voted against his candidacy.

Appendix 2. Competitiveness of the leader's elections in Civic Platform.

Date	Supporters of the leader	Opponents of the leader	Leader
2001*	n/d	n/d	Maciej Płażyński
2003*	n/d	n/d	Donald Tusk
2007	n/d	n/d	Donald Tusk
2010	98.39%	1.26%	Donald Tusk
2013**	79.58%	20.42%	Donald Tusk
2016**	91.00%	9.00%	Grzegorz Schetyna

* the leader was chosen by the parliamentary caucus

** the leader was chosen by the rank-and-file

D. Tusk from 2003 till 2013 did not have any competitors in the party. However, in 2010 he had some opponents who voted against his candidacy.

Appendix 3. Competitiveness of the leader's elections in Modern.

Date	Supporters of the leader	Opponents of the leader	Leader
2015	100.00%	0.00%	Ryszard Petru
2017	51.56%	48.44%	Katarzyna Lubnauer

In 2015 elections Ryszard Petru was the only candidate.

Appendix 4. Competitiveness of the leader's elections in Democratic Left Alliance.

Date	Supporters of the leader	Opponents of the leader	Leader
2003	80.43%	19.57%	Leszek Miller
2004	55.88%	44.12%	Józef Oleksy
2008	52.38%	47.62%	Grzegorz Napieralski
2012*	92.00%	7.8%	Leszek Miller
2016**	58.39%	41.61%	Włodzimierz Czarzasty

* all members had the right to vote in electing the leader

** in the first round of the election all members had the right to vote, in the second – only the congressional delegates voted

Appendix 5. Competitiveness of the leader's elections in the Polish People's Party.

Date	Supporters of the leader	Opponents of the leader	Leader
2000	n/d	n/d	Jarosław Kalinowski
2004	55.60%	44.40%	Janusz Wojciechowski
2005*	80.00%	20.00%	Waldemar Pawlak
2008	83.37%	16.63%	Waldemar Pawlak
2012	50.79%	49.21%	Janusz Piechociński
2016	95.25%	4.75%	Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz

* National Board chose the new chairman because the outgoing leader was called off before the end of the term.

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PO5_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of Civic Platform, 18 October 2016.

PO10_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of Civic Platform, 17 February 2017.

N4_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of Modern, 6 April 2017.

N6_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of Modern, 10 February 2017.

PSL4_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of the Polish People's Party, 3 April 2017.

PSL6_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of the Polish People's Party, 12 May 2017.

R2_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of the Together Party, 17 February 2017.

R3_2017 – in-depth interview with a member of the Together Party, 16 March 2017.

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Tamże, s. 73.

¹ M. Cichosz, *Transformacja demokratyczna – przyczyny, przebieg i efekty procesu*, [w:] A. Antoszewski (red.), *Systemy polityczne Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, Wrocław 2006, s. 52.

¹ J. Baszkiewicz, *Powszechna historia...*, s. 155.

¹ T. Kowalski, *Formy i przesłanki obecności kapitału zagranicznego w mediach drukowanych*, „Zeszyty Prasoznawcze” 1998, Nr 1-2, s. 37.

¹ M. Górak, *Cyfrowa prasa: chwilowa moda czy przyszłość*,
<http://internetstandard.pl/artykuly/45301.html>, 6.12.2004.

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